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Abstract
Performing El-Rap El-ʿArabi 2005-2015: Feeling Politics Amid Neoliberal Incursions In
Ramallah, Amman, And Beirut
by
Rayya El Zein
Advisor: Professor Maurya Wickstrom
This study is about politics in Arabic rap. Specifically, it is about affective
dynamics and material negotiations during rap concerts in three cities in the Levant. I
analyze Arab hip hop culture in the context of three different but related histories of
cosmopolitan, middle class growth, and gentrification. Using an ethnomusicological
framework rooted in participant observation and performance theory, I compare concert
conditions, audience behavior, and accessibility of music production in Ramallah,
Amman, and Beirut.
In Chapter One, I elaborate the discursive and theoretical frameworks that have
pinned the political valences of Arab youth, Arab artists, and Arab rappers in particular
into representations of “resistance.” A confluence of energies I call “neoliberal
orientalism” drives the recent, widespread attribution of “resistance” to Arab youth and
cultural production, especially rap and hip hop in the aftermath of local protests over the
past decade. As an alternative, in Chapter Two I propose tracing the emergence of what I
call political feeling when the music is performed live. In this chapter, I argue that tarab
can be built and does emerge in contemporary Arabic rap. Based on this proposal, I build
an ethnographic model for analyzing this subcultural music production that is attentive to
the holding in tension of political feelings as politics in process. This is one answer to the
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question: how can we talk about politics in cultural production without talking about
resistance?
Chapters Three, Four, and Five are case studies centered on concerts in Ramallah,
occupied Palestine; Amman, Jordan; and Beirut, Lebanon, respectively. They apply the
theoretical frameworks built in the first two chapters in each context. In all three cities, I
locate the overwhelming majority of hip hop concerts within the provenance of
increasingly cosmopolitan middle class culture. Tracking how neoliberal urban changes
like gentrification affect concert venues and programming, I consider how material
realities influence the choices that rappers and their fans make. This puts musicians and
audiences in the material context of the political concerns they relate without assuming
their work is “resistance” to them.
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which follows the guide of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies but leaves
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common French transliteration pattern “ou” to differentiate from the sound of the plain
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transliterated as Mohammed al-Maghout, not Mohammed al-Maghut. Except in the
prepositions fi and bi, the long $ is for the most part rendered “ee.”
The rest of my adjustments reflect the phonetics of the colloquial in question and
local spellings for commonly transliterated words and names. The letter % appears as “g”
in the name of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, following the Egyptian colloquial adopted in this
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common transliteration used in Lebanon of “Gemmayzeh” and in Gaafar Touffar’s stage
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the time, % is transliterated as “j.” I retained the qaf, even if it was not aspirated. I
reflected the elision of some letters in definite article constructions, so as-siyaseh, not alsiyaseh. The & I rendered ah or eh, reflecting pronunciation. Al and el are used
interchangeably for the article ['(].
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The letter ) I have transliterated as [ʿ] with the exception of the musicians that
have already romanized their names by using the number “3,” as is common on social
media. El Far3i, Morabba3, Bil3ax, and Mashrou3 Leila follow this transliteration
pattern. Readers should infer the Arabic letter ʿain, not the English number three.
Similarly, the Lebanese protest movement “You Stink” is transliterated as “Tol3et
Ri7etkom,” following the additional substitution of the number seven for the letter ha [*].
Commonly transliterated words are rendered without the [ʿ], as in “Amman” and
“Abdullah.” Finally, when musicians transliterate their own names without an additional
marker for the letter ʿain (as in Asifeh and Shua), I followed their preferences. When
musicians include an apostrophe [‘], I used the [ʿ], as in Muqataʿa and Sheʿrab.
When lyrics were provided by the artists I did not change or adjust the texts.
When I transcribed lyrics myself or included transliterated excerpts from interviews, I
reproduced the dialect heard in the recording. Which is to say, I made no attempt to make
spoken or written Arabic conform to MSA. In notes and bibliographic entries, titles of
songs and video clips given in Arabic are in italics. When the title is given in romanized
script, it is not italicized. Full-length translations are collaborations with the artists,
whereas excerpted lines of tracks are my own translation, unless otherwise noted.
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Introduction
“Politics Pulls at Me”
Overview

This study is about politics in Arabic rap that are manifest in the affective
dynamics and material negotiations during rap concerts. I analyze Arab hip hop culture in
the context of three different but related histories of urban, cosmopolitan, middle class
growth, and gentrification. In this dissertation, I build an ethnomusicological framework
rooted in participant observation and performance theory in order to compare concert
conditions, audience behavior, and accessibility of music production in Ramallah,
Amman, and Beirut.
The introduction that follows sketches the general terrain within which I consider
the theoretical and ethnographic research that follows to operate. Research questions
guide my use of feeling as a theoretical tool in the study of cultural production. In asking
these, I begin to situate how I use “feeling” – both as a noun (a specific affect engendered
by specific pieces or by particular live concerts) and as a verb (a process of sensation,
used to discern what I call politics in process). In the first section, I identify the
theoreticians of affect and cultural studies with whom I consider myself in dialogue in
proposing this approach to rap performances in the Arab world.
I also contextualize my pursuit of “politics” in a study of Arab cultural
production. In the second section, I outline some of the stakes of locating the “political”
in both Arabic and English language studies. This traces the emphasis on “modernity” as
well as “politics” in Arab cultural production while also acknowledging the geo-political
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atmosphere in which most English language research on the Middle East has taken place.
I conclude this introduction with brief outlines of each of the five chapters that follow.

Part One: Affective Research

I try to ignore it/ but politics she pulls at me/ I tell her, let go,
I’m not interested!/ She tells me, I am part of your life, you
won’t be able to resist me.
~The Ramallah Underground1
A 2008 recording by the Ramallah Underground, “From the Cave” [“Min il
kaheff”] closes with a refrain that prefigures an internal monologue between the speaker
and a woman, “Politics.” Stormtrap raps, “I try to pay no heed, but Politics, she draws me
back. I tell her, ‘Let go of me! I am not interested.’ She responds, ‘I am a part of your
life, you won’t be able to resist me.’” Others have identified this refrain as indicative of
political ambivalence. For example, while arguing for the need to trouble the “resistance”
attributed to Palestinian rappers, Ted Swedenburg suggests that this refrain
communicates ambivalence about the artists’ political convictions (which they spend the
preceding verses laying out) or even a certain “regret” about the conditions in which they

1

“Ramallah Underground – ‘Min il Kaheff,’” YouTube video clip, 4:20, posted by “Unkown Solider of the
Sick Side Army,” July 21, 2009, accessed January 10, 2014,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7EtoUO9V-c. For a complete translation of the entire track, see
Loubna Bilali and the Ramallah Underground, “Min el Kaheff,” in “Exploring Popular Literature: Arabic
Hip Hop,” ed. Rayya El Zein, Shahadat Spring (2012): 10-15.
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live (wouldn’t it be easier to be a musician somewhere else?). 2 Somewhat differently, I
suggest it is a particularly excellent example of the capacity of this musical genre to
conduct very powerful political feeling.
This need not construct a framework for a binary interpretation of this refrain or
others – a debate about whether or not it is political. Rather, I want to point to different
ways that politics may be located, felt, and understood via the emotions and sensations
aroused by interacting with this content. Ramallah Underground’s refrain frames the
emotional pull that is present in political deliberation. It spins and inverts the Palestinian
proverb “Politics runs in our blood,”3 instead illustrating a political process that does not
champion (a) specific political objective(s). In doing so, it calls for the recognition of a
feeling or emotional experience that can have a powerful affect on the listener.
I remember that I was in public the first time I heard “Min il Kaheff” and I could
not stop myself from crying. The recognition and voiced articulation of an internal debate
over political engagement was both comforting and devastating. At other moments,
different verses in this piece elicited other strong emotional or physical reactions –
elation, clenching my fists, grinding my teeth, the urge to shout, the need to be alone, the
desire to be with others. Conversations with other fans and performers of the genre
suggest this personal experience is not unique to me or to this track. Others relate similar
private experiences with other pieces of Arabic rap, and artists recount the impact of
more public displays of these feelings during live performances. This process of
2

Swedenburg’s chapter has been influential in spurring many of the questions that I pursue in this project.
Ted Swedenburg, “Against the Struggle Paradigm,” in Popular Culture in the Middle East and North
Africa: A Post-Colonial Outlook, eds. Mounira Solimon and Walid El Hamamsy (New York: Routledge,
2013), 17-32.
3

Qtd. in Helga Tawil-Souri, “The Necessary Politics of Palestinian Cultural Studies,” in Arab Cultural
Studies: Mapping the Field, ed. Tarik Sabry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 137.
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interacting with the material is not only affective but productively political, not
withstanding the fact that, like the refrain quoted above, the lyrics do not always clearly
articulate a specific political project.
The experience interacting with this track in recording and others during live
concerts drives in part the theoretical approach to ethnographic research I have pursued in
this dissertation. The feeling generated listening to tracks like Ramallah Underground’s
“Min el Kaheff” I call political feeling. These are instances of “emotional blending”
generated by the various sonic elements in a recording – the samples, the beat, and the
lyrical content – together with elements of performance – the tone of the rapper’s voice,
and (in live performance) the gestures that accompany the verbal “spitting” of lyrics.
These, as in the example I have offered here, evoke what the eighteenth-century scholar
Murtada al-Zabidi called “the stirring of both joy and sorrow in the listener.”4 Al-Zabidi
called this tarab – an ethnomusicological term with considerable history in Arab musical
performance, religious recitation, and spiritual contexts. Tarab may seem alien to the
technological “modernity” of hip hop and rap musical production, or the “post-modern”
hybridization that rap in Arabic seems to embody.5 My proposition that tarab may exist
in some Arabic rap concerts is the subject of a lengthy exploration in Chapter Two:

4

Qtd. in Lois Ibsen al Faruqi, An Annotated Glossary of Arabic Musical Terms (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1981), 350.
5

I am leaning here on the relationship of modernity to the use of technology that Tarik Sabry describes in
Cultural Encounters in the Arab World: On Media, the Modern, and the Everyday (London: I.B. Tauris,
2010), 19, and note 10, 196; and on Timothy Taylor and Simon Frith’s discussions of hybridity in so-called
“World Music” since the mid 1980s. (See Timothy Taylor, “Some Versions of Difference: Discourses of
Hybridity in Transnational Musics,” in Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World [Durham: Duke
UP, 2007], Kindle edition; and Simon Frith, “The Discourse of World Music,” in Western Music and its
Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music, ed. Georgina Born and David
Hesmondhalgh [Berkeley: U of California P, 2000], 305-322.)
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Feeling Politics.6 Before we consider this proposal in more detail in that chapter, I
identify here the trajectory of affective research which has led me to it.

Political feeling

“A mysterious force that everyone feels and no philosopher has explained… a
force, not a labor… that surges up from the soles of the feet.”7 This is how Frederico
García Lorca described the duende, the “dark sounds” that he argued reverberate with
anarchic energy in Andalusian music and Spanish poetry. Ethnomusicologist A.J. Racy
compares the duende with tarab. Both duende and tarab are concepts that speak to
emotional engagement with embodied or vocalized creative expression (music, poetry,
and dance) and have been analyzed in various musical and poetic contexts. One of the
interesting intersections between duende and tarab is philosophers’ hesitancy to define
them as a single emotion, sensation, or feeling.8 As such, the historical debates around
tarab and duende are examples of the attempt to theorize affects generated by
6

I acknowledge that the enthomusicological literature on music and trance is extensive, a review of which I
return to in abbreviated form in Chapter Two (see for example, Gilbert Rouget, Music and Trance: A
Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985]; Judith Becker,
Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion, and Trancing [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004]; and David Aldridge and
Jörg Fachner, eds., Music and Altered States: Consciousness, Transcendence, Therapy, and Addictions
[London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2005]). I single out duende and tarab of many other terms that refer
to heightened emotion in different musical practices around the world because of the political resonances
Lorca ascribed to the duende and the long and engaged history of traditional Arabic music and classical
poetry and its attention to the arousal of an emotional state. As my analysis will make clear, it is less the
loss of consciousness typically discussed in the arousal of “trance” that I am interested in analyzing here
than how the rational processes of interpreting political ideas that are communicated as emotions or
consumed as pleasurable bodily sensations.
7

Frederico García Lorca, “Theory and Play of the Duende,” trans. A.S. Kline, accessed January 10, 2014,
http://www.poetryintranslation.com/klineaslorcaduende.htm.
8

For a concise summation of this debate around tarab see A.J. Racy, Making Music in the Arab World:
The Culture and Artistry of Tarab (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 198-208.
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performance. Tarab is frequently described as a mix of melancholy and elation.9 Lorca
says the duende brings “totally new and fresh sensations” and “never repeats itself.”10
Racy suggests both terms try to explain an affective “transformative blending,” where
“new blends that are no longer identifiable in terms of their inner, mostly emotional,
ingredients, or are no longer emotional in the familiar sense.”11 In other words, tarab and
duende describe an affective process that plays with emotion and transforms it into
something else.
But what something else? The curiosity that attempts to track the evasiveness of
this content drives an interdisciplinary approach in my research and is influenced by the
so-called “affective turn” in critical thought.12 Borrowing from Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari’s explorations of the machinic body and built off the philosophical work of
Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, the critical concept of “affect” explores the
“straddling,” as Michael Hardt has put it, of the long-held, cleanly segregated categories
of mind and body, reason and emotion. 13 Constructed as opposite ends of unbridgeable
poles in the Cartesian philosophical tradition, the harkening back to Spinoza has been
used to open up critical thinking to an investigation of the subject as an open, as opposed

9

Ibid., 205.
Lorca, “Theory and Play,” 19.

10
11

Racy, Making Music in the Arab World, 203.

12

Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham: Duke
UP, 2007), 1-33.
13
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Michael Hardt, “What Affects are Good For,” in ibid., xi.
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to closed, system.14 The philosophical as well as political aspects of this trajectory of
thought as productive in how I conceive of the theoretical constructs in my project.
“Emotion,” “feeling,” and “sensation” are almost used interchangeably in this
literature. “Emotions” typically refer to a state of mind or a mood, often involving a
physical reaction or state (shaking, tears, etc), or a particularly intense feeling. “Feeling”
is frequently associated, as Teresa Brennan notes, with “sensations that have found the
right match in words”: love, shame, or anger, for example.15 “Sensation,” in turn, is
sometimes used to describe physical manifestations of those feelings: the light step in
love, the heavy heart in shame, or the hot head in anger. It is in particular the definitions
of “sensation” that I find particularly evocative in these studies – what Brian Massumi
describes, following Leibniz, as the “perception of perception.”16 Teresa Brennan
deepens an understanding of this awareness of feelings, emotions, and affects by
developing the concept of “discernment” – “a process whereby affects pass from the state
of sensory registration to a state of cognitive or intelligent reflection.”17 My attention to
feeling politics builds upon Brennan’s and Massumi’s work, furthering their elaborations
of “sensation” and “discernment” with the formulation of my own theoretical concept
that calls attention to the ways that certain affects are felt and discussed in cultural

14

In addition, the so-called “affective turn” has elaborated discussions of power and ideology. This analysis
combines Marxist critique with Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian analyses of control. Feminist studies’
theoretical focus on the body and queer studies’ theoretical emphasis on emotion are clear precursors of
this aspect of the “affective turn.”
15

Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 5.

16

Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke UP, 2002), 14 and
note 11, 258.
17
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Brennan, Transmission of Affect, 120.
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production.18 I suggest theorizing affective engagements (the experiences of tarab or
duende) as political processes in order to unsettle, and offer alternatives to, dominant
models of locating “politics” in cultural production. Doing so pushes discussions of
political agency in cultural production as well as theorizations of the transmission of
affect in live performance in new directions.
In other words, the presence of a political feeling is important. In the case studies
that follow, I identify feelings of disgust, resignation, ambivalence, caution, and others in
the concerts and recordings of the artists I study. But I also suggest that the awareness or
sensing of this feeling are equally important in that it points us to politics in process.
Analyzing these political feelings by feeling politics is an ethnographic method that
factors the material realities of urban change and contextualizes concerts and concert
venues within them. As I elaborate in more detail in Chapter Two, feeling politics is an
ethnographic procedure to discern, analyze, and understand political feeling, or affective
content. Pointing to politics in process, feeling politics borrows from Raymond William’s
formulations of “emergent” and “pre-emergent” forms while it is in dialogue with other
affectively grounded approaches to music and poetry in the Arab world.19

18

Brennan, Transmission of Affect; Massumi, Parables of the Virtual. I also lean on Sara Ahmed’s efforts
to pay attention to how emotion and affect are implicated in the rational assessments of politics. (Ahmed,
The Cultural Politics of Emotion [New York: Routledge, 2004].)
19
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Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), 124-126.
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Feeling politics

In excavating the political feelings generated by some Arabic rap, I position the
experiences of listening to and performing this creative content as tantamount. That is,
my study of the development of politics in Arabic rap is an analysis of the processes of
cultural production – as opposed to a more traditional analysis of cultural products as
political artifacts. In contrast to much contemporary scholarship on the so-called “Arab
Spring” that celebrates in rap lyrics, graffiti tags, and other products of youth culture the
sudden appearance of new politics, my research instead analyzes how the practices of
some of these creative expressions contribute to the development of other politics. That is
to say, I am less interested in the presentation of works of art, within which it is possible
to read symbolic or literal politics (what Williams called the “fixed, finite, receding
forms”) than in the political experiences of audiences and performers when they engage
with each other under the context of this genre of cultural production.20
In this, my approach finds productive traction with William’s location of the
“active and pressing but not yet fully articulated” that he frames as “structures of
feeling.”21 In this research, paying attention to politics in process is not pinning lyrical or
performative work in some Arabic rap to a specific correlate in political action or
political efficacy. Rather, it testifies to the particular textures of deliberation, negotiation,
and hesitating that rarely are accompanied with spectacular political action. I explore
political action and visibility as politics in Chapter One: Locating Politics. My theoretical

20

Ibid., 129.

21

Ibid., 126.
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engagement in that chapter is related to my conceptualization of agency in the listening
behavior of rap audiences.
Studies of performance have recently identified the limitation that expectations to
overcome spectator passivity have placed on determining a piece’s political
effectiveness.22 An emphasis on the affective experiences during performances of Arabic
rap allows me to consider the dynamics between spectators, and between spectators and
performers, without reducing these interactions to readings of their “passivity” or
“activity.” This follows Jacques Rancière’s encouragement that
Everywhere there are starting points, intersections and junctions that
enable us to learn something new if we refuse, firstly, radical distance,
secondly the distribution of roles, and thirdly the boundaries between
territories. We do not have to transform spectators into actors… we have
to recognize the knowledge at work… in the activity peculiar to the
spectator.23
Focusing on affective exchanges in live performances of Arabic rap thus allows me to
consider the generative politics present as not confined to the genius of the art product
(the lyrical rap), the person of the performer, or the radical action of the spectator taken
as a result.
My attention to affect in the experiences of performers and fans also differentiates
the study that follows from literature on subcultures or “scenes” that emphasize the
transgressive power of “resistance” in the execution of individual style. My own
approach diverges from this dominant model in subculture studies (I will return to this
22

See for example, Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (New
York: Verso, 2012), 37-38; and Maurya Wickstrom, Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism:
Thinking the Political Anew (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 102-103. Both authors refer to
Jacques Rancière’s analysis of “the paradox of the spectator” in The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory
Elliott (New York: Verso, 2009), 2-23.
23

!

Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 17.
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below). However, unlike the “post-subcultures” critiques that reify (intersectional or
inter-subcultural) identity,24 I lean on Jasbir Puar’s work on queerness as “assemblage” as
a way to reassess performances of agency. Puar’s postulation of assemblage as a way to
“underscore feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information” in the construction of
“self” and “other”25 (and the blurring of the boundaries between them) is useful in the
theorization of the affective experiences of audiences and performers that I offer in this
dissertation. I suggest understanding politics in Arabic rap not through the representations
of resistance through style, or agents’ performances of visible political positionings, but
in an analysis of emotional excess produced in live performance.
In the development of this affective model I am influenced by the pioneering
work of several scholars who have built in the theorization of cultural production in the
Arab world invigorated models for the location and assessment of politics. The attention
to affect in Tarek El-Ariss, Charles Hirschkind, and Marc Schade Poulsen’s studies of
Arab literatures, listening cultures, and music respectively have proved inspirational to
this project. El-Ariss’s development of the notion of “hacking” as a strategy of modern
living, Hirschkind’s respect, in advocating for listening as political practice, for what he
calls “visceral modes of appraisal,” and Schade-Poulsen’s explorations of not only what
“people have done [to rai music, but]… what it does to people” have been for me

24

See especially David Muggleton, Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style (New York:
Oxford, 2000); David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl, eds., The Post-Subcultures Reader (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2004); Andy Bennett and Keth Kahn-Harris, eds., After Subculture: Critical
Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
25
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Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke UP, 2007), 215.
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examples of inventive and curiosity-driven ways to invent terminology that gropes for the
something else felt in cultural production.26
The model that I propose in this research proposes paying particular attention to
the ways in which performances produce affect. That is, I focus on how performances of
Arabic rap affect bodies and the interactions between them and point to the generative
“inbetween-ness” between bodies and consciousnesses that Spinoza considered emotion
and affect to be capable of defining.27 Focusing on affect, on the ability to affect and be
affected, is central in the philosophical recalibration of the subject as an open system.
Beyond the capacities of a single body or the symbolic actions of a collective,
considering affect encourages the recognition of the significance of a prescriptive grid or
force-field within which a single body may be found. Massumi suggests “adding
movement to stasis is about as easy as multiplying a number by zero and getting a
positive product.”28 The likelihood, in other words, of cultural production to rouse
audiences from apathetic slumber and direct them into political action is improbable.
Locating the ability of Arabic rap to conduct political feeling instead asks how
performance can be understood to be involved in the disintegration of this prescriptive
grid, leaving bodies and relationships aware of each other in different ways. What would
a youth politics that was not “resistance” look like in Palestine or in Lebanon? Can such a

26

Tarek El-Ariss, Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political (New York: Fordham
UP, 2013); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics
(New York: Columbia UP, 2006); Marc Schade-Poulsen, Men and Popular Music in Algeria: The Social
Significance of Rai (Austin: U of Texas P, 1999), 13.
27

Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (Stillwell, KS: Digireads Publishing, 2008).

28
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thing be conceived of? And if not why? What might forcing the question do to a
conceptualization of “politics” in the Arab world?
Before moving on to elaborate further what these “politics” may look like, two
general research questions further guide what I consider the significance of this affective
approach to the research that follows. Moving into the next section of this Introduction,
which considers an overview of politics in Arab cultural production, I elaborate how a
theoretical emphasis on the recognition of emotion and feeling in live performances of
Arabic rap and hip hop can be put to the service of understanding political production in
this genre. I begin by asking: how is political feeling is located?
This question underlines a very basic distinction. It points to the critical difference
between studying the process of the appearance of a political feeling and studying
political feeling tout court. This distinction is important in how I see the politics of my
own research functioning. That “some” groups seem to possess greater or lesser degrees
of emotion is a cultural conundrum that Sara Ahmed has addressed while emphasizing
what emotion does. In the study that follows, I too am reflecting on the processes of
sensing emotions, as opposed to the simpler admission or location of their presence.29
This is important in a study of Arab youth culture where agents are already assumed to be
more political or more emotional (susceptible to affect) than agents elsewhere.30 In
chapter one I elaborate in further detail how histories of representing the “authentic” and
29

Sara Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion.

30

In his recent study on “authenticity” in Syrian music, for example, Jonathan Shannon argues that a
comprehension of Syrian modernity is incomplete without understanding the “Oriental spirit” and the
enhanced emotionality it provides Syrian subjects: “Indeed, emotion if not emotionality is in many ways
the centerpiece of the aesthetics and kinesthetics of musical and other modes of performance in Syria, and
this accounts for the centrality of sentiment in what I am arguing are the outlines of a Syrian alternative
modernity” (Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria
[Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2006], 17).
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the “exotic” play into interpretations of Arabic rap in the neoliberal global media and I
explore how trajectories of Orientalism may apply to the relatively recent attribution of
“political” and “resistant” as positive qualifiers to Arab youth.
In asking how political affect is located, I can thus ask more specifically: what are
the implicit presumptions when one declares, in positive terms, that Arab rappers
“resist”? What is so immediately laudable about an Arab youth who raps, yet so easily
dismissible (as commercialized, violent, misogynist, among others) about a black or
Latin@ youth who engages in the same type of performance? These questions point to
the need to understand what is happening when certain cultural agents are identified “as”
political. What is the Arab rapper presumed to be resisting and how? Asking these
questions leads me to wonder if the framework of laudable “resistance” applied to Arab
artists has the potential to alter or even mollify pointed criticisms and productive affects
they offer in their work. Further: how does it affect how one may read critical differences
between performers? These questions stem from asking how political affect is located.
The second general question that frames my approach to affective research is:
how are politics recognized in specific cultural production? This is similar to but
distinguishable from the first question in that while the former asks how politics come to
be associated with specific players (in this case, Arab youth), the latter asks how politics
are recognized in specific genres (namely rap and hip hop). I wonder, for example: why
has electronic music in Beirut not garnered the political attention that rap has – despite
being performed at many of the same venues, relying on the creativity of many of the
same producers, and attracting similar audiences? Asking this question recognizes that
political feeling is incrementally developed during live performances via specific
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strategies. It does not just exist, but is built, communicated, and shared through specific
experiences.
In this research, localizing Arabic rap aesthetically helps to address this question.
I acknowledge that rap builds and borrows from other international as well as local art
and music cultures and has expanded beyond the traditionally identified originators of hip
hop’s beginnings in the Bronx. Electronic and experimental music, traditions of Arabic
poetry, more “commercial” hip hop sounds form the corpus of influence of contemporary
Arabic rap. I place particular emphasis on embodied practices during live performances
and the shared and different qualitative affects in Arabic rap and its neighboring
performance genres. I elaborate in particular the affective choreography of live rap
performances. This is not an analysis of break dancing sometimes associated with hip hop
culture, but rather an attempt to locate the gestures by which political feeling is made
manifest. By paying attention to gestures and to a wide range of influences, I recalibrate a
definition of hip hop or rap “culture”31 in each of the cities studied here. In so doing, I
construct an alternative framework for understanding some contemporary Arabic rap as
political activity, one that is particularly attune to corporeal practices and techniques and
habits of reception.
How is political feeling located? and how are politics affiliated with certain forms
of expression? are questions to which I have returned over the course of this study, when
attempting to shake out the particularities of the political feelings I describe. Having
31

“Hip hop culture” refers to the intersecting energy made manifest in lyrical raps, beat boxing, graffiti,
and break dancing. See, among others: Jeff Chang, Can’t Stop Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop
Generation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005); Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal, eds., That’s
the Joint! The Hip Hop Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2004); H. Samy Alim, Awad Ibrahim,
Alastair Pennycook, eds. Global Linguistic Flows: Hip Hop Cultures, Youth Identities, and the Politics of
Language (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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elaborated an initial field of theory within which this study is situated, I now move to
sketch another. The question of politics has been a regular concern of cultural theorists
writing about the Arab world. In the next section I consider the different but connected
Arab and Anglophone intellectual contexts which illustrate the stakes surrounding the
near constant assessment of “politics” in Arab cultural studies.

Part Two: Politics in Arab Cultural Studies

Debates about modernity – how to enter it, how to re-invent it, and what it may
mean in the Arab world – have been central currents in Arab thought since the Nahda.32
Recent analysis has argued that this preoccupation with modernity is a product of –
sometimes directly responding to, sometimes indirectly influenced by – global
configurations of power in which the Arab world has frequently found itself at the
contested center. Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ suggests “…[I]t is quite impossible and indeed
unrealistic to grasp the social and intellectual dynamics of the modern Arab world in
isolation from other world factors.”33 These factors have consisted of the struggles to
overthrow imperial occupations; fights against continued colonial presences even after
the evacuation of those imperial powers; contests over local control of resources in postcolonial contexts; struggles against poverty, corruption, and weak states; or against
nepotism, cronyism, and authoritarian states (frequently propped up by neocolonial
32

Nahda, literally “awakening,” describes the cultural and intellectual renaissance that spread across the
Arab world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
33
Ibrahim Abu- Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History
(London: Pluto Press, 2004), 3.
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presences).34 The debates over Arab modernity have been waged by political, cultural,
sociological, economic, and religious players in intellectual, state, and popular
discourses. Here I want to look at what debates over and about modernity in analyses of
cultural production signal in the ways Arab intellectuals have located the political
possibility in literature, theatre, music, and other cultural production.
Tarik Sabry suggests the preoccupation with “modernity” among Arab
intellectuals has effectively delimited interest in non-literary or more everyday cultural
production.35 “Dominant discourses in contemporary Arab thought,” he argues “are more
concerned with structuring and orchestrating narratives of becoming than with the kind of
being they are anxious to deliver from wretchedness and ahistoricity.”36 In so doing,
seemingly “non modern” practices and habits that do not fit this narrative are necessarily
sidelined and ignored. At the same time, Arab scholars have found in the poetry of Nizar
Qabbani and Adonis, tarab musical culture, turath folklore, and the politico-religious
discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood, among others, the seeds or the tools for a
homegrown resistance against a stronger, usually Western, increasingly USonian,
opponent.37 In these analyses, Arab intellectuals have found essential traits of Arab

34

For a more detailed overview, see Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in
Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 2.
35

Indeed, as Sinan Antoon, Boaz Shoshan, and others have suggested, the sidelining of an entire history of
more popular literature for centuries can be understood in this light. See Antoon, The Poetics of the
Obscene in Premodern Arabic Poetry: Ibn al-Hajjaj and Sukhf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and
Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993).
36

Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 23-42.
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The configuration of power that asserts itself across the Arab world today is no doubt international.
However, the central role and the uncontested power of the US, especially perhaps in the context of the USled invasion of Iraq, has led many scholars to identify US power and culture identify in particular as a
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culture and identity in particular forms or cultural products. As such, they are hailed as
powerful tools with which to counter the cultural effects of globalization and
neocolonialism.38 These studies quickly attain pointed and powerful political
significance, specifically because they frequently adopt established political narratives.
As Sabry explains:
Due to the external threats from Western imperialism and Zionism, it was,
and still is, much more fashionable for Arab intellectuals to contextualize
their work on ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ within frames of nationalistic, panArab and pan-Islamist discourses… Attempts to de-essentialize Arab
‘culture’ and ‘identity’ have also been equated with treason, abandonment
of the Palestinian question and the pan-Arab project.39
Often within the context of a debate about modernity, the contemporary analysis of Arab
culture in Arabic has been frequently conceived of as a specific kind of political project:
where culture is a tool with which to, or which reveals the means to, counter US-Western
hegemony.40
Despite a chasm that has long separated Arab and US/European intellectuals, and
very different institutional structures,41 it is significant that scholars writing in other
languages also identify “what modernity is” for the Arab subject as a major concern in
economic/political critiques. (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab
Intellectual History, 5, see also note 21, 376).
38

See Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History, 57; and
Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique, 3.
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Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 48.
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To encourage the visibility of frequently sidelined, alternative approaches, Kassab devotes a volume’s
worth of energy on what she calls the “growth of critique” (Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, 2); Sabry
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of Abdelkabir Khatibi (Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 33); and Abu-Rabiʿ’s edited volume works to bring
greater attention to the work of what he calls the much ignored scholars of “critical thought” (Abu-Rabiʿ,
Contemporary Arab Thought, xiv).
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sociological, literary, and other cultural analyses. Even when the author’s stakes are not
countering or defeating US-Western power, dozens of texts in English make arguments
for particular types, incarnations, or performances of Arab “modernity.” Many of these
studies include assessments of various media – travel, the Internet, television, film, social
media, music, etc.; in them, authors attempt to describe or redefine how Egyptians,
Lebanese, Syrians, Algerians, and others relate to the contemporary world vis-à-vis the
production and circulation of various media.
Importantly, in defining “modernity” or hadatha, authors in both Arabic and
English languages frequently juxtapose this concept with that of “tradition” [asala] or
“heritage” [turath]. Even when authors argue for a hybrid approach to these concepts,
combining new and old elements to create a particular “modernity” unique to a specific
part of the Arab world in a particular moment, the emphasis on the rapprochement
between two poles on a binary is clearly felt. In English, many of these analyses,
alongside other postcolonial scholarship, have worked to expand the hegemonic
perceptions of “the modern” associated with the so-called “Global North” to include
certain kinds of being emanating from the so-called “Global South.” For example,
Jonathan Shannon theorizes “alternative Syrian modernity” in his study of emotion and
music.42 Studies of Arab media in particular have engaged questions of modernity in a
globalized context since the 1990s.43
In both languages, thus constituting a significant global understanding of Arab
poets, musicians, and audiences, Arab culture is frequently understood to stage a contest
42

Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees. See note 30.
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between competing pulls of tradition and modernity.44 This overwhelmingly central
polemic has profoundly affected the ways in which an Arab cultural product’s “politics”
might be interpreted. Different nuances of the arguments not withstanding, political
resonances have frequently been determined by the degree to which a culture or cultural
practice incorporates or discards tradition or technology. Arguments about “resistance”
are easily construed in myriad ways along this binary: youth “resist” conservative state
practices via any number of hybrid music or leisure routines; simultaneously,
conservative players may “resist” commercialization or commodification by reclaiming
or reinforcing religious rites; etc. Debates about modernity and tradition thus structure
one significant way “politics” have been interpreted in studies of cultural production in
the Arab world.
In Arab cultural studies in Arabic, it is significant to note that theorized studies of
“subculture” and “popular” culture are extremely rare, the preoccupation being instead
with culture of a more “respectable” (i.e., neither commercialized, or shaʿabi [popular]45)
nature.46 While English language scholarship on Arab subjects has historically also
favored assessments of “high” culture, a growing body of work on Arab “popular” and
subcultures is emerging, which constitutes a significant development in the ways in
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Throughout Contemporary Arab Thought, Kassab does well to point out this cultural quandary and
intellectual “obsession” is not unique to the Arab world. Similar interrogations are found in many “postcolonial” contexts.
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I discuss the resonances of the Arabic “shaʿabi” in relationship to the English “popular” below.
The noteworthy exception to this may be the work of Saudi Arabian scholar Abdullah al-Ghathami, who
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which politics are assessed and understood in this scholarship. I will address this shift and
the effect of intellectual models that have influenced the frameworks of many of those
studies shortly. I want to point first to institutional developments that have allowed for
Arab cultural studies in the US academe in particular.
Institutionally, the course of studies of Arab culture in English over the past
several decades has been significantly influenced by the development of “Area Studies”
disciplines across the social sciences since the end of World War II.47 The financial
resources devoted by the US government and US-based private foundations to fund
international area studies before and during the Cold War has in large part made the
growing cultural studies of today possible. 48 The thrust of this endeavor was initially to
facilitate the knowledge of US scholars and institutions of numerous international
“others,” in order to lessen the threats of the unknowns lurking between the US and the
USSR.49 This is not to suggest that the political motives of the State Department in the
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Said points to some of these implications vis-à-vis the US and the Arab World in his Orientalism (New
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1940s have influenced or presided over all studies undertaken with these resources since,
but to note the global political environment in which the opening of the US academe
towards these parts of the world took place. Moreover, the overwhelming emphasis in the
tradition of “area studies” has necessarily been on the particular “locality” of a given
population, region, or demographic.50 Coinciding with the rise of post-colonial studies,
area studies scholarship has largely worked to understand a given “Other” – but often by
reifying that very Otherness.51 Indeed, the incorporation of specific area studies
disciplines into the academy, despite the increased visibility of this material, has
nevertheless ensured that cultural production from these regions (Africa, South and Latin
America, the Middle East, Asia) or of other traditionally marginalized demographics
(including Native Peoples, women, and LGBTQ populations) need not enter the
normative cannon of traditional “literature” or “cultural studies” departments, nor effect
the theories for analyzing the material “native” to those disciplines.52 It is in this context

Americans skilled managers of foreign and domestic affairs.” (Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies,” 9397.)
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that enthusiasm about Arab culture as “political” or “resistant” in English language
scholarship must be understood and critiqued. By this I mean: in the context of an
institutional (which does not presume authorial intention) perpetuation of the exotic
“Otherness” of the Arab (and other post-colonial) subject. In this context, the “political,”
among other, qualities of Arab cultural production are necessarily seen in
contradistinction to cultural production in other places, namely US/Europe.
The common configuration of the study of Arab culture as “political” in English
language scholarship is especially well-illustrated in the context of Palestinian cultural
studies. A closer look at this subfield is informative for understanding the stakes of this
attribution of political resonances to cultural production in the Arab world. Helga TawilSouri suggests that in the context of both this burgeoning field of study53 and Zionist
policy (which declares in the legacy of Golda Meir, that “Palestinians do not exist”)
every study of Palestinian people and culture that shows that they do is necessarily
political.54 The deplorable lived reality of the Palestinians and the international political
environment in which these conditions are discussed outside the Arab world have thus
led to the preconfiguration of politics in analyses of Palestinian cultural production.

A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman [New York: Columbia UP, 1994], 84, original
emphasis.)
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I affirm the desire and the accompanying urgency to deliver and protect
declarations about the existence of Palestinians, a reality the Israeli state consistently and
violently attempts to erase. But I find problematic the wholesale celebration of
Palestinian life as political, especially implied in contradistinction to, say, US, Belgian, or
Kuwaiti life as not or less political. I hesitate first because of the growing contradictions
engendered by the advance of neoliberal incursions in Palestine, a discussion I return to
later in this dissertation. Put simply, I am skeptical that the celebration of all activity
under occupation as “resistant” is able to advance radical politics – especially, perhaps, in
the context of intense neoliberal urban growth.55
But the wholesale celebration of Palestinian cultural practice as “political” is
damaging for a second reason. The preconfiguration of politics engenders a dependent
relationship between “resistance” and the study of Arab cultural production more
generally. An implicit value judgment is appearing here: wherein subjects or cultures that
are not demonstrably “resistant” are of lesser interest or critical import. Furthermore, the
definition of what marks something as “resistant” is critically not neutral, as a generation
of scholars critiquing methods of subcultural analysis in the UK and the US have
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demonstrated since the late 1980s.56 Contemporary discussions in the Anglophone
academe that affirm the necessity of “politics” in the analysis of Arab cultural production
may stem from and frequently attempt to address the lacunae formed by political biases
in the academe. But, as I will now explore, the intellectual framework they impose may
nevertheless be limiting how politics can be understood and interpreted. They do this by
shrinking political diversity to applications of a specific kind of “resistance.”
Understanding how analyses of “politics” in cultural production have been
reduced to locations of a specific kind of “resistance” requires a consideration of the
methodological tendencies in and ideological influences upon much of this literature. It is
not insignificant that critical consideration of an increased range of Arab cultural
products as “resistant” comes concurrently with recent recognition in this scholarship of
“popular” Arab culture and “everyday” practices as worthwhile subjects of study. Nor is
it coincidental that this literature has been all but dominated by analysis in the tradition of
the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham (CCCS).
Indeed, the value attributed in this model to the capacity of cultural practice for political
“resistance” against the mainstream has frequently been invoked to validate these new
(popular, subcultural) subjects of study.57 Scholarship that focuses on everyday culture
has slowly shifted understandings of agency and power in the Arab world as confined to
ruling elites, and the intellectuals associated with those classes, to the political capacity
(and implicitly the value) of marginalized segments of Egyptian, Algerian, Moroccan,
56
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Lebanese, and Palestinian populations. However, at the same time, the sociological
model of agency and “resistance” has tended to: privilege young, cosmopolitan, visibly
“alternative” agents as active; emphasizes certain kinds of creative activity (music, dress,
or other style elements) as (“the right kind of”) political; and/or recognizes specific
collectivities (secular, extra-labor, non-gender normative) as empowering. To put it more
explicitly, the emphasis on “symbolic violation” and “style,”58 so central in the
Birmingham approach, has the tendency to reinforce particular, neoliberal values of
individuals, their choices, and their relation to the collective that may actually hamper
explorations of alternative meaning/politics engendered by cultural practice.59 I will
argue in more depth in Chapter One that an analysis which distills divergent political
experimentation in Arab cultural production into a simple symbolic “resistance” fails to
assess the actual, sometimes contradictory political energy in these city streets. In the
context of the Arab uprisings generally – or Tahrir Square, Pearl Roundabout, and other
city sites specifically – to call creative choices “resistant” fails to add depth or
particularity to an understanding of what cultural production may do or mean. At the
same time, neither has it helped researchers, students, or critics to discern between
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different emerging voices and aesthetics.60 For now, its should suffice to recognize that in
much English language scholarship on Arab cultural production, studying politics by
looking for “resistance” has limited the ways in which these politics can be understood.
Without denying the real material realities that affect the lives of Palestinians,
Lebanese, Egyptians, and others, what should an analysis of “politics” in Arab cultural
production look like? Given the discursive contexts just outlined, is it possible to conduct
an analysis of politics in cultural production without reinforcing the trajectories – that is,
the conceptualizations of political possibility – suggested in these histories of
scholarship? Asking as much clearly does not suggest stripping political analysis from
Arab cultural studies. Nor does it argue against the observation that cultural production,
as the work of living women and men in actual societies anywhere in the world, is
always, necessarily political.61 On the contrary, being cognizant of the particular
intellectual histories of locating “politics” within Arab cultural production notes the
limiting patterns within which these politics have been understood, precisely in order to
advance alternative political analysis.
I am concerned throughout this dissertation that attributing “politics” to Arabic
rap be done in such a way that reflects ongoing political discussions in these youth
cultures. That is to say, in a way that complicates, dislocates, and disregards the binaries
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of East/West; traditional/modern; secular/religious; global/local; passive/active; and
commercial/authentic. Instead, political energy in some Arabic rap struggles towards
what Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi rappers called in a recent collaboration
“khat thaleth” (literally, a “third rail”, or a “third option”). It is this productive unsettling
of existing structures that I am interested in theorizing.62 A khat thaleth does not explode
or erase existing binaries. Rather, a third rail, like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s dismissal of
scholarly pleas for “beyond,” encourages instead the formulation of an option that
operates beside in order to unsettle and grow over the restricting pull of binary politics.63
Such a formulation of what this might look like theoretically in Arab cultural
studies might start with a reevaluation of the “popular” in popular culture. The meanings
of the word “popular” in Arabic are notably distinct from those attributed to the word
English. This consideration is not usually taken up by Anglophone cultural scholars
working on the Arab world, however, in whose literature it is occasionally not at all clear
what “popular” might mean in the local context. “Popular” is directly translated into
Arabic as shaʿabi, an adjective derived from the word shaʿab, and meaning literally “of
the people.” Unlike in English, the word in Arabic has connotations that associate it with
modesty and humility, as opposed to success or riches (perhaps closer to “populist” than
a celebrity’s “popularity”). A “popular” [shaʿabi] cinema or cafe is not so because it
attracts the largest number of clientele, but because it is located in hay shaʿabi, or a
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“working class quarter and frequented by working class audiences.”64 Sabry suggests that
in the Arabic context, “To be popular is to be one of the people.”65 Importantly, then,
shaʿabi need not only refer to class identity. A rich politician or intellectual can be
shaʿabi, if s/he can connect to and be embraced by the people. When I asked the
Lebanese rapper Gaafar, for example, what “shaʿabi” meant to him, he said, “haqiqi” –
or, literally, “real.”66
Furthermore, the word “shaʿabi” has further political resonances in Arabic
because of the way the noun shaʿab [people] is used in state discourse. Politicians invoke
a-shaʿab [the people] to unify the electorate (something most politicians in the US would
be abhor to do, lest they be accused of arousing “populist” sentiment). Similar to much
nationalist sentiment all over the world, shaʿab can thus also be used to “mask the
particularities of the very voices, heard or unheard, which make up Arab popular
cultures.”67 In other words, the word meaning of the people can and is used to distort the
diverse needs and desires of those very populations. Referring to “popular” culture in the
Arab world thus has political intonations that are both charged with class and infused
with state discourse. It may be that there is a consistent enough set of associations that
link the Arabic “shaʿabi” to a specific kind of political “resistance.” But an
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accompanying analysis of what this might be or imply for cultural practice and political
possibility within it is, as of yet, unclear.68
Furthermore, I think the enthusiasm to read “popular” [shaʿabi] as “resistant” has
likely been encouraged (paradoxically perhaps) by the prominent use of the word sha‘ab
in the Arabic slogans heard in 2010-2013 protests. But the consideration that the concept
sha‘ab masks difference in a false unity is actually all the more relevant in the context of
the widespread chants: “a-shaʿab yureed isqat a-nizam” [“the people want the fall of the
regime”], as evidenced in what has been the devastating disintegration in more than one
instance of protest movements into sectarian and other divisions in the wake of these
uprisings. Considering notions of the collective invoked by shaʿab and shaʿabi may
complicate understandings of symbolic resistance, belonging, and “politics” in Arab
(pop)cultural studies.
I refer to Arabic rap as “subcultural” not “popular” culture. Marking this out in
part identifies the political histories of scholarship to which I see this work contributing. I
refer to Arabic rap as “subcultural” production because my research suggests its market
share is quite small relative to other musical production in the region and because of its
frequently antagonistic relationship to “mainstream” music in both English and in Arabic.
Furthermore, as I demonstrate in my case studies, rap in Arabic also capitalizes on an
“experimental” or avant-garde cache that would make its qualification as “popular” in the
US/European sense quite inaccurate. That said, while I do not consider Arabic rap
“popular” in the English sense, I do pursue questions of its shaʿabi nature. Interlocutors’
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answers, like Gaafar’s above, indicate particularities about how they see the politics of
the work functioning that are revealing. This pursuit of shaʿabi resonances within a
subcultural study allows me to trouble some of the historical emphases in US/UK studies:
subcultural models of responding to accusations of “degeneracy,” “non-normativity,” and
social “marginalization” figure specific political resonances. Exploring the shaʿabi in
subculture pushes on the terms “subculture,” “popular,” and the location of “politics”
therein.
In general, I am not trying to counter claims of degeneracy in a subculture of Arab
youth by arguing that Arabic rap is political. Indeed, in contrast to a number of global
musical subcultures from jazz to hip hop, politics has already been attributed to rap in
Arabic. Since its fans and producers corroborate these claims, my aim is rather to develop
a concept to theorize how Arabic rap functions politically. Towards this end, and quite
differently from much cultural scholarship invested in political resonances, I am not
interested in debating whether or not these agents have agency. I believe they do. Nor am
I invested in discussing how agents’ activity (as opposed to passivity) defines them as
political subjects.69 In my theoretical work in this subcultural study, I propose moving
away from discussing agency and instead towards theorizing affectivity.
I also begin from the assumption that Arabic rap is a hybrid genre – it has deep
roots in many places: the US, the trans-Atlantic, the Arab world, and various diasporas. I
am less interested in what is for me the fact of Arabic rap’s aesthetic and cultural
hybridity than in its ability to communicate specific political feelings. In truth, sometimes
it is hybrid aesthetics that help it do so, but it is not the simple presence of hybridity that
69
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communicates politics. The frequency and ubiquity of hybrid cultural production both
within the Arab world and outside it suggests that the practice of cultural borrowing and
appropriation is widespread. Fetishizing hybridity, contrary to frequently stated interests
in assimilation, collaboration, and integration, has the tendency to reify difference,
further delineating as distinct the different “Others” involved.70 This study does not work
to establish where this cultural production comes from – historically or culturally – and
use those findings to make a claim about agents’ resistance to various cultural and
political factors. Rather it attempts to interrogate what this particular experimentation
does to the people and environments with which it immediately interacts.
Finally, for my analyses of politics and affect to resonate, I position these players
within the material, urban contexts in which they produce their work. In other words, I
pursue the generation of affect in the particular urban, neoliberal contexts in which it is
found. Here I am building from recent theatre scholarship that connects the conditions of
performance to manifestations of neoliberalism.71 Like these scholars and critics, I too
find it increasingly disingenuous to discuss the political resonances of performances in
Beirut, Ramallah, and Amman today without addressing the neoliberal configurations
that in part determine how that content is produced, presented and consumed. The
relationships between art institutions, real estate development, NGOs, and the state are
different in each city, but the similarities in neoliberal structure cannot be ignored. It is in
establishing and understanding these contexts that the affective resonances can actually
70
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be felt. My conceptualization of the intersection of affect and material reality is
influenced here by Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick’s elaborations on “the whole issue of
texture.” She argues: “The sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic
understanding of agency and passivity; to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle,
to heft, to tap, or to enfold, and always also to understand other people or natural forces
as having effectually done so before oneself…”72 I follow how Arab rappers and
audiences reach for other political possibilities, knowing that in these interactions, they
encounter the particular urban texture of neoliberal incursions.
I develop more completely what I mean by neoliberalism and its incursions in
Chapter One: Locating Politics, where I address the ongoing debate over the relevance of
the term “neoliberal/ism” and especially its application to economic and political power
in the Middle East and North Africa. Here, I point to the resonances in this dissertation
with a growing body of scholarship that is now contextualizing the political events of the
Arab Uprisings within a larger historical trajectory that dates back to the 1970s. Doing so
furthers the discussion I elaborated in this section about the intellectual trajectories of
locating politics in Arab cultural production generally by contextualizing the recent
enthusiasm about Arabic hip hop and rap more specifically in the wake of the so-called
“Arab Spring.” As should be clear, this is a tendency the present study acknowledges and
tries not to reproduce.
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Political enthusiasm and neoliberal critique

Drawing on the irony of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s praise for
Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian “sound economic policies and market reforms” weeks
before the outbreaks of revolutions, Koenraad Bogaert argues that understanding recent
events necessitates contextualization of the “pressing economic grievances and uneven
development that are a result of more than thirty years of neoliberal policies” in those
countries.73 Not doing so, he suggests, actually exacerbates miscomprehension of the
region and its shifting politics.
…In an attempt to explain political change and authoritarian persistence,
many approaches to Arab political life mainly highlighted endogenous
political legacies (e.g., corruption, clientilism, etc.), thereby constructing
stereotypes of the ‘Arab regime’ that actually got in the way of
understanding the complexity of the social forces and capitalist agency
that are manifesting themselves in the current political orders of the
region.74
In other words, while the enthusiasm about these paradigmatic changing events is
understandable, the onus is now upon criticism to pay attention to what is being
constructed and elided by this excitement.
In a similar vein, Alain Badiou coined the phrase the “phenomenon of Western
inclusion” to describe the transformation of recent political resistance in the Arab world
into a desire for “the West.”75 By this he refers to the narrative process wherein the
unruly and anti-despotic ethos of the Arab crowd is translated by Western state
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departments and the global mass media into a desire for “freedom.” This “freedom” is
embodied politically in the trappings of liberal democracy and economically in the
opening to/of “free” markets. Translated and transmitted in this way, an eruptive popular
movement and populous moment “has every chance of ending in very modest
constitutional reform” with the ushering into power of regimes that will come to “the
general surprise of supporters of the riot.”76 (In other words, in results that do not address,
on a structural level, corruption, gross inequities of wealth, the stripping of resources, or
the refusal of IMF loans and their debilitating stipulations, and that neither include an
increase in representation, self-determination, or any number of other demands vocally
stated and physically embodied by ongoing protests.) “What would be a genuine change,”
Badiou suggests, “would be an exit from the West, a ‘de-Westernization’, and it would
take the form of an exclusion.”77
This exclusion might embody a menace, in Homi Bhabha’s sense of the term, to
the neoliberal and neocolonial order as it stands. Bhabha’s formulation of colonial
mimicry – a mixture of “resemblance and menace” – points to the construction by the
colonial subject of an identity or of desire that is “almost the same [as the colonists’] but
not quite.”78 This menace is the same threat that Badiou locates in the mounting
“anxiety” of “Cameron, Sarkozy, [and] Obama” in their assessments of the Arab
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uprisings. Badiou says the uprisings “contain an Idea, as yet unformulated, which is
highly displeasing" to the governments and those heads of state.79
One of the hypotheses of my research is that a consideration of this “displeasing”
“unformulated” exclusion –of a potential exit from neoliberal practice and policy, or the
admission of a certain colonial menace – is being actively stripped or at least tangibly
occluded from contemporary narratives. This is happening not only, as Bogaert,
Armbrust, and others have suggested, in discourse about political developments in the
region, but also in discussions about how “politics” or “resistance” appears in different
kinds of cultural production. Hundreds of articles have been written about various aspects
of youth culture in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Levant in recent years, including about Arabic
rap. Virtually all champion its “resistant” qualities. But almost none discuss the actually
alternative political possibilities that subcultural producers and audiences wade through. I
develop affective models to discern precisely the development of these politics. Doing so
also allows me to question and pursue the tenuous bonds of “solidarity” invoked by
artists and activists in different cities.

Part Three: Chapter Breakdowns

The dissertation that follows is structured in five chapters. The first two are
theoretical in nature, not taking a specific geographic location as their focus. They are
designed to build the affective and political model I began to contextualize in this
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introduction. I then implement this model in each of the three case study chapters that
follow.
“Chapter One: Locating Politics” takes issue with the discourses of resistance that
I suggest all but categorically frame understandings of Arab rap. Building on specific
examples of the presentation of Arab rappers and other performance artists in New York
City, I suggest that neoliberal orientalism on international art stages, in academic
literature, and in the neoliberal media depoliticizes Arab rappers. This plays on a
racialized imagination, approximating Arab and Muslim subjects to African and African
American history, culture, and musical expression, while stripping the politics from both
Arab and black experiences. Having identified the depoliticizing work of discourses of
resistance in specific examples, I propose a theoretical elaboration for understanding the
political implications of the dominance of “resistance literature” in anthropological and
cultural studies. Hannah Arendt’s concept of “political action” underpins my
investigation. Her emphasis, which has been critiqued of late, on activity in the polis as
indicative of agency grounds my critique of the approaches to resistance in both
Subcultural Studies and Subaltern Studies, two fields of literature intimately connected to
this project.
Having exposed the limitations of frameworks of “resistance” for understanding
politics in cultural production, “Chapter Two: Feeling Politics,” sets out to offer an
alternative. In this chapter, I build the models of feeling politics and political feeling that
I began to sketch in Part One of this Introduction. I elaborate my use of tarab as political
feeling by proposing a framework for tracking its emergence specific to rap concerts. I
further the explorations of urban change and neoliberal incursions elaborated in the
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previous chapter by suggesting a “spatizalized” approach to the materiality of concert
venues. Leaning on the late Doreen Massey’s work, I propose that recognizing “the very
fact of spacing” between audiences in specific concert venues in cities navigating
cosmopolitan and neoliberal incursions deepens the political implications of the feeling
conducted during rap concerts. This chapter also includes an outline of my methodology
and outlines how I considered my scope and approach as researcher.
“Chapter Three: Ramallah – The Second Wave of Palestinian Rap” contextualizes
Palestinian rap production since the end of the Second Intifada (2006/7). My research in
this chapter pushes back against the dominant understanding of Palestinian rap as an
embodiment of the changing forms of youthful “intifada,” that is, as an enactment of
resistance against the Occupation. My own findings did not corroborate this narrative.
Instead, I argue Palestinian rap today largely does not engage or (re)produce an ethos of
uprising, revolution, or resistance. In this chapter I explore how the material negotiations
of concert makers and concert-goers continue to be political despite not being
“resistance.” Importantly, exploring the political feeling in second wave rap concerts in
Ramallah quickly became less about finding a subcultural answer to the Occupation in
rap concerts and more about comprehending one of the myriad ways in which life
continues under it.
“Chapter Four: Amman – Resignation and Longing in an Emerging ‘Cultural
Hotspot’” documents the recent emergence of the Jordanian capital as a regional cultural
hub – in particular its development into something of a concert hub – together with an
overwhelming, articulated desire of young people to leave Amman behind. I build from
assumptions of Jordanian “stability,” central to its attraction as accessible regional host
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for cultural production, to explore a political feeling of resignation in reaction to a host of
social and political situations produced in some Jordanian rap lyrics. This chapter
engages notions of performed cosmopolitanism in addition to performer and audience
testimony and thick description.
In “Chapter Five: Beirut – Poetics of Disgust,” I propose understanding the
dynamics held in tension in rap in Beirut as a product of affective disgust. Affectively
different from the performed resignation I identified in some rap in Amman, it points to
similar grasping for and working through both material and affective realities in Beirut.
Disgust is the recognition that the city is being stolen from its inhabitants; the frustration
with the status quo; the utter dissatisfaction with the government; resentment towards
people who leave; and the identity crises that result upon return. As such, I consider that
expressions of disgust are specific, active navigations of politics. By distancing
themselves from dysfunction, corruption, neglect, and racism in a particular affective
register, the speaker of disgust works around available political affiliation by refusing and
circumventing in specific ways the trite, disappointing narratives of politicians, the
humanitarian aid industry, and local as well as regional nostalgia. In this chapter, spitting
disgust engages with performative analyses of political disgust like Sara Ahmed and
Imogen Tyler’s, while diverging from these studies in ways contingent to my own
context.80
In the study’s “Conclusion - Politics, Positions, Presence,” I offer a final
reflection on the political use of a concept like political feeling at the time of the
completion of this study – a context which is considerably different than the geopolitical
80

Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004) and Imogen Tyler,
Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (London: Zed Books, 2013).
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situation that framed and encouraged the proposal of this research. From here I offer a
critical engagement with the concept of “solidarity” as informed by both my
interlocutors’ testimonies as well as their lyrical work. I close the study with a
consideration of the technology via which this music is primarily consumed.

*

*

*

In this Introduction, I have sought to provide an initial intellectual
contextualization of the research that follows in terms of both studies of feeling (affect)
and politics. The affective tension of “politics pulls at me” in the Ramallah
Underground’s track succinctly frames the confluence of politics and feeling that I
explore in this genre of subcultural production. I take the opportunity to conclude these
initial thoughts on affectivity and politics in this research with a qualification about the
relationship between affective processes – or the location and study of feeling – and the
contemporary Arab demographic that is my focus.
While my study takes as its subject specific subcultural production by and for
young Arabs,81 I do not consider that the theoretical model I am building is salient
because of an inherent political or cultural nature that these agents possess. Given the
intellectual debates I hope this research will engage, the importance of this specification
cannot be overstated.82 It is crucial to me that the discussion of affective dynamics in

81

The demographic reach of this genre is growing and concerts and events analyzed in Chapter Three
demonstrate the appeal of this work to a range of linguistic and cultural backgrounds. However,
conversations with artists confirm the overwhelming audience consists of predominantly Arabic speakers.
82

The lively debate around Vivek Chibber’s recent book Postcolonial Studies and the Spectre of Capital
has been instrumental in identifying and articulating this distinction.
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Arabic rap that I provide not be construed as validation for the Orientalist or “reverseOrientalist” claims83 that Arabs are simply more emotional, more susceptible to
emotional arousal (and by extension, in this study, “more” political) than “Westerners”;
or that musical practice in this part of the world is in essence less celebral, more illogical,
or more interactive than “Western” musical practice. It is foolish to argue that cultural
differences do not exist; they do. But it is equally ridiculous to impose onto cultural
production cultural essences that are devoid of considerations of the material conditions
in which they are found. Especially in a discussion of the “global” form of contemporary
hip hop and the urban environments in which it is intervening with such vitality, such an
interpretation of this research would be most out of sync with my intentions as an author.

83

Sadik Jalal al-ʿAzm proposed the phrase “Orientalism in reverse” to describe a vein of scholarship that
responds to critiques of Orientalism by suggesting unique (frequently “textual”) tools with which to assess
the culture, religion, and political structure of “the East.” In doing so, he suggests, “‘Orientalism in
Reverse’… simply imitates the great Orientalist masters – a poor imitation at that – when it seeks to
unravel the secrets of the primordial Arab ‘mind,’ ‘psyche,’ or ‘character’… But the novel element is the
conclusion of Orientalism in Reverse that comparative philological and linguistic studies prove the
ontological superiority of the Oriental mind (the ‘Arab mind’ in this case) over the Occidental one.” (AlʿAzm, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” Khamsin 8 (1980), accessed January 31, 2014,
http://libcom.org/library/orientalism-orientalism-reverse-sadik-jalal-al-’azm#footnoteref20_93ck6iy.)
Indeed this simple reversal of a study of “essences” just to get the opposite result (“the East” is, in actuality
superior, not inferior, to the “West”) is something Edward Said himself warned against (Said, Orientalism,
322). Gilbert Achcar expands al-ʿAzm’s study of “reverse Orientalism” to French thought in Marxism,
Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism, 40-56. I address this discursive intersection of Orientalism, affect, politics
and contemporary hip hop in Arabic in more detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter One
Locating Politics

Overview
This chapter lays the first part of a theoretical foundation I will rely on in the
subsequent case study chapters. It consists of a critique of a “discourse of resistance”
which I identify exists in discussion and analysis of Arabic rap. In the first half of this
chapter, I identify this phenomenon, which I acknowledge builds and diverges from
“resistance literature” in the humanities. In order to establish the particular implications I
see in these discussions of “resistance,” I explore how what I call neoliberal orientalism
structures these representations of Arab cultural producers.
Having established what the “discourse of resistance” is and what its implications
are, in the second half of the chapter I aim to illustrate how it works. To do so, I turn to
Hannah Arendt’s theory of political activity in the polis, and its critiques. I use Arendt’s
theorization of political activity as indicative of political subjectivity to point to how the
discourse of resistance pins agency into a representative framework where it is incumbent
on spectacular displays of resistance. Critiques of Arendt’s model help to illustrate that
this framework depends on the continued existence of individuals without agency, against
whose background only some may be celebrated as active political subjects. I follow this
theoretical exploration in two subfields of sociological and anthropological literature:
subcultural study in the tradition of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies and postcolonial theory, especially as manifest in subaltern studies.
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The lengthy theoretical discussion in this chapter works to clear the space in order
to be able to add something new to existing debates and analysis about rap in Arabic and
the political behavior of its producers and consumers. This theoretical elaboration should
allow my case studies, and the theoretical alternative to the discourse of resistance I
propose in the next chapter, to work against the exoticizing of these agents that I find
prevalent in much existing literature.

Part One: Discourse of Resistance and Neoliberal Orientalism

On April 14, 2013, Columbia University in New York hosted an event entitled
“Art as Resistance.” It was advertised as a panel discussion between two actors from the
Freedom Theatre in Jenin, Palestine and a professor of theatre at the University of
Connecticut. The email blasts and the website of the Center for Palestine Studies include
short bios of the three panelists, wherein the first thing noted for both Palestinian actors
are their ages. Faisal Abu Alhelja was 23; Ahmad Al-Rokh was 24. The age of Gary
English, the third panelist, a Distinguished Professor of Theatre (and current director of
the Freedom Theatre) was not listed. The advertising suggested that the “expertise” the
first two panelists boasted was their Palestinian youth. The credentials of the third
panelist (presumably not Palestinian and older) were his established career as a theatre
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professional and scholar. “Resistance” only appeared in the event title. It was unclear
from the promotional materials who or what these artists resisted, or how.1
As pointed to in this dissertation’s introduction, critics and scholars have
identified that the abstract framing of Palestinian artists and their work as “resistant” may
be problematic. Helga Tawil-Souri has suggested that the expectation that Palestinian
artists exclusively depict or address their political reality has limited the aesthetic
possibilities available to them.2 Speaking of Arab artists more generally, Daanish Faruqi
has suggested that even when Arab artists display works of high quality, their work may
be neglected, even in their countries of origin, because it “fails to inform our political
impulses.”3 In the wake of the political events since 2010 and the incredible attention to
creative expression within the “Arab Spring,” Arab artists themselves have also begun to
question and in some cases reject demands that they produce or perform “resistance” in
galleries and concerts, and the presumption their work be framed as such.4 What is the

1

Email blast reprinted in Phillip Weiss, “‘Art as Resistance’ – Two Actors and Artistic Director at Jenin
Freedom Theater to Speak at Columbia Sunday,” Mondoweiss, April 12, 2013, accessed November 1,
2014, http://mondoweiss.net/2013/04/resistance-artistic-columbia.
2

Helga Tawil-Souri, “The Necessary Politics of Palestinian Cultural Studies,” in Arab Cultural Studies:
Mapping the Field, ed. Tarik Sabry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 138. See Introduction.
3

As opposed to on an international art market. See Daanish Faruqi, “Art and the Arab Spring,” Al Jazeera
English, January 10, 2012, accessed October 22, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121612493122450.html.
4

Naira Antoon and Aimee Shalan, “After the Spring: Thoughts on Cultural Production and the Selling
Power of Change,” Jadaliyya, November 15, 2011, accessed October 22, 2014,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3117/after-the-spring_thoughts-on-cultural-production-a; Andrew
M. Goldstein, “New Museum Curator Natalie Bell on How to Understand Contemporary Arab Art,”
ArtSpace, July 17, 2014, accessed October 22, 2014,
http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/natalie-bell-on-here-and-elsewhere-at-the-newmuseum; Shehab Fakhry Ismail, “Revolutionizing Art,” Mada Masr, October 25, 2013, accessed October
22, 2014, http://www.madamasr.com/content/revolutionizing-art; Omar Kholeif, “The Social Impulse:
Politics, Media, and Art after the Arab Uprisings,” Ibraaz, May 2, 2012, accessed October 22, 2014
http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/34; Mona Gamil, Amira Chebli, et al. “Arab Dance Caravan,” (“Open
Studios” panel discussion at biennial meeting of Internationale Tanzmesse, Düsseldorf, Germany, August
27-30, 2014).
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proclivity towards “resistance” about? Why are critics and artists distancing themselves
from it?
If Arab artists and critics in general are bristling against expectations that they
produce “political” artwork all the time, the case of rap and hip hop in Arabic provides an
especially dense archive of this phenomenon. A discussion of rap in the Arab world in
English or French that does not lay claim to its political or resistant nature, or its
affiliation with political behavior, simply does not exist. The few analyses in Arabic that
do not celebrate its imminent resistance tend to decry the genre for the same reasons
others find it powerful (and political).5 This constant framework of representation is not
the case with any number of Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian or other filmmakers, poets,
theatre directors, or other musicians, who encounter expectations that their work is
political or questions about how it is so, among other considerations.6 In the genre of
Arabic rap in particular, I argue that we can see distilled the elements that drive the
problematic political gesturing in other art and music arenas where Arabs are also
involved. It is my argument that in Europe, in North America, and in the Middle East, the
enthusiasm about this genre is inescapably bound up in a juxtaposition of African
American influence, and progressive Arab “street” energy. These factors, taken singly or
together, dominate the representative framework of these rap musicians and their work.
The framework of political resistance attributed to Arab rappers is unique to this region
among other studies of rap around the world. It may also be understood as a condensation
5

Yazan Sa’dy, “Mostaqbal al-rap el ‘arabi ‘ala ‘Khat Thaleth,’” [“The Future of Arabic Rap after ‘The
Third Rail’”], Ma3azef, February 19, 2013, accessed November 1, 2014,
http://www.ma3azef.com/node/114.
6

Many rappers who also perform in other genres, who act as producers, or who otherwise engage in art or
literature production affirm that it is their rap work that is foremost identified as political.

!

46
of a larger neoliberal framework of representation of Arab youth in general.7 It is at the
intersection of these spheres of influence of African American, Islamic, and Arab Spring
energies that, for example, the Tunisian rapper El Général was named one of TIME
magazines top 100 influential people of 2011, that press like CBS and the New York
Times pontificated about the rap “soundtracks” of the 2011-2012 revolutions, and that the
BBC and others wondered if “hip hop was driving the Arab Spring.”8
The converging spheres of influence in the body of the Arab rapper and his work
are not arbitrary. They are driven by specific economic and imperial concerns and a
particular racial ideology. Moreover, the “discourse of resistance” I identify builds from a
trajectory of humanistic literature. I turn to that literature first, before elaborating that the
discourse of resistance I am specifically concerned with is structured by neoliberal
orientalism. With this phrase I attempt to define the “regime of power-knowledgepleasure” that structures the ways in which Arab rappers are celebrated for producing
political music.9

7

The study of “global” hip hop is frequently conducted through a frame of subcultural study and therefore
is often celebrated for the agency of its subcultural subjects that it affirms. The deliberate association that
rap in the Middle East is political is more unique to the region. See also Ted Swedenburg, “Imagined
Youths,” Middle East Research and Information Project 245: 2007, accessed November 1, 2014,
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer245/imagined-youths.
8

“The 2011 TIME 100,” TIME, accessed November 1, 2014,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2066367_2066369_2066242,00.html;
Sujatha Fernandes, “The Mixtape of the Revolution,” The New York Times, January 29, 2012, accessed
November 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/opinion/the-mixtape-of-the-revolution.html?_r=0;
Cordelia Hebblethwaite, “Is Hip Hop Driving the Arab Spring?,” BBC News, July 24, 2011, accessed
November 1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14146243.
9

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage Books, 1990).
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Discourse of resistance

Recent reactions by Arab artists and critics against the invitation that their work
perform “resistance” should be understood within a larger discussion about the usefulness
of the concept of resistance in analyzing the political effects of cultural production. That
resistance may be celebrated in cultural production, and that this celebration may be
problematic is not a new debate in humanistic literature. Donald Moore identified what
he called a “boom industry” in “resistance studies” in the 1970s and 1980s.10 Moore was
referring to the emergence of “ethnographies of resistance” and the proliferation of
studies of “everyday forms of resistance.”11 In the 1990s, a slew of astute critiques
reacted to this trend. Lila Abu-Lughod warned about “romanticizing resistance”; Douglas
Kellner worried about its “fetishization”; Sherry Ortner remarked upon an “ethnographic
thinness” in “resistance” literature; Roy D’Andrade bristled at the “moral model”
anthropologies of resistance presented; and Michael Brown even suggested that, among
anthropologists, “resistance” had become “theoretical hegemony.”12 Interest in the

10

Donald S. Moore, “Subaltern Studies and the Politics of Place: Remapping Resistance in Zimbabwe’s
Eastern Highlands,” Cultural Anthropology 13 (1998): 348.
11

See for example Jean Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South
African People (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985); Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the
Making (Berkeley: U of California P, 1985); Aihwa Ong, Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline:
Factory Women In Malaysia (Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1987); Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism
and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1985); Michael A.
Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P,
1980); Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York:
Columbia UP, 1981); Forrest D. Colburn, ed., Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New York: Sharpe,
Inc., 1989); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven,
CT: Yale UP, 1985); James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in
South-East Asia (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1986).
12

Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin
Women,” American Ethnologist 17(1990): 41-55; Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies,
Identity and Politics, Between the Modern and the Postmodern (London: Routledge, 1995); Sherry B.
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concept persisted despite these critiques, however, and the 1990s and 2000s have seen
invigorating attempts to re-energize the ways in which resistance might be located and
studied. For example, Scott’s emphasis on “indirect resistance,” what he calls “weapons
of the weak,” borrows from Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of “bricolage.” The
construction of agents as bricoleurs, constantly negotiating forces of oppression in
expressing resistance, attempts to explain what appear to be inconsistencies in the
political behavior of participants. Studies like Scott’s both build on Dick Hebdige’s
formulation of resistance as bricolage in Subculture and the Meaning of Style (1979) and
foreshadow the most astute studies of resistance today, especially attention to apparent
“ambivalence” in political behavior.13
Within the realm of theatre and performance studies, “resistance” has also
appeared with some regularity. It frequently appears in the framework for the study of
non-US/European performance cultures.14 But it has also guided explorations of politics
in especially avant-garde, community-based, and non-commercial theatre in the latter
contexts as well. Marvin Carlson suggests that the rise in the study of the anthropology of
performance has encouraged the development of alternative political analyses in
Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative Studies in Society and History
37 (1995): 173-193; Roy D’Andrade, “Moral Models in Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 36 (1995):
399-408; and Michael F. Brown, “On Resisting Resistance,” American Anthropologist 98 (1996):729-749.
13

I return to these considerations in the next chapter. See the special issue of History and Anthropology
introduced by Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “On De-Pathologizing Resistance,” History and Anthropology
25 (2014): 415-430. Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Routledge, 1979).
14

See for example, Glenn Odom, Yorùbá Performance, Theatre, and Politics: Staging Resistance
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Terence Chong, The Theatre and the State in Singapore:
Orthodoxy and Resistance (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Belinda Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of
Apartheid (Columbus: Ohio UP, 2004); Jean Graham-Jones, “Rethinking Buenos Aires Theatre in the
Wake of 2001 and Emerging Structures of Resistance and Resilience,” Theatre Journal 66(2014): 37-54.
Of course, the prevalence of this tendency to understand “other” cultures as political or as demonstrating
“resistance” is one of the theoretical concerns of this dissertation. (See Introduction.) This is not to detract
from the compelling research presented in these studies.
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conventional theatre study and practice. He tells us that especially Victor Turner’s work,
on “the potential of liminoid activity to provide a site for social and cultural resistance
and the exploration of alternative possibilities has naturally been of particular interest to
theorists and practitioners of performance seeking a strategy of social engagement not
offered by the more cultural-bound structures of the conventional theatre.”15 Dozens of
compelling works of theatre and performance theory have been written in this vein:
Randy Martin’s work on the performance as “political act,” Baz Kershaw on the “radical”
in performance, Jill Dolan on the “utopic”; Alan Read on “the everyday” – to name only
a few.16 A longer elaboration of politics as conceived in theatre practice is outside of my
scope here.
Instead, my focus here is on the trajectory of this debate about resistance in
cultural production in the humanities. Looking at this history, we can glean that a
discussion of the political aims and agency of the ethnographer, critic, or theorist have
been a central part of studying “resistance.” Since the mid 1990s, these debates have
considered, and indeed have been particularly charged, around the question of the
relationship of political engagement to scholarly practice. For example, Nancy ScheperHughes proposed a “barefoot anthropology” as “a more womanly-hearted” way of
conducting ethnographic research where one is both scholar and companheira.17 Her

15

Marvin Carlson, Performance, A Critical Introduction, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2004),
19-20.
16

Randy Martin, Performance as Political Act: The Embodied Self (New York: Bergin and Garvey
Publishers, 1990); Jill Dolan, Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater (Ann Arbor: U of
Michigan P, 2005); Alan Read, Theatre and Everyday Life: an Ethics of Performance (Oxon: Routledge,
1993); Baz Kershaw, The Radical in Performance: From Brecht to Baudrillard (London and New York:
Routledge, 1999).
17

Scheper-Hughes writes, “Witnessing, the anthropologist as companheira, is in the active voice, and it
positions the anthropologist inside human events as a responsive, reflexive, and morally committed being,
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assertions that the anthropologists must “become alarmists and shock troopers…
[producing] morally demanding texts”18 offended colleagues who considered the
procedures of objective, scientific observation central to the sustenance of the integrity of
the field.19 Hers is perhaps only the first in a string of calls for “militancy” in humanistic
critique. Jeffrey Juris, for example, advocates a “militant ethnography” that merges
practice and research.20 I will return to engage how these different articulations of
scholarly endeavors inform my own positioning vis-à-vis political questions and
engagement in the next chapter. I find them significant because they point to the often
personal stakes that are involved in the choice of the researcher and theorist to engage the
concept of “resistance.” For now, however, it will suffice to mark that the relationship of
the social scientist’s political practice to the observation and theorization of resistance in
the lives of her research subjects has been a significant part of the development of the
recent debate around the concept of “resistance” and its use in the academy.
What can we gather from this trajectory in humanistic literature? This history
indicates the existence of a phenomenon we might call, following Michel Foucault, “the
putting into discourse” of resistance.21 Significant for my own work, recognizing a

one who will ‘take sides’ and make judgments, though this flies in the face of the anthropological
nonengagement with either ethics or politics.” (Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “The Primacy of the Ethical:
Propositions for a Militant Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 36[1995]: 419)
18

Ibid., 417.
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See D’Andrade’s counter argument to Scheper-Hughes in the same issue of Current Anthropology:
D’Andrade, “Moral Models in Anthropology.”
20

Jeffrey S. Juris, “Practicing Militant Ethnography with the Movement for Global Resistance in
Barcelona,” in Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations, Collective Theorization, ed. Stevphen
Shukaitis, et al. (Oakland: AK Press, 2007),164-178.
21

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 12. Many have commented on a depoliticization of intellectual activity,
despite claims to uncover “resistance,” “politics,” and “agency,” roughly since the late 1970s, a period
which coincides with the trajectory of literature just outlined. Aijaz Ahmad writes for example, “We have
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discourse of resistance works to open up studies of politics in cultural production by
insisting on exploring the relationship of this discursivity to power. By this I mean paying
attention to what discussing resistance, representing it, celebrating it, does. Paying
attention to a “discourse of resistance” is different from analyzing the political strategies
of agents themselves. In my case study chapters, I get to individual cases and different
political strategies. And in the next chapter, I explore different ways to access and
understand those strategies. In this chapter, however, I am considering the representation
of the activity of these agents as political content. I do this in order to clear the space for
subsequent theoretical and political explorations. In addressing this discourse, I am, like
Foucault, interested in “instances of discursive production (which also administer
silences, to be sure), [instances] of the production of power… and [instances] of the
propagation of knowledge (which often cause mistaken beliefs or systematic
misconceptions to circulate).”22
Identifying how acts of resistance are “put into discourse” is productive in that it
moves the discussion past a deliberation of the truth or falsehood of the studies. I am
largely not concerned with the question whether or not a musician’s work resists. As
Foucault recommends, “the essential aim will not be to determine whether these
discursive productions… lead one to formulate the truth… or on the contrary falsehoods

witnessed, in all the bourgeois countries, the ascent to dominance of an entirely new kind of intellectual
within a formation which continued to call itself a Left. The characteristic posture of this new intellectual
was that he or she would gain legitimacy on the Left by constantly and fervently referring to the Third
World, Cuba, national liberation, and so on, but would also be openly and contemptuously anti-communist;
would often enough not affiliate even with that other tradition which had also descended from classical
Marxism, namely social democracy, nor be affiliated in any degree with any labor movement whatsoever,
but would invoke an anti-bourgeois stance in the name of manifestly reactionary anti-humanisms…” (Aijaz
Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures [New York: Verso, 1992], 192.)
22

!

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 12.

52
designed to conceal the truth.”23 In other words, I am less concerned with whether or not
the artists I will later discuss in detail are actually producing political strategies, than I am
with the production of power and knowledge that accompanies the discourse about them
and their work. The question at the moment is not the political or social efficacy of
rappers lyrical and performative work; it is how representative frameworks limit how we
understand that efficacy in the academy. 24

Rap and resistance

In March 2013, the Brooklyn Academy of Music hosted an event entitled “Mic
Check: Hip Hop from North Africa and the Middle East.” The event literature described
it as follows:
From the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, rappers have
emerged as torchbearers of the movement’s progressive energy and restless
defiant spirit. For Mic Check: Hip-Hop from North Africa and the Middle East,
BAM brings together a host of these intrepid anthem writers—Amkoullel (Mali),
Deeb (Egypt), El Général (Tunisia), Shadia Mansour (Palestine/UK)—alongside
more traditional musicians Brahim Fribgane and Yacouba for an evening of
contemporary music born from radical social and political change.25
The event and the artists’ roundtable that preceded it was a noteworthy showcase of Arab
musicians on one of New York’s most prestigious stages. The curation by Zeyba Rahman
brought rap in Arabic to an international stage as perhaps its live performance had not yet
been. The innovative curation of this concert is both interesting and curious for a few
23

Ibid., 11, emphasis added.

24

I owe much here to Lila Abu-Lughod’s suggestion that we might better use resistance as a “diagnostic of
power.” (Lila Abu-Lughod, “Romance of Resistance,” 42.)
25
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reasons. Looking at these closely sets the stage for a discussion of the neoliberal
orientalism I see at play in the attributions of resistance to these artists.
First, there were the dynamics in the opera house itself. For an event focused on
“intrepid anthem writers” it is interesting that the lyrics of the anthems themselves were,
for a majority of the gathered audience, impossible to follow.26 Even though BAM
regularly hosts events in this venue with supertitles, the singers sang in their Arabic and
African dialects without the assistance of simultaneous translation. Lyrics were printed in
the program, but the house was not lit during the event. Audience members remained
seated for the considerable majority of the evening. The “radical social and political
change,” whose music had been discovered and showcased by BAM, was thus for the
most part communicated through the addresses to the audience by the artists fluent
enough in English to do so and the framework BAM provided. Deeb used call and
response during his set. Shadia Mansour gave an impassioned and expansive address
about Palestinian prisoners, and Amkoullel encouraged the audience to join him in
dance.27 Ultimately, the political reach and meaning of these gestures was formed or
limited by the general framework constructed to bring these artists together.
In the artists’ roundtable two days before the concert, Mansour, Deeb, and Ben
Amor (El Général) admitted they were not familiar with Amkoullel’s work before having
been invited by BAM to New York. The inclusion of this musician from Mali on billing
that reads “from North Africa and the Middle East” and implies direct connections with

26

The musicians sang in different dialects without supertitles. Even if a majority of the audience – unclear
from audience responses if a majority was Palestinian, Egyptian, Tunisian, or from Mali – understood one
dialect, it is extremely unlikely that more than a handful of people could understand multiple performers,
much less all of them, just by listening.
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the revolutions of 2010-2013 is decidedly curious. First, Mali is not typically included in
the umbrella of “North Africa.” It has a different history, ethnic makeup, linguistic
currents, and patterns of economic development than its northern neighbors. Claiming
Amkoullel is North African because he is from Mali is at best unusual and at worst
patently false – this is so regardless of the decidedly problematic racial and economic
considerations that have accompanied the division (by the “West” or the UN) of the
African continent into regions. Second, even though Mali is, approximately speaking,
near Tunisia, a country which did witness quite radical “social and political change”
recently, the unrest in Northern Mali in 2012-2013 cannot be said to even remotely
resemble the revolutions of the “Arab Spring.” Of course, this would not matter if the
event were billed as anything but a celebration of music “from the recent revolutions of
North Africa and the Middle East.” Since the event was billed as such a celebration,
however, and since the lyrical meanings of the artists’ music were obscured in
performance, these curatorial choices are important. The umbrella provided by BAM had
the effect of collapsing these important differences into one muddy, political soup. My
point is that this is not accidental, even if it was not intentional, but ideological.
The problematic reduction of the artists to a shared common background and
politics can also be seen among the three Arab musicians. A practice of collaboration
among rappers in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Arab diaspora had by
2011 become impossible for fans or critics following the genre to ignore.28 These
collaborations allow artists to experiment with sounds and political expressions, reach
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A well-publicized example of this is the collaborative album Khat Thaleth, produced by Stronghold
Sound, released January 22, 2013, accessed November 18, 2014,
http://strongholdsound.bandcamp.com/album/khat-thaleth.
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new audiences, and strengthen both aesthetic and political alliances. Even so, the Arab
artists invited to perform in this event (Deeb, El Général, and Mansour) had never before
collaborated. 29 There is a rich history of borrowing and exchange between Tunisian,
Algerian, and Moroccan rappers. But their work has a notoriously limited reach in the
Levant and Egypt. Mansour, a resident of the UK, has collaborated extensively with
Eygptian and Palestinian crews, but not with Deeb. The artificial collaboration imposed
by the curation on these artists by bringing them together under one umbrella of “music
born of… change” has the effect of collapsing the very specific politics each musician
addresses and the very different aesthetics in their work. Deeb, Mansour, and Ben Amor
do not have similar histories in performing their music or in the subjects they address in
their lyrics. The sense one gets from the curation is a little bit of tokenism, looking for
wide representation: Deeb as a sort of liberal hipster, Mansour as a woman, and El
Général as imprisoned rebel rapping against the machine. Moreover, the artists reacted to
the reality of being thusly abstracted.
For example Deeb closed his set with the following call and response, “When I
say Egypt, you say Free! Egypt – ” and then the audience responded “Free!” He repeated
it with Syria and Palestine (which received the heartiest response). This exchange is

29

Journalists like Moe Ali Nayel and Mohammed Jabali and many of the musicians I interviewed have
suggested to me that this historical lack of interaction and collaboration is due to the wide discrepancies in
local dialects between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North African coast, something rappers within the
Levant, or between the Levant and Egypt encounter to a much lesser extent. There is a considerable
exchange between North African artists and French musicians of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian
descent. These artists share French in addition to local dialects. Interestingly, despite the persistence of
French language education in some parts of Lebanon, and despite the diasporic experiences in France of
some Lebanese musicians during the Lebanese Civil War (I am thinking primarily of El Rass and Rayess
Bek), the collaborations between them and their North African colleagues in this genre is still negligible. I
have yet to encounter a compelling explanation for this. My own hypothesis is that the differences are more
aesthetic and economic than linguistic. Finally, it is worth noting that this may in fact have begun to change
ever so slightly since the Tunisian Revolution, as those events sparked a renewed interest in pan-Arab
collaborations, political debates, and communication in addition to a surge in Arabic rap production.
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recorded on the track and in recordings of other live events. At BAM, however, he
rounded out the exchange with “the World –”/ “Free”; a choice that seemed to mute the
powerful resonance of the refrain “Palestine/Free” that preceded it. But the most
remarkable indication of the political washing out of the event came in Amkoullel’s
closing set.
Amkoullel’s most popular track is perhaps “SOS”: a piece which recounts the
difficulty of fighting off violence and extremism in Northern Mali. This number, which
he performed at BAM in the midst of the expedition of French troops to its former colony
(in just another iteration of the world-wide “War on Terror”),30 basically asks for help.
The chorus of the song is in French. The curatorial choice to conclude an evening born of
the radical politics of the “Arab Spring” 31 with a SOS to French power was simply a
remarkable appropriation of the local, radical energy of this period. The curation risked
translating the radical critiques of corruption, nepotism, and racism in the preceding
musicians tracks into a plea for Western aid. Allowing the chorus of “SOS” to conclude
the evening was a specific – and very political – interpretation of the “radical and social
change” sweeping “the region” between 2010 and 2013.32 In this way, the curatorial
team, while pretending objectivity, imparted political meaning on the kind of change and
the means of that change that the lot of presenting artists supposedly share.
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Adam Nossiter and Eric Schmitt, “France Battling Islamists in Mali,” New York Times, January 11, 2013,
accessed November 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebelsfrance.html.
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The Arab Spring was always the implied context of this event, if not declared outright.

Anti-foreign intervention energy and mobilization was a significant part of political mobilization and
rhetoric in every single Arab country (from Tunisia to Yemen) that experienced political and social
upheaval in 2010-2013. The most contested of these of course has been in Libya, where Western powers
did intervene, and in Syria, where (at time of writing) they have yet to, in an official capacity.
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Having sung “SOS,” Amkoullel changed the mood. Reminding the audience that
“we musicians,” while sometimes engaging politics, also need to have fun, he proceeded
to remove his traditional vest and began to dance, topless, asking the audience to shake
their hips with his. He then sang his song “Farafina” a song with the message,
underscored in call and response, that “We are all Africa.” Hisham Aidi calls this
“blackwashing”: the attempt to tame political expressions with appeals to African
American or trans-Atlantic African diasporic culture.33
Indeed, what is significant about the curation of the BAM event is that it makes
very obvious an imagined correlation between Arab politics and black bodies. More than
this, the curation relies on this connection in order to produce a sense of cohesion
between the artists. Here the confluence of black and Arab is enacted and performed by
an art institution, but it exists in mainstream journalism, in efforts of the state department
and their research and cultural programming, and in popular culture.34 This imagined
correlation between black bodies and Arab politics draws together exoticized images of
both black and Arab experiences.
Moustafa Bayoumi writes about the emergence of “the African American” as
“intermediary” with the Muslim World. Bayoumi suggests this correspondence between
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Hisham Aidi, “The X Factor,” Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2014), Kindle edition.
34

Moustafa Bayoumi suggests that the black man (he doesn’t specify gender, but I am – because in his
analysis it is obvious he means black men), because of his own lived history of oppression, has emerged as
the figure capable of empathizing with Arabs today. Films like The Siege, The Kingdom, and The Traitor
portray “blacks at the helm” of liberal American empire. (Bayoumi, “The Race is On: Muslims and Arabs
in the American Imagination,” Middle East Research and Information Project, March 2010, accessed
November 9, 2014, http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/race.)
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blackness and Arabness represents a significant shift in a US racial imagination.35
Whereas a post-World War II US racial imagination frequently conflated Arabs and Jews
in a sort of general anti-Semitism, and the 1980s saw ubiquitous images of Arabs as
terrorists and oil sheikhs,36 in the post-9/11 period, Arabs have taken more of the
spotlight as the denigrated racial “other” – leading to the popularized formulation “Arab
is the new Black.”37 This latter phrase refers to a noticeable shift in surveillance and
profiling – especially in heavily policed cities like New York City – from African
American populations to Arab and Muslim ones. Most of the focus in literature that
explores this new racism perhaps understandably emphasizes the effects on Arab and
Muslim communities and the changing negative representations of Arabs.38 The
transformation of the representations of African Americans however, in particular their
emergence as iconically American, is just as significant. Bayoumi asks, “What could be
more American today, after all, than the African American?”39
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I am aware of a certain fluidity in this section in my use of “Arab” and “Muslim.” They are obviously not
the same thing. Many have taken pains to parse this, especially in order to counter an increasingly acrid
Islamophobia in the public sphere of many European and American countries. The thread of this latter
critique is that all “brown”—looking people, Asians, Latin@s, and of course Arabs, are being cast as
dangerous “Muslims” in cities grappling with the effects of increased immigration. Since I am talking
about this imagination that frequently collapses the two, I permit myself the same fluidity in order to
address the scope and reach of the phenomenon. It should not be construed as an endorsement, however, of
this problematic ignorance. (See Steven Salaita, Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where it Comes from and
What it Means for Politics Today [London: Pluto Press, 2006], 10.)
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Despite the different histories of Arabic poetic expression that Arab rappers
regularly invoke as influential, rap in Arabic has nevertheless provided an especially
fertile soil for this racial imagination.40 It has already been exploited by the State
Department. Hisham Aidi explores blackwashing in the context of the Rhythm Road
Tours, a program developed by the State Department in partnership with Jazz at Lincoln
Center. In 2004, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the tours revived a
strategy of cultural diplomacy used during the Cold War. Then, jazz superstars stars like
Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodman, and Duke Ellington were dubbed
“Jazz Ambassadors” and sent by the State Department to the Middle East, the former
Soviet block, Africa, and southeast Asia to play their music and to spread what they
hoped would be a political imagination uniquely tied to the US. Politicians and musicians
alike concluded that this experimental program was “powerfully effective against Red
propaganda.”41 Results of the Rhythm Road program have been more mixed. Originally
featuring rap crews, the millennial incarnation of the Cold War strategy was sent to
appeal to Arab and Muslim youth across North Africa, the Middle East, and the parts of
Asia most susceptible to extremism, through the message of hip hop.
The tool of hip hop seemed to appeal to these cultural policy makers for two
reasons. First, for its aesthetic qualities of “speaking truth to power” or, in the words of
the State Department, “promoting dissent.” And second for a perceived opportunity to
40

Timothy Taylor writes that the dominance of American popular music, itself influenced heavily by
African American sounds, from Jazz to Rock-and-Roll, leads to the effect that “African American sounds
[are] taken to signal ‘western’ more generally.” (Timothy Taylor, Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and
the World [Durham: Duke UP, 2007], Kindle edition, location 2909.)
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The quote is attributed to Gillespie. See Fred Kaplan, “When Ambassadors Had Rhythm,” New York
Times, June 29, 2008, accessed November 11, 2014,
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connect with Muslim youth via hip hop’s history with Islam in the US. In fact, Aidi links
the choices of the State Department to use hip hop and rap to reach out to Arab and
Muslim youth directly to the transnational history and political legacy of Malcom X. The
latter is frequently referred to in rap lyrics, and held in high esteem. Noting this, Aidi
argues that the State Department sought to capitalize on aspects of Malcom’s thought and
experience, while attempting to align his figure more closely with the interests of the US
state.42 That is, they attempt to recast his political legacy: framing Malcom X as a hero of
the post-Civil Rights Era, one celebrated by a “post-racial” US, presumably one that does
not torture. Aidi points out that the Rhythm Road program recognized the long history of
Islam in rap music as it developed in the United States and hoped to use this musical
genre, home-grown in the US, as a tool against Islamic extremism abroad. Aidi connects
this interest in “soft diplomacy” to the concurrent energies of different politico-religious
partnerships that worked to secure funding and investment in schools of Islamic thought
in the US that they found most amenable to US policies.43
If the Jazz Ambassadors were sent to counter “Red propaganda” and defeat
communism, the “hip hop envoys” (as participants in the Rhythm Road tours were called)
were sent to stave off religious extremism. And if the free experimentation of jazz offered
an imaginative escape from the rigid confines of Soviet communism, US hip hop was
packaged to promote the “free expression,” “democracy,” and “dissent” that were at once
denied by fundamentalist Islam, and which US policy makers hoped would undo it.44
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What is significant to me in this use of hip hop in the Arab world is the reworking of
“dissent” as a tool of US imperial power. This fashioning of “dissent” was achieved
through the imaginative blending of Arab and black experience. The Rhythm Roads
Tours hoped to use elements of African American culture as a tool to seduce and appeal
to Arab and Muslim youth, who, once won over by US culture, would presumably be less
likely to dissent against capitalist exploitation and occupation by US forces.
I refer to the BAM concert as an example of a discourse of resistance structured
by neoliberalism in the context of a history of cultural programming like the Rhythm
Road tours to suggest that this one concert was not an anomaly. Rather, its curation built
off of energies and expectations generated through other cultural institutions,
programming, and support. I have been using the example of the BAM concert to lay out
the elements of neoliberal orientalism that structure the discourse of resistance in arts
programming I wish to critique. These elements include: collapsing the background of
different artists and different politics under one rubric of “radical change”; substituting a
distinctly liberal political message (like the call for foreign intervention) for the ethos of
otherwise untranslated political expression; and blackwashing – tapping into imagined
African or African American experience in order to access Arab subjects.45 While
Hisham Aidi’s work highlights how blackwashing works when the State Department
used a sanitized perception of Malcom X in order to reach Arab audiences, the curation
of the BAM concert as discussed here illustrates how blackwashing works by tapping
into an imagination of African diasporic experience to frame for audiences the Arab
performers in front of them.
45
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The curation of “Mic Check” built on the dynamics Aidi describes, but it added
another dimension. BAM’s event, held in the predominantly (since the 1970s) African
American and Puerto Rican and rapidly gentrifying neighborhood of Downtown
Brooklyn, encouraged the imaginative confluence of Arab politics with black culture in
the US via the medium of hip hop.46 But it also conjured a more global imagination, one
tied with the aesthetics of “World Music,” wherein performances of tribal authenticity
were melded with ideas of change, struggle, and politics in this region of the “Third
World.” This Third World “otherness” was conjured by the “authenticity” and “tradition”
performed by the two ʿoud musicians who played between the rap sets and had a visual
counterpart in the costume choices of some of the artists. (Mansour wore an embroidered
Palestinian gown, or thob and Amkoullel wore a wide brimmed straw hat and Malien vets
and pants.47) These elements of “authenticity” were deliberately juxtaposed with the
“modern” sounds of hip hop to create an aesthetic of “hybridity.” Hybridity, what
Timothy Taylor has called the “new exotic” in the genre of world music, tends to feature
blackness centrally and also feeds into narratives of resistance and change. Taylor notes
that blackness has the tendency to fall out of narratives or analysis of resistance, even
though its presence helps to conjure it.48 This would explain how Amkoullel could not
46

Hillary Miller has explored how BAM has been at the heart of contests over what constitutes culture,
funding, and public space in Downtown Brooklyn. She shows convincingly how the “revitalization” of
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Northwestern UP, forthcoming 2016).
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only fit into billing “From the Middle East and North Africa” and how his music could be
understood as being borne of the struggles of the Arab Spring – it points to how he was
centrally necessary for it. Noting that “blackwashing” exists in the discourse of resistance
around Arabic rap maintains focus on the productivity of these racial imaginations.
To be very clear, it is not that there is no similarity between Arab and Black
struggles or no solidarity between these agents. It is that this solidarity desperately needs
to be deliberated; it cannot be projected. There is good reason to be hopeful about these
alliances,49 but there is also considerable reason not to project ideas of solidarity, as the
alliances are very much not clear.50 Imposing a framework of solidarity, or of simple
commonality, as BAM did, enacts a washed-out, liberal understanding of oppression,
liberation, and change. In this vision of the world, these voices “from [North] Africa” are
understood in terms of projects that “oppressed” people must need: like the right to
education, to individual freedom, and above all to the freedom of expression. Within the
curation proposed by BAM, even Shadia Mansour’s impassioned lecture about the
condition of Palestinians in Israeli jails risked being understood as a problem of abstract
censorship and oppression, completely severed from US influence or power.

African American musics have influenced musicians around the world, but if the discussion in question is
about ‘world music’ and is framed by questions of authenticity or hybridity, blackness frequently falls by
the wayside.” (Taylor, Beyond Exoticism, Kindle locations 2838-2842).
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In sum, the effect of the curation, which was facilitated by an appeal to
overlapping racial imaginations, was to depolitcize both these musicians’ work and the
struggles they claim they address. This happened despite, indeed through, a deliberate
and overt framework of “radical and social change.” 51 Event literature deliberately
invoked the “Arab Spring” while pitiful efforts were made to illuminate those political
enjeux (and several were seemingly made to obscure them). The event, which overtly
championed “progressive energy,” a “restless defiant spirit,” and “radical change” relied
on a through-line of black culture and one literal black body, culminating in the refrain
“we are all Africa.” This curatorial framework appeared to be invisible (read: neutral),
benevolently encouraging the artists to “speak for themselves.” In fact, however, the
framework directly structured how meaning could be made from these artists’ work.
Through BAM’s curatorial frame, political change was best understood as a multicultural
call for a “free world,” in which we all recognized our similarities (and our urge to dance)
and grooved a little. Aidi called this phenomenon “blackwashing” and I locate it in the
“discourse of resistance” I identify around rap in Arabic. The putting into discourse of
cultural resistance – in this case, the literal putting on stage of these political artists –
builds on specific racial imaginations. As I’ve begun to deliberate here, this imagination
is informed by the specific, material conditions of the status-quo politics that maintain
them.

51

It deserves mention that the title of the event (“mic check”) further capitalized on a protest strategy
during “Occupy Wall Street,” with which many New Yorkers may have been familiar with at the time. This
further feeds the impression of protest politics that audiences were invited to explore during the concert.
(See Edward D. Miller, “Authoring the Occupation: the Mic Check, the Human Microphone, and the
Loudness of Listening,” in Media Authorship, ed. Cynthia Chris and David A. Gerstner [New York:
Routledge, 2013], 180-193.)
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Moreover, it is worth pointing to the general political milieu in which the
“discourse of resistance” I’ve been discussing is found. Central to Michel Foucault’s
deliberations on sexuality is his attention to an “endlessly proliferating economy on the
discourse of sex.”52 Foucault suggests that this expansive discourse, the mandate to
discuss sex, obscures the liberation such speech is meant to enact. We talk of sex to prove
we are no longer repressed. But this insistence creates a loop wherein Western society
(according to Foucault) continues to enact the same anxieties, but in the form of sexual
liberation. Foucault’s focus is thus not on the existence or disappearance of repression but
on the “mechanics of these incitements” to speak.53
A proliferation of talk about “resistance,” about creative dissent, and about free
speech in the face of censorship can be similarly understood. The discursivity around
resistance and politics in cultural production has emerged at a time when the debate and
consideration of actual political strategies has retreated from universities and intellectual
life. Many have pointed out the depoliticizing effects of the so-called “cultural turn” over
the past few decades. Nicky Gregson calls this “the evacuation of the social”; Donald
Mitchell has argued that the cultural emphasis in “postmodern” approaches in humanistic
literatures has rerouted research away from analysis of and intervention in sociopolitical
struggle; and Vivek Chibber accuses strands of post-colonial studies in particular of
refusing to actually engage in class or material analysis.54 Understanding that a
52
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“discourse of resistance” exists derives its significance from acknowledging that its use
enacts something. In the “appearance of a deliberate transgression,”55 the celebration of
“resistance” reflects on the speaker. “We” talk of resistance everywhere in order to prove
that we do not condone censorship or repression – in order to prove that our societies are
free – unlike those from which the resistant artists hail – and in order to affirm our own
tolerance.56 The celebration of “dissent” that has pervaded art programming in recent
years is an especially rich archive of the confident anxiety around political alternatives
where neoliberal power has taken hold. The concert at BAM and the talk at Columbia
discussed above are both examples of events showcasing Arab politics, resistance, and
dissent.57 As I have argued here, both depoliticize the artistic subjects they present.
Which is to say, enthusiasm for narratives of “resistance” fills in where the debate of
political alternatives has abated. The political and racial landscape in which the discourse
of resistance is found now deserves further attention. “Neoliberal orientalism” makes
specific a particular framework of representation of Arab youth in particular. 58 It is
informed by the jockeying for power between players in the Global North and South, in
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which contest over control of resources in the Middle East has for some time been a
central theatre.

Neoliberal orientalism

What can be discerned about the intersecting efforts of the academe, art
institutions, and the state department that sustain this “discourse of resistance”? What is
the relationship between racial imagination and material dispossession? The discourse of
resistance I am identifying around rap in Arabic relies on, indeed is managed by, the
convergence of contemporary orientalism and contemporary global capitalism, or
neoliberalism. Neoliberal orientalism imagines exoticized others by incorporating,
augmenting, and adjusting racial imaginations. It does so as part of a political regime that
is built on the expansion of capital between north and south, which expands its material
power vis-à-vis dispossession and the dismantling of the services traditionally provided
by the state. The discourse of resistance is one kind of knowledge production that
sustains this phenomenon.
In choosing the phrase “neoliberal orientalism” to describe what the discourse of
resistance serves, I am admittedly slamming two concepts together: one which has been
used to discern a contemporary iteration of late capitalism; and one which has been used
to deconstruct a racist, colonial mentality projected onto the “East” by the “West.” To
readers familiar with Said’s work on Orientalism, it will be clear why Foucault’s work on
discursivity has been useful to me up to this point. Said leans on Foucault’s concept of a
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discourse to make his case for the existence of orientalism.59 At the same time, it may
seem less clear how Foucault’s work on discourse and the production of knowledge will
serve a critique of neoliberalism, especially considering the overtly Marxist vein that runs
through what follows. My urge to combine the critique of a particular discourse with a
material analysis and critique of neoliberalism into a single, productive phrase comes
from frustration with both: Marxist critiques of late capitalism that leave little room for
an analysis of racism alongside that of class,60 as well as post-colonial critiques of
“colonized/colonial mentality” that hesitate to recognize the machinations of class and
material, institutional power in the perpetuation of racism and discrimination. 61
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Said writes, “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the
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as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify
Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly
understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even
produce—the Orient...” (Edward Said, Orientalism [New York: Penguin Books, 1977], 3.) Aijaz Ahmad
thoroughly critiques what he sees as Said’s sloppy use of Foucault, a critique to which I will return to
shortly. (Ahmad, In Theory, 166-167.)
60

Vivek Chibber has suggested a common thread in this postcolonial literature centers on Marx’s notion of
“abstract labor” which is seen as “a prime example of the deficiencies of universalizing theories.” (Chibber,
Postcolonial Theory, 130. In this passage, he is in particular talking about Dipesh Chakrabarty’s
Provincializing Europe [Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2000].) Scholars like Lisa Lowe and David Roediger
have argued that Marx’s abstract analysis of social difference is incompatible with the reality of racial
difference in the workplace. In other words, Marx’s theory doesn’t explain how racial discrimination
effects capital. (Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics [Durham, NC: Duke UP,
1996]; David R. Roediger, How Race Survived US History: From Settlement and Slavery to the Obama
Phenomenon [London: Verso, 2008].) Cornell West has also analyzed a trajectory of African American
socialist thinkers, whose early deficiencies, he points out, were that they confined their analyses of racism
to the workplace. (See West, “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism,” Chicago Democratic Socialists of
America, accessed November 9, 2014, http://www.chicagodsa.org/CornelWest.html.)
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Said wrote, “[I]n the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the imperial or colonial or racial
sense, race takes precedence over both class and gender.” I do not share this belief of his. If orientalism as a
concept or way of understanding the representation of Arab youth on global stages is to be useful, it must
be qualified to bring an analysis of material reality – of class at least, though eventually this is
indecipherable without also considering gender – on par with that of race. (Said, “Media, Margins, and
Modernity: Raymond Williams and Edward Said,” ix; Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism:
Against the New Conformists [London: Verso, 1989], 196-197.) Others have made this critique of Said (see
Ahmad, In Theory, 197), most of which fall in line with the critiques of the “cultural turn” referred to
earlier. For example Neil Smith has argued that basic social categories (such as gender, race, and class)
have been recast as subjectivities and identities, obscured from the material processes of their construction.
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In arguing for and recognizing neoliberal orientalism in the representation of
artists, musicians, and performers who are also, predominantly, Arab youth, I attempt to
describe the interconnected material and affective frameworks that continue to produce
racist representations and unequal opportunities. I also attempt to bring together and
respond to critiques of Marxist analyses which accuse the latter of “reducing everything
to political economy” and critiques of post-colonial analysis which “blame everything on
the West.” It is certain that a compelling analysis must address both race and class (or at
least if not class, than material inequality). But how to do this? That is, without
essentializing race or class, how can the intersections of material exclusion and racist
discrimination be understood? Theorizing “neoliberal orientalism” is my attempt to do
this.

“Neoliberal – ”

The debate over the relevance of the term “neoliberalism” in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA Region) has been a heated one. I want to clarify what I mean when
I refer to the term in this study and why I find locating “neoliberalism” useful. I
understand neoliberal power as characterized by three central features.
First, it does not originate in one part of the globe. It builds its power and extends
its flexibility because of a reciprocal relationship it embodies between “north” and
“south.” In associating this fluidity with neoliberalism, I position myself in the current
debate about the relevance of the term “neoliberalism” to studies of the contemporary
(Neil Smith, “Socializing Culture, Radicalizing the Social,” Social and Cultural Geography 1 [2000]: 2528.)
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Middle East. I am distancing myself from the argument that “neoliberalism” cannot be
used to understand grievances or changes in this region because local particularities
trump global trends. This argument, more prevalent in popular usage than in published
work, has become considerably less popular since analyses of social movements during
Arab Uprisings consistently pointed to shared economic grievances across the region –
grievances protesters share with others across the Global South and in the slums and
ghettos of the Global North.62 The argument against the relevance of neoliberalism in the
MENA suggests that the region’s economic growth (different sites within it at varying
degrees) is primarily being hampered by local corruption, religious conservatism, and
autocracy innate to the culture of the region and not global trends in financial capitalism.
As Koenraad Bogaert describes, in pre-2011 studies of ruling elites in the MENA region
“a misleading subdivision is made and everything that falls under neoliberalism is
situated within the realm of economics while the ‘regime’ is situated within the realm of
politics.”63 Like Bogaert, I refuse the bifurcation of “politics” and “economics” – where
the former is local, cultural, and historical and the latter informed primarily by the global
present. The argument that a blanketing “neoliberalism” like a similarly encompassing
“capitalism” should not and cannot be read onto the diverse and different cities of the
Global South shares many features in common with post-colonial theory that seeks to
establish that the reach of capitalism into Asia in particular in the twentieth and twenty62

But it was still current enough in 2013 to send academic roundtables into heated debate. “Neoliberal
Urbanizations in the Arab World,” roundtable, organized by Alaaʿ Al-Hamarneh. (Middle East Studies
Association Annual Conference, October 12, 2013, New Orleans, accessed February 18, 2016, Louisiana.)
https://mesana.org/mymesa/meeting_program_session.php?sid=774d7fa6343cb7fd8e13091518e7d3c3.
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Bogaert, “What Do We Mean When We Talk about Neoliberal Urbanism in the Arab World?” paper
presented at “Neoliberal Urbanizations in the Arab World,”
https://mesana.org/mymesa/meeting_program_desc.php?pid=ba68cc2f3e303cfdb5f2e2979a8888a7,
accessed February 18, 2016. (See previous note.)
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first century must be understood as wholly distinct from the development of capitalism in
Western Europe and the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.64 I want to
distance myself from this argument.
My own analysis follows the Marxist critiques coming out of Beirut, Cairo,
Mumbai, and elsewhere that underscore a faulty essentialism in these refusals of capital
as a framework for understanding power.65 I find problematic the idea that capitalism in
the “Global South” is essentially different from that in the “Global North.” In particular, I
reject the hesitancy to identify and analyze neoliberal incursions as such based on the
belief that the Global South develops at a different pace than the Global North. Different
regions develop differently; but it is in fact the exchange of capital, and indeed the
negotiation of it between North and South, that defines the different experiences between
neoliberal societies.
Following Stephen Graham, I instead consider that neoliberal incursions in the socalled Global South in fact inform how neoliberal power moves and operates in the
Global North.66 Neoliberalism thus refers to a configuration (theoretical and practical) of
late capitalism that cannot be relegated to the cities of Europe, Japan, or North America.
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For critiques of this tendency, see Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital; Benita
Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London: Routledge, 2004); and Crystal Bartolovich
and Neil Lazarus, eds., Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004).
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Partha Chatterjee’s work is a good example of this trend. I will return to his work later in this chapter.
See previous note.
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Graham writes that through “processes of imitation, explicitly colonial models of pacification,
militarization and control, honed on the streets of the global South, are spread to the cities of capitalist
heartlands in the North. This synergy, between foreign and homeland security operations, is [a] … key
feature of the new military urbanism.” (Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism
[New York: Verso, 2001], xvi-xvii.)
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While Paul Amar has called this reciprocal relationship the “end of neoliberalism,”67 I
consider this in fact a most powerful distinguishing feature of neoliberalism. Amar
explores how strategies in urban securitization, for example, are tried out in the
occupations of Baghdad and Ramallah, and in the favelas of Rio, and then imported to
New York or the US-Mexico border.68 In fact, the traversing of the South/North division
– the construction of “core” and “periphery” through the increased contact between the
two – has been central to how neoliberal ideology and practice has functioned since the
first experiments of the so-called Chicago Boys in Chile in the 1970s.69
Secondly, I understand that neoliberal power is characterized by shrinking states
and the non-governmental energies developed to fill in this deficit. This may be the result
either of policies imposed on countries by creditors (as in the case of Lebanon); by
military force (as in Iraq); or by elected representatives (as in Tunisia); or a combination
of any of these (as in Egypt).70 That is, neoliberal orientalism appears in starkest relief
when states and the services they provide are shrinking and the non-governmental
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Amar frames the “end of neoliberalism” as the rise of or increased concentration of facets of
“international humanism,” to impose a “moralized” security on unruly publics, via the intersections of nongovernmental efforts (which he calls in a most useful formulation, parastatal formations). Focused on
specific case studies of Egypt and Brazil, his are uniquely focused analyses of many processes that others
have attributed directly to neoliberalism. My assessment is that Amar’s declaration of the “end of”
neoliberalism stems from fatigue conjured by the debates around “neoliberalism” in political science and
developmentalist circles as opposed to an interest in drawing finite distinctions between the modes of
governmentality he discusses and those that are found “in” neoliberalism. (Paul Amar, The Security
Archipelago: Human Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism [Durham: Duke UP,
2013].)
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My examples here are informed by Amar’s work, which looks at patterns of securitization and
surveillance in Brazil and Egypt (Amar, The Security Archipelago). See previous note.
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Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Picador, 2008), 91-105.

For a solid comparative study see, Nazih Ayubi, “Etatisme Versus Privatization: The Changing
Economic Role of the State in Nine Arab Countries,” in Economic Transition in the Middle East: Global
Challenges and Adjustment Strategies, ed. Heba Handoussa (Cairo: American U in Cairo P, 1997), 125166.
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organizations (NGOs) that attempt to fill these gaps are proliferating.71 A critical
consideration of debt at an individual and national level is a central part of understanding
this aspect of neoliberalism. Moreover, at the same time that states are downsized at
home, they attempt to expand their reach away from home, building a market for
contractors, and NGOs.
Stephen Gill has argued that neoliberalism “is an epoch-making order” manifest
in part in the “quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms.” 72 My
own study shares with his the understanding that neoliberal power is removed from
central states and invested more directly into “quasi-constitutional regional
arrangements,” the “multilateral regulatory framework of the new World Trade
Organization,” and an economy of non-governmental organizations and contractors.73
Aiwha Ong has called this effect of neoliberal state formation as “overlapping” or
“graduated sovereignties.”74 Especially relevant to the exploration I am conducting of
neoliberal discursive power is that the state may no longer be either the central conduit of
this power or the primary generator of this discourse. Indeed, the wholesale shrinking of
the state that many theorists have described in neoliberal economy should not signal the
absence of centralized power or the elimination of elite hegemony.75 On the contrary, as
71

See Koenraad Bogaert, “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics Behind Three Decades of
Neoliberalism,” Middle East Critique 2013: 17-19.
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Stephen Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium: Journal
of International Studies 24 (1995): 399-423.
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Ibid.
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Aiwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (London: Duke UP,
2006), 7.
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In her discussion of the transforming concept of “civil society” in relationship to NGO economies, Sibille
Merz points out, “In development policy, the idea of civil society, mostly reduced to NGOs… is closely
tied up with the notion of good governance and often equated with political as well as economic
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David Harvey has argued, this shrinking of the state has ostensibly only removed the
workings of power from public accountability, without significantly restructuring it as
more egalitarian.76 In much of the Arab world, the shriveling of the state under the
context of “failed,” “besieged,” and “promised” states has led to the proliferation of
NGOs upon which denizens now depend as heavily as they may have on proper social
security and other services provided by a traditional nation-state. Neoliberalism in this
study also means considering the discourses that an economy of NGOs constructs.
The third and final defining characteristic of neoliberalism that I consider is
colonial appropriation. This may be manifest either in outright military or police
occupation, or alternatively as settler colonialism. Neoliberalism in the MENA region
today is indecipherable from the contest between international and regional powers over
the satellite control of resources and governance in the Arab world. The fact that I
consider the structure of these colonial interventions to be inherently neoliberal does not
pretend to negate the presence of different forms of racism, as I will elaborate in the
discussion of “orientalism” below.
Colonial appropriation then, as Timothy Mitchell, Gilbert Achcar, and others have
argued, considers the significance of the contest over oil in this region and the continued
colonial dimensions therein.77 Recognizing this is not reducing Arab culture or politics
(or resistance!) to the ambitions of multinational oil companies or the imperial behavior

liberalization.” (Sibille Merz, “‘Missionaries of the New Era’: Neoliberalism and NGOs in Palestine,”
Race, Class 54 [2012]: 52.)
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David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 205.

Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011);
Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprisings, trans. G. M. Goshgarian
(Berkeley: U of California P, 2013).
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of the states that facilitate this predatory behavior. Rather, this recognition underscores
that the occupation of states like Iraq, resistance against it, and regional dynamics at play
in large part around those interests has irreparably affected local dynamics across the
Levant, and have done so for nearly a century. Oil has placed the peoples of the Middle
East center stage in the post-Cold War theatre. And it has made the region a central pawn
in negotiations between the US, China, and Russia as each of these powers jockey for
international influence and power. As Achcar has put it, “One can deny that oil is the
stake of Western powers’ intervention in the region only at the price of ignoring that
stake’s immense economic and strategic importance.”78 Achcar, Adam Hanieh, and
others even stipulate this is a major driving force behind the unequivocal support of the
US for Israel.79 The investment in, development of, and conflicts over oil in the Middle
East are both: the legacy of eighteenth and nineteenth-century colonialism; and the field
in which the newest kinds of war and dispossession are tried out. This means that
understanding “politics,” even in cultural production like rap concerts, must incorporate
analysis of a legacy of orientalism that is both borne of the colonial period and adapting
to neoliberal technologies and strategies.
My insistence upon qualifying as “neoliberal” the way power operates in MENA
cities also reflects a way of thinking about and historicizing global power and politics,
since the “end” of the colonial period after the Second World War. That is, the shift from
categories of “first” and “third” worlds for global “North” and “South” not only relates to
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Achcar, The People Want, 81.

See Adam Hanieh, “Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power, Parts One and
Two,” MRZine, July 19, 2008, accessed November 9, 2014,
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hanieh190708a.html.
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globalizing economic and cultural strategies but also, significantly, relates to the political
alliances structuring the post-Cold War landscape. Vijay Prashad recounts how following
the Second World War and riding the wave of post-colonial independence struggles, the
“Third World” emerged as a political pact and alliance between new states of former
colonies. This pact joined to pressure Europe and the US for more representation in the
new United Nations. The eventual dominance of terms like Global North/South mark the
ultimate failure of the Third World pact to realize its political goals. It also marks the
emergence of the UN as a devastatingly unequal representation of global interests.80
These three characteristics structure what I mean by neoliberalism in this study: a
reciprocal relationship of power between “north” and “south”; shrinking states and the
non-governmental energies developed to fill this deficit; and dispossession.81 Running
through these central features are many of the terms and buzzwords of neoliberal critique
that have circulated in the last decade. I will discuss specific examples of financialization,
privatization, debt and credit, securitization, gentrification, and “Lebanonization” in the
case studies that follow, unique as their manifestations are to each city. 82
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Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (New York: Verso, 2014),
85-142.
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See for example, Judith Bulter and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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William Safire, “On Language; Izationization,” New York Times, April 21, 1991, accessed August 21,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/21/magazine/on-language-izationization.html.
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“ – Orientalism”

Considering the framework of power, especially vis-à-vis state power which I
have just described as neoliberal, is it at all accurate to continue to speak of orientalism?
Since the relationship between the US and its allies and the Arab world today does not
resemble, in a structural way, the imperial interventions of the French or British of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, or US imperial interests in the same period in the
Far East, is Said’s understanding of orientalism as a way of managing colonized
populations vis-à-vis “vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, [and] colonial
bureaucracy and colonial styles” still relevant? 83
I believe that it is, though the term requires adjusting. The adjustment I offer via
the term “neoliberal orientalism” serves not only to account for the neoliberal structure of
power that has replaced imperial bureaucracy but also to incorporate and accommodate
the critiques that have built on and further developed Said’s observations in the years
since its initial publication. At its essence, neoliberal orientalism adapts – and limits,
actually84 – Said’s understanding of orientalist discourse to the ways in which I just
described neoliberal power as operating.
First, then, neoliberal orientalism acknowledges that the fabrication of denigrating
and exoticized representations of “oriental” others is maintained, like neoliberalism’s
reciprocity between “north” and “south,” vis-à-vis a reciprocal relationship between
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Said, Orientalism, 2.

Aijaz Ahmad remarks that Said attaches “orientalism” both to imperial power and to a “European
imagination” that reaches back to ancient Greece. I return to this discussion later in this chapter. (Ahmad,
In Theory, 181.)
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“east” and “west.” Neoliberal orientalism is not a product of the “west” alone. By
referring to “neoliberal orientalism,” I want to recognize that Arabs themselves are
playing a significant role in the perpetuation of orientalist representations, and that there
are distinct class elements tied to the ability to “speak for” in this way. In considering this
deepening of Said’s concept of orientalism, I recognize that many of the features of the
“discourse of resistance” I highlighted during the “Mic Check” event in New York also
appear in the presentation of artists in the Arab world.
In arguing for an understanding of orientalism as built reciprocally between “east”
and “west” I am building on Lisa Lau’s concept of “re-orientalism.” Lau proposes this
idea to describe a process she calls “Orientalism by Orientals,” which she associates most
clearly with “diasporic Orientals.” Lau underscores and takes issue with these agents’
“speaking for and representing the Other,” “seizing voice and platform,” and thereby
“consign[ing the Oriental] to subalternism.”85 I take from Lau the emphasis she puts on
“orientals” producing orientalism.86 Departing from her work, however, I am again
convinced this type of orientalizing energy has less to do with the location (diasporic
nature) of these individuals as it does with their access to capital. In these Arab cities
with which I am concerned, I find that re-orientalism is much more closely related to
class than location of residence. Of course, there are considerable overlaps between the
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Lisa Lau, “Re-Orientalism: The Perpetration and Development of Orientalism by Orientals,” Modern
Asia Studies 43 (2009): 571-572.
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Edward Said stated that it was never his intention with Orientalism to further reify “East” and “West.”
That is, it was not his intention to mark that only Westerners can produce orientalist discourse. That kind of
thinking, he writes, “adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book
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two, but the tendency to “speak for” so central in Said’s articulation of orientalism87 is
much more widespread within educated and monied classes, wherever they live, than it is
among diasporic populations in general, which are comprised of a fantastic range of
political ideas, access to capital, relation to their countrymen and women, and cities or
countries of origin.88 As Hamid Dabashi has argued, “In an increasingly amorphous and
boundary-less world, it no longer requires us to divide intellectuals along a fictitious
center-periphery axis.”89 Considerations of exchanges of and access to capital are more
relevant than location for understanding how both neoliberalism and orientalism operate.
Building off this idea of fluidity between zones of “East” and “West,” the most
important adjustment in my use of orientalism is that it is based on an understanding of
exchange and interaction, not of encounter. Said’s understanding of orientalism depends
on the notion that the “West” encountered the “East” and through this encounter,
developed the discursive means to manage and produce the Orient. Said’s framework
denies, as Tarek el-Ariss and Nabil Matar (among others) have powerfully demonstrated,
a rich history of transfer and exchange from the other direction: that is, of Arabs
87

In establishing what he meant by orientalist discourse, Said famously takes the example of Gustav
Flaubert writing about the Egyptian courtesan Kuchuk Hanem. Said writes, “…she never spoke of herself,
she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign,
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Oriental.’” (Said, Orientalism, 6, original emphasis in italics, added emphasis underscored.)
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In Brown Skin, White Masks, Hamid Dabashi refers to Joseph Massad’s writing on shifts in the
Palestinian intelligentsia post 1967. Massad denounces those intellectuals in and out of Palestine, within or
without 1948 or 1967 borders, or in the diaspora, who “traded in their national liberation goals for proWestern pragmatism.” Dabashi concludes his discussion of Massad’s history by writing, “the category [of
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ultimately color-blind.” (Hamid Dabashi, Brown Skin, White Masks [New York: Pluto Press, 2011], 45.)
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“encountering” the West and the knowledge they produced.90 For an understanding of
“orientalism” to be productive today, it requires allowing for what Steven Salaita has
called the “interaction of Arabism and Americana”91 – that is, paying attention to how an
Arab community in the US (or in France, Germany, Belgium or elsewhere) “facilitate[s,
or] indeed, inspire[s]”92 representations of Arabs on a globalized stage.
For orientalism to be useful it alsoneeds to be able to reflect a more complicated
and interdependent set of racial dynamics than the ones Said accounts for. This is
especially important in my own study because any discussion of hip hop and power,
considering the genre’s history in the US, is already racially charged. Contextually,
acknowledging the shift from Said’s colonial encounter to the neoliberal exchange means
accounting for how realities of immigration have effected the shape of inner city life in
Europe and the US and how these are actively informing perceptions about the Arab
world.
Moreover, I recognize that the existence and the treatment of increasing numbers
of Arabs and Muslims in growing cities in the US and Europe over the past several
decades accounts for changes in the styles and types of orientalist representation of
Arabs. This interaction between “Arabism and Americana” influences the texture of
orientalism today. Further, I am deciding to continue to speak of orientalism despite a
clear trend in critical discussions of representations of Arabs in recent years to speak
instead of either racism or Islamophobia. I opt to consider “neoliberal orientalism” and
90
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not “neoliberal racism” or “neoliberal Islamophobia” primarily because of a positive as
opposed to negative tone in much of the discourse I critique in this study. While
Islamophobic discourse is almost always negative, orientalism – especially the neoliberal
orientalism I am arguing structures the discourse of resistance I take issue with here – is
more often than not couched in positive, enthusiastic, even celebratory language. If the
ubiquitous celebration of Arab rap as “cultural resistance” is problematic, it is not so
because the orientalizing speaker denigrates or intentionally degrades, but because she
elevates and exoticizes. This formula, which Said also identified in orientalism, remains
central in a discussion of neoliberal orientalism. Ultimately, while Islamophobia can raise
its head in the discourse I suggest is structured by neoliberal orientalism, the history and
context of its use are not particularly suited to the problems I am considering here.93
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One primary difficulty in adapting the discourse of Islamophobia to the discourse of resistance in cultural
production in the cities of Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut is the fact that this term has developed in large
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grassroots, and Muslim players may in part be understood as trepidation about Islam in politics. The
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Second Intifada. Elements of Islamophobia do circulate in NGO discourse that I refer to in neoliberal
orientalism; however I ultimately consider they are not central.
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I am interested, as Said was, in recognizing a systemic way of representing the
Arab world that makes Arabs objects of desire and the places they call home exotic
spaces of experimentation. My adjustment comes from acknowledging that this
imagination today comes from a more complex dynamic of overlapping racisms and of
intercultural exchange. This means in part considering, as Mustafa Bayoumi has
identified, a certain slippage between mainstream perceptions about marginalized
communities, especially between African American and Arab American ones. It also
means considering, as Hisham Aidi has established, how institutions and the US State
have deliberately used perceptions about African American experiences in order to reach
Arab youth. This adjustment to orientalism I propose provides the space to consider, for
example, how blackwashing functions within a framework of representing and
understanding the Arab world.
The third adjustment I propose stems from considering theoretical reproaches of
Said’s construction of the concept of Orientalism. One of the most compelling critiques
Aijaz Ahmad offers of Said is what he calls “the form of Foucault’s resurfacing in Said’s
thought.”94 In this, Ahmad pushes the literary scholar on his use of “discourse,”
questioning where orientalism comes from, or what kind of ideology we should
understand it is attached to. Ahmad points out that Said ties his concept of “orientalism”
to post-Enlightenment Europe, where “Orientalism appears to be an ideological corollary
of colonialism.”95 At the same time, Ahmad notes, Said locates the origins of Western
ideas about the Orient – what Said calls “the European imagination” – in ancient
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Greece.96 Said uses this thousand-plus-year gap to argue that the strength of “the codes of
Orientalist orthodoxy” is derived from their development over hundreds, not tens, of
years. Said writes, “To say simply that orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is
to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather
than after the fact.”97 Ahmad takes reasoned issue with Said’s insinuation that a single
through-line runs through “Western” imagination from Aeschylus to Flaubert, pointing to
a discourse that has only intensified and condensed over time. Ahmad rightly denounces
this as Said’s clumsy use of Foucault. Ahmad writes, “The idea that there could be a
discourse – that is to say, an epistemic construction – traversing the whole breadth of
‘Western’ history and textualities, spanning not only the modern capitalist period but all
the preceding pre-capitalist periods as well, is not only an un-Marxist but also a radically
un-Foucauldian idea.”98
The implications of this critique on the usefulness of Said’s notion of Orientalism
need to be considered, all the more so because I have positioned the usefulness of a
“discourse” (of resistance, that is fueled by neoliberal orientalism) centrally in my
elaborations here. In using the phrase “neoliberal orientalism” I do not envision a further
intensification of the racial imagination Said invokes. There is no single racial
imagination in the “West” distinct from that in an “East” that can be traced from the
defeat of Xerxes through to the occupation of Baghdad by US-led forces. I concur with
Ahmad that this is a soundly essentialist notion that has little use in a material analysis of
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forces of oppression in the Middle East today. Neoliberal orientalism is not meant to
indicate an intensification of colonial orientalism.99
It is meant to address how the shape of neoliberalism structures the contours of
orientalist representations of the Arab world and its subjects. The world is much too fluid
today to productively be split into sealed zones of “east” and “west. ” That is, like Hamid
Dabashi and Gayatri Spivak, I also am concerned with the tendency in Said’s articulation
of orientalism to conjure “victims” and “oppressors” based on their location in the world
or their ethnic identity.100 Neoliberal orientalism, as I structure it in this study, also
considers the orientalising work within the Arab world by Arabs themselves as they try to
enter globalized markets and international opportunities. The imperial context of the
nineteenth century has changed considerably and as such, neoliberal orientalism as I’ve
articulated here accounts for active reciprocity between “core” and “periphery,”
challenging the validity of these concepts. By qualifying this orientalism as neoliberal, I
also point to shifts from colonial bureaucracy to economies built on a coordination of forprofit interests and the NGO sector. Finally, I consider orientalism in this study to build
on overlapping racial imaginations that rely on a neoliberal economy of exchange as
opposed to a colonial logic of encounter.
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The final critique of orientalism I must address revolves around the question of
agency. Many astute critiques of Said accuse him of writing off “Oriental” populations as
forever oppressed, without agency. Said attempted to respond to this accusation with
what was in many ways a sequel to Orientalism, his Culture and Imperialism.101
Understanding my hesitations about the question of agency, looking for it, finding it, and
then celebrating its presence, requires a theoretical detour. I turn to this in the next
section.

Part Two: Resistance and Politics

If the “discourse of resistance” is different from whatever political strategies
individuals or communities employ, it is also not necessarily confined to instances where
the word “resistance” itself is invoked. I have chosen the term “resistance” because of the
frequency of its use, as pointed to above, and to which I return shortly. As I identified in
the BAM example, the “discourse of resistance” is a way of pointing to a phenomenon I
see at play when a number of words and concepts – “political,” “revolt,” “revolution,”
“change,” “defiant,” “radical,” “rebel,” among others – are invoked. That being said, it is
important to qualify that the “discourse of resistance” I identify is not the same as a
history of ideas and debates about how to challenge power, many of which have been
conceptualized as revolution, rebellion, and radical politics. The productivity of the
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“discourse of resistance” is directly attached to neoliberalism, and has emerged primarily
since the latter has taken hold as a political and economic ideology.
In different centuries, and from every corner of the globe, theorizations of
rebellion and revolution have addressed when and how uprisings should take place, under
what conditions they are sanctioned, who is permitted to carry them out, and the possible
effects of these changes, should they effectively be enacted. My ultimate concern with
the “discourse of resistance” that I identify, and the reason I spend so much time in this
chapter locating it, is because I fear it distances the subjects and contexts in which it is
found from those radical theorizations. In my case studies, I explore how musicians and
their audiences invert and deconstruct ideas of thawra [revolution], mouqawameh
[resistance], ijtihad [reasoned struggle], tamarod [rebellion], sabr [patience], sumoud
[resilience], wataniyya [nationalism], and others. But before turning to these, I first want
to explore how the neoliberal “discourse of resistance” I am identifying works. How does
the depoliticization I identify happen? This theoretical exploration will help to guide my
exploration of the concepts just mentioned in subsequent chapters, so as to not repeat the
same mistakes that I identify as intrinsic to the “discourse of resistance.” I spend the rest
of this chapter arguing that the discourse of resistance works by relying on a limited
framework of recognizing and representing political action. These actions are in turn tied
to a specific theorization of subjectivity, and with it, agency; a theorization which is
necessarily reflected in the status quo. I turn to Hannah Arendt to begin this discussion.
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Political activity

“Wherever you go, you will be a polis.” ~ Ancient Greek saying102

In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt relegates politics to a space she
calls the polis. She describes the polis as “the space of appearance.”103 Her
conceptualization of political activity in the polis is the seed both of Arendt’s original
contribution to political thought and the source of the most compelling critiques of it.104
In exploring Arendt’s definition of political activity in this section, I am not endorsing all
the possible implications of her theory. I am, however, suggesting that Arendt’s
theorizations of politics (political activity in the polis) can be used to illuminate the
tendency to speak of “resistance” as representative of agency, if not incumbent on it.
The Greek word polis means city, or city-state. Arendt uses it as Aristotle and
Plato did, to elaborate an ideal political community. She writes, “The polis, properly
speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people
as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.”105 As both Plato and
Aristotle, despite their differences, considered the members of the polis as removed from
more worldly considerations, so too does Arendt separate the realm of politics from other
human activity. That is, the first claim Arendt makes about political activity is that it is
102
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removed and different from the other spheres of human behavior.
Arendt’s theorization of political activity is thus based in her differentiation and
separation of fields of human experience. Three categories – labor, work, and action –
divide the activities of human beings by their function. Labor is the activity required to
maintain life. Work is the activity that produces products for trade or sale – what enter
human beings into worldliness. And political action is what happens in the polis – it is
speech and action seen and heard by others. Political action performs the plurality
intrinsic to the human condition.
Most critiques of Arendt take issue with her definition of the polis as a sphere
removed from other aspects of human life. For example, in recognizing activity in the
polis as distinct from that which is required to sustain life, Jacques Rancière accuses
Arendt of expressing “the will to preserve the realm of pure politics.”106 He is concerned
that Arendt perpetuates as apolitical, as incapable of politics, those whose lives are
consumed with the labor of living, whose efforts are largely consumed by the sphere of
activity she defines as labor.107 For Rancière, these categories of behavior endorse
unequal categorization of political actors. Indeed, Rancière’s critique will prove salient in
the next subsection, when I follow Arendt’s idea of activity to its corollary, agency.
Arendt’s separation of work, labor, and action is rooted in a critique and a
proposition. The critique she makes is of the rise of the significance in “modern” political
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philosophy108 of “labor” as the intrinsically human activity.109 That is, she takes issue
with the dominance of homo faber – or, the idea that what makes human beings human is
that they can produce things, in political thought. Arendt critiques this notion and in its
place she proposes something else. For Arendt, what makes human beings unique (what
defines the human condition) is not their ability to labor nor to work, but their ability to
carry out action. It is political activity that defines human beings as human beings. This is
so because political activity affirms the plurality of the human experience – the condition
of being among others. Through political activity, individuals recognize similarity among
fellow men and women and distinguish themselves as individuals. This recognition and
this distinction reflect the human condition of plurality, and they are enacted in the polis.
Arendt suggests that the essential thing to understand about the human condition is not
that the human being labors, nor that she works, but that her life is lived in the plural,
among others.
The significance of this idea to my own study, and my elaborations in this chapter
of how a discourse of resistance operates, lies in in the way in which Arendt ties plurality
to an idea of politics. Her attention to plurality in the polis, via actions that are seen and
heard by others, constructs a representative schema for politics. This is a useful tool for
understanding how the discourse of resistance limits “resistant” subjects and the theorist
who takes them on. To understand how Arendt’s work can help illuminate this, I consider
more carefully Arendt’s distinctions of the three fields of human activity.
Arendt comes to the conclusion that it is action that defines the human condition
108
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after deliberating the difference between work and labor; a distinction she says has been
ignored by modern philosophy.110 Labor is the energy required to sustain life: what Locke
called the “labor of the body.” This is in contradistinction to the “work of our hands.”111
That there is a difference between the two, Arendt suggests, can be proven in the contrast
between different words delineating ideas of work and labor.112 Arendt suggests that this
difference has been interpreted in the development of the distinction between productive
and unproductive labor; between skilled and unskilled labor; and even between
intellectual and manual labor.113 The development of the distinction between productive
and unproductive labor in particular contains the “fundamental division between work
and labor.”114 This distinction is found in the fact that the former consists of the
fabrication of products, and the latter leaves nothing behind. The efforts of labor are
completely consumed by living, while the efforts of work may be brought to market,
bought and sold, or abandoned to decay. While the unique nature of laboring led Marx to
conclude (according to Arendt) that human beings are essentially animal laborans;115 it

110

She takes particular issue with the concept of “labor” in Marx’s work, see note 115.

111

John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 5, Section 27. Qtd. in Arendt, The Human
Condition, 79.
112

Note the difference, Arendt suggests, in Latin between laborare and facere; in French between
travailler and oeuvrer; and in German between arbeiten and werken.
113

Arendt, The Human Condition, 79-81.

114

Ibid., 87.

115

Marx thought that labor produced a productivity of its own, a surplus value he calls labor power, namely
the production of life. Arendt summarizes, “Unlike the productivity of work, which adds new objects to the
human artifice, the productivity of labor power produces objects only incidentally and is primarily
concerned with the means of its own production; since its power is not exhausted when its own
reproduction has been secured, it can be used for more than one life process, but it never “produces”
anything but life.” (Ibid., 88.) In his own words, Marx writes, “Given the individual, the production of
labor-power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. For his maintenance he requires a
given quantity of the means of subsistence. Therefore the labor-time requisite for the production of laborpower reduces itself to that necessary for the production of those means of subsistence; in other words, the

!

91
was the unique nature of work that led others to propose homo faber, or the fact that our
species can produce objects, as our quintessential essence.
Arendt looks at both of these frameworks and remarks that the tools and products
of both these activities dissipate. The tools upon which human beings labor in order to
sustain life – their own bodies – as well as the products human beings produce through
work – the carpenter’s chair, or the farmer’s crops – all are ultimately negatively affected
by our use of them. They wear out through consumption. But this is not so, Arendt
suggests, for the “human artifice” itself. The sphere of action, what takes place in the
polis, has a unique kind of durability. Speech and action are not consumed, even if they
are affected by generation upon generation of human activity. As long as speech and
action take place in the polis, they endure. This is the distinction between the spheres of
labor and work and the sphere of action. Human actions recognized in the polis have a
kind of durability not seen in the other spheres of human activity. Here it is worth quoting
Arendt at length:
Distinguished from both consumer goods and use objects, there are finally
the ‘products’ of action and speech, which together constitute the fabric of
human relationships and affairs. Left to themselves, they lack not only the
tangibility of other things, but are even less durable and more futile than
what we produce for consumption. Their reality depends entirely upon
human plurality, upon the constant presence of others who can see and
value of labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the laborer.
(Karl Marx, “The Buying and Selling of Labor-Power,” Capital, Volume One: A Critique of Political
Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Penguin Books, 1977], 272.)
The critique Arendt makes of Marx lies in her assertion that in his conceptualization of labor
power, Marx conflated labor with work. Throughout Marx’s thought, Arendt suggests that “labor is
endowed… with certain faculties which only work possesses.” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 102). She
suggests that Marx conceived of labor as a process that has a productivity of its own, “no matter how
furtive and non-durable its products may be.” (Ibid., 88.) The problem Arendt saw with this model is that
Marx’s revolution proposed not emancipating the laboring classes but emancipating man from labor. This
creates a paradox for Arendt. “The fact remains that in all states of [Marx’s] work, he defines man as an
animal laborans and then leads him into a society in which this greatest and most human power is no
longer necessary. We are left with the rather distressing alternative between productive slavery and
unproductive freedom.” (Ibid., 105.)
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hear and therefore testify to their existence…They themselves [action and
speech] do not ‘produce,’ bring forth anything, they are as futile as life
itself. In order to become worldly things, that is, deeds and facts and
events and patters of thoughts or ideas, they must first be seen, heard, and
remembered and then transformed, reified as it were, into things – into
sayings of poetry, the written page or the printed book, into paintings or
sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents, or monuments.116
Herein lies the essence of the schema of representation that can be found in Arendt’s
conceptualization of politics. What distinguishes speech and action from labor and work
is the sustenance that is maintained by their representation.117 Arendt does not argue that
the intentions of political agents are sustained through actions once initiated or that the
fallout of speech once uttered can necessarily be predicted or prescribed. What she does
argue, what she insists upon actually, is that the significance of speech and action lies in
the fact that others perceive and recognize them.118 To exist at all, political activity must
be seen and heard by others. This is essentially an understanding of a representative
schema of politics. Certain behaviors indicate the presence of politics and of political
agents. Significantly, these behaviors don’t produce politics; they signal the arrival of
political subjects to others. Through speech and action, political subjects emerge, and the
“space of appearance” of the polis is the stage on which they do so.
116
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I want to suggest that Arendt’s theory of the polis can be used to deconstruct how
attributing “resistance” to marginalized actors functions. That is, it is a useful way to
understand how looking for and finding resistance attributes agency to certain individuals
while implicitly denying it to others. The discourse of resistance essentially consists of
building a polis around given subjects, creating an audience that is able to see and hear
their actions. The discourse of resistance recognizes and interprets political activities and
in so doing attributes agency to given subjects. Some examples will illustrate how the
narrating process of “resistance’ builds a polis around specific political actors. The
examples I use here are referred to widely in the literature on both politics and cultural
production in the Arab world.

Example: the Birmingham School and “symbolic resistance” in subcultural study119

Subjects of subcultural study (a significant subgenre of the boom in “resistance
studies” referred to above) have traditionally been populations seen to be manifestly
unproductive. Indeed the location of the “sub” in subcultural populations is necessarily
tied to an idea that the subjects involved are removed, or somehow “below” normative
society. In his historical overview of subcultural studies from the eighteenth century
through the twentieth, Ken Gelder begins by defining what a “subculture” is. He suggests
that, “Subcultures are always in some way non-conforming or dissenting,” and then
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suggests six key ways “in which subcultures have been generally understood.”120 The
first of these identifying characteristics is the “negative relation [of its members] to
work.”121 He points to Henry Mayhew’s Those Who Will Not Work as a foundational text
in the field.122 Gelder is concerned to point out that a primary, shared characteristic of
subcultures is that they are perceived to be “‘idle’, ‘parasitical,’ hedonistic, criminal,
etc.”123
For Gelder, this negative relationship to the mainstream is what initially defines a
subculture. The perceived distance from “productive labor” in the qualification of
“delinquency” or “degeneracy” in subcultures is most significant in the sense of a
perception of social alienation. This can be seen in the other characteristics of subcultures
that Gelder identifies, such as an “ambivalent relationship to class” and “movement away
from home into non-domestic forms of belonging.”124 That is, what defines a subculture
is not primarily unemployment but alien forms of sociality – different ways that
individuals identify with and distinguish themselves from others.
We might see this social alienation as an alienation from the sphere of action.
“Delinquents” do not perform activities fit to be seen and heard by others. Their
“degenerate” behavior, in dark alleys, and at odd hours, only proves their unfit nature for
engaging with others in the polis. Significantly, subcultural studies, even before the
Birmingham School, to which specific case I am arriving, almost uniformly seek to recast
120
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the subjects of their study in brighter light. That is, the outside perception of the subjects
of study as in one way or another “delinquent” or “degenerate” is frequently cast as a foil
in this literature, which the researcher proceeds to counter. When researchers take
communities that are perceived to be “idle” or “parasitic” as their subject, their concern –
almost categorically – is to recast their behavior in a positive light. It is to reinterpret this
behavior as productive, social, and meaningful.
Gelder suggests that subcultures are a “matter of narration.”125 And he also
suggests that understanding subcultures consists of understanding how each of these
social groupings “creates its own geography,” that is, how individuals imagine “a set of
places or sites… through which [they] gain cohesion and identity.” Applying Arendt’s
political theory as a way to deconstruct this gesture, we might say that this process in
subcultural study consists of building a polis around subcultural agents. That is, the
researcher attends to an audience that sees or hears the actions of these marginalized
individuals. In this way, significance and meaning is restored to behavior the subcultural
theorist suggests is misunderstood.
In recent decades under the profound influence of cultural studies theorists like
Stuart Hall and Dick Hebdige, the trend has been to attribute significance or meaning by
framing subcultural activity even more explicitly as “resistance.” In the tradition of some
theory coming out of Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies at the university of
Birmingham (CSSS), the work of the sociologist is frequently then one of a decoder that
translates the seemingly unproductive into active choices that are symbolically resistant.
For example, “style,” especially in Dick Hebdige’s work, became a way in which
125
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political activity is enacted by subcultural participants. Sartorial choices, hairstyles,
piercings, and tattoos transform working-class youth into individuals rallying against late
twentieth century capitalism, nostalgic for the working-class communitas of his parents’
and grandparents’ generation.126 In Tony Jefferson and Stuart Hall’s work, activity that
articulates a powerful “symbolic resistance,” permits these youth a political life otherwise
ignored by parents, teachers, and the upwardly mobile middle classes.127 Whether or not a
specific critique or sentiment of resistance existed before the stylistic choices appear is
not something these theorists explored. Nonetheless, the ready presence of “resistance” is
readily attested to, whether the subjects of study were mods, teddy-boys, punks, or in
later studies influenced by this approach, hip hop heads, ravers, or world music fans.128
Indeed, Stanley Cohen has argued that the “constant impulse [in sociological studies
following the Birmingham tradition] is to decode the style in terms only of opposition
and resistance.”129 It is the relegation of “resistance” to the appearance of recognizable
activity that signals to me a representative schema of politics.
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The deliberations, hesitations, and feelings that lead a teenager to shave her head
are ignored for the spectacular action itself. These are the deliberations I am interested in,
but these cannot appear in this kind of discussion of resistance. In the search for
“symbolic resistance,” spectacular activity is the primary evidence. Gang fights; spiked
hair; even the seemingly banal is nevertheless still spectacular in its distinction from
normative behavior. The best example of the latter is perhaps sociologist Paul Corrigan’s
essay “Doing Nothing.” In this essay, he explores the “intense activity which is found” in
Sunderland street-corner culture.130 Corrigan argues that activity that is seen by parents
and teachers as a waste of time is actually teaming with activity. Readers of Corrigan’s
study learn that the major elements of “doing nothing” are in fact talking and fighting –
or, Arendt’s markers of political activity par excellence! Corrigan looked for and found
speech and action. Through that speech and action, he narrates a significance he calls
“resistance.”
That this gesture, in Corrigan’s study, of recasting the behavior of these young
men is a (re)narration of specific activities should be clear. Corrigan takes street-corner
loitering and turns it into working-class resistance. This is a good example of the
narrating that Gelder attests is central to subcultural literature. We could also see it as a
good example of the “remembering and transformation” Arendt suggests is intrinsic to
political action in the polis. That is, by recognizing the activities of working-class
Sunderland youth, Corrigan constructs a polis around them, an audience that sees and
hears these agents. He narrates and commemorates their actions as political subjects,
giving those activities new meaning.
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Pointing to the construction of a polis is another way of referring to the erected
context within which agents are found. But it is more than that. The contours of the polis
literally dictate what agency looks like. In a qualification about what constitutes the polis,
Arendt quotes an ancient Greek saying: “Wherever you go, you will be a polis.” She
suggests that this “watchword of Greek colonization” reflects the Greek belief that the
relationship between citizens in the polis could be created anywhere. This Ancient Greek
truism is an assertion of the perceived universality of the human condition of plurality.
However, as a colonial ideology imposes itself onto a people, so does the search for a
polis – in my case, the search for resistance – structure knowledge about marginalized
populations. It is not that a more astute perception, looking more closely, will allow one
to see more real and more radical “resistance.” What I want to argue that as long as one
looks for resistance, one recreates this imposition of the polis.
This is because the theoretical gesture I am discussing – wherein the polis
functions as a “space of appearance” confines an analysis of politics to the appearance of
political subjects. The appearance of resistance restricts the discussion to the
recognizable activities of individuals. It consists of, as Arendt suggests, attributing glory
to heroic actors. In subcultural literature, the attribution of “resistance” to subcultural
actors is an assertion about the presence of agency within a given community. As I will
explore shortly, a similar gesture is at play in so-called subaltern studies. At best, this
gesture has the power to expand the polis. This could mean extending the possibility of
enacting political activity to greater numbers of people. This is significant. Ultimately
however, I find the political reach of this gesture limited. The ways in which this agency
is located means that it must always be found as distinct from individuals without it. To
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explore this further we need to return to Arendt and to the relationship between political
activity and the agents who can carry it out.

Political life
“Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it, is meaningless.”131
In order to further understand how political activity resonates, Arendt’s definition
of politics requires interrogating the relationship between political activity and the
subjects capable of executing it. For Arendt, it is not political activity alone that has
political meaning. “Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it,” she suggests, “is
meaningless.”132 This is a crucial point in her definition of politics. When an individual
performs a recognizable action, she proves that she has agency – the ability to act. Arendt
suggests that enacting political activity performs a “second birth,” that of the political
subject.133 Speech and action that is seen and heard by others have an “agent-revealing
capacity.”134 When we speak of agency, in other words, we have attached the dimension
of a subject to (political) activity. This relationship is presupposed by the human
condition of plurality. The collectivity of the polis is significant because it is required for
the recognition and narration of subjects who perform political actions.
Here we must consider the critical assessments of Arendt that I pointed to in the
beginning of this discussion of her work and to which I promised I would return. The un131
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ignorable critique of Arendt is that her formulation of politics perpetuates a sort of elitist
view of political subjectivity. Because she separates work from labor and action from
both of these, she is accused of denying agency to those whose lives are consumed with
laboring or with work. This recognition of the cleavage Arendt proposes between
activities, and with it subjects – some of which (and whom) are political, and some of
which (whom) are not – informs the critique I am working to provide of how the
discourse of resistance problematically projects passivity and assumes silence on the part
of the subjects for which it attempts to speak.
Writing in the early 2000s, almost fifty years after the publication of The Human
Condition, Jacques Rancière questions the separation Arendt proposed between public,
political space, and private, unpoliticized space. Rancière was writing in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of humanitarian intervention in the name of
human rights. The discussion of “human rights” and how they are being used in
international politics leads him to a discussion of the rights of the “citizen” versus the
rights of “man.”135 I am interested in Rancière’s attempt to “reset the question of the
subject of the Rights of Man,” and with it resetting the subject of politics.136
Rancière suggests that Arendt’s political theory is useful in understanding the
problematic dynamics in a period expected to be “a peaceful posthistorical world” that
has nevertheless seen an unprecedented proliferation of violence on a global stage.137 The
problem for Rancière is that violations of “human rights” have become the excuse by
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which colonial and imperial intervention have continued. Rancière suggests it is through
a conceptualization of human rights as “the rights of the victims,” rights which must be
defended by others.138 Human rights are the ones invoked by the plight of those who have
no state or other body to whom they can appeal. Rancière follows Arendt’s argument that
the “rights of man” are not the “rights of the citizen”; a citizen can appeal to her state for
redress of grievances. In contrast to the citizen, the refugee and the exile have no body
from which to claim or to which to petition her rights. Hers are the rights of “man.”
Rancière suggests that these rights are held up and defended by others, through which
maudlin exercise “humanitarian interference” is invoked as essentially the right to
invade.139 Rancière accuses Arendt of providing the theoretical basis through which this
cleavage – this separation of “man” from “citizen” is possible. He suggests that Arendt
envisioned “the public sphere [ie the polis] as a separate sphere, removed from the realm
of necessity.”140 In the latter, life is trapped in “idiocy” or brute necessity and is incapable
of public action.141 Outside the polis, neither actions nor life are political.
I am not sure the perpetuation of a “realm of pure politics” was Arendt’s intent –
her emphasis on collectivity in action and the plurality of the human condition speaks to a
wider conceptualization of shared humanity than that which Rancière gives her credit for.
It is nonetheless unavoidable that the construction of a sphere called a polis, where
actions can be recognized, implies that there is necessarily a space separated from the
polis, perhaps surrounding it in a kind of vast abyss, where actions are apolitical, where
138
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activity if it happens at all, is not recognized, and where actual people live an
unpoliticized existence. This must be the case because otherwise the polis would not be
recognized as a distinct sphere of human interaction. Its defining feature would not be a
“space of appearance”; and its central content would not consist of the spectacular
recognition and distinction of individuals. If all individuals were political agents, the
“second birth” marking the arrival of political subjectivity would not be necessary.
Indeed, if the polis represented all human activity – it would not exist at all. Its very
definition is built on selection and distinction: the emergence of individual political
subjects from an apolitical, indecipherable mass.
The polis and political activity within it requires the continued existence of a
space that is not the polis, where human beings are not political subjects. In this light,
sociological or anthropological studies that circle around the question of agency are
curious indeed, especially when they essentially consist of claiming agency for
marginalized or oppressed populations. What I mean is, the theoretical gesture that raises
“marginalization” or “oppression” as a foil, which is then countered by narratives of
resistance that attest to the presence of agency among marginalized communities, is
curious in that it intrinsically relies on the idea that spectacular actors emerge from a
great mass of subjects without agency.
I just considered how subcultural studies reclaimed delinquent behavior as
symbolic resistance. Subcultural theorists like Dick Hebdige, Tony Jefferson, and Paul
Corrigan recast marginalized youth populations presumed to be a drain on society’s
resources as active bricoleurs, making meaning and building symbolic resistance. In so
doing, these researchers attributed political subjectivity to their interlocutors. I now want
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to turn to explore another trend in how agency is located and constructed among another
kind of marginalized community. I turn to studies concerned with “resistance,” but this
time in the field of so-called “subaltern” studies. As I will show, this literature is also
concerned with populations considered to be marginalized or, as is more frequently
invoked in this literature, oppressed. These are post-colonial populations, at the
“periphery” of global power; often peasant or working class; occasionally women, or
other social categories removed from the center of power. I mentioned in the previous
discussion that subcultural researchers frequently invoke the perception of delinquency
and unproductivity as a foil that they then counter with claims about the meaningfulness
of intense activity among their interlocutors.
In subaltern literature, the claim is first that oppressed subaltern populations
“resist” in robust ways: that is, that they have agency. Secondly, the claim is that this
agency is wholly different from “Western” agency, and thus requires new tools to discern
it. Subaltern “resistance,” these authors claim, is different. Without conflating the plight
of Bengali jute workers with the leisure activities of English mods and tods, I intend to
use Arendt’s model of political activity as a tool in order to argue that the search for
resistance which these literatures share poses problems for actually different
conceptualizations of politics and political subjects.

Example: Subaltern agency

One of the most influential schools of thought in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries has been subaltern studies, or alternatively “post-colonial” theory.
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Heavily influenced by Edward Said’s provocations about imperialism in Orientalism, and
headed by the so-called “Subaltern Group,”142 Subaltern Studies has succeeded in
bringing unprecedented study of the non-European/US world into the European and US
academe. At the forefront of efforts to “decolonize” theory and academic practice, this
theory and research has consistently insisted first that “Western” historiography has
repeatedly sidelined the “subaltern” subject. They critique the fact that the subaltern
subject has only ever been a sidekick to the march of European history. Second, these
efforts to decolonize theory and academic practice insist that the subaltern subject has
been ignored because “Western” models are inadequate for the study of African, Asian,
and aboriginal or indigenous cultures. Using different approaches, subaltern theorists
have argued that understanding the “subaltern agency” unique to Indian peasants, Bengali
jute workers, and other marginalized communities requires attention to the different
forms of belonging, community, and spirituality in the non-European world, and the
effects of these particularities upon the history of capitalistic development in these places.
To pay attention to these aspects, subalternists argue, a process of writing history that is
different from those used for Western subjects is required. Indeed, so they make the case,
subaltern history is incomprehensible if analyzed through the perspective of Western
experience.143 Historically, much literature concerning Arab politics has also occasionally
embraced this model of championing local difference at the expense of global
comparison and contextualization. Especially with regards to the study of “Arabs,”
142
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music, and emotion, this championing of essential cultural difference is widespread.144 (I
return to these considerations in the next chapter.) Here, I recognize how this theoretical
gesture of inverting Western bias, despite the intentions of its authors, can have
depoliticizing effects.
Ranajit Guha’s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, a
foundational text in the subaltern canon, provides an example of how the reliance on
spectacular activity as indicative of agency in this literature is problematic.145 Guha uses
an archive of instances of insurgency and rebellion, which he interprets to reveal a
different kind of political agency, unique to the peasant in colonial India. Guha’s
methodology for doing so initially allows him to argue that a certain kind of political
subject has been ignored by both colonial and nationalist historiography.146 Elementary
Aspects asserts that the Indian peasant is worthy of having her own history written, and
not as a subset of some other history – like that “of the Raj, or of Indian nationalism, or
of socialism.”147
The second intention of Guha’s text is to confirm the value of this first venture by
suggesting it is impossible to understand the history of the Indian peasant using the tools
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of Western historiography. Guha is thus concerned to trace a different kind of political
subjectivity. In Elementary Aspects, he does not trace individuals, political affiliations, or
particular locales. Rather, he traces something he calls “peasant consciousness.” This is
Guha’s attempt to recast the political subjectivity of the subaltern subjects he studies.
Guha argues that the Indian peasant cannot and should not be understood vis-à-vis
“Western” identity groupings like political party, class, gender, et al.148 Rather, peasant
history should be understood through social and cultural specificities unique to the Indian
context: things like, “negation, ambiguity, modality, solidarity, transmission, and
territoriality.”149
Importantly, for Guha, these elements of peasant consciousness can be seen to
appear in moments of insurgency and agitation. Indeed, Guha repeatedly insists that
moments of insurgency reveal the political or rebellious consciousness of the Indian
peasant, and it is therein that this consciousness appears. His emphasis on the appearance
of political consciousness and its revelation through spectacular acts is an excellent
example for the argument I’ve been developing here about how an understanding of
spectacular acts that reveal political subjects is problematic.150 It is so because it is never
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quite clear to whom these subjects are “appearing” or to whom they are revealing
themselves.
Indeed, what’s fascinating about Guha’s study in relation to the discussion of the
recognizability of political activity and the putting into discourse of “resistance” that I
have been elaborating is precisely the archive to which Guha turns. Guha writes that,
unlike crime, “rebellions are necessarily and invariably public and communal events.”151
Further, he states that peasant consciousness is “expressed through its resistance at the
point of insurgency,” when it appears as “an antagonistic force” in the historical records
of the dominant classes. In other words, not only did rebellion or resistance only appear
to exist when others noticed it, but specifically when it appeared in the historical register
of the colonizer! In actual fact, Guha builds his whole notion of subaltern consciousness
(their unique political subjectivity) on records he himself identifies as “elitist in origin” –
on “police reports, army dispatches, administrative accounts, minutes and resolutions of
governmental departments, and so on.”152 If Guha is interested in recasting subaltern
agency (which he claims he is), then this is methodology is problematic at best. More
specifically, I find it limited: limited in the sense of how it is ultimately unable to break
out of the framework of oppression it reportedly attempts to deconstruct, one where elites
oppress, narrate, and control the means of representation of the subaltern.
One might call Elementary Aspects, a re-narration of Indian history. I call this a re
narration because the author relies on the identification of the same spectacular acts
considered to be criminal or unprincipled by previous visitors to the archive. Guha’s
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work in Elementary Aspects is an example of how subaltern literature, like Corrigan’s
subcultural study above, functions as a reformation of the polis in order to extract
different meaning from human activity. Where the British colonizer found these
spectacular events evidence of treason, and the nationalist historian found them proof of
the “pre-political” (that is, not ideologically informed) nature of peasant frustration, Guha
finds these events indicative of a unique peasant consciousness. In all cases, political
subjectivity is located via the recognition by the colonial police (among others) of speech
and action.
I would suggest that we do not have in this methodology a radical formulation of
“politics.” In these formulations we are still very clearly narrating the birth of political
subjects vis-à-vis the recognition by a chosen elite of some spectacular activity. The
appearance of the robust consciousness to which Guha attests lies in its distinction from a
mass of apolitical, unconscious, behavior that presumably, nobody bothered to write
about. Some agents demonstrate consciousness. Which ones? The ones the police and the
colonial governor saw fit to enumerate in the ledger. As some critics of Guha have
pointed out, this is indeed a peculiar way to reclaim the agency of the subaltern,
especially perhaps, the one arguably sidelined by “Western” historiography.153
A discussion of formulations of subaltern agency and their limitations here would
not be complete without considering the major damage the tendency to reverse153
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orientalism has done to the search for alternative kinds of agency. This also draws out the
question of to whom politics and agency appear when spectacular acts take place. I
suggested above that the first major concern of subaltern studies has been to claim that
the subaltern has agency, and that the second has been to assert that this agency looks
different than “Western” agency. According to this literature, subaltern agency is unique;
and it requires its own tools of analysis.
For example, in The Nation and Its Fragments, Partha Chatterjee argues that
community plays a much more prominent role in rural Bengal society than in the
individualistic, European societies from which capitalism comes and in which the
struggles against it initially took place.154 Chatterjee urges us to “grant that peasant
consciousness has its own paradigmatic form, which is not only different from
[European] bourgeois consciousness but in fact its very other.”155
It is undoubtedly one of the greatest paradoxes of the legacies of Said’s
Orientalism that in establishing a considerable history of racism that the “West” projected
on the “East,” and encouraging its further recognition and analysis, the compelling
framework of orientalism was nevertheless not able to discourage many authors from
composing explicitly reverse-orientalist analyses while invoking the very terms of antiorientalist critiques and analysis.156 That is, the claims to unique subaltern community,
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consciousness, and resistance more often than not end up spinning “Western” stereotypes
about “Eastern” subjects as positive cultural aspects. Negative tropes about the religious,
tribal, or irrational nature of the subaltern are flipped into essentialized claims about
unique subaltern “community,” “spirituality,” and “consciousness.” Critics of this
tendency in subaltern theory have explicitly taken issue with this: that in theorizing a
uniquely “subaltern” consciousness, the school has first ended up reinforcing Orientalist
perceptions of southeast Asia (in particular) and second, this reverse Orientalism
ultimately and necessarily circles back to bourgeois humanism and the birth of the
rational political subject, vis-a-vis recognizable political activity.
Which is to say, the “unique” resistance and indigenous political consciousness
found among subaltern subjects has frequently either mirrored the political subjectivity of
Western subjects, or reiterated the prejudices of nineteenth-century Orientalism. The
point for me here is not that subaltern theorists potentially fail at their own project (as
Rosalind O’Hanlon argues157) but that this dependence on the emergence of behavior of
activity to indicate politics is quite clearly tied to normative understandings of
subjectivity. That is, my interest is not in insisting that a different political consciousness
157
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actually exists among subaltern populations but has been misunderstood by postcolonial
theorists. Rather my argument is that even this literature, with its pretentions to radical
critique and its widespread influence in the academe as such, also relies on the same basic
understanding of political subjects being born through spectacular acts of resistance. This
understanding, as I’ve been arguing, requires the perpetuation of life, behavior, and
individuals whose existence is ignorable, and apolitical. Most importantly, it is an
understanding quite at odds with the (radical) notion, articulated throughout this
literature, that oppressed and marginalized populations have the capacity to “resist,”
“have agency,” or live politicized existences, despite not appearing in normative
histories, archives, or ledgers.
The parallels that I see between what signals indigenous “resistance” and
subaltern agency within postcolonial critique and what in cultural studies marks
“symbolic resistance” and subcultural agency lie in how individuals are understood as
performing political activity, or enacting agency. I do not intend to conflate the political
impact of a jute workers’ strike with that of the sartorial choices of suburban punks. But I
have wanted to look at the theoretical mechanism that allows both to be seen as markers
of an “Other” agency. “Alternative” agency that ultimately mirrors normative political
engagement and subjectivity illustrates the limitations of the theoretical feedback loop
upon which subject-based political analysis depends.
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Conclusion

I have spent a great deal of time in the second half of this chapter critiquing two
very important fields of cultural study. I hope to have established that they share certain
expectations of political activity. We might say the framework they share begins from a
zero-state of no agency. Marginalized populations start as non-descript groups of people,
understood as devoid of the potential for political activity, which are then scripted by the
theorist as entering and performing on a political stage. The researcher interprets the
recognizable activity that renders the demographic in question active, that is, political.
Despite the widespread championing in these literatures of the power and capacity of
marginalized societies, they begin, much like the hegemonic framework they bemoan,
with the supposition that youth agents and the colonized/post-colonized are
disempowered by their very subject positions. This is overcome by the performance of
specific and recognizable actions that render them political subjects. The problem as I see
it is that these conceptualizations of agency, contingent upon certain kinds of action,
promise to continue producing ignorable subjects.
If I have traced political activity and a discourse of resistance in two otherwise
unrelated traditions of academic practice, my attention to these two specific literatures in
particular is directly informed by my subject matter in this study. Rap and hip hop
concerts in the Arab world and the political resonances therein beg to be addressed most
immediately by the frameworks developed either in subcultural or in subaltern literature
(or both). My sustained attention in this chapter to dominant frameworks in these fields
has been to lay the groundwork for how my own understanding of politics in the genre of
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rap music in these three Arab cities will diverge from these.
In sum, I have tried to draw attention to how an emphasis on recognizable activity
has created a representative schema of “resistance” – which frames and limits the ways in
the North American (and British) academe are able to recognize political energy. My
understanding of what politics may be generated in Arabic rap concerts thus started with
a critical understanding of how recognizing agency as incumbent on spectacular activity
necessitates the perpetuation of agents without agency and apolitical behavior. Having
established the limits of this model, I will now be concerned to propose an alternative.
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Chapter Two: Feeling Politics

Overview

In the previous chapter, I suggested that an emphasis on locating “resistance” has
limited the study of politics in subcultural and subaltern studies to the location of
spectacular activity. I argued that the theoretical gesture which frequently attributes
significance to this activity comes in the construction by the researcher of a polis around
certain actors: a political space within which the significance of a given activity is
affirmed. I suggested that this framework necessitates the perpetuation of apolitical or
non-spectacular behavior – against whose background only some subjects can emerge as
having agency. I argued that this is a troubling way to conceive of radical politics among
a certain group of actors or within a specific genre of cultural production.
In this chapter, and in order to get out of the theoretical cul-de-sac, which I
suggested limits our understanding of the political possibility of cultural production, I
propose applying elements from both the spatial and affective turns in critical theory. I
propose a broadening and deepening of a potential polis in Arabic rap and hip hop by
considering a spatial analysis of concert culture. Then, I propose a critical consideration
of feeling to produce a similar complication of subjectivity. This serves, I hope, to open
up a conceptualization of subjects and agency within this rap and hip hop culture in these
cities.
In the first part of this chapter, I propose an ethnographic methodology rooted in
the spatial dynamics of concert culture. This consists of a consideration of the urban
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geography through which performers and audiences travel, as well as an awareness of the
construction of intimacy between performers and audiences. It is my intention that this
material reading of the spaces within which concerts take place can reset a sociological
imagination of the “polis.” That is, this spatial methodology may help dissuade from
focusing on a group of agents in isolation. Following this, the second part of this chapter
makes a case for the construction of what Dorreen Massey has called a “spatialized
subjectivity” by inserting an analysis of feeling in rap concerts. That is, I add a
consideration of subjectivity (via felt processes) to my conceptualization of political
“space.” Specifically, I propose discerning feeling through a re-invigoration of the
ethnomusicological concept of tarab, traditionally applied to classical forms of Arabic
music. In doing so, I propose tracing the building of tarab in rap concerts as a technique
to recognize ways of being with others that are politically potent.
Bringing together the theoretical arguments allows me to propose a model for a
political ethnography of subcultural production: what I call feeling politics. This
procedure – considering both space and feeling, or feeling through space – is my
alternative to the discourse of resistance and the theoretically limiting tendencies of
recognizing spectacular political activity that I identified in Chapter One. I conclude this
chapter with reflections on my role as researcher and my personal navigations of both
space and subjectivity over the course of this research.
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Part One: Deepening Space

Heterogeneous audiences

In Harlem, the MC took the mic between opening acts. She called out to
the audience, scattered throughout the concert space, in a mix of Arabic
and English, ‘Who here is falasteeni [Palestinian]? Who here is from
falasteen [Palestine]?’ A few enthusiastic shouts of solidarity and hands
shot up from the crowd. I spotted Palestinian flags, noticed some familiar
faces from the Arab American community. She repeated the question to a
slightly more enthusiastic response. Then she continued, ‘Who here is
from masr [Egypt])?’ You could tell she was preparing to run through a
short list of countries, and the performance space and the bar quieted
slightly waiting to hear who would be called on next.
In the pause, from the bar, a middle-aged African-American man, seated
with a friend hollered back in response, “Harlem! From Harlem!” When
she ignored the outburst, his friend continued “Yea, from Harlem! Speak
English!” The interaction effectively ended that tactic of community
building which the rapper Shadia Mansour, when she took the stage,
seconds later, quickly countered with an Arabic language reference pulling
her audience to her and encouraging them to ignore/forget the outburst.1
The incident above happened at the Shrine, a world music venue in Harlem, New
York, at 113th Street and Amsterdam. Over the past decade, it has built a reputation as a
world music venue and bar in the heart of a neighborhood that has, in the past thirty
years, gone from perhaps the most notorious ghetto on the East coast to an increasingly
hip haven of valuable real estate.2 In November 2011, the UK/Palestinian MC Shadia
1

Author’s field notes, November 19th, 2011. Parts of this analysis and fieldwork will appear in “Resisting
‘Resistance’: On Political Feeling in Arabic Rap Concerts” forthcoming in Arab Subcultures:
Transformations in Theory and Practice, Tarik Sabry and Layal Ftouni, eds. (London: IB Tauris, 2016) and
different parts will appear in “Call and Response, Radical Belonging, and Arabic Hip Hop in ‘the West’”
forthcoming in American Studies Encounters the Middle East, Alex Lubin and Marwan Kraidy, eds.
(Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 2016).
2

Property values in Harlem were on a steady climb before the 2008 financial crash. Developers and
investors are enthused to see the market returning (showing gigantic jumps in asking prices – asking prices
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Mansour performed there with DAM, a group of Palestinian rappers based in Lyd, Israel.
The concert was part of a promotional tour in several US cities for the documentary film
Hip Hop Is Bigger than the Occupation, filmed and produced by the non-profit group
Existence is Resistance.3 The MC warming the crowd, who goes by the name Harrabic
Tubman, did so after a young rapper had already taken the mic as an opening act, but
before Shadia Mansour and DAM took the stage. 4 How to understand this exchange? To
me, it is irrelevant whether or not the older men seated at the bar identified, understood,
or sympathized with the political struggle around Palestine and its occupation by Israel
that the artists and the event were endeavoring to make visible. Furthermore, it is
similarly perhaps tangential if they identified the rap music being performed as a legacy
of African American musicians that were first formulated by rappers a few miles away
and decades before.
Considering the hostility with which it was laced, the inclination to clump the
African American men at the bar in with the things the rapping Palestinians “resist” is
politically dangerous: pitting minorities against each other in the midst of gentrifying
Harlem plays into both racism and essentialism. Neither does it advance the Palestinian
struggle. But it no way did the men’s vocal rejection of the concert’s content actually
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accessed August 10, 2014, http://www. nytimes. com/2011/12/02/nyregion/in-reborn-harlem-liquor-storedraws-complaints. html? _r=3&ref=nyregion; Julie Satow, “After a Short Nap, Harlem is Back,” New York
Times, March 22, 2012, accessed August 10, 2014, http://www. nytimes.
com/2012/03/25/realestate/harlem-back-after-a-short-nap. html? pagewanted=all&_r=0.)
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empower Arab or diasporic listeners, nor did it further the Palestinian cause writ large, or
the musicians’ performances in particular. More pertinent to a material understanding of
what is political about this subcultural event – and what in my opinion is more likely – is
that the men from the neighborhood were responding to an influx of much younger, white
and Arab incomers with different cultural capital in a quickly gentrifying neighborhood.
That this audience’s arrival in the neighborhood was couched in a presentation of “hip
hop culture,” but rendered alien via the language in which it was spoken, was likely also
significant.
The framework of the event at the Shrine – fundraising for an NGO called
“Existence is Resistance” – should easily recall the problematic politics of the discourse
of resistance elaborated in the previous chapter. One can imagine an analysis of this
concert that applauds Palestinian resistance against the Occupation; that celebrates the
power of music to transcend borders (after all the film being promoted is entitled Hip
Hop Is Bigger than the Occupation); and that, considering the concert’s location,
similarly celebrates the intersectionality of African American and Arab/Palestinian
struggles. “Harrabic Tubman”’s stage name also invokes this intersectionality.5
Strangely, perhaps, all of these narratives necessitate that we ignore the exchange
between the MC and the bar, relying instead on the positive responses from audience
members that huddled close to the stage.
Towards an alternative, I want to suggest this exchange at the Shrine can
productively illustrate the limitations of the dynamics of the “polis” I described in the
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previous chapter. There, I argued that Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of the polis as
the “space of appearance,” or the sphere where political activity happens, was a useful
framework for understanding how a persistent discourse of resistance functions in
academic literature. I identified that a discourse of resistance operates vis-à-vis a
methodological gesture of recasting a group of people around certain actors. Within this
constructed polis, given activities can be understood as significant – as empowering, as
“resistant”, etc. I argued that what was troubling about this construction of the polis was
the necessary continuation of apolitical behavior outside of it, against which only some
activity can be interpreted as political.
An important part of the construction or location of a polis lies in the presumption
of some kind of homogeneity within this political sphere. I mentioned that Arendt writes
that the polis is “the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking
together.”6 In subcultural literature concerned with style, for example, “resistance” is
attributed to those haircuts and sartorial choices that peers (who approve) or teachers and
parents (who don’t) recognize. Similarly, I noted that the actions of subalterns are
registered as threatening by the colonizer (recorded in colonial police legers). In these
accounts of “resistance,” the polis is made up of supporters – those who recognize
empowerment in selected actions; and foes – those who recognize a threat or other
negative implications in the same actions. But what to make of the others who witness
activity but accord it neither of these valences? At the Shrine, what to make of the men at
the bar? How to document politics in motion while acknowledging the heterogeneity of
audiences even as they gather in the same concert venue?

6
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So the significance of the incident at the Shrine lies in its ability to underscore the
dynamic heterogeneity of urban concert audiences. It illustrates the feebleness of only
considering the fans huddled close up to the stage – the inadequacy of constructing a
specific audience, through which political significance can be attributed. Secondly, the
incident clearly highlights the tensions in urban venues when the marketing of the live
music is effected by or playing into the discourses of resistance I identified in the
previous chapter. Concert frameworks investing in a kind of “urban chique” all too
frequently position events at the frontlines of gentrification in whatever city they are
found. The response to the MC’s efforts to warm the crowd from the bar’s local clientele
rejects this momentum in a memorable way, while at the same time putting into relief the
vibrant intersection of trajectories alive in the concert space and ignited by the concert
itself. How can a political ethnography of subcultural production account for these urban
dynamics and these political exchanges? How can an analysis of the political texture in
concerts like this one level the boundaries of the polis so that other actors – who don’t fit
the binary of resistor/resistee – can also be recognized and their political activity (their
existence) accounted for?
In other words, can we build a model for understanding politics in subcultural
production that accounts for the multiple trajectories present at once? Can there be a
model for understanding politics in performance that accounts for what Doreen Massey
calls the “simultaneity of stories-so-far”– that is, the heterogeneity in a given venue at a
given time?7 How can politics be extracted or attributed to the processes of encounter,
collaboration, and co-consumption in city spaces that are themselves actively contested?

7
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The first part of this chapter attempts to deepen the polis, and in doing so moves towards
a more spatial understanding of the hetergoneity of audiences and venues.
I am hardly the first to recognize that intrinsic to the idea of the polis are practices
of exclusion. In the previous chapter, I pointed to Jacques Rancière’s critiques of Arendt.
For centuries, the liberal idea of the cosmopolis has emerged in political theory as the
open, welcoming counterpoint to the closed, exclusive polis. Against the idea of a finite
and bound city-state, increasingly manifest in modernist claims to the political
community and identity of the state, theorists have theorized the cosmopolis. As R. B. J.
Walker explains, after Hobbes, many philosophers have come to the conclusion that “the
modern polis can no longer be our political home, at least our only political home.”8
Moreover, over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence of theorizations of the
cosmopolitan, deepening and complicating the term, searching for a “cosmopolitics.”9 As
David Harvey has quipped, “cosmopolitanism is back.”10
This more recent resurgence in theorizing the cosmopolitan comes in part as a
response against critiques of utopian cosmopolitanism that emerged in the wake of the
Cold War, perhaps most easily perceptible in the work of Martha Nussbaum.11 Her critics
found much at fault with the celebration of the open and global reach of capital, and with
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the positive aspects of globalization in her work.12 The complete range of formulations
developed to recover the cosmopolitan project in response to these criticism – what
Harvey calls “counter-cosmopolitanisms” – are outside the scope of my discussion here.13
These debates have in various ways tried to root or locate cosmopolitanism in a specific
geographic place or among a specific set of identities. Thereby, they address the darker
sides of the transnational expanse of capital, paying attention to the irregularity of
privilege and movement across the globe, looking for “actually existing
cosmopolitanism.”14 Can the idea of a rooted cosmopolis – a diverse, tolerant, and open
political community, that is nonetheless effected by shifts in global capital, transform the
political expectations I suggested were attached to the more traditional polis? Can
thinking of urban audiences consuming avant-garde music as cosmopolitan shift the
processes of recognition of political activity away from locating “resistance”? Is the
cosmopolis a satisfying alternative to the polis?
A certain degree of cosmopolitanism in Arabic rap and its consumption is easily
recognizable. Some rap lyrics articulate anti-sectarian and anti-nationalist sentiment.
More significantly, the structure of live rap consumption in Ramallah, Amman, and
Beirut is markedly cosmopolitan. Most live rap concerts are primarily geared towards a
mobile, and upwardly mobile cosmopolitan audience – whether that means foreigners,
locals who travel or have lived abroad, or simply locals with mobility in each city. That
Arabic rap concerts almost exclusively rely on this framework while Arabic rap lyrics
12
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frequently bemoan structures of power and speak in local idiom to the street, need not be
terribly surprising. It would indeed be remarkable if an iteration of what is at least
occasionally a “global” culture – hip hop – did not have at least some cosmopolitan
qualities. What is worth underscoring, however, are the class considerations that mark its
live (cosmopolitan) consumption. It is here that what Doreen Massey terms “the local
production of the neocapitalist global” may be interesting in terms of Arabic rap and
concert culture.15 This is something I return to in each case study.
Indeed Massey’s “local production of the neocapitalist global” may point to the
different ways in which gentrification is manifest in Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut. It is
here that the limits of understanding the political implications of rap production as
cosmopolitan can be found. The cosmopolitan economy I just described, while trading in
anti-sectarian, anti-religious, and “universal” values and aesthetics simultaneously
engages in processes of exclusion based on class, ethnicity, and religion (especially as
publicly displayed). The cosmopolis – globalized (sections of each) city, open and
connected to (sections of) other cities – necessitates for its existence vast stretches of
rural or urban backwardness from whose restrictive confines and familial doldrums
young people are understood to flock. As I detail in my all three of my case studies
however, audiences frequently refuse this narrative, in some cases violently. The most
“cosmopolitan” centers of Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut are also, for some audiences,
the least tolerant, the most exclusive, the most difficult to access. On Hamra Street in
Beirut, a young veiled woman from Hermel (in the Bekaaʿ Valley) asks to stand next to
me as she awaits her ride after a rap concert at the theatre Metro al-Madina. She is afraid,
15
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standing alone on this hipster-ized thoroughfare, that people will make fun of her for
wearing the veil. In Ramallah, youths from the neighboring refugee camp throw bottles
over the wall into the lush garden of La Vie café, where rappers and electronic musicians
have performed, and which prides itself on trading in local, organic products and
implements the boycott of Israeli goods. Café ownership considers erecting mesh netting
over the garden to protect from the projectiles. In Amman, young boys flock to stare at
the stream of well-dressed men and women queuing to enter the Roman amphitheatre for
the Al Balad Music Festival. They throw stones from the concrete plaza outside, into the
theatre, to which they (and anyone without a ticket) are barred entry during concerts. The
festival’s director understands this expression of frustration as stemming from the fact
that during the festival, this public space is (in his words) “stolen from them.”16 Like the
incident I described during the concert at the Shrine, these examples of audience
interactions, expectations, and resentment point to very real difference and heterogeneity
within and around cultural spaces. I want to suggest these spaces are not adequately
understood either as cosmopolitan, or as a cohesive political community constructing a
polis within the bounds of which the significance of political activity can be located.
These examples, and the others which I detail in the chapters that follow, have led
me to question the limits of the open tolerance of the cosmopolis. Even when (especially
when) this cosmopolitanism is couched in globalized modernity, when it actively
counters restrictive religious social mores, and when it supposedly encourages free and
alternative creative expression, it consistently implements a class project which allows
for the middle and upper-middle class consumption of forms of globalized culture while
16
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it actively excludes working class audiences (frequently in the name of security concerns,
or in the name of profit).17 I review in more detail, and, I hope, complicate these
dynamics in each case study chapter.
For now, I want to note that these testimonies have led me to interrogate the
structure of the cosmopolis in relation to the polis. In other words, considering the
practices of exclusion upon which both depend, are the polis and the cosmopolis actually
opposed?18 Walker suggests:
It is a great mistake to assume that our futures lie either with the polis or
with the cosmopolis. We confront, rather, ongoing struggles to resituate
and politicize sites of political authority. We already know that the old
distinctions between local and global or urban and rural or north, south,
east and west are being renegotiated very rapidly. These negotiations
imply the need to renegotiate our understandings of both the polis and the
cosmopolis.19
In fact, the polis and the cosmopolis are co-constituted, each based on a similar
understanding of a modern subject, its limits, and construction. While the polis sees the
necessity of a community of individuals, constituted as subjects, through which to
distribute democracy; the cosmopolis affirms the status of the individual subject while
recognizing the need to tolerate difference (embodied in different, individual, subjects).
In other words, my search for a different sort of political space in which to read the
political significance of rap concerts does not find much traction in the cosmopolis as
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alternative to the polis. This is so even though the aesthetics of many Arabic rap concerts
frequently trade in global, cosmopolitan, trends.
The phenomenon of “that metropolitan-academic preoccupation: cities” (of which
this study is in some ways a part) provides another avenue of inquiry.20 The metropolis is,
of course, a conceptualization of space within which much politics (and “resistance”
incidentally) has been located in recent scholarship. From “everyday” resistance to the
“right to the city,” the urban metropolis has emerged as the terrain upon which political
significance is readily discernable.21
Since Lefebvre located the unspoken assumption in Marx and Engels (namely that
the struggle over the means of production is essentially an urban struggle), the political
potency of activity in the city has taken on new meaning.22 US cultural studies in this
vein are especially prone to these discourses of resistance, which, as Kristin Ross
explains,
…take capitalism for granted as a kind of force field or switchboard that
processes meanings; the Salvadoran or Guatemalan selling oranges on the
freeways of Los Angeles becomes a figure of ‘resistance’ - someone who
has appropriated urban space and used it to his own devices, someone
thumbing his nose at the ‘master planners.’23
But, Ross asks productively, “resistance to what?”24 Here, similar to the hesitation I
articulated in the previous chapter, Ross critiques the washing out of “resistance” within
20
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the specific confines of urban studies, where the “metropolitan” becomes place holder for
struggle. For her part, Doreen Massey explains that: “What Ross is really worrying about
here is the lack of coherence in this resistance, and the lack of a singular focus (tactics
‘are not made to refer back to capital nor to offer any means of understanding the system
as a whole.’)”25 And she continues:
Against ‘the city as system’, the implacable presence of stabilized
legibility, is romanticized a mobile ‘resistance’ of tactics, the everyday,
the little people… This central power is understood as removed from ‘the
everyday’ … It is an imagination which has taken a strong hold in urban
literature, with its own elaborations… of this street as ‘the margins.’26
I have articulated so far in this chapter that I seek a deeper conceptualization of political
space than the one available in either the polis or the cosmopolis. It should be clear
however, that to consider the whole physical city – or metropolis – with its ghettos,
refugee camps, and gentrifying neighborhoods together, as the political space par
excellence, is also limiting and problematic. If the polis – as a political community built
on the recognition of specific activity – is built on the continuity of apolitical behavior
outside it, and the cosmopolitan neighborhoods of each city actively exclude in order to
build an ethos of tolerance; than the metropolis flattens all urban conflict or confrontation
into a single amorphous struggle, the political goals of which are not clear. How then to
imagine the terrain through which politics in this genre of subcultural production are
built?

25

Massey, For Space, 47.

26

Ibid.

!

128
A Different methodological gesture

In her book For Space, the late Doreen Massey makes a compelling case for
philosophical and political attention to the concept of “space.” She argues for an
understanding of space as something more than a simple “expanse we travel across” and
proposes instead to understand it as “the product of interrelations, as constituted through
interactions.”27 That is, she proposes an understanding of physical space that is not just
“there,” bounded and unbounded by different political and ecological boundaries, but that
is constantly constructed through the material interactions it hosts. In this way, her
conceptualization of space is voluminous: it is three-dimensional. Hers is not an
understanding of space as area, as flat expanse. This sense of depth in her formulations
about space adds a living dimension to physical location; Massey’s argumentation “for
space” is about understanding how we interact in it and through it: as the “sphere of
possibility of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality.”28
This “contemporaneous plurality” responds to trends in post-colonial and subaltern
literature, and to the anthropologization of the “Other” that consistently figures “the
field” as frozen in time and research subjects and their locales as existing in a
romanticized “tradition” that is always in the past.
In Massey’s theorizations, I find a sharp theoretical model for reformulating the
political space within which rap and hip hop concerts are found. Massey urges us to
rethink space. And she does so from political convictions about contemporary
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globalization – our understanding of which she sees as philosophically confined by the
traditional binary between space and time – that are similar to the political concerns I
have attempted to unravel over the course of this dissertation’s introduction and the
previous chapter. Massey’s work allows me to discard notions of a polis, momentarily set
aside considerations of the cosmopolis (and cosmopolitan aesthetics or consumption),
and to really interrogate the shape of the metropolis – the city itself – by thinking instead
about the constantly-being-constructed, three-dimensional space through which
performers and their audiences move to arrive at the concert venue and which they
construct together through their interactions over the course of the performance event.
Massey’s provocations provide fertile ground to begin to understand the
intersecting trajectories manifest in the concert at the Shrine in Harlem, at Metro alMadina in Beirut, La Vie in Ramallah, and during the Al Balad Festival in Amman. In
other words, “space” is a way of understanding the venue and cultural event that is
pregnant with possibility, without eroticizing the alternative or transgressive nature of
cultural production or the seemingly alternative venues – themselves often at the heart of
contestation over the right to the city.
Considering rap concerts spatially means recognizing that ongoing urban change
is part of the politics of these events. In some cases these urban changes look like
gentrification, in others dispossession, and in others systemic privatization. Audiences
and performers live and understand these urban processes in different ways, and they
move through the physical manifestations of these changes in order to meet in specific
venues. For me this is not only a question contextualizing a rap concert within the history
of the gentrification of Harlem, to take the example I pointed to earlier. Rather, analyzing
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patterns of listening and audience behavior spatially will deepen understanding
audience/performer interactions by pointing to politics in process. Massey writes that
recognizing space is a “recognition of the fact of spacing.”29 It is precisely the dimension
of space as distance and proximity felt in the performance venue that I argue is political,
that points to political processes.
A subcultural ethnography built on this recognition is less prone to romanticizing
the political or populist reach of a certain musical genre. Understood spatially, concerts
are moments when relations are enacted, brought into relief. Moreover, these relations,
because they are situated in space, are always in motion. Massey tells us that relations are
“are necessarily embedded material practices which have to be carried out.”30 The
political impact in such an understanding lies in acknowledging that collective feeling,
community building, shared experiences, or political expression in rap concerts may not
be already formed, as in some hypothetical, succinct subculture. Rather, the processes of
interacting in space may be the political developments to pay attention to. As Sara
Ahmed has offered: “Collectivities are formed through the very work that has to be done
in order to get closer to other others.”31 In other words, rather than the already formed
and outwardly performed identities, styles, politics often taken as evidence of
“resistance,” politics may equally be productively discerned in processes of interacting.
This has deep implications for the capacity of live cultural production – like rap concerts
– to shape politics and determine political constitutions. Moreover, if the concept of
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space is able to dissolve the boundaries the polis, allowing us to dissect and consider
patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the conceptualization of feeling I elaborate in the next
section multiplies subjectivity and moves the discussion away from both identity and
agency. This is to pick up where Massey stops, to offer a theorization of what Massey
calls a “spatialized subjectivity.”32

Part Two: Spatializing Subjectivity
Feeling
I feel you. That’s the most important thing: I feel you. The
first line of rap I ever wrote is maybe the most important
one I will ever write. It says “ana hases feek katheb [I feel
you, liar].” The line does two things. First, it shows the
listener that the politician “on high” doesn’t feel him at all.
And in the track, I’m describing the pain [that comes from
this]. And second thing, at the same time, I’m telling the
listener that I’m with you: I’m in the same place. I am in
pain in the same way.
~Bu Kolthoum33
Massey’s proposition to spatialize subjectivity comes from her recognition of the
“inseparability of individuality and sociability.”34 In her efforts to dislodge the primacy
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of temporality as framework for narrating the subject, she writes, “Experience is not an
internalized succession of sensations (pure temporality) but a multiplicity of things and
relations.”35 Subjectivity in other words, she suggests, is not built chronologically, but is
constantly constituted in the multiple relations held simultaneously. Similarly, Moira
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd have argued that the emotions and passions that build an
individual are not constituted separately and succinctly, but can be held simultaneously,
effecting both memory and imagination. Leaning on Spinoza, they write: “To understand
the operation of the passions in individual life is at the same time to understand the
relations of collaboration and antagonism which bind human beings together in
society.”36
This way of understanding the individual complicates subject readings that are
based on a variety of identities (class, gender, nationality, et al.). It does so by pushing
past the immediate alternative, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, to assert,
in post-modern times, the presence of hybrid identities. Instead, the line of inquiry
Massey, Gatens, and Lloyd pursue places the body at the center of the interrogation of the
individual. Importantly, this body is always recognized in relation to other bodies in lived
space. So, Gatens and Lloyd write, “It is only as a finite individual among other finite
individuals – made vulnerable but also sustained by their collective power – that the
individual exists.”37 This individual in relation to others is significant not because of the
different identities it can carry, but because of the capacity of the body to affect and be
35
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affected by other bodies. “To be an individual at all is to be exposed to the external force
of other bodies – to the powers, whether congenial or antagonistic – of other
individuals.”38 This focus on the body as a force that acts upon and is acted upon opens
up interesting ways to consider the politics in live cultural production, and in particular to
evaluate audience interactions in contested city spaces, like rap concerts.
In particular, this line of inquiry allows for a way of interpreting interactions
without drawing a tight circle (a polis) around chosen performers and their audiences,
excluding subjects around them. That is, by acknowledging that audiences “are not just
passively moved by external forces, [t]hey have their own momentum,” we are able to to
consider audience movement – not just in the concert space, but towards it and away
from it. This spatializes the individual listener – putting the focus on her in relation to
others, but not necessarily as opposed to or removed from others. In other words, that
audiences bring affect into concert venues and simultaneously are affected by fellow
audiences and the performer is central to the processual politics in rap concerts. Listeners,
in Gatens and Lloyd’s terms, “act and [are] acted upon in a multiplicity of ways.”39
Like Massey and Gatens and Lloyd, I also lean on Spinoza’s conceptualization of
sensation and subjectivity. It is in particular his formulations that our sense of self is our
sense of our body in relation to other bodies that is most productive here. That is,
subjectivity is built vis-à-vis what is felt in the body and sensed in relation to other
bodies. His idea of subjectivity is something simultaneously felt internally and in relation
to others. New avenues to imagine politics in process open when the feeling body is
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repositioned as central in how to conceive of subjectivity and collectivity. It is not the
shape or color of bodies (ie identity) that is my primary interest, but their ability to hold
energy, absorb energy, sense other bodies.40 This emphasis on sensation is central to my
proposal of “feeling” as central to the politics in rap concerts.
I use “feeling” in the meaning of sensation. That is, I mean feeling as the process
of sensation, not as specific emotions. What is important to hold on to here is the spatial
relationships sensed between self and others. Consider the expressions, “You feel far”; “I
feel close to you”; “I feel you”; “I don’t feel it.” The point is to notice the difference
between these statements and phrases like “I feel sad/happy/angry.” Importantly, while
the latter are internally focused (even if the cause or catalyst of the feeling is external),
the former communicates sensation of the body in relation to others. It is easy to imagine
a range of emotions attached to each phrase: “You annoy me. I wish you would leave.
You do. You feel far. I am happy.” Alternatively, when used in this context: “I miss you.
You feel far,” the same phrase can carry different affect. The sensation of distance or
proximity can arise from different emotional registers, or even multiple emotions at once.
Consider this example: “Come back. I am angry at you because you feel far.” Here, one
can imagine both longing and anger together as the affective registers. It is not the
emotional qualities in and of themselves that concern me in my elaboration of feeling in
rap concerts in the following – except perhaps in so far as registering that emotions
(plural) may be held simultaneously. (I will return to the emotional blending in the
discussion of tarab, below.) What I am concerned to trace, rather, is the feeling of others
– whether as proximity, distance, or co-presence.
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Feeling featured as a central part of my conversations with interlocutors over the
course of this research. Considering the internet-based media through which Arabic rap is
primarily disseminated and the real obstacles to hosting live events (especially in
Ramallah and Amman), the reasons artists give for bothering to attempt and continuing to
host live events were always an important part of our discussions. Tangentially, the focus
I brought on the live concert often came as a something of a surprise to my interlocutors,
who are used to a slate of questions from journalists and researchers about politics,
resistance, protest (vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, intifada, or whatever other street protests
are underway),41 or their relationship with US hip hop culture. It was nonetheless
exploring the live aspect of their work that led me to the line of inquiry that I elaborate
here. Their answers as to why they consider concerts important are almost categorically
wrapped up in the opportunity “to feel” their audience or, as listeners, to feel the music.
DJ Sotusura locates an inciting moment in his personal history about the relevance of the
live rap concert in an experience listening to American rap:
There was a festival in LA. I went because Wu Tang were the headliners.
Right before Wu Tang, Mos Def took the stage. It was 1999. Mos Def’s
first album had been out for like six months, and I hadn’t really listened to
it. I had heard one or two tracks but I hadn’t really listened to the whole
album. Mos Def took the stage and did his set. I was totally stunned. I’m
telling you, he gave me goose bumps. Any song he did, the whole crowd
was with him. This was the first concert where I felt the power of an MC. I
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During my last two months of fieldwork, protests against the corruption and inefficiency of the Lebanese
government erupted in a new wave of anti-sectarian protests catalyzed by a crisis over the nation-wide
disposal of garbage. The #YouStink protests (#tl3at_r7tkom) were accompanied by renewed interest in the
political rap of Beirut, especially the work of Naserdayn al Touffar and El Rass, as I explore in the Beirut
case study. The discourses of protest and resistance attached to Arabic rap are thus neither confined to the
context of the “Arab Spring” (elaborated in previous chapters), nor the Palestinian intifadas (as I discuss in
the Ramallah chapter). Rather, the alacrity to associate Arabic rap with protest, the street, and “resistance”
is susceptible to the presence of spectacular activity (like street protests), regardless of the specific political
issues addressed and interests at play.
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can listen to Mos Def at home, and like the album, but the effect he has on
stage is much greater than anything else.
When I came back [to Amman] in 2004 we did concerts with Ramallah
Underground. And when they went to London I went on stage with them.
And [there] I felt like the crowd was being touched the same way I felt
when I saw Mos Def. The guys [of Ramallah Underground] just had to
hold the mic right and you could feel their energy: rage. Like, they were
just going to explode. This feeling, I know the audiences felt it. Arab or
British, it didn’t matter — there were people who came up to them after
and were like, ‘Man I don’t know what you’re talking about, but I can feel
it.’42
Sotusura’s testimony points to the involuntary, felt sensations (goose bumps) that
transpired when listening to a powerful performance and to the centrality of the
experience of feeling or being moved by the music in the consumption of live rap that I
want to focus on in the remaining part of this chapter. Audiences and listeners alike
affirm the importance of the opportunity to discern these feelings. The Ramallah-based
rapper, producer, and DJ Boikutt (himself one third of the now disbanded Ramallah
Underground) elaborates from his perspective:
I can put music online, and people can hear it, like it or not like it,
whatever. But live, there’s a connection in the moment. You can know
right in the instant what the response is of anyone listening, how they
receive what’s coming out of me, what I’ve been working on for years. I
can see in the instant how people react. In people’s faces. In their eyes. I
can feel the energy, I can feel the vibe, khalas [that’s it]. And at the same
time, it’s a connection. At the end, music for me isn’t one sided. There is
call and response.43
Building a theoretical model based on these testimonies and those of their peers,
the alternative I propose to reading resistance in rap concerts lies in paying attention to
42

Hicham Ibrahim, the DJ who goes by the stage name Sotusura. Interview with the author, September 12,
2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Ibrahim are taken from this interview. Translations
from the Arabic are my own.
43

Boikutt, interview with the author, March 30, 2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from Boikutt are
taken from this interview, unless otherwise noted. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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these powerful sensations – of feeling the performer – or feeling the audience. Simply,
these experiences on stage can act as validation for performers. They also, I think, point
to politics in motion: as performers experiment with expression, audiences are exposed to
articulations to which they may not be otherwise. When this happens in semi-public
spaces, both the articulation and the reactions of listeners are felt multiply, from different
directions. This call and response of receiving and giving affect are the political
exchanges in these live musical events at the same time that they are absolutely central to
the aesthetics of the genre and different performers within it. Having established a spatial
understanding of concerts, and the centrality of feeling in order to discern the self in
relation to others, I now want to propose tracing the building of tarab in rap concerts as a
way to analyze and codify how these feelings circulate.

Tarab
Music is the way to the soul. You get people into trances,
basically. If you have an audible algorithm, you can make
them feel certain stuff. Basically, that’s lovely, it’s
beautiful.
~Al Nather44
In this dissertation’s introduction, I referred to seemingly uncontrollable
emotional reactions (tears, shouts, etc.) in response to powerful performances of Arabic
rap. I suggested these felt reactions of mine have in part driven a curiosity to explore
other less tangible forms of political engagement in this genre of subcultural production.
44

Mohammed Masroujy, the Palestinian DJ and rapper who goes by Al-Nather. Interview with the author,
March 30, 2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from Al-Nather are taken from this interview.
Translations from the Arabic are my own. (Al-Nather heavily interspersed his discussion with me with
English.)
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Similar to but distinct from the Spanish duende and the Persian hal, Albanian wedding
singing, the Tunisian stambeli, and the Moroccan gnawa, explored by other scholars of
music, poetry, and performance, tarab is a term that describes both a traditional genre of
Arabic music production and the audience-performer interactions and the affective
condition evoked by the exceptional performance of live music, often associated with the
genre.45 Ethnomusicologist Ali Jihad Racy’s foundational study on tarab culture provides
the basic understanding for the term that I assume and then depart from here.46
Pointing to the centuries-old use of the term in Arabic philosophy on art, Racy
tells us that reference to tarab appears frequently in medieval Arabic literature.47 Of
these, especially Majd al-Din al-Ghazzali’s work on proper modes of listening in music
and in prayer was long the most developed work on the subject.48 Racy builds on these
and other ethnomusicological literature in order to develop his own understandings of
tarab as a state of rapture, an emotional blending that is transformative for subjects,
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Michael Anthony Sells, Early Islamic Mysticisms: Sufi, Qur’an, Mi’raj, Poetic and Theological Writings
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulis Press, 1996); Lorca, Frederico García Lorca, “Theory and Play of the Duende,” trans.
A.S. Kline, accessed January 10, 2014, http://www.poetryintranslation.com/klineaslorcaduende.htm; Jane
Sugarman, Engendering Song: Singing and Subjectivity at Prespa Albanian Weddings (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1997); Richard C. Jankowsky, Stambeli: Music, Trance, and Alterity in Tunisia (Chicago: The
U of Chicago P, 2010); Deborah Kapchan, Travelling Spirit Masters: Moroccan Gnawa Trance and Music
in the Global Marketplace (Wesleyan, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2007).
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Ali Jihad Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: The Culture and Artistry of Tarab (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge UP, 2004).
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While pointing to these sources, Racy also takes care to critique Glibert Rouget’s dependence, in the
latter’s seminal study on trance, on these medieval sources in trying to establish understanding of
contemporary music. While acknowledging the history of the term dating back to the medieval period,
Racy is keen to define and analyze a contemporary musical practice corresponding to some characteristics
associated with the term for centuries (Racy, Making Music, 197). See also Gilbert Rouget, Music and
Trance: A Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession, trans. Brunhilde Biebuyck (Chicago: U
of Chicago P, 1985).
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Excerpted in James Robson, Tracts on Listening to Music (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938). Also
translated by Duncan MacDonald, “Emotional religion in Islam as Affected by Music and Singing. Being a
Translation of a book of the Ihya ʿUlum ad-Din of Al-Ghazzali with Analysis, Annotation, and
Appendices,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1901:195-252.
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and/or an overtly expressed longing invoked by a particularly powerful piece of music or
poetry, and a desired state of spectatorship. Racy focuses his study in the twentieth
century, in the urban centers of Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and to some extent Aleppo,
where tarab dominated a type of specialized, urban musical production, associated with
particular patterns of listening. Most readily located in the careers and popularity of Umm
Kulthoum, Mohammed Abd el-Wahab, and others of their generation, tarab music
reached its peek during their lifetimes, and has since steadily declined in popularity.49
This tarab music is associated with songs written in specific modes, where the subject is
almost always love, and is nearly completely dominated by an affective mode of longing.
Tarab music is called such because of the tarab condition it has been associated
with producing. Distinct from trance though it shares some of its characteristics, the tarab
condition is an affective state induced by the processes of careful listening and exchange
with engaged performers.50 In Arabic, it is often invoked in relation to saltanah, or
ecstasy, and wajd, religious ecstasy or trance (especially in the Sufi tradition), but is
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See also Virginia Danielson, The Voice of Egypt: Umm Kulthum, Arabic Song, and Egyptian Society in
the Twentieth Century (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997); and Jonathan Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees:
Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2006).
50

Charles Hirschkind calls tarab “enchantment” that is “produced by the affective synthesis of listener and
performer.” He also refers to it as “harmony” and “an intersubjective form enabling an exchange of feeling
or an affective melding.” (Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic
Counterpublics [New York: Columbia UP, 2006], Kindle edition, locations 823 and 1153.)
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nonetheless distinct from both.51 Tarab need not have a spiritual connotation; nor is it
solitary, nor inwardly focused (like the experiences of saltanah and ecstasy).52
Considering my focus in this study is not the music of Umm Kulthoum or others,
but with Arabic rap, I am here less concerned with the twentieth-century classic music
genre usually associated with the word tarab than with the affective condition frequently
associated with it.53 My interlocutors are nonetheless intimately familiar with the style of
popular music, often referred to as tarab elʿarabi [tarab music]. They consistently testify
to its presence in their narratives of musical exposure as children and teenagers. Further,
this music has been consistently sampled across the wide range of Arabic rap developed
over the past thirty years (I return to this below). The style and form of tarab music is
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Saltanah is frequently related as an element of tarab. Saltanah is the ecstasy an individual can go into as a
result of (mostly) playing music. Tarab more readily invokes the dynamic of elation or ecstasy invoked by
exchange between performer and listener, what Racy calls the “transformative experience.” One can
yusaltan (go into ecstasy) listening or playing alone. The same is not typically true for tarab. (See Racy,
Making Music, 120-146.)
52

Rouget tries to make a firm distinction between ecstasy and trance. The former he confines to the
religious experiences (the likes of those documented by the nun Teresa de Avila), which are solitary, quiet,
and which the subject remembers clearly afterwards. By contrast, trance is the stuff of shamanistic rituals,
and may be manifest in trembling, shaking, foaming at the mouth, swooning, etc., and is induced by music,
drumming, or other noise, the experience of which few subjects are able to recall after the fact. His
definitions are not always compatible with the translated terms he refers to, for example, other translators
use the same words (which in Rouget’s study have completely opposite meanings) to describe different
aspects of different terms. Neither am I convinced that there cannot be elements of what Rouget describes
as ecstasy in trance. I return to Racy’s problematizing of Rouget’s work on tarab specifically with reference
to its Arab subject matter later in this section. (See Rouget, Music and Trance, 3-11.)
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On Oum Kulthoum and tarab see Virginia Danielson, “The Voice of Egypt: Umm Kulthum, Arabic Song,
and Egyptian Society in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997), 139, among others. For
distinction between singers in this genre and their ability (or not) to produce tarab, especially for the
interesting contrast he draws between between tarab and sentimentality, see Martin Stokes, “Abd alHalim’s Microphone,” in Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia,
edited by Laudan Nooshin (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 55-74. Furthermore, the relationship of tarab to
spiritual practices, especially certain Sufi rituals, points to its presence of tarab outside this musical genre.
See for example, Michael Frishkopf, “Tarab in the Mystic Sufi Chant of Egypt,” in Colors of Enchantment:
Visual and Performing Arts of the Middle East, edited by Sherifa Zuhur (Cairo: American U in Cairo P,
2001), 233-269.
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also sung (not sampled) in the work of the Hermel-based rapper Gaafar al Touffar, who is
known for singing mawwal between verses or as the hook in his tracks.54
What I am primarily interested in here is not tarab el arabi but tarab el jumhur
[tarab of the audience]. That is, not the genre of music, but the reactions of the jumhur
[audience]. Rather than dissecting the style of music in use, whether sampled or recorded,
I want to propose tarab as a way of approaching audience dynamics in rap concerts and as
a way to re-center the processes of listening to rap as significant.55 Racy’s observations
continue to be useful here. A performer of tarab music himself, Racy tells us that that
tarab concerts [haflat] rely on a specialized listening audience, on which the singer
depends for responses that may include clapping, exclamations [aiwah! (right on!),
Allaah! (Heavens!), et al.] rocking, swaying, etc. These reactions facilitate the
performer’s own ecstasy and encourage him/her to yitrabou [go into tarab]. Moreover,
Racy tells us the emergence of tarab depends in significant part on specialized listeners or
samiʿah, who were trained, either through formal or informal instruction, how to
appreciate the series of improvisations performed by vocalists and instrumentalists,
themselves possessed by the trance-like condition of tarab.
On the heels of a small concert under spring rain in Amman, I asked Boikutt
about what he discerned from the gathered audience’s reactions. His description is
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In classical tarab, mawwal is a sung piece of music before the formal song begins. Sung in dialect as
opposed to standardized fusha, the mawwal allows the singer to demonstrate his/her ability to improvise a
non-metrical melody.
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Al-Ghazzali emphasized the significance of listening as meaning making. He writes, “There is no way of
extracting… hidden things save by the flint and steels of listening to music and singing, and there is no
entry into the heart save by the antechamber of the ears.” (Al-Ghazzali, translated and printed in Duncan B.
MacDonald, “Emotional Religion in Islam as Affected by Music and Singing being a Translation of a book
of the Ihya ʿUlum ad-Din of Al-Ghazzali with analysis, annotation and Appendices,” Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society (1901): 195-252, qtd. in Rouget, Music and Trance, 258.)
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illuminating in unpacking tarab exchanges in rap concerts – in order to understand those
interactions between audience and performer that establish whether or not the music is
felt:
I found two people who were interested. I could tell from their faces.
There was a guy up front, and there was a very open connection between
us, he was exchanging with me a lot. I don’t mean to imply some deep
analysis of his personality, but he was very clear and open with me. And
there was another woman, she was standing in the back and she was
giving me a lot of feedback on the flow. I’m not even sure if she spoke
Arabic, but she was giving me feedback on the music. So there, I had two
points in the audience. One guy is giving me feedback on the lyrics, and
one is giving me feedback on the technicality, on the musicality. This was
the perfect balance for me. At a complicated lyrical place I’d check in with
this guy, for the flow I’d check in with the woman in the back; both cases
I could see if it was good or not. Of course I was also checking in with
other people who were there, but I would always return to these two
points. I need this energy.
In this case, the “dialectical …intercommunication with others who ‘felt’ the music”
seems predominantly to takes the shape of eye contact and slight movements of the
head.56 Other performers at different events describe it in more obvious displays like
shouts, clapping, raising both hands to the temples or forehead in an expression of shock
or relief. The intensity of the exchanges can build and release over the course of a
concert. In rap concerts, as in the traditional contexts Racy describes, the tarab state can
suggest “loss of control” – jumping, shouting, or other releases of energy that may
otherwise not be typical and at the same time be “physically empowering.”57 Regardless
of the form it takes however, of central importance is that it is an exchange. Like the
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Racy, Making Music, 9.
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Ibid., 201.
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rapper and DJ Dakn explains, “It’s question and answer, it keeps going. We’re in a circle
and we all go into a trance together.”58
Performers thus refer to exchanges that rely on some of the traditional performeraudience interactions in hip hop concerts – like, for example, call and response. H. Samy
Alim has suggested that call and response in contemporary US hip hop and rap music
developed from similar interactions in funk music performances, like this basic one:
“[Rapper] Say ‘Hoooo!’ [Audience] ‘Hoooooooo!’ [Rapper] Say ‘Ho! Ho!’ [Audience]
‘Ho!’ ‘Ho!’”; etc.59 Literature on call and response, sometimes called antiphonal
exchange or communication, in hip hop studies, anthropological accounts of African
musical forms, studies of preaching styles in African American churches, as well as
assessments of protest strategies in Occupy Wall Street, all suggest that these responsive
utterances are additionally significant in that they are able to create community during the
performance event.60 Robert Farris Thompson describes call and response as “perfected
social interaction” for its ability to bring individuals together to act as one body.61 Daniel
and Smitherman concur adding, “call and response seeks to synthesize ‘speakers’ and
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Interview with the author, March 30, 2015, Amman, Jordan. All subsequent quotations from Dakn are
taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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‘listeners’ in a unified movement.”62 Arab rappers and MCs, like their counterparts that
perform rap in other languages around the world, also use antiphonal strategies to connect
with and activate their audiences.
However, MCs and listeners I spoke with readily discern between what they call
“hype” and what they call a listening experience that “biʿabi el rass” [fills the head]. The
difference as manifest between two prominent Palestinian crews with pronouncedly
different aesthetics will be some of the focus of a subsequent chapter. At the moment, I
want to note that what my interlocutors call “hype,” or the excitement that comes from
traditional call-and-response, where a performer is able to charge the crowd and excite
them, is not always the kind of tarab I want to pay attention to here. The ability of the
music to fill the head, is, however. This tarab can be much harder to notice visually,
because it is not predicated on spectacular behavior (jumping, yelling, etc.); the feeling,
however, can be much more powerful. Recall Sotusura’s recollections of the Ramallah
Underground show in London. The performers were not very active or hyped up. There
was little call and response. Sotusura says “all they had to do was hold the mic properly”
and the communication of feeling was powerful enough that even non-Arab speakers
were moved enough to tell the musicians afterwards they could “feel it.” The Lebanese
rapper El Rass’s distinctions between a concert that hypes and one that does something
else make this distinction very clear. He started by explaining to me how he notices the
presence of tarab in his concerts:
For example, when they shout, when they cry. There are a lot of nuances,
when you see a hall of three hundred people and you’re spitting your shit
and no one is moving a thing. They're staring and you can see that they
62
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really want to get every word you’re saying, you can feel that, compared
to a public for example that only reacts when you say something
provocative or very catchy. You can see the difference between the
different kinds of reactions. And it’s not only a question of different kinds
of publics, sometimes it’s your responsibility too to take the public to this
kind of place. As opposed to keeping them in the “shout out” place, in the
“hype” thing. A lot of people would see a successful show as a super hype
thing. For me this is not an ideal show.
Super hype — when they’re dancing?
Or like you know when it gets shouting and people going crazy and put
your hands up and whatever. For me this is not the ideal show. For me the
ideal show is when people individually and internally are most affected by
what I am proposing to them. And not on a simplistic, basic, bond of
punchline-reaction, insult-reaction.
Filling the head, what El Rass calls “when people are most affected” – as opposed
to hype – requires a more focused, active listening. Racy’s emphasis on the importance of
what he calls “creative listening” points to the centrality of the audience in this form of
performance analysis.63 Racy suggests this “creative listening” can be led by a
specialized section of the audience, what Racy calls the samiʿah, or “listeners.” These are
the dedicated fans who fuel the performer with attuned reactions to delivery, rhythm, tone
of expression.64 In other words, tarab is not manifest in just any response, but in a
specific kind of delivery within the framework of the performer-listener call and
response. Racy tells us “proper listening requires the display of reactions that are both
genuine and idiomatically correct.”65 In other words, the communication of “feeling” the
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music in the reactions of samiʿah is nuanced. 66 This active listening communicates to the
performer what is working – what “is felt” and to what extent, as in Boikutt’s
recollections about the concert at Jadal, above.
Sprinkled throughout the jumhur, or general audience, the specialized listener
helps in part to shape the appropriate reactions and who deliver the most useful feedback
to performers.67 The samiʿah may include musicians (other rappers and DJs for example
in my context), but usually they are just dedicated fans. Racy says that the “samiʿah can
be viewed as an in-group.”68 These audience dynamics also appeared in the rap concerts I
am concerned with here. Asked if he noticed characteristics particular to rap audiences,
the owner of a music venue in Ramallah responded thusly:
A rap audience is different, specific. [They are] more of a community.
People come in a group, like maybe ten of them and they know each other
well. Audiences of other bands are more spread out. [In a rap concert],
there will always be the first two rows, full of loyal listeners. They’ll
always be there, and you’ll see them in all the rap concerts. And then the
rest of the audience… they’re varied.69
In these recollections, the owner recognizes the presence of a specialized listening
crowd within the general public at rap concerts. Importantly, he offers that the
presence of the samiʿah is unique to rap concerts among the other genres of music
(rock, jazz, DJ parties) that he hosts in his venue.
66

Racy adds: “the ability of the samiʿah to listen and feel is manifested in a culturally established
vocabulary of gestures, facial expressions, body language, and verbal exclamations, that all
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Racy argues that tarab induced by this listening is impermanent; tarab lasts a few
moments or, at most, a portion of an evening: it is transient, fleeting. The effects of tarab
may include disruption of the perception of time: seemingly speeding up or slowing
down its passing. Predominant among the sensations aroused by tarab is the sense of
empowerment it induces –physically, musically, emotionally, causing reactions,
performances, or expressions that may not otherwise be typical. Significantly these felt
sensations connect audiences to each other. As Racy, leaning on the qanun player Amin
Fahmi expands, “listeners experience an elative sense of surrender, a feeling of
communitas that… binds them together as citizens of the tarab nation.”70 Indeed, this
phenomenon – where an individual, subjective sensation encourages the “imaginative
awareness of others” evokes the spatialized subjectivity proposed by Massey and Gatens
and Lloyd, with which I opened this chapter. What are we to make of the proposition of a
“tarab nation”?
Perhaps most compelling to me in the characteristics Racy ascribes to tarab is its
conceptual elusiveness – that is, tarab is not partial to a particular ideological expression
or belief. It is surely tied to the lyrical expression involved, but it need not depend on the
articulation of a particular political project. Racy suggests that tarab is “an ethos that is
felt rather than something that is merely conceived or visualized.”71 Further, neither is the
emergence of tarab tied to a specific emotion or affect. Racy takes great care to
emphasize the distinction of tarab from emotion-specific descriptions of sentiments or
70
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feelings.72 Instead, echoing statements from his own interlocutors, he asserts “al fann
ihsas” or, “art [music in this case] is feeling.” Differentiating it from both sentiment and
emotion, Racy explains that this feeling “is best interpreted as something resembling…
the concept of ihsas… [which] stands for “feeling” (rather than ‘feelings’ in the plural)
and is not committed to any particular emotional or sentimental profile.”73 Ihsas as he
identifies it, and as it means in Arabic, means something closer to a physical sensation, a
feeling. And it is this meaning that I also want to invoke when I propose the phrase
“feeling politics” as a methodology for the political ethnography of subcultural
production. But before moving on to address this proposal, I want to return to the
subjective yet interrelational aspects underscored in the presence of tarab as active
listening, to the ideas of communitas that may be engendered by the emergence of tarab. I
will do this via a detour, however, to address the some cultural assumptions invoked by
this framework.
Racy notes that Arab audiences’ emotional responses to live musical
performances captivated the interest of eighteenth and nineteenth century Western
observers of the Arab world. He points to the orientalism that allowed observers like
Guillaume Andre Villoteau to comment on Egyptians’ “bizarre display of passion.” 74
Racy argues that it is orientalism that allowed these authors to postulate about the
emotional, hysterical, or childish essence of Arabs based on behavior that, in comparison
to British, French, and German norms in concert etiquette, seemed quite alien. In
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deepening an understanding of tarab from the perspective of both scholar and performer
of the genre and the affective condition associated with it, Racy takes great pains to
distance himself from even twentieth century ethnomusicological studies. He deplores
claims like Rouget’s, for instance, that the Arab listener
is encouraged by his upbringing to cultivate this emotion, sharpen it,
exacerbate it as it were, and not only give it free expression but make it
explode, and express this explosion in the most spectacular way.75
Racy is right to point out that this type of analysis, despite being frequently fronted by
explanations that seem to deny cultural essentialism, nonetheless perpetuates it. Rouget’s
efforts preceding this passage only shake a bias about an “innate Arab temperament” to
place it instead on an Arab “sociocultural phenomenon”:
It is indeed hyperesthesia that is involved, it seems, at least relative to
what we late-twentieth-century Europeans see as the norm. But to what
should be attribute it? I trust everyone will agree we cannot see it as some
natural and innate quality of the Arab temperament. We are clearly dealing
with a sociocultural phenomenon (even though one could just as easily
interpret our relative indifference to music as resulting from a veritable
form of anesthesia of our musical sensibility; in which case this would
then be our culturally specific characteristic).76
Whether the “sociocultural phenomenon” is “ours” or “theirs” makes no difference, the
essentializing function remains.77
It would be a great shame if my proposal to apply an interpretation of tarab to
audience dynamics in Arabic rap were interpreted as an invitation to understand these
audiences or these performers, the politics that seem to be in process, their lyrical
expression, or their behavior otherwise as particularly “emotional.” My proposals in this
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chapter of “feeling politics” and recognizing tarab in order to do so are not an attempt to
orientalize my interlocutors or to understand their politics as either hysterical or innately
emotional. I should think that the concept of tarab in music and in audience behavior – as
a way of understanding feeling aroused by performance and as analyzing how music is
felt – could be a productive tool of analysis in a number of cultures and performance
styles. I see no reason why it cannot be applied to some forms of hip hop elsewhere,
especially hip hop resembling the early political roots of US hip hop (see for example,
Sotusura’s recollections, above). As should be clear in my differentiation of “hype” and
music that “fills the head” neither is this proposal of tarab as performance analysis an
invitation to haphazardly apply it to every instance in which one discerns
audience/performer call and response. Rather, if I am successful, my attempts here to
unseat the phenomenon of tarab from the genre with which it has recently been associated
in ethnomusicological literature should be a productive theoretical and methodological
move for the study of other types of performance. The framework of tarab seems to me
more attached to the nature of some live performance than any cultural essence. My
intention in using the term is to attempt to adapt – and to introduce into English discourse
no less – a concept of Arabic musical theory and listening analysis to the discussion of
contemporary live performance. Tarab is just as valid a framework of performance
analysis for these live events as any number of other models of spectatorship touted in
recent years.
The analysis of political space I elaborated in the first section of this chapter
culminated in the proposal to “spatialize subjectivity.” By this I meant recognizing the
self in relation to others, specifically by rooting an understanding of community in the
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felt sensation of the body and its proximity or distance to other bodies. I pointed to theory
building on Spinoza’s work that suggests that it is only through the felt body that we
imagine others. Rap concerts are rife with these processes of feeling. As performances of
live music, they are ideal events within which to elaborate further this conceptualization
of self and other through the analysis of performance. On the philosophical importance of
recognizing the felt experiences of listening to music, Judith Becker writes:
[W]e experience music with our skins, with our pulse rates, and with our
body temperature. To subscribe to a theory of musical cognition which
cannot deal with the embodiment of music, of the involvement of the
senses, the visceral system, and the emotions is to maintain a Cartesian
approach of mind/body dualism.78
Building from this, I suggest that offering an analysis of Arabic rap that does not consider
the felt experience of listening to it, is to relegate its analysis to the traditional study of
music as text (whether lyrics or beats), and to confine a study of the politics therein to the
rational workings of logic (the mind), as opposed to the materially felt experience of
interacting with others in space (the body). It is indeed to continue to perpetuate this
dualism.
How the music is felt is important. All the more so because, as I have been
working to elaborate, the processes of an individual feeling the music herself are
intimately intertwined with her processes of perception of the communities within which
she can imagine herself. Earlier, I referred to Fahmi’s invocation of a “tarab nation” – or
an imagined, ephemeral community in the presence of tarab during live concerts. This
concept points to something that is felt internally, communicated or shared with others,
fleeting, and empowering. I also referred to literature on call and response which
78
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similarly can bring into being a feeling of community with its enactment. Central to the
political significance that may be attributed to rap concerts as a result of the presence of
tarab during them may lie in the sense of self in relation to other that it evokes.
Importantly this fleeting, empowering felt self in relation to felt others is unique
from the models of audience rapport and communitas largely based on visual (as opposed
to aural) stimulation offered of late by scholars of theatre and performance. Erika
Fischer-Lichte’s autopoetic feedback loop for example, describes exchanges between
performers and spectators in avant-garde performance practices since the 1970s.79 This
concept applies to various performatic arrangements wherein the roles between spectators
and performers are reversed (spectators act, performers watch or listen), community is
generated, and intimacy and distance in the performance space is actively negotiated.
Performances Fischer-Lichte considers do not represent community generation or
intimacy, rather, “…they actually create instances of these processes. The spectators
become actors and in so doing having an important effect on the course of the
performance itself.”80
Significantly for my study, and especially for the analysis I offered in the previous
chapter, all of Fischer-Lichte’s examples require quite spectacular behavior on behalf of
the spectators in order to confirm their “transformation” into actors. Audiences of Marina
Abramovic’s Lips of Thomas moved to stop the performance itself, covering the artist
with their coats as she lay crucified upon blocks of ice. Similarly, some of those who
attended Joseph Beuys’ action in 1964 at the University of Technology in Aachen,
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stormed the stage and punched the artist until he bled from the nose. Taking an example
from music, attendees to David Tudor’s 4’33” audibly and vociferously voiced their
disapproval, shouting and throwing things onto the stage when the pianist sat in silence,
refusing to play a single note. The feedback loop Fischer-Lichte indicates as
transformative is, in the examples she presents, categorically manifest in quite
spectacular behavior on behalf of those audiences supposed to be passive. The passive
spectator becomes active through the manifestation of spectacular behavior. This is
precisely the problematic theoretical cul-de-sac I identified in the previous chapter. When
we locate political activity in the behavior of individuals who act out, we are perpetuating
the need for apolitical, passive activity, from which only a few gestures can emerge as
politically significant. While this celebrates some individual choices, it actually
necessitates the continuation of “apolitical” behavior, against whose background some
gestures appear transformative.
The interactions I am talking about when tarab emerges in rap concerts also point
to the reality that live performance is co-conceived, or at least dependent on a live
audience. However, the reactions that rappers are going for are not the spectacular
transformations from passive actors into active spectators, which Fischer-Lichte talks
about. As the DJ Dakn told me, “It’s energy going back and forth, you play with it, it’s
like soccer.” Or as the Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum put it,
At the base it’s about energy. I grab a stone of energy and throw it at them
[the audience], and I’m waiting for a response. I throw a spark, like they
say. The response they give me allows me to respond again with
something stronger. It gets me higher, higher, higher, and this lets them
come with me on this trip. If I get to a very high spirit, I know 100% that
they are with me. But if I sing and there’s no response, I can’t.
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Contrary to some theatrical presumptions about the passivity of the spectator, rappers
assume their listeners are already active, it is about bringing them “on the trip,” in order
to feel the music. Audience reactions are about communication, presence, and feeling, not
the transfer or transformation of subject positions. Dakn again:
Sometimes when I’m spitting verses, I close my eyes. But within the first
four lines you can notice what’s happening in front of you. And from there
it becomes clear if the listeners are political, or if they’re not into arts, or
into whatever… from their feedback I can tell if they know what’s going
on. I can also tell if they understood me but it wasn’t satisfying enough for
them [in that case] that means I need to work on myself. You also have to
build from one concert to the next.
The importance on feeling (as opposed to vision) is made so clear in these remarks,
where Dakn admits in four lines he can tell what’s happening with his eyes closed. The
goal is feeling this proximity or distance, and the satisfaction or dissatisfaction from it,
not the agitation or provocation into a certain type of action, or any spectacular behavior.
In fact, the emphasis on correct forms of listening, implied in all these interlocutors’
reflections, suggests that the radical transformations of the position of listener/performer
would not be welcome. As evidenced in these recollections, audience reactions not only
let him know his weaknesses, but if the audience even “knows what’s going on.” Dakn is
referring here to a definitely understood framework of behavior, within which
comprehension and communication can also not be faked.81 Within this understanding of
audience-performer interactions, the goal is in fact not to be spectacular or to produce
spectacular behavior outside the understood framework, but to recognize and feel the
presence of those present. This points to an understanding of the act of listening as
81

Judith Becker elaborates at length about negotiations of “believability” in trance (Becker, Deep Listeners,
30-32); and Racy discusses the sincerity of audience reactions in depth in the context of tarab listening
(Racy, Making Music, 37-39).

!

155
always already active; one needn’t catalyze a spectacular gesture in order to overcome an
inherent passivity.
When asked if tarab exists in rap concerts, most performers confirm its presence.
The great majority of the MCs I interviewed positively related the presence of tarab – or
particularly charged exchanges with their audiences – in concerts as a central part of the
value of the live concert itself. In cases where musicians and audiences affirm powerful
exchanges of feeling but hesitate about whether or not to call it tarab, the value placed on
tarab-like exchanges is still high, pointing to the primary machine of pleasure in rap
concerts, for both performers and listeners. The hesitation about whether or not to call
these sensations tarab in rap concerts may come from the discomfort with what seems
like an anachronism, applying a classical term to contemporary performance. Other
times, it may come from the reality that many listeners of Arabic rap also listen to and
enjoy the classical tarab. The patterns of listening to the latter (and frequently the
company within which one finds oneself when doing so) are markedly different from the
patterns of listening to the former. Most notably because classical tarab concerts are now
somewhat rare in these cities, listening to this music will likely be confined to the home
or the home of a friend, playing or replaying familiar recordings, the extent and depth of
whose satisfaction is largely familiar. In most ways these jalsat [gatherings] will be quite
different from the rap concerts I describe below: in terms of audience, in terms of affect,
and in terms of energy. For some, I think that makes also describing the interactions in
rap concerts as tarab difficult to accept.
My goal is to make a convincing case for why tarab can be applicable to rap
concerts, primarily by focusing on the shape of the interactions and sensations shared
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between listeners and performers. For a moment, however, I want to indulge a brief
digression into content, in order to explore the political potency of these feelings and
sensations. While I have been using standard translations of tarab as ecstasy, trance-like,
and so on, at a very basic level, tarab means “agitation” or “movement.” To be affected
by tarab in a musical context like the ones I discuss here, means to be moved by the
music. Al-Ghazzali tells us that the subject of the medieval songs that moved listeners in
his time was the love of God. It is for that reason that al-Ghazzali’s treatises are on the
proper forms of listening: how to be moved (and how not to be moved) by the love of
God. In twentieth-century tarab, Racy suggests the subject of most tarab music was
heterosexual love: sweet hearts, forbidden love, slighted love, betrayal, alienation. He
offers that the development of some lyrics about camaraderie, friendship, and drinking
can be traced back and occasionally conflated with love of God. Regardless, we can
imagine al-Ghazzali’s shock (can we not?) at the secular, profane, and perhaps much
more explicitly erotic nature of the lyrical longing in twentieth century tarab in
comparison to that of the twelfth century, in which he wrote.
A great number of contemporary rap lyrics also deal with longing – not for a
sweetheart, for God, nor (explicitly) for camaraderie and drink – but rather for any
number of things taken, lost, missing, or otherwise non existent. While not taking a lover
as the subject, many, many Arabic rap lyrics articulate sentiments of betrayal, of
spurning, or deceit. Most powerful pieces articulate some form of alienation – from self,
from immediate community, from international understanding — that may be the result
of local corruption, colonialism, occupation, stereotyping, and so on. While these lyrics
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are not articulated in an affective register we associate with love-lust or despair, much of
it, I think clearly fits a mode of longing.
It is perhaps for this reason that twentieth-century tarab sampling works so well in
contemporary Arabic rap. Consider a track I will discuss at length in the Ramallah
chapter: Ramallah Underground’s “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let Me Live”]. The track opens
with a sample of Oum Kulthoum singing a line from her piece “Amal Hayati” [“Hope of
my Life”]. Oum Kulthoum’s piece is about a love affair that is ending – khaleeni ʿayeesh
is a plea to be allowed one more day in the company of her beloved. Her refrain takes on
a very different meaning sampled under Boikutt’s verses. The phrase “khaleeni ʿayeesh”
sung between verses about the impossibility of resistance (and the hypocrisy of the
diaspora) still literally means ‘let me live’ but here it is directed at the forces of the
Occupation as well as political discourse about what one should and shouldn’t do under
Occupation. The lyrics I excerpted in this dissertation’s introduction “I try to forget but
politics pulls at me/ I tell her let go, I’m not interested/She tells me I’m a part of your life
you won’t be able to resist me,” also by the Ramallah Underground, similarly position
political struggle as a tiff between lovers (not least of which is evident in the
anthropomorphism of “politics” as a woman). There are dozens and dozens of examples
of this politicized longing and frustration in the work of the musicians I deal with here.
This affective articulation of desire, betrayal, or slighting in an overtly political
context (Occupation, corruption, diaspora, etc.) should not be confused with pieces in
which rappers directly address the subject of love or romantic partnership, a growing
subgenre. This subject, which is a favorite suggestion among journalists, enthusiasts, or
musicians themselves who declare politics “gets boring,” has seen different periods of
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interest and growth. But this is not what I am referring to.82 I do not want to associate the
powerful tarab I think can exist in rap performance with individual songs that discuss
love. I am rather talking about an affective mode of longing when the topic is not overtly
romance.
It seems to me that the jump from longing for a lover to the longing for some
political alternative, the end of Occupation or colonialism, or another becoming, not yet
arrived, is not that dissimilar from the jump in subject matter from the love of God in the
twelfth century to the love of a lover that dominated tarab listening in the twentieth. If
tarab can be equally found in lyrics addressing both of these subjects, it may surely
structure the longing for neither a specific, omnipotent power, nor a specific, unattainable
lover. Tarab can also be manifest in the longing for something politically evasive and as
of yet unattained. Similarly, someone else expressing that longing can relieve the
pressure felt on the individual listener.
For example, Rouget takes from al-Ghazzali the example of a woman taken by
her husband far from her homeland. One day when she is off to gather water, she hears
someone singing about their own homesickness. The woman is so moved by the music
she faints and dies. This is an (rather extreme) example of being moved by the music, or
feeling tarab. This anecdote highlights how the feeling of homesickness was already
present in the woman, but the surprise of hearing someone else articulate it, and set to
music, brought that feeling out and moved her to (in this case a rather dire) ecstatic
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climax. Nonetheless, this tarab still relieved her (one might say) of the painful feeling of
being far from home.
Listeners of Arabic rap similarly point to a release when they listen to specific
pieces. If we were to follow the framework of resistance we are so eagerly told should
exist in this genre, it seems at the very least the anger articulated by performers in their
lyrics (rage, I was told more than once) should translate to the audience, inspiring them to
pick up rocks, and make revolution – or whatever artistic “resistance” is meant to
catalyze. On the contrary, however, most listeners affirm they feel relieved or relaxed
after having attended a rap concert. DJ Sotusura offers his reflections having watched
audiences for over a decade:
This guy on stage relieved them. He said everything that was on their
minds so they relax. They don’t come out of the concert, “let’s break
shit!” I think rather they come out of it feeling like, “wow this was good
for my soul to hear someone say what I can’t say.”
This points to the pleasure in tarab listening during rap just like during classical tarab or
the medieval example. Similarly, audiences of Oum Kulthoum did not exit her concerts
heartbroken and weeping. Rather, even if there is heartbreak at play within the individual
drama – indeed especially if this is the case – the musician pulls out and relieves the
longing via the emergence of tarab. My suggestion is that the same can be true whether
the subject of longing is the singular God, a specific lover, or an abstract politics. This is
why I think it valid, for political analysis no less, to engage with an analysis of tarab in
rap concerts. This relief felt together in the presence of the MC’s articulated expression is
the beginning of the felt self in relation to others that tarab is able to generate.
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At the same time, this is not the same effect Augusto Boal writes of when laying
out the politics of Aristotelian catharsis.83 When Boal writes about how Aristotle’s
“coercive system of tragedy” functions, he argues that disruptive politics are purged from
the body politic via their representation on the stage in this kind of play-making. The
audience leaves the theatre less likely to confront the fates because Oedipus has done so.
The protagonist’s indulging his own hubris leads the spectator not to want to do the same.
This is not the same kind of catharsis I identify.84 The feeling of tarab I am talking about
can be empowering, and thus politically potent, while it provides relief. As I mentioned,
this feeling stems from the felt sense of self in relation to others. This relief is not
catharsis in a lesson received from the performer or his or her message. It is a felt
confirmation of not being alone, of feeling self in relation to others, of feeling longing
with others. To understand this relief, its tarab-ness as it were, is to acknowledge longing
and relief simultaneously – this is the impact of the “emotional blending” I will address
shortly.
There is a final note about emotion as reflected in longing and with regards to the
Arab context to be mentioned here before moving on to see how this model differs from
other discussions of politics in Arabic music and rap. I affirmed above that Arabs are not
more emotional than other groups of people, neither is “their” political articulation more
hysterical, hot-headed or otherwise prone to feeling than that found elsewhere. In specific
ways, however, the political history of the Arab world today is marked by loss, and this
loss is outwardly recognized as such in ways that the political defeat of progressive forces
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elsewhere on the planet is not. The continued presence of the Israeli Occupation, the still
felt defeats of the wars with Israel of the previous century, the failure of pan-Arabism,
and in the past ten years the devastating counterrevolutions in Libya and Egypt, the rise
of fundamentalism and ISIS, and the recent occupations and divisions of Syria and Iraq
mark Arab political reality today with an inescapable sense of loss. This loss is much
different, both affectively and to the extent to which it is felt and accepted, than the felt
decline of “the Left” in Western Europe and North America, or the millenial “malaise”
we are constantly being told is disturbing the youth in the US. It is not that Arab politics
are inherently emotional or that Arabs are inherently political, it is that political history at
this moment in this region is – I think it is safe to say – and perhaps especially among this
generation of 18-35 year olds, felt to be full of failure and defeat. The anger and longing
that emerges in some tracks of Arabic rap is tied to this material, political reality.

Revolutionary song in the Arab world

The conceptualization of feeling in rap concerts I am elaborating here allows for
an analysis that other studies of the political valences of Arabic music have not be able to
access. Political study of Arabic music – whether or not they revolve theoretically around
a notion of resistance – has most typically been conducted in an analysis of song as
political vehicle. While genres and particular singers are recognized for their proximity to
politics or their manipulation to political ends85 and genres are recognized as part of
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political and cultural life, musicological readings, in depth lyrical analyses, and
discussion of politics in music have regularly been analyzed through individual, iconic
songs.86 This attention has produced a veritable repertoire of Arab political song in the
twentieth century, where the influence of cultural forms like the dabkeh, political
movements like Nasser’s state-led socialism, and general changes like the advance of the
video-clip influenced the development of music within which individual songs became
prominent classics.87 Recent work on politics in Arabic rap music has continued in this
vein, highlighting particularly popular tracks as new anthems for the rising generation.88
It is worth noting that this critical attention on political song has perhaps
disproportionately focused on Palestinian artists or Palestinian subject matter, considering
the centrality of the Palestinian question in regional Arab politics. (Or, at least, the
centrality of the Palestinian question in Arab politics as perceived by an international
audience. Local political questions have always outweighed the regional ones, in the
Arab world as elsewhere – to the great expense of the Palestinians, no less.) My emphasis
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on tarab in performance rather shifts the focus away from the song as political vehicle
and into deliberations of the political experiences of interacting during concerts.
This approach I am proposing, based in the recognition of the slow building of
tarab, is also considerably different from most studies of the politics in “global hip hop.”
Unlike much contemporary discourse about hip hop and rap in the US, rap outside of the
US is much more readily associated with the early political roots of US hip hop and is
almost always digested with an understanding of its political, if not “resistant”, potential.
These political valences are often located within the social structure of rap production
and consumption, in “empowering youth communities,”89 often associated with if not
directly dependent on local economies of aid, NGO markets and cultural production, and
international recognition thereof. Alternatively, politics may be located in the formation
or expression of local, hybrid, or conflicting identity.90 These are different strains within
the trend of postulations about rap as “resistance,” from which I hope my proposals here
will allow my study to diverge.
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Haflet rap

Like a piece of theatre, a religious ritual, a sporting event, or a government
ceremony, haflet rap [a rap concert] is marked by social expectations that change for the
different phases of the event, each understood by the participants.91 The features of this
performance event and the behavior of its participants are similar enough in the three case
study cities of this dissertation to be recognized, and yet unique enough to be set apart
from the concerts of other genres of music and other performance events. In many ways
the features of the rap concert are similar to those in rap concerts in venues with
comparable numbers elsewhere in the world. Similar to Racy’s assessment of the tarab
music event, which leans heavily on Victor Turner’s classification of the phases of a
performance/ritual, I characterize the haflet rap here as having four phases.92 Breaking
down the performance event as such is a way to systematically pay attention to the
formation of tarab, and thereby to notice the motion and interaction between audiences
and between performers and audiences in the concert space. In my case studies, my
excerpts from field notes provide thick description that typically hone in on one particular
phase within the concert itself. The observations that opened this chapter, during the
concert at the Shrine, for example, focused on the “warming up” period, as explicated
below. Breaking down the rap concert in this way allows for a more systematic tracing of
the emergence of tarab. Alongside my descriptions, which are formed from participant
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observation and informal conversations with anonymous audience members, are specific,
recorded recollections from musicians.
Build up. The concert announcement happens online between two and ten days
before the event takes place. It consists of circulation of a poster designed specially for
the event online (usually on Facebook, either by the venue itself or by the individual
performers).93 The poster displays a title for the event – usually not simply the musicians’
names, but a title for the event – an album name, or another conceptualization of the
reason for this concert, ticket price if applicable, start time, venue, and the performers.
This announcement is part and parcel of word-of-mouth communication. Not all
attendees hear of the event through Facebook or social media. Audience and performer
interactions begin in this phase, with audience’s enthusiastic assertions that they will
attend, regrets that they cannot make it, questions about whether there is new material,
and performer responses, including encouragements “not to miss it” and assertions about
the one of a kind nature of the event.
Opening of the house. The time listed on the announcement is anywhere between
one and two hours before the moment when the musicians first take the stage. Between
the time listed on the event announcement and the emergence of the musician on stage,
there is little or no music in the venue; house lights may be on, or lighting may still be in
process; and the house is empty save the bartenders and other arriving guests (technicians
may also be present). If the sound check has not happened, it may be in progress. The
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musician may occasionally be visible passing through the venue (he or she may also be
acting as technician). However, MCs are typically not there just “hanging out.” Boikutt
explains:
I like to be by myself before the show. That’s why I don’t like shows
where there isn’t a backstage. I get uncomfortable. I end up outside in
front of the crowd, and if I find myself talking to somebody I know for a
while, then I get nervous. Because I end up not in my own energy, you
know? My inner peace is distracted because that someone else will be
talking to me about something else that doesn’t have anything to do with
the show. I’ll be thinking about the first track and the second track. I need
to sit and be thinking like this. So I like to be by myself. It doesn’t always
work out. So I go to the bathroom a lot to be by myself. Sometimes I’ll do
a little exercise in there if I can. If the bathroom is big enough I’ll do
pushups, if it’s smaller I’ll do some stretches, so that my muscles can
relax.
While musicians prepare, audiences socialize. They may smoke, drink, or order
food. They may even leave the venue to do so. Many are coming en route from
somewhere else; almost all attendees come accompanied by or meet friends and
acquaintances in the venue. Audiences do not know everyone present, but even if they do
not come in a group, they are sure to meet people they know once there. Audiences greet
each other from across the venue, move through the venue to meet each other, introduce
each other to others, etc. The significance of this phase of the performance lies in its
establishment of the social milieu in which the musical performance will take place.
Significantly, happenings outside the venue frequently flow into the space during this
time. This may include recent political events, or neighborhood drama, from the large to
the minute. This phase allows the space in the venue to calibrate – expanding or
retracting as necessary, in order to absorb the different navigations through the city which
audiences completed in order to arrive at the venue. Audiences get comfortable with each
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other before getting introduced to the performers. Performers also speak of it as a
significant time in their own preparation to perform.
Warming the crowd. The first performer, MC, or set of musicians to take the stage
are usually younger (in experience, and usually age) than the MC of primary billing.
Their stage presence is less developed, appearing nervous, jittery, or overly confident.
Usually an MC who is not performing (or who may perform a single number later in the
evening) will introduce them, encourage them, and direct the audience’s attention to the
stage. This attention may not be very focused at first. Audiences will largely still be
socializing and arriving, paying attention sporadically, or at the culmination of a
particularly compelling track or refrain. Even during this period, however, committed
fans or listeners in the audience – they may be friends, family, or just followers – of the
less experienced MC will be listening astutely and will facilitate directing audience
attention to the stage. This may take the shape of cheering “aiwa!” [right on!] and
clapping after significant passages or at the end of tracks. Hearing these cheers,
especially in the middle of a piece, encourages audience members who may be unfamiliar
with the young MC, or engaged in socializing to direct their attention to the stage. Not
everything is encouraged uncritically. Passages that are poorly delivered or poorly written
will be politely ignored, as audiences turn back to conversation and refreshment,
applauding more or less when cued by the hosting MC. This phase, while its energy
doesn’t compare to the following phase, is important for several reasons. First, it gives
younger performers the valuable stage experience they need while introducing them to a
largely still unfamiliar fan base. Second, it facilitates a transition from the energy of the
socialization of the previous phase to the more focused energy of the following phase.
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This is the most experimental of the phases of the performance event, where less
experienced performers try out themselves and their work, and where audiences feel out
the kind of evening coming up. There is generally a progression of performers, leading to
the most prominent name(s), again introduced by a well-known MC. This MC also works
to focus audience attention, starting a sort of question-response. Joking is usually at a
pleasant minimum, though the MC may show his or her charm, often exhibited in a kind
of big-sibling mode, in anecdotes about the performers, for example. Venues may also
play with the lights during this phase, gradually darkening the house further and lighting
the stage more. Digital projections may begin intermittently; foot lights or spotlights may
be introduced.
The heat. The boundary between this phase and the previous one can vary but one
can be sure it has arrived when the overwhelming focus of energy in the venue is between
the stage and the first two or three rows of people, standing, crowded up against the
stage. It is frequently initiated by the request of an MC known to the audience to “come
closer.” Where requests like “I need your energy,” “Where are you?” “What are you
sitting for?” “You want me to sing and dance for you?” are not uncommon. These
sarcastic jibes at the audience by the performing MC point to an understanding that the
work of the performance is shared, and that without the focus and presence of the
audience, the MC will not be able to perform. Boikutt explains:
For me to be on stage, holding the mic, and people are seated, far from
me, where I can’t get the body language from them: that’s very difficult. I
don’t have fun in the show and I don’t feel like I’m connecting with the
audience.
This phase also builds gradually, usually from this request to come closer to a
coordinated call and response, or series of them, which leads to the most lyrically
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complex, as well as most succinct and powerful political expressions, that also happen to
be the best known by the audience. This is not to suggest that these are refrains familiar
to all the audience, but that they are better known than others. Talented MCs are able to
play with surprise in this phase because there is something to contrast with – that is, a
new verse, refrain, or other introduction or substitution may appear new in contrast to
what the audience already is familiar with: something that is difficult with newer
material. Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum notices the presence of this phase in a particular set
of gestures:
The reactions I see are always [from listeners in] the first and second row,
after that I’m kind of blind to the rest because of the light. I see their lips
moving with the track. And I feel it when I deliver [islekh] a punch line
and everybody’s like oohhhh! [he puts his hands on his temples].94 This
body language by itself has a big effect. This is satisfying to me. It means
they understand what I’m saying. It means they understand the work
musically because they love the music, and at the same time they
understand the issue, they understand what I mean by this punch line
(because we don’t speak in a very direct way [shekl mubashar] in Arabic
hip hop).95 I know they understand because the sound from the audience
feels like the place is going to explode.
It is in this phase and interactions like these that the tarab present in the performance is
most obvious. Performers speak of temporarily losing consciousness, of a feeling of
being high (that is not drug-induced), riding the energy in the performance space,
becoming something else, and arriving at a more complete realization of the work. 96
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Audiences may exhibit elements of trance behavior: the ceaseless flowing of the body or
of the head in rhythm with the music, seemingly involuntary exclamations, or other
exhibits of elation. During this phase of the performance the venue almost without
exception becomes unbearably warm, regardless of the season outside. If smoking is
permitted inside (and often even if it isn’t), the smoke in the room becomes thick. If there
is a dominant mood conjured by the music or the musician, or by the effect of both on the
audience, be it enthusiasm, aggression, distaste, confrontation, or otherwise, it becomes
pronounced in this period. When I speak of a political feeling in rap performances, I am
talking about the energy sustained in some events during this phase. During this phase,
the multivaried elements of the performance, performer and audience, are flowing into a
more cohesive energy. It is this that I refer to as tarab in these performance events.
Cooling. Concerts frequently culminate with a finale or series of them. Return for
a formal “encore,” popular in other genres of musical performance in these cities, is
usually skipped in rap concerts, or else it is nodded to by a symbolic gesture. When the
performers have finished, the concert is definitively over and the performance space
usually empties quickly. This is often mandated by the heat in the room; “cooling”
frequently takes place outside the performance venue, or at least away from the stage,
playing music also appears in the testimonies of my interlocutors. Most artists I spoke with talk of needing
heightened concentration in order to perform well, despite having experimented with alcohol or marijuana
in performance contexts. Even if artists do imbibe alcohol while performing, none credit it for the feeling of
elation during performance. On the other hand, some musicians prefer performing in venues that sell
alcohol. They consider that the presence of alcohol among the audience sometimes allows for more of a
release of audience energy and reactions the performers seek. As Al-Nather puts it “it’s way more difficult
to get people into our music if they’re not sincere. If there is peer pressure. Any kind of social pressure. It’s
difficult because we’re not socially accepted. I think we can easily get people ‘tarab-ed’ if they’re
completely honest with themselves. Alcohol helps with this.” Boikutt concurs: “It’s not that I prefer [there
to be alcohol], it’s that I prefer that people be relaxed and comfortable and giving real responses. If they
can do that without alcohol, great, but up to this point I don’t really see that happening without alcohol. So
I prefer there to be alcohol.”
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where audiences and performers can smoke, wait for rides, and otherwise dissipate into
the evening. This phase, which may differ in length for individual participants releases
the energy accumulated between the stage and house in the previous phase. It returns
participants to the secular social mode with which the event began, coming down from
the transformative tarab or elation which marked the previous phase. Rapper Bu
Kolthoum describes his feelings after a concert:
When I come off the stage afterwards, I’ll be trembling. I don’t know why.
I come out of the event the feeling mkhaddar, zero, energy at zero, I mean
no anxiety, no energy to try anything else. Zero thoughts. In my brain
there will be nothing. I’ll be exhausted, but super relaxed. I come off the
stage like a guy who’s let everything out [fashesh khilqho w khalas]. I
come out of the stage like… like someone who’s been imprisoning
something and just let it out. I come out like someone who was thirsty and
has drank [ʿatshan w shereb]. I’m very “relaxed,” calm [rayeq], “calm.”97
Likewise the Palestinian rapper Haykal recounts coming down from tarab after a freestyling session, or open jam:
I am not really always focused on what I’m saying [when free-styling],
sometimes it will be the beginning of an idea, and sometimes it’s like
when [the prophet] Muhammad said biyji el wahi [inspiration comes to
him] or like when TuPac says “I feel his hands on my brain, when I write
rhymes I go blind and let the Lord do his thing.” You understand what I
mean? Not literally. And it depends. But it happens especially when I’m
free-styling. I lose it, I start talking, talking, talking. Most of the time I
stop by just leaving. I go somewhere else, or I go for a walk, or I smoke a
cigarette. Sometimes I laugh, sometimes I cry, I don’t care. It’s only about
doing the energy.
These testimonies point to a particular emotional release for the performer. Racy
proposes the emotional “blending” to understand the affective exchanges in tarab
dynamics.98 His attention to emotional blending in his construction of this feeling,
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something felt between joy and sorrow, between longing and satisfaction, between
empowerment and submission, between anger and relief, pushes concepts of affect and
feeling in a productive direction. Racy argues tarab consists of “transformative blending,
or “the creation of new blends that are no longer identifiable in terms of their inner,
mostly emotional, ingredients, or no longer emotional in the familiar sense.”99 In other
words, tarab consists of emotional blending that is both individual and shared. It is
subjective, but it requires certain conditions.100 Furthermore, considering its affective
nature – the emotional blending Racy suggests is intrinsic to it – the presence of tarab
points to the kind of simultaneous heterogeneity that I suggest is also a necessary
characteristic of audiences themselves – a collection of “bodies with [different]
momentums.”

Feeling through space

In this chapter, I have proposed paying attention to how tarab is built is a
productive way to trace the development of feeling in rap concerts. I suggested attention
to feeling and sensation as a way to consider the “multiplicity of things and relations” in a
concert space. Specifically, I find this productive because it allows me to discern
emotions not in succession to one another but simultaneously (anger and relief; elation
and discomfort; etc.). The intrinsic “blending” in tarab points to the powerful political
experience of complicated attachments to self and community, while its outward
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Racy offers: “The emotional impact of tarab renditions is subject to the listeners’ own interpretations,
which in turn reflect their temporary moods, as well as their levels of musical initiation.” (Ibid., 216.)
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manifestations allow for a way to consider and analyze audience behavior and performeraudience dynamics.
This is the feeling part. The discussion of “through space” that follows combines
this analysis inside the concert venue with an appreciation of the physical, urban space
which audiences traverse in order to arrive at concert venues. I alluded to this
conceptualization of political space in the first section of this chapter. I am now putting
these two sections together: feeling through space is a two-part process, both are
spatialized. First, I want to consider a spatial understanding of the live concert event: the
venue, the neighborhood, from where audiences arrive and how they leave. Then, I want
to consider the spatialized dynamics felt within the concert space – how the music is felt,
how performers and musicians communicate, and the feelings that emerge in the space
when they do. This is what I call feeling through space, and what I elaborate as feeling
politics.
In the case studies that follow, I document examples of feeling suspended
between audiences and performer and/or other individuals in and around the performance
space. I use performer and audience interviews to build an understanding of how tarab is
built in different venues, at different moments, and with different audiences. Thus, I trace
the development of tarab and its affective texture in different concerts and in the
experiences of different musicians and fans. Importantly, my study and my use of tarab
differs from traditional studies of tarab – I propose a qualitative documentation of its
affective texture. This means I do not assume the same quality of tarab in all concerts,
even while it is based on similar structure of expression (seemingly involuntary call and
response, a powerful affective experience, audience composition, mix of committed and
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casual fans, and rapport with the performer). I am introducing a qualified study of tarab
as audience-performer relation; suggesting that the affective blending sustained within
the framework of tarab interactions points to processes of politics in motion.
The ability to arouse tarab does not point to established political positions voiced
with force, but to a combination of manner of expression, awareness, and feeling that is
able to access the listener’s own politics in process. Its political potency lies in this
combination of lyrical and affective delivery, which is primarily accessible in live
performance, and the success of which performers gauge in their audiences’ responses to
them. This potency is indecipherable, however, without an equally attentive appreciation
of the materiality of concerts within urban space. So, my documentation of tarab feeling
in rap concerts comes alongside a documentation of the changing urban space within
which participants live and across which they traverse.
Feeling politics means combining sensation of the individual body in relation to
other bodies with an analysis of the material volume of space. This points to the
heterogeneity of stories-so-far and a recognition, like Susan Leigh-Foster emphasizes,
that bodies do not go through space the same way.101 I suggest this to be a framework for
a political ethnography of subcultural production. With regards to the particular case
studies examined here, I have proposed that this may be achieved by following the
emergence of tarab in concert venues situated within changing city neighborhoods.
Critically, the experiences during rap concerts need not necessarily lead to more
egalitarian, less misogynistic societies, neither must they portend greater capacity for
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communities to respond to or retaliate against oppressive power structures. They may
occasionally be a part of larger, progressive social transformations. But they need not be
in order to find significance in this study. This allows me to offer research that dissects
city spaces and relations within them as they are lived: without projecting resistance on
them before hand, or attributing radical significance to them afterwards. I see little reason
to attribute to rap concerts a single, radical affect, or a single political experience. But, I
do see plenty of reason to see these events as rich societal cross-sections, rife with
politics in motion, the eventual state of whose outcome is far from clear.

Imagining the researcher: Or, my body and I (also) move through space
“Mind is the idea of body.”102
In bringing this chapter to a close and as an opening towards the case studies that
follow, the perhaps obvious fact that as a researcher I also had feelings and also moved
through space deserves some attention here. In a way, the academic articulation of my
location as a researcher is perhaps as much a formalized response to the constant probing
of identity and trajectory that were asked of me by strangers, acquaintances, and
interlocutors over the course of this research, as it is now an ethical requirement in the
writing up of my findings. In my own mind, this probing of identity and place is only the
latest chapter in a lifetime of negotiating space (and my “place”) between the US and the
Arab world.
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I am an Arab-American woman who speaks Arabic with an accent that is not
quite place-able: outside of Lebanon, the accent is presumed Lebanese; inside Lebanon it
is decidedly not. It is Palestinian, Lebanese, and American. Above all it is broken, based
on a phonetic understanding of the spoken language (ʿammiyeh). The Arabic I speak is
prone to mistakes and mispronunciations not typical among literate adults, based as it is
on aural exposure to the language since I was a child and very little formal instruction. At
the same time, my relative ease with language offers me access I would not have
otherwise. My familial identity (my name), my familiarity with local dialect, with
patterns of joking and understanding, with social expectation, and with political
expression initially open the doors to intimacy and trust with my interlocutors that I
would have had difficulty opening under different circumstances given my own
personality (increasingly introverted) and the emotional journey that accompanied this
research. That said, I look more like my northern-European grandmother than the
imagination of “Arab” by either Western or Arab interlocutors. And perhaps more
pronounced than my physical features or the structure of my speaking, I grew up in the
US. Living “abroad” has forced the recognition that I carry myself in a culturally specific
way: the way I walk, the way I dress (in terms of style, not exposure of skin), how I hold
my body, the eye contact I maintain or dislike, all mark me as “foreigner” whenever I
travel in the Arab world.103
The combination of these factors – the fact that I am quite obviously not “Arab”
and quite obviously “Arab” at the same time – creates, I have been forced to notice, a
kind of weird effect. Neighbors, police, salespeople, receptionists, waiters, busboys,
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bouncers, bartenders, baristas, and strangers consistently remark with surprise “that I do
not look Arab” in the middle of conversation. Meanwhile, friends of friends are often
eager to discern my “identity package” with tests of language or attempted readings of
the way I pronounce certain words. These kinds of tests are not unique to my person (I
witnessed them tried out on others constantly) and most frequently come in attempts to
(quickly) understand where one is coming from, and (quickly) decide whether to
establish or dispense with trust.
I bother to mention all of this in an attempt to acknowledge perhaps some
underlying exoticism that I carry with me unintentionally as a researcher, which is the
product of hybrid upbringing. Asked to reflect on my position “in the field” (which is at
the same time my only permanent home [in the case of Beirut], and where I “come from”
[in the case of Palestine]), I have come to recognize that I frequently perform familiarity
and difference at the same time. This can generate enthusiasm and curiosity that brings its
own set of challenges and advantages as a researcher.
In Palestine for example, in the middle of the 2014 Gaza war and its aftermath, I
was overwhelmed by the amount of sharing – of intimate details, of personal histories –
to which I was warmly (urgently?) made privy in Ramallah, within weeks (sometimes
within minutes) of meeting people. I came to recognize that politics were often projected
upon me: as a “Westerner,” I was frequently assumed to be tolerant, open-minded, not
religious, but also that I probably did not yet understand the difficulties, complicities, and
betrayals of NGOs nor the specificities of local politics. At the same time, without
making too much out of it, my company may have seemed to feel comfortable and
familiar because we converse in Arabic.
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The significance of language in my own mind was highlighted by my frequent
recognition in social interactions with friends in Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut, of shifts
of trust and limitations on sharing when the conversation was entirely in Arabic versus
when, in the presence of non-native speakers, it turned to English or French. (This is the
case even though my interviews were conducted in all three languages.) That this
research was conducted for the most part during a particularly violent period of the “War
on Terror” should not be sidelined. Without exaggerating its significance (and quite
understandably, no less, considering the disastrous fall-out of the huge influx of NGO
workers and other expats), I frequently perceived a tangible distrust of foreign observers
in the different Arab communities which I wove in and out of. The difficulty of the
Arabic language – and the fact that still relatively few non-Arabs communicate
effectively in local dialect – makes of the language both a security blanket within which
speakers can feel at ease, and an easy barrier to stave off strangers, or at the very least
with which to invert the conceived power dynamic between “the West” and the Arab
world.
The projection of familiarity upon my person through language or otherwise
nevertheless in some cases profoundly unsettled me, in many cases because I had much
less reason to feel either comfortable or familiar. One set of revelations about physical
abuse in a romantic partnership in particular pushed me to the point of doubting the
contours of what I was actually doing and forced me to reevaluate what it was I was
hoping to theorize, or where I hoped my impact would be. Of course many researchers
confront challenges of intimacy “in the field.” This is to recognize my own.
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That I am a young woman who appears “unattached,” entering into what has been
in my experience a predominantly male “scene,” has also been a significant part of my
positioning within this research. My experience of it as such comes from several factors.
Concert culture in the Arab world, as elsewhere, is first and foremost a social exercise.
However, unlike New York for example, where a culture of music consumption and
amateur listening is particularly cosmopolitan (indeed, where dilettante consumption of
music is almost professionalized!), going to concerts alone in either Beirut, Ramallah, or
Amman – as was absolutely necessary in my case upon arrival in each city – is a rather
alien act, upon which, it should be noted, not terribly interesting or pleasant expectations
attend. (This is not only a question of gender. A most welcome conversation near the end
of my research with a rapper revealed his own experiences of hostility and confusion
when he attends concerts alone, as work – whether it is to scope out a venue, or observe a
colleague, etc.) My experience nonetheless of the scene as predominantly male, or as
particularly charged with testosterone, comes from interfacing almost exclusively with
men at concerts, most of the time not of my own volition, more often than not fraught
with expectation and feigned confusion (“why so sad,” “why don’t you dance,” or if
slighted, for example, “what, are you CIA?”), and all too frequently accompanied by
intrusions into personal space brought on by the need to hear despite the sound system,
and so on. There are of course women who consume this subculture, and as my stay in
each city progressed, I met and, in all three cases, built or became part of friend groups of
mixed gender where we exchanged and shared reflections, in the process of which
attending concerts became less fraught and less open to misinterpretation. Part of a group,
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my presence at a concert was obviously no longer solitary, and as such my being there as
an observer or researcher was less noticeable – indeed it was probably invisible.
The majority of musicians I interviewed were also male. Of course there are
exceptions and of course I made an effort to include them in this study. That this music
production is generally dominated by men should not be surprising, however. (I find
attempts to declare otherwise problematic: the search for token female performers is often
informed by the discourses of resistance I discussed in the previous chapter). Moreover,
in this gendered context, this researcher’s desire for an “in” occasionally presented some
confusing choices. It is perhaps not at all evident what “a PhD about rap concerts” could
possibly mean outside of an academic context (see last remarks in this section), and I
think it is fair to assume that in many cases I was initially presumed to be a naïve, eager
fan, with the attending expectations about sexuality that this social grouping is frequently
presumed to embody. I felt this in the way the girlfriends of musicians occasionally
reacted to me, in the complete (or deliberate) lack of attention to social norms some
invitations to meet up conveyed, and in the near constant appreciation for the
professionalism and seriousness with which I was treating the work in question – often
articulated with respect or surprise in the middle of or upon conclusion of an interview.
While many anthropological or ethnographic researchers struggle with access to
their interlocutors, in my case I was for a long time preoccupied – perhaps more than was
necessary, though it did not feel so at the time – with structuring that access in order that
I did not find myself in a position that would damage the reputation of the study. That
said, I can assert (without surprise), that all of my in-person interactions with
interviewees were full of mutual respect, especially as I both was given the opportunity to
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explain my study and as I built a reputation for myself over the years. The impact of
words of respect from one musician to his colleagues cannot be underestimated
(vouching for me, as it were), and as my study progressed I found it less and less
necessary to find ways to iterate my seriousness (it was assumed) or (interestingly) to
assert or articulate my identity, which I believe somehow became less relevant.
My access to funds also clearly influenced my position in this research, in the
most obvious way by getting me out of New York. At different times, I carried university
funding, departmental support, NGO affiliation, or was part of a US governmentaffiliated program. I eagerly sought all these types of funding for years and uncritically
accepted all kinds of support when my applications were finally successful. Without
them, the breadth (and certainly length) of this research would not have been possible.
Funders variously did put stipulations on research projects and potential interlocutors. In
my case, however, at no point did a funder’s delimitations effect whom I spoke with or
where I saw music performed.
However, to stop the consideration of how funding effects research positionality
there would be to disregard how affiliation nevertheless marks a researcher. As I explore
in the following chapters, the affiliation with NGOs or with the US government in my
sites almost always carried with it a set of associations that were far from neutral. The
words and names that conjure respect and prestige in some places can inspire very
different associations in others. Knowing this, I nevertheless made it a point to try not to
obscure the sources of my funding in conversation with my interlocutors (the publication
online of my research affiliations I exercised more discretion over, for different reasons).
I did this not only out of respect for the opportunities I was offered, despite the troubling
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politics that I came to understand were in some cases attached with them. In the best
cases, being forthright about affiliation (unexpectedly, and pleasantly) became a way to
further conversation about opportunity, strategy, and access, deliberations many of these
musicians also share. I adapted my presentation of where and how I was coming to a
given interview depending on with whom I was speaking.
What most affected the locality of my research, however, and most relevant
perhaps to the theoretical explorations in this chapter, was my material mobility as
researcher through, around, and outside of each city. With the exception of the studios of
Katibeh 5 in the camps of Bourj el Barajneh outside of Beirut, I confined my research
(and myself as researcher) to the cosmopolitan centers of each city. That is, I have
restrained my research to the districts where gentrification is most obvious, where the
great majority of concerts are held. The most significant way in which the study is limited
is thus in terms of class as it is reflected in the geography in each city. I spoke with
musicians and audiences from across the economic spectrum. However, the physical
space in question in this study is decidedly not the refugee camps around any of the three
cities, nor the working-class neighborhoods of Dahiyeh (Beirut) or East Amman; it is
rather the suburban sprawl of Masyoun (Ramallah), the bars and festivals of West
Amman, and the pubs, clubs, and cafes of Hamra Street, Mar Mkhayel, Gemmayzeh, and
Monot (Beirut).
I am of course aware that rap concerts have taken place in refugee camps around
all three cities. Unfortunately, none of these took place during periods while I happened
to be in any of these cities. These concerts appear in the reflections of musicians and fans,
but as I did not have the opportunity to witness a single such event in person, I have
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hesitated to the point of abstention to postulate about the audience-performer dynamics in
such events. Moreover, and this is as much a question of methodology as the study’s
limits, I deliberately did not insist, as far as my capacity as a researcher was involved, on
access outside the cosmopolitan centers of each city. Where I was invited, I humbly tried
to follow, and learned much (as is the case with Katibeh 5). My interviewees come from
and live in a variety of neighborhoods and represent the spectrum of economic class.
Whenever possible, I tried to leave interview location categorically at the interviewee’s
discretion. But where I was not invited or did not have established pretext via which I
could enter spaces outside the center of the city (an introduction, an interview, or a
concert), I did not – in my capacity as data-gatherer or recording observer – try to enter.
This was a conscious decision based on my interpretation of what was appropriate
considering the features of the performance of gender and identity just elaborated (how I
am most frequently read by strangers), and what I set for myself to be the ethical limits of
a project such as this one. I considered that attending concerts alone in West Amman,
Masyoun, or Gemmayzeh to observe, to meet and talk with strangers, and to make
connections to be a necessary part of my research. Trolling refugee camps to meet people
or make connections I considered something else entirely. I considered it so despite
knowing, thanks to the recollections of my interlocutors, that I may find other consumers
and different frameworks for the consumption of rap in other neighborhoods. This
decision for me was as much about ethics as it was about focusing research energy. The
intrusion by “Western” researchers into the most downtrodden sections of each city, and
the penetration of the most vulnerable populations by well-meaning cultural observers is
a real problem, the disdain for which was articulated to me by more than one of my
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interlocutors – and to which I had no wish to contribute. To put it another way, this
choice of mine is marked by a refusal of trends in urban literature, what Massey calls
“another form of eroticized colonization of the city…getting laddish thrills (one
presumes) from rushing about dark passages.”104 Entering a refugee camp a handful of
times would neither have given me the impetus to speak about the place or value of rap
across the whole society (as so frequently happens in English language assessment of the
genre!) or to pontificate about these neighborhoods in particular. I could have focused my
project entirely on rap in a particular camp in each city, but doing so would mean I ignore
most all live rap and hip hop, period, most of which depends on the cosmopolitan
frameworks of the gentrifying city-centers.
Thus, part of my research choices in this regard is an emphatic refusal to fetishize
the most vulnerable populations as the most authentic. Part of this is to acknowledge the
very limited populism in concert culture, so often assumed in the discourses of resistance
discussed earlier, in this genre of cultural production. And part of this is to appreciate
both the foreignness (to me) and density of each of these three cities, despite the months I
spent in each, and the need to limit and focus my scope. If it is not already evident,
however, narrowing the geographical scope of my research, even if it is in some ways
marked by class as reflected in the topography of the city, does not mean that class drops
out of the considerations I pursue in each chapter. Over the course of the remaining
chapters, the class dynamics attached to a certain kind of cosmopolitan consumption
should become obvious.

104
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Massey, For Space, 47.
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A final consideration about my positioning as researcher may be a consideration
of my belonging inside/outside hip hop culture itself. I do not consider myself a “hip hop
head.” Style-wise I do not think I can be read this way, and I do not pretend to boast this
cultural expertise, as much as I have tried to catch myself up in my research since
beginning this project. My interest in el rap el ʿarabi was at first concerned with the
performance of what was to me fascinating and extremely personal political expression in
the wake of the most exciting political developments since 1968. My own history of
exposure to hip hop (in any significant degree) is very recent, and almost entirely
attached to trying to understand the development of the genre in Arabic. My practice of
participant observation was/is never styled, consciously or otherwise, as a part of b-boy
culture, or the other attending stylistic or expressive elements of global hip hop. Out of
respect for the musicians whose work I appreciate, I never attempted my own raps or
beats. I expect there will be readers who will find fault with the lack of “inside-ness” I
could thus hope to boast as a researcher and consumer of the genre. But I have decidedly
tried to “keep it (more) real” by not making pretensions about own “hip”-ness, or “hip
hop”-ness, as it were – with my interlocutors and readers, both.
The media fascination with performers of this genre has, for the most part, not
been conducive to musicians taking writing about them seriously, or as serious work, or
as stemming from serious interest or thorough study. It is my hope that I am able in the
case studies that follow to respond to these musicians’ creativity and seriousness with the
same – a testament to the fastidiousness with which they attend their own work.
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Chapter Three: Ramallah1
The Second Wave of Palestinian Rap
Overview

My first aim in this chapter is to draw attention to patterns that have distinguished
rap production in Ramallah over the past ten years from rap production in occupied
Palestine in the decade that preceded it. This encourages me to recognize the emergence
of a different mode of production and consumption of rap music since roughly 20062007, what I propose to call a “second wave” of Palestinian rap. My second aim in this
chapter is to explain how the production and consumption of the second wave functions
politically. Following the theoretical elaborations I offered in the first and second
chapters of this dissertation, I do this by tracing the emergence of tarab during second
wave concerts. Having located the particular political feelings produced by this tarab, I
then situate these dynamics in concert venues within the larger context of the city of
Ramallah. This allows me to include a consideration of who is included and who is
excluded in the production of this particular political feeling.
With few exceptions, most existing academic literature on Palestinian rap and hip
hop understands Palestinian rap as an embodiment of the changing forms of youthful
“initifada” and as an enactment of resistance against the Occupation. My research
findings largely do not corroborate this narrative. I found that Palestinian rap today

1

Research for this chapter was made possible by a June Bennett Larsen Alumni Research Grant, the
Wenner Gren Foundation, and the Palestinian American Research Center (PARC). Thanks in particular to
to Penny Mitchel and Mark Ropelewski for facilitating this research.
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largely does not engage or (re)produce an ethos of intifada, uprising, revolution, or
resistance. In the pages that follow, I explore how the material negotiations of concert
makers and concert-goers continue to be political despite not being intifada or
“resistance.”
Exploring the political feeling in second wave rap concerts in Ramallah in my
research quickly became less about finding a subcultural answer to the Occupation in rap
concerts and more about comprehending one of the myriad ways in which life continues
under it.2 The second wave of Palestinian rap can best be understood as an avant-garde
musical subgenre whose consumers and producers are largely part of an “alternative”
middle class in Ramallah. Initially, the politics of the second wave can be found in the
ways in which they interrogate Palestinian politics by refusing the romanticism of
traditional political narratives. Second wave rappers push on the contours of Palestinian
struggle by refusing the politics of sumud [steadfastness], questioning the intentions and
existence of international solidarity and the cohesiveness of the diaspora, and
interrogating, sometimes irreverently, notions of authenticity or heritage [turath] and
resistance [mouqawameh].
In Chapter One, I pointed to the “putting into discourse” of resistance. There, I
considered what calling cultural production “resistant” or “resistance” does. I asserted my
interest in the production of power and knowledge that accompanies how artists are
discussed. And I argued that the putting into discourse of cultural production as resistance
2

I spent approximately five and a half months between July and December 2014 based in Ramallah. The
period, marked as it was by the kidnapping and burning alive of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu
Khdeir and the Israeli Defense Force’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip in “Operation Protective Edge,” was
undeniably a very tense one across the West Bank and throughout Israel. These political events had
important effects on my research in ways I could not anticipate. For example, there was much less live
music in Ramallah in the summer and early fall of 2014 than in previous or following years.

!

188
builds on specific racial imaginations. In this chapter, in addition to exploring briefly
some of this racial imagination in existing literature on Palestinian rap in particular, I will
explore how traditional narratives of Palestinian struggle build on specifically classed
imaginations. I am concerned to pay attention to how second wave rappers represent the
political and economic contradictions they observe and to how they refuse dominant
political representations of Palestinian identity and struggle.
As mentioned, much existing literature on Palestinian rap is keen to underscore
the capacity of this cultural production for resistance. To do so, authors have framed
these artists and their fans as part of an international youth “movement.” This latter is
frequently understood as being virtually able to pull artists out of the Occupation.3 Others
have framed Palestinian rappers as part and parcel of ongoing local activism,4 whose
lyrics are envisioned as tools of physical struggle.5
My hesitancy in this chapter to call these artists or the cultural content they
produce “resistance” is encouraged by Ted Swedenburg’s ambivalence about the ubiquity
of “the struggle paradigm” in Palestinian rap.6 More specifically, my concern is not only

3

Sunaina Maira, “‘We Ain’t Missing’: Palestinian Hip Hop – A Transnational Youth Movement,” The New
Centennial Review 8 (2008): 161-192; Caroline Rooney, “Activism and Authenticity: Palestinian and
Related Hip-Hop in an International Frame,” in The Arab Avant-Garde: Music Politics Modernity, ed.
Thomas Burkhalter et al. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2013) 209-228; Randa Safieh, “Identity,
Diaspora, and Resistance in Palestinian hip hop,” and Janne Louise Andersen, “Transgressing Borders with
Palestinian Hip Hop,” both in Palestinian Music and Song: Expression and Resistance since 1900, ed.
Moslih Kanaaneh et al., (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013): 69-81 and 82-96, respectively.
4

Sunaina Maira, Jil Oslo:Palestinian Hip Hop, Youth Culture, and the Youth Movement (Washington, DC:
Tadween Publishing, 2013).
5

David McDonald, “‘Carrying Words like Weapons’: DAM Brings Hip-Hop to the West Bank,” in ibid.,
My Voice is My Weapon: Music, Nationalism, and the Poetics of Palestinian Resistance (Durham: Duke
UP, 2013), 262-282.
6

Ted Swedenburg, “Palestinian Rap: Against the Struggle Paradigm,” Popular Culture in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook, ed. Walid El-Hamamsy and Mounira Solimon (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 17-32.
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that the location of “resistance” in second wave rap may be inaccurate – it directly
contradicts the testimonies of my interlocutors – but also that this narrative of locating
resistance makes it impossible to discern and evaluate the political deliberations and
interactions that do exist and that are taking place. Asserting that Palestinian rappers
enact resistance against the Occupation may obscure an analysis of the politics of rap
production and consumption under it. In addition, I argue that the reach of this essentially
avant-garde musical experimentation in live performance is very limited. The limits of
populism in this concert culture needn’t be reason for its dismissal. After all, hundreds of
studies have focused on contemporary and historical avant-garde art movements. In this
chapter I want to testify to the aesthetic innovation and political experimentation in this
genre while also acknowledging the exclusivity of its concert culture. This should only
prove contradictory if we assume certain romance about political struggle or creative
expression in the Palestinian context.
My analysis of the deliberations and contradictions in my interlocutors’
testimonies has been markedly animated by Sherene Seikaly’s very recent book, Men of
Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine.7 While dealing with a different
time period than mine here, Seikaly compellingly lays out how the historiography of
Palestinian choices since 1948 has almost exclusively been narrated in the academe
against the backdrop of Zionist victories (I expand on my use of Zionism in this chapter,
below). She argues this has led to characterizations of the middle class as consisting of

7

Sherene Seikaly, Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford
UP, 2016).
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either loyal nationalists or colluding capitalists.8 Moreover, the historical failure of
Palestinian capital to defend its national interests (I explore neoliberalism in the context
of the Occupied Palestinian territories, below) – today combined, I would argue, with the
acceptance among the middle classes of more globalized forms of culture – has
“embarrassed scholars” and pushed researchers away from studies with Palestinian
middle class protagonists.9 This has not only led to what Keith Watenpaugh calls a
“paucity of work” on the Arab middle classes, generally; in the case of Palestine
specifically, Seikaly argues convincingly that this has closed off avenues to understand
politics and strategies in formation.10 Viewing Palestinian capital – like that middle-class
cultural and economic capital invested in alternative leisure like rap concerts – as
necessarily either of the revolutionary vanguard that can lead the struggle against the
Zionist Occupation, or part of a “comprador” class that colludes with it leaves very little
room for understanding the complexity of Palestinian social fabric.
I attempt in this chapter to illustrate some of the complexity of that social fabric.
Moreover, to do so I lean on the theoretical discussion elaborated in Chapter Two.
8

When narrating the middle class, Seikaly suggests that “Historians have used the divides between the
comprador and authentic economic nationalist to explain late capitalism and the failure of the national
bourgeoisie to uproot older forms of economic power.” (Seikaly, Men of Capital, 12.)
9

Ibid.

10

Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and
the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2006), 18; qtd. in Seikaly, Men of Capital, 12. Christa
Salamandra’s work has also countered this tendency to ignore upwardly mobile and “elite” Arab
protagonists as worthwhile subjects of ethnographic research. In the conclusion of her work on new
consumptive practices of upper classes in Damascus, she writes, “Elite social statuses are being redefined
through new consumptive practices, as ways of life are transformed into lifestyles of the modern sort. Such
processes are rarely discussed in literature on the Middle East, where it is assumed, despite evidence of
rapid and profound social transformation, that the old urban notables still know who they are—and are
known by everyone else—and have nothing to prove.” My research leans on her attention to classes with
economic and political power in a different Arab, urban context. (Christa Salamandra, A New Old
Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004], 155).
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Spatializing an analysis of subjectivity under Occupation allows for a material and
affective analysis of what these “avant-garde,” “middle class” political negotiations feel
like. This is not to argue for their efficacy. It is to testify to their sensation. In my
discussion of what I consider analysis-worthy politics in Palestinian rap today, I do not
propose that my interlocutors invent and then embrace a radical, new politics. My
proposed conceptualization of politics in Palestinian rap alludes to politics in process by
considering the material, discursive, and affective navigations these artists and their fans
undertake.

Part One: The Ramallah Bubble

A bourgeoisie doesn’t make a state
Am I going to come and tell you that there are [neo]liberals in Ramallah? I
can’t say that. There is a monopoly, and there is monopolizing. There is a
bourgeoisie, and there is a bourgeois class. These bourgeois are open to
global culture, and they live like the world is a playground built just for
them. And if and when anything happens, they pack themselves up and
leave. There is a bourgeoisie; and a bourgeoisie doesn’t make a state.
~Sheʿrab11
These comments by Sheʿrab (which means poetry-rap) came during the first
interview I conducted in Ramallah. I didn’t realize at the time how aptly the poet-rapper
crystallized a complex phenomenon that I would spend many months afterwards trying to
parse. His words came in my response to my question to him of what, if anything,
neoliberalism meant to him. His answer, which in half a dozen lines points to the
11

Sheʿrab, interview with the author, August 26, 2014, Ramallah, all subsequent quotations from Sheʿrab
are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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relationship between capital, Palestinian sovereignty, and the Israeli Occupation needs to
be understood within the context of economic and political changes in Ramallah and the
occupied Palestinian territories since the 1991 Oslo Accords, and within the context of
the sixty-odd years of Israeli Occupation of historical Palestine. I begin this discussion of
the emergence of a second wave of Palestinian rap with an elaboration of the context in
which it is found. I open with Sheʿrab’s comments, to which I will return.
As the military, economic, social, and political history of the creation of the state
of Israel has been thoroughly documented elsewhere, I have relieved myself of
reproducing it here.12 However, given the scope of this literature it is worth being clear
about a few definitions I will use throughout this chapter in reference to the Occupation
of the Palestinian Territories by Israeli forces. I refer to the presence of Israeli forces in
the West Bank and the Gaza strip as an “occupation.”13 In doing so, I position the politics
of this study and myself as researcher within an extensive and expanding literature–
academic and otherwise – that assumes the illegality of Israeli presence in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip since 1967, recognizes the complicated system of settler-colonialism
which structures its jurisdiction there, bemoans the brutality of its military, and critiques
the system of separation, or “apartheid,” that have made of Palestinians and “ArabIsraelis” second-class citizens in their own homeland. When I refer to the “Occupation,” I
mean Israel’s integrated apparatus of embodied military force, disembodied surveillance,
12

For an overview, see for example, James Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of
War, Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014) or Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine: One
Land, Two Peoples, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006).
13

In his study examining the historical discourses of Palestinian-Israeli relations, Sean McMahon
acknowledges that the “Occupation” and the “Occupied Palestinian territories” [oPt] are terms that
“represent the overwhelming international consensus on the status of the[se] spaces.” (Sean McMahon, The
Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations: Persistent Analytics and Practices [New York: Routledge,
2010], 8.)
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an extensive permit system, and a legal code that is applied to Palestinian and Israeli
subjects differently, and which is intended both to separate Israelis from Palestinians and
to appropriate resources for the State of Israel and its (Jewish) citizens.
To differentiate my positioning now within literature that is critical of Israel and
its policies, it is important to me to underscore that I understand this Occupation to be
driven by the specific political project of Zionism. Zionism is one of the most significant
political ideologies of the modern period, developed in Europe in the nineteenth century.
This political project for an exclusively Jewish state is the basis of Israeli institutions and
foundations and drives the Occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Zionism is separate
from Judaism, a religion, and from Jews, an international community of individuals who
adhere to this faith. Moreover, I identify Zionism as the driving ideology of Occupation
and Israeli state policy while recognizing that one Zionist strategy is settler colonialism.
This is to assert that I consider that racism and colonial practices are mobilized in the
name of a specific ideological political project. In a similar way, the politicized religious
zeal that drives contemporary Zionism enables Israel to enforce a system of apartheid. In
the Occupied Territories and Israel today, both settler colonialism and a system of
apartheid are tools of Zionism. This should serve to position my use of terminology vis-àvis current literature on Israeli settler colonialism and apartheid.14

14

The contemporary trend in critical literature on Israel/Palestine is to use models of either settler
colonialism or apartheid to understand the Occupation. These gestures have garnered the Palestinian cause
considerable attention through international lines of solidarity and comparison – with other indigenous
struggles, and with the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. I insist on expressly identifying Zionism
as the driving political and ideological force that mobilizes both settler colonial and apartheid strategies as
tools. I consider this to be the best way to deflect the most powerful Zionist defense in use today: that
critics of Israel are anti-Semitic. Recognizing Zionism as a political project quite distinct from Judaism is a
less frequently articulated piece of pro-Palestinian critical discourse today, the attention much more
frequently going to settler-colonialism and apartheid. (On settler colonialism and apartheid see: Maya
Mikdashi, “What is Settler-Colonialism?” Jadaliyya, July 17, 2012, accessed November 3, 2015,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6453/what-is-settler-colonialism; Ilan Pappé, “Zionism as
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The Zionist Israeli Occupation effects mobility, economic growth, and access to
resources like water within the West Bank as it affects Palestinian access to places and
resources outside these territories. As the manager of La Wain club told me:
The Occupation affects everything, generally. Specifically it affects the
cost of alcohol and the ability of those coming from Jerusalem,
Bethlehem, Jenin, and wherever to get here. When there are four
checkpoints to cross at night, [your potential audience] will tell you,
“Why do I want to go out? No, man. I’ll stay home.”15
Alongside the images of young men and women throwing stones at tanks, the idea of
young poets spitting words like weapons in an expression of non-violent, empowering
creativity in face of this occupation has proven especially sellable. My point is that
understanding how these concerts work politically requires understanding them not as
images or ideas cast against the Occupation, but as sites of production and consumption
within a material economy structured by it.16 As my interviews with interlocutors
illustrate, it is impossible to talk about the challenges facing the production and
consumption of a second wave of Palestinian rap in Ramallah today without – in addition
to the Occupation – also considering the shortcomings of the bureaucracy of the
Palestinian Authority (PA; in Arabic simply as-sulta [the Authority]) as well as the
economic realities of living in the West Bank. As the following interaction between co-

Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa,” South Atlantic Quarterly
107 [2008]: 611-633; Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation [London: Verso,
2007]; Lorenzo Veracini, The Settler Colonial Present [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015].)
15

Bakar, manager of La Wain club. Interview with the author, December 2, 2014, Ramallah. Subsequent
quotations from La Wain management (with Ramzi Hazboun) are taken from this interview. Translations
from the Arabic are my own.
16

For a discussion of the emphasis on “real”-ness in hip hop culture see H. Samy Alim, Roc the Mic Right:
The Language of Hip Hop Culture (New York: Routledge, 2006), 51-108.
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managers of La Wain pub, which followed the earlier statement quoted above about the
Occupation, illustrate:
Bakar: We want to install a new sound system and expand. That’s the
plan. Inshallah [God willing], you never know, tomorrow they can come
and occupy us.
Ramzi Hazboun: Who can?
Bakar: The Authority.17
Testimonies like this one need to be understood within the context of the PA as sustained
by the Oslo Accords (1991).18
Oslo I, Oslo II, and the Paris Accords directly tied a promised Palestinian state to
the development of a specific Palestinian economy. This economy was not an abstract
horizon but a particular program of “good governance,” aid packages, and investment
opportunities structured by the IMF, the World Bank, and the so-called Washington
consensus, over which Israel ultimately held the veto. Importantly for the political effect
it produced, this particular economic program was called a “free” economy.19 However,
this “free” economy was never actually free, nor nominally even “open” to free trade.
17

See note 15.

18

Oslo I (1993), the Protocol on Economic Relations (also called the Paris Protocol, 1994), and Oslo II
(1995) are the signed agreements referred to generally as the “Oslo Accords.” Signed between 1993 and
1995, their term was not meant to extend a period of five years, approximately 1999.
19

The Oslo Accords were able to essentially dictate the shape and pace of the development of the
Palestinian economy by establishing a preliminary structure for a Palestinian government and by setting the
boundaries within which this government could operate. Article 21 of the Basic Laws, drafted by the
Legislative Council for the Palestinian Authority (PA), addresses the structure of the Palestinian economy.
It begins, “The economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principle of free market economy.”
(Palestinian Basic Law, Article 21, March 18, 2003, accessed March 5, 2015,
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2003-amended-basic-law.) Tariq Dana notes, “paradoxically,
even the United States, the global driver of free market capitalism, has a constitution that is flexible enough
to allow for different responses to specific economic circumstances.” (Tariq Dana, “The Palestinian
Capitalists That Have Gone Too Far,” Al-Shabaka, January 14, 2014, accessed March 5, 2015, http://alshabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-capitalists-have-gone-too-far/.)
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Sara Roy has underscored not only the crippling reliance of Palestinian trade on Israeli
markets, but also the deliberate and systemic Israeli attempts to thwart any substantial,
independent Palestinian economic growth or development, because of the preludes to a
state that such growth would provide. She calls this “de-development.”20 Amal Ahmad
calls it Israel’s policy of “containment.”21 Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir point out
that the Paris Protocol structured an Israeli “customs envelope” around Palestine, wherein
even foreign aid donated to Palestinians was required to pass through, and be taxed by,
Israeli customs.22 It is common, frustrating knowledge to most of my interlocutors, all
Palestinians under 35, that Oslo I and II and the Paris Accords amount to an economic
and security prison imposed on Palestinians and enforced by Palestinian security forces
and the PA: a prison where, for example, the construction of tanks to collect rainwater,
the manufacturing of school uniforms – and literally hundreds of other basic activities –
are prohibited by Peace Accords that promised a Palestinian state. 23
This is all to point to an important relationship between Zionism and
neoliberalism. The development of an independent Palestinian state and an independent

20

Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Beirut: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1995).
21

Amal Ahmad, “The Customs Union and Israel’s No-State Solution,” Al-Shabaka, November 26, 2014,
accessed July 4, 2015, https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/the-customs-union-and-israels-no-state-solution/.
22

Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, “Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied
Palestine in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 19(2014): 435.
23

See also Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, “The Economic Strategies of Occupation: Confining Development and
Buying-off Peace,” in Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy, ed. Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014), 13-31; and Raja Khalidi, “Under-the-Radar Palestinian
Connections,” MERIP, June 24, 2014, accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.merip.org/under-radarpalestinian-connections.

!

197
Palestinian economy is overseen and limited by Occupation forces.24 This is to point not
only to the failure of the Accords in helping to establish Palestinian sovereignty,
something all my interlocutors readily acknowledge, but to the very complicated role of
investment of capital in Palestine today, considering the necessary collusion that
investment requires with the existing forces of Zionist Occupation.25 Moreover, it is
within this context that the disdain for recent Palestinian economic growth that Sheʿrab
expressed in the quote that opened this section can be understood. When he says that the
bourgeoisie “doesn’t make a state” he is referring to the hollowness of economic
development in this context.

*

*

*

This foray into the politics of Palestinian development under Occupation is
relevant to my study here because the recent growth in the rap scene in Ramallah is part
of economic and cultural development attached to the specific growth of the city. In my
research, this neoliberal economic growth emerged as a central factor in the city’s ability
to host a “second wave” of Palestinian rap. The political status of the city as Palestine’s
“de facto” capital in the “post-Oslo” period reflects an influx of Palestinian and other
24

This is within a larger regional context driven by the material interests of the US, as world power. See
Tawfiq Haddad, “Political Economy of Neoliberal Approaches to Conflict Resolution and State Building in
the OPT, 1993-2013” (PhD diss., The School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 2015).
25
For a critique of this relationship as a critique of “capitalist peace,” see Tariq Dana, “The Symbiosis
between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace’: the Political Economy of Capitalist Peace
in the Context of Colonization,” Conflict, Security, and Development 15(2015): 455-477. It has been
important for me over the course of this research to discover, assert, and re-assert how Zionism and
neoliberalism work together, at the same time, and when and how they diverge from each other. I
understand that the Occupation is underpinned by Zionism at the same time that it structures neoliberalism
in Palestine. Conversations with Lisa Bunghalia, Falastine Dwikat, Yasmine Hemmayel, and Tawfiq
Haddad were instrumental in this process.
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Arab capital that operates in close coordination with the Zionist Occupation.26 In this
context, and as I’ve begun to allude to here, the lines of anti-capitalist struggle, antiZionist struggle, and Palestinian liberation (which ultimately needs both) become very
hard to follow. The need for Palestinian growth and the development of its economy are
not addressed by anti-capitalist critiques of recent Palestinian neoliberalism. In the
context of the Accords that require this development for Palestinian liberation, it is not at
all clear how an anti-capitalist sovereignty could be achieved. At the same time,
considering Zionist control over this capital and its use, it is equally unclear how the
development of the Palestinian “state” or “its” economy could ever be achieved via this
kind of capitalist investment.
Tawfiq Haddad calls the recent growth of Ramallah a “second phase” of
neoliberalism in the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt).27 This was heralded by then
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the promotion of policies since dubbed “Fayyadism” –
significant accelerations of the neoliberal program imposed by Oslo, coming on the heels
of the Second Intifada (2000-2005/6). A US-educated, former minister of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Palestine, Fayyad’s “institution-building” program
received consistently positive reviews from supporters like Tony Blair and George W.
Bush. 28 Robert Danin has called it “a third and highly pragmatic form of Palestinian

26

For a historical trajectory of the growth of Ramallah and its middle class leading up to the Oslo Accords,
see Lisa Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis: The Paradoxical Case of Ramallah/Al-Bireh,” Journal of Palestine
Studies 37 (2008): 9-14.
27
28

Haddad, “Political Economy of Neoliberal Approaches.”

Khalid Farraj, Camille Mansour, and Salim Tamari, “A Palestinian State in Two Years: Interview with
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nationalism.”29 But the accelerated neoliberal approach increasingly gathered criticism,
despite touted figures of an increased GDP.30
Fayyad’s critics have offered more cautious analyses of this program’s potential.31
Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour suggest that “[Fayyad’s] statehood program encourages
the idea that citizens may have to acquiesce [to the] Occupation but will not be denied the
benefits of smoother running traffic, a liberal education curriculum, investor-friendly
institutions, efficient public service delivery, and, for the middle class, access to luxury
hotel chains and touring theatre performances.”32 Kareem Rabie argues that the investorfriendly environment proposed and worked towards by Fayyad created the muchremarked upon “Ramallah bubble.”33 This bubble refers to both a credit cycle that looked
unstable and to a new culture of consumption, “luxury,” and entertainment that catered to
a lively expat community and the Palestinian middle class. Within the “bubble” one could
almost forget the continued presence of the Occupation, encouraged by an atmosphere of
consumption. Moreover, the extension of consumer credit helped in part to provide an
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Robert M. Danin, “A Third Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and Its Discontents,” Foreign Affairs 90
(2011): 94.
30

Critics point out that by severing Gaza from the West Bank, figures of GDP growth misrepresent
Palestinian reality. (See Jeremy Wildeman, “Delusions of a Palestinian Economic Miracle,” ThinkIR, June
25, 2011, accessed March 22, 2015, http://www.thinkir.co.uk/delusions-of-a-palestinian-economicmiracle/.)
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See among others, Alaa Tartir, “Securitized Development and Palestinian Authoritarianism under
Fayyadism,” Conflict, Security, and Development 15(2015): 479-502.
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Khalidi and Samour, “Neoliberalism and Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the
Palestinian National Movement,” Journal of Palestine Studies 60 (2011): 16.
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Kareem Rabie, “Ramallah’s Bubbles,” Jadaliyya, January 18, 2013, accessed March 22, 2015,
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audience, which had time, interest, and spendable capital for a spectrum of leisure and
entertainment, including “alternative” musical production like rap concerts.34
The emergence of this bubble was marked in my interviews with interlocutors
with a mix of surprise, excitement, and disdain, as is clear in these recollections of Sami
Said, the owner of a prominent restaurant-bar cum music venue:
I remember this period of like one month when maybe ten or fifteen
broadcasts came out, and they all did the same report on the same theme,
and that was: “Nightlife in Ramallah.” The first and the second one, we
were pleased, whatever. But then we started to feel like something wrong
was happening. [It’s like people were surprised that], even though there’s
an Occupation, people are still living. What does this mean, people are
still living? Like, what are we supposed to do, die? And then all of a
sudden we stopped hearing from these journalists. [And we were like,]
what was that, you finished? Everything is fine because people go out at
night? Look: it’s our right to go out. And, we want to go out. And we still
have problems. It doesn’t mean that everything is ok, that people are living
normally.35
Indeed, the existence and development of the “Ramallah bubble” is one of the primary
concerns the second wave of Palestinian rappers in Ramallah are eager to discuss.36 The
growth that has made of Ramallah a hub for an international audience consuming
34

Sam Bahour, “Palestine’s Economic Hallucination,” This Week in Palestine 165(2012), accessed March
22, 2015, http://archive.thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=3596&ed=202&edid=202.
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Sami Said, interview with the author, December 7, 2014, Ramallah. All subsequent quotations from Said
are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own. Taraki notes that an orientalist
“wonderment that Palestinians are capable of intelligent lives pervades these journalistic writings [on the
Ramallah Bubble, by ‘Western and Israeli journalists’].” (Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis,” 11-12.)
36

To be sure, these concerns are not limited to the genre of hip hop and rap, and are addressed in musical
lyrics across a number of genres. (See, for example the indie rock band Bil3ax’s piece, “Ramallah”:
“Ramallah-Bil3ax,” YouTube video, 3:32, posted by “Faressho,” November 12, 2013, accessed April 23,
2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61nTMkSCEm0&ab_channel=Faressho.) Neither are these
concerns about Ramallah’s changes and the culture of detachment and aloofness “under” the bubble limited
to the genre of musical production. In July of 2014, Ashtar Theatre produced Yasmin Shlalda’s play
entitled, Ramallah Bubble Lounge and Coffee House. The play, which premiered during the 2014 Israeli
assault on Gaza, is a series of vignettes, each of which characterizes different, well-recognizable parts of
Palestinian society as they pass through one café. It is a critique of precisely this culture of detachment
within the Ramallah “bubble.”
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alternative cultural production is the basis of its (very recent, and relatively limited)
claims to cosmopolitanism, acting as a precarious node in circuits of exchange between
Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Amman, and to a lesser extent, Beirut and Dubai. Understanding the
limits of this cosmopolitanism requires a closer look at how audience makeup and youth
demographics reflect persistent class stratification in the oPt (I return to this in the third
section of this chapter). Finally, the fact that the oPt receive of the highest levels of per
capita foreign aid in the world must effect how we understand its “free” economy.37
Understanding how the “Ramallah Bubble” is built requires considering not just the
neoliberal imperatives for a “free” economy and the push for private investment. It also
requires a consideration of how the economy has been “developed” by a booming NGO
sector in the absence of a state.

Locating the “Second Wave”

The concerts that I document and focus on in this chapter all took place within the
“Ramallah Bubble,” the cosmopolitan phenomenon acerbically critiqued by academics
and Leftist commentators as neoliberal while they are simultaneously celebrated by the
Western press as proof of a growing Palestinian economy. Importantly, despite the
increasing critiques Ramallah’s growth in cultural production and consumption is
receiving, audiences, musicians, and bar owners are all enthused by the progressive
implications of the presence of alternative leisure in Ramallah. None of my interlocutors
– musicians, fans, curators, journalists, or venue owners – see the increase in privately
37

Anne Le More, “Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State,” International Affairs
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owned leisure spaces, more opportunities for concerts as provided by them, or the
alternative sociality built in these venues as part of the negative effects of neoliberal
development in Ramallah. They certainly do not consider that these events or this cultural
production encourage or facilitate the Occupation. While most of my interlocutors readily
recognize effects of gentrification in increasing real estate prices, the changing
demographic of Ramallah, the presence of expats and aid workers, increased
securitization (by both the IDF and the PA), all in a culture of encouraged consumer debt
– they categorically do not connect their concerts to this trend. On the contrary,
musicians, audiences, venue owners, are all enthused by the prospect of its growth.
Consuming this culture is, more often than otherwise, seen as exciting, if not liberating.38
Understanding this seeming paradox requires stepping back to assess the kind of
opportunities available for artists and fans to interact. What distinguishes the second
wave rap concert is both how it differs from previous concert trends and how it refuses
opportunities from the NGO sector.
Rap concerts during the Second Intifada and immediately after were often held in
basically public venues (like the Qasaba theatre) or as part of festivals hosted outside.
Private venues could accommodate small audiences only (like Pianos, a bar/lounge). The
owners of Beit Aneeseh (now called Radio) explain that before they opened in 2008,
concert culture was limited:

38

Lisa Taraki suggests that Ramallah’s middle class actively “recasts” narratives of Palestinian resistance
to accommodate these new patterns of consumption. She suggests that, “a new conception of resilience has
been taking root, one that is not based on an ascetic denial of frivolity, joy, or entertainment, but rather
renders the very pursuit of happiness a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time.”
(Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis,” 17.) This is not my argument. That is, I am not interested, as has been the
trend in subcultural studies for some time (see Chapter One) to invest the “everyday” with an ethos of
resistance. I return to how second wave rap and their concerts engage with narratives of Palestinian struggle
in Part Two of this chapter.

!

203
[There used to be concerts], but, excuse the expression, [they] used to
happen in a dull [ghabi] way. Like for example, Qasaba would bring a
band, and you’d go, and sit in your chair, and listen to Arabic soft rock, or
hip hop or whatever, from your chair. There were no drinks, you couldn’t
smoke, there was no interaction. [Concerts] used to be like this: in a
proper, official, cultural venue; or in the street, during a festival, for
example. But still there were no drinks. In between these two options [the
formal concert venue and the street festival] – a bar where 200 people
could drink and see the musician and talk to them before or after the show
– this didn’t exist [before we opened]. Beit Aneeseh was the first place
like this.
Since the second phase of neoliberalism in the oPt we can see a consolidation of a general
trend in the performance and consumption of a certain kind of rap in private venues. Hip
hop concert culture, advertised via social media, taking place after dark, in private venues
that post cover charges and employ bouncers, is a development since the end of the
second intifada and coincides with the growth of the Ramallah Bubble. It does not mean
that there were not rap concerts in bars during the period of the Second Intifada or that
one cannot find rap in more public spaces or as part of festivals today.39 I want to
recognize a general trend towards a specific kind of consumption tied to the aesthetic and
political development of this music.
This trend is partly driven by a refusal of the influence of non-governmental
organizations in cultural production. Musicians and other artists I spoke with are hesitant
to engage with, if not fiercely critical of, the not-for-profit and/or non-governmental
institutions (NGOs) which sponsored, encouraged, and showcased the first forays into the
genre of Palestinian hip hop in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and which continue to host
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For example, Boikutt recounts having been invited to perform in Qalandiya refugee camp, alongside
MCs from the camp. They performed on the bed of a truck in a main street. Boikutt recalls it as one of the
best gigs he as played, where the interactions with felt the least inhibited and the most engaged.
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projects, events, workshops around hip hop and rap across the West Bank.40 As
filmmaker and then co-manager of La Wain pub Ramzi Hazboun told me:
NGOs … have Western politics. Whatever work you do with them
contributes to those politics – it doesn’t matter what the work is
specifically. Like in our field for example, are the NGOs in music and
culture or [are they] in politics? In the end, it’s always politics. They
might bring you a brilliant band from wherever, but to work with them
they always put it in your face [in a contract where you have to state] that
you’re against “terrorism” – without anybody clarifying what “terrorist”
means, and how it’s meaning is changing, actually. [Their structure] is
colonized, regardless if they bring a band whose beats we appreciate. We
try to avoid working with anyone that’s imposing a politics on us. Not just
in the bar, but in all aspects of daily life.
Musicians’ desire not to participate in this NGO economy is frequently propelling them
into the arms of private businesses, in the form of privately owned bars and clubs. To be
sure, they also have complaints about the general managing structure that shapes these
opportunities, including financial negotiations with owners, or the hassles of putting up
capital to rent a space on their own. By and large, however, they prefer these
arrangements because they feel they have more control over the transmitted meaning of
their work.
None of my interlocutors admitted to collaborating with an international NGO for
the purposes of showcasing their own, original work. Anecdotally, many revealed having
attended or agreeing to a gig and then resigning or stepping out at a later time.41 Some
artists and producers of the second wave may have worked with NGOs in the past,
thereby deterring them from future collaborations; others have come of age in a period
40
41

Maira discusses several examples of these (Maira, Jil Oslo, 42-43).

Almost all my interlocutors, venue owners and musicians, hold down other jobs in addition to making
music/running the venue. Some of this work is in the NGO sector, with both local and international NGOs
represented.
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when they could consume a range of cultural production, within which they were able to
discern important political differences. In this way, “second wave” points not only to the
emergence of new voices on the Palestinian rap scene, but also to evolution among artists
as they learn from experiences and establish political positions.42
For example, when I arrived in Ramallah in July 2014, Stormtrap/Asifeh (rapper
and producer, formerly one third of the crew Ramallah Underground) and Asma Ghanem
(an experimental musician going by the name Shams Asma43), then a couple in addition
to occasional musical team, were debating participation in a musical festival and
workshop sponsored by the US State Department called “One Beat.” They had received
an invitation to participate in the weeklong series of concerts and workshops in the
Southwest US from the US embassy and had preliminarily agreed. Some time later, they
discovered it was sponsored by the US State Department and when I met them, they were
in the process of deciding what to do.
In our discussions, Asifeh was sure their participation (or his at least) had to be
terminated. He had no interest in being affiliated with the State Department (How can I
decry others’ complicity with the Occupation if I take this gig?, he asked). Ghanem was
less sure. There were no other Palestinians on the billing, and no Israeli musicians either.
42

My observation of this political position vis-à-vis NGOs during interviews with musicians, venue
owners, and audiences is in marked contrast to some recent literature that has asked Palestinian cultural
producers and consumers what they think about (mostly Western) NGOs. Sunaina Maira writes that, “in the
focus group interviews [she] did with youth in the West Bank, none of them spoke about foreign NGOs as
a factor in the “Westernization” of Palestinian culture or the entry of globalized cultural forms.” She writes
about an “absence of [a] direct critique of… the process of NGOization of the cultural sphere.” (Maira, Jil
Oslo, 42-43.) Needless to say, these findings are in direct contradiction to my own, as evidenced in
Hazboun’s quote above. It may be that the five to ten year difference between her fieldwork and mine has
allowed for the growth of this critique, as it is surely true that frustration with NGOs is growing. Of course
other literature on cultural production and cultural producers in this period also found antipathy towards
NGOs. (See for example Maurya Wickstrom, Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: Thinking the
Political Anew [New York: Palgrave, 2012].)
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Ghanem argued that cultural exchange was necessary and that furthermore, the
opportunity to make a statement always existed. As an artist, she suggested, one should
always be able to make an intervention. She argued that by refusing the invitation they
were giving up the opportunity to expose people to different politics. By way of example
of how they may be able to subvert the political meaning via their participation, she
recounted her experience participating in a workshop in Graz, Austria, run by an Occupy
Wall Street activist and sponsored by a public Austrian university.44
During a workshop, the artist-participants were tasked with making protest
signs which they could later choose to hold in the day’s performance: a
staged protest in a public square. The participants were furnished with
markers and poster board and told to use images only to construct either a
statement (concluded with an exclamation point) or a question (concluded
with a question mark). Ghanem recounts that much of the talk at the time
was about gay marriage and homosexuality and many of the participants
chose this subject as the subject of their posters. An organizer assured
Ghanem that her poster could be about anything she desired, however.
Assured, Ghanem took a marker and a poster board and drew the Israeli
flag, then the equals sign, then a swastika, and concluded with a question
mark.
Before she finished, seven or eight people crowded around her and took
the poster and the marker from her. They asked her what she thought she
was doing and demanded that she removed, covered, or blotted out the
swastika. When Ghanem refused in the name of artistic license, the
organizer blotted it out with a marker for her. Word of the incident spread
quickly. For Ghanem, this was a successful intervention — in that it
exposed the limits of Austrian “freedom” and generosity towards artistic
expression that the workshop was clearly invested in showcasing. In that it
forced a tiny but very literal enactment of the censorship [on the subject of
Zionist policy] in the society lived daily.45
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Asifeh spent many childhood years in Vienna with his family. He speaks German and holds Austrian
citizenship. He cites collaborations with his neighbors and friendships in Vienna as an important part of his
artistic development. (Interviews with the author July 19, August 27, and September 5, 2014, Ramallah.)
45

Field notes excerpt, July 2014; discussions, and recorded interview with the author July 19, August 27,
and September 5, 2014, Ramallah.
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I include this anecdote as an example of the experiences which artists return to in
debating their participation in internationally funded opportunities. Interestingly, Ghanem
was using this experience as reason to participate in the US State Department venture.
The discussions Ghanem and Asifeh had with me and the arguments they rehashed in my
presence also illustrate how social relationships are guiding the political development of
the second wave. Asifeh, a performing musician across two decades, was much more sure
of his position than was Ghanem, who has been performing her own work since roughly
2009. Asifeh’s experience undoubtedly helped to shape Ghanem’s position – and this
needn’t reflect on the nature of their personal relationship, only. Aesthetic as well as
political influence is easily perceptible in the friendships between second wave rappers in
Ramallah, and navigating opportunities is a primary forum in which these experiences are
rehashed and reviewed. Ultimately, the pair declined the invitation, pulling out of the
workshop.46
In addition to suspicion of European and US NGOs and sponsored festivals,
some musicians and venue owners also relate an antipathy between them and local nonprofit cultural organizations. They accuse the latter of being secretive or selective about
opportunities, and of generally unambitious programming – either with regards to more
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During my conversations with both Ghanem and Asifeh in July, we talked at length about the
frameworks of “resistance” which are available to, and indeed asked of, them as musicians when they
represent Palestine in international festivals. My own research is part of this industry of cultural production
and exchange. When Ghanem and Asifeh were debating their participation in One Beat, both asked for my
opinion. I was forced then (and continue to) reflect on the stipulations placed on the researcher by the
different funding opportunities which I accepted and which facilitated this research, and the underlying
ideological systems of which they are a part. In accepting PARC funding, I uncritically signed a contract
which included a clause stating I would not collaborate with “terrorists,” the same kind of clause Ramzi
Hazboun acerbically critiqued in our interview (quoted above). The complications of affiliation while on an
IIE Fulbright research fellowship, affiliated as it is with the US State Department, and which facilitated my
research in Amman, would become clear at a later time. It has been impossible for me to engage sincerely
with the questions these musicians navigate without simultaneously reflecting critically on my own role as
researcher and the structure of opportunities that facilitate this work.
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mainstream aesthetics or the relative paucity of events organized. Several musicians also
related resentment about an attitude of dependency, which they felt was expected of them
by local cultural institutions, and which they simultaneously perceive in the relationship
between these institutions and international organizations or artists. These musicians feel
that on the one hand, local cultural institutions want to be the ones setting the pace and
determining the horizon of cultural expression; at the same time, they feel these
institutions depend too much on international support and validation. As with the
international NGOs, it frequently seems to musicians that the priorities are not in the right
place. Indeed, I often felt from my interlocutors a more pronounced astringency and a
more ready disgust towards NGOs – foreign and domestic – than that even towards the
Occupation. While the abuses of the latter are well-documented, the problematic politics
of “development” via NGOs and donor aid are still less current in analysis and discussion
of cultural production and politics within it. Similarly, while the negative effects of the
Occupation were often assumed in our conversations, my interlocutors frequently
expressed what seemed to me a desire to correct a positive image of NGO work, with
testimony to the political contradictions they impose on them.
It is against this political and economic backdrop that I argue that we can notice
the emergence of a “second wave of Palestinian rap.” The second wave is set apart by
patterns of social collaboration, by the kinds of concerts they pursue and perform in, and
the musical, lyrical, and performatic experimentation therein.47 Sunaina Maira has
proposed jil Oslo, or the “Oslo Generation” as a category useful for understanding the

47

I use performatic as Diana Taylor does, as a term to describe something relating to live performance.
Taylor suggests the term as an alternative to distinguish from J. L. Austin’s discursive notion of the
“performative.” (Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire [Durham: Duke UP, 2003], 6.)
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politics of Palestinian hip hop. She describes this youth demographic as coming of age in
the years after the Oslo Accords.48 This category effectively encompasses, I think it’s
safe to say, most all Palestinian rap, and definitely all Palestinian rap in Arabic.49 While
there is at maximum a ten or so year gap between some musicians I mention here, my
proposition that there is a “second wave” of Palestinian rap speaks less to a generational
distinction between the musicians in question than it does to aesthetic currents, patterns
of collaboration, histories of exposure, concert culture, as well as the political feeling
generated within them. My discussions with musicians and fans, my experience at
concerts, perusing online footage, and listening to the music encourages me to mark the
development of different aesthetic and political energies within a single generation.
Haykal, Dakn, al-Nather, Shua, Julmud, Faragh, Riyadiyat, and Boikutt/Muqataʿa
form a loose collective they call saleb wahed or, “minus one”: “-1.”50 This is the most
tangible, physical manifestation of the energies I identify as belonging to the second
wave. To this named collective, I add Sheʿrab and Stormtrap/Asifeh to the category of

48

Maira, Jil Oslo, 34-73.
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Many Palestinian rappers began writing poetry or rap in English before writing in Arabic. For example,
Boikutt recalls rapping in a crew called Two Man Army with friend John Naʿmeh in English before
Ramallah Underground formed. Tamer Nafar of DAM began his career rapping in English and Hebrew
before switching to Arabic (see Ted Swedenburg, “Against the Struggle Paradigm,” in Popular Culture in
the Middle East and North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook, Mounira Solimon and Wael El Hamamsy, eds.
[New York: Routledge, 2013],17-32.)
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Haykal’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/haykalonol; Dakn’s
Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/dakn-1; Shua’s Sound Cloud
page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/shu-a-1; Julmud’s Sound Cloud page, accessed
April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/julmud-1; Faragh’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015,
https://Sound Cloud.com/faragh1; Riyadiyat’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound
Cloud.com/riyadiyat-1; Boikutt’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound
Cloud.com/boikutt: Boikutt was one third of Ramallah Underground and is a part of the visual/sound
installation performance collective Tashweesh [Interference] with Basel Abbas and visual artist Ruanne
Abu-Rahmeh.
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the second wave.51 Together, this near dozen musicians and producers participate in a
robust network of exchange and collaboration with Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian
rappers, producers, and other musicians. They collaborate extensively among themselves
and with Edd Abbass (of Fareeq al-Atrash, based in Beirut), DJ Sotosura (Amman),
Osloob (of Katibeh 5, Paris), Bu Kolthoum (Syrian, residing in Amman), El Rass
(Beirut), Sayyed Darwish (Beirut), Psychaleppo (Beirut), El Far3i (London). These
collaborations form a dynamic, inter-urban exchange not present in the rap scene in
Palestine or in the region before 2007/2008.52 In addition, all of the “-1” artists DJ
recorded sets in addition to performing and recording their own raps. The production
work of Al-Nather (who raps less than the others) is helping to connect a dozen or more
MCs across the Arab Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the influence of Boikutt – as a
producer as well as a musician – among this group of musicians and their fans is palpable
and undeniable. The second wave of Palestinian rap is thus distinguished by a certain
cohesion among a group of artists and their social patterns of collaboration.53
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Another important player is al-Had, who shares a history socially and musically with the “-1” group
(especially Haykal and Dakn) but who is now based in Chicago. Sheʿrab’s Sound Cloud page, accessed
April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/she3rap. Stormtrap made up one third of the Ramallah
Underground. Stormtrap/Asifeh‘s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound
Cloud.com/stormtrap..
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Bu Kolthoum’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/bu-kolthoum; El
Far3i’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/el-far3i; Satti’s Sound Cloud
page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/ay-satti.
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Others have explored how collaboration online or for the infrequent concert organized by an international
festival or NGO fosters a liberating sociality by creating a virtual mobility not available to Palestinian
musicians under Occupation otherwise. In my research, I recognize that the collaborative patterns of a wide
range of musicians across the Levant is a powerful social as well as aesthetic network. However, I do not
make arguments here testifying to the political potential of this networking. For one, the bigger the scene
gets, the more fractious it actually becomes. In Beirut, for example, the city where the most collaboration
could and does take place, the rift between different groups of rappers and hip hop heads has become so
deep as to prevent collaborations and interactions between musicians. In Amman, the politics of
international concert organizing created resentment where “foreign” artists were paid while “local” artists
weren’t (they were all Arab rappers). Secondly and more importantly perhaps, suggesting that a specific
politics emerges just from collaboration patterns in the context of this region – where geographical mobility
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Unsurprisingly since they share such strong social connections, similarities in
musical exposure form another defining characteristic of these musicians. Asked about
the first rap they really took to or to which they remember being exposed, many of the
“-1” point to different artists than those referred to by Arab rappers performing in the
early 2000s. This makes sense considering teenage years lived in the latter half of the first
decade of the twenty-first century.
A particularly memorable scene in Jackie Salloum’s Slingshot Hip Hop (2008)
features Tamer Nafar of DAM holding Public Enemy’s album Fear of a Black Planet. (I
identify DAM as part of the “first wave.”) Nafar points to the CD and says, “There, they
have a fear of a Black Planet… Here, we have fear of an Arabic nation.” The sound bite
opens the trailer to the film, so well does it frame an easily-digestible understanding of
Arabic rap in relation to its African-American predecessors: Palestinian Arabs under
Occupation identify with the struggles of African Americans in US East Coast ghettos,
and so are attracted to imitate their modes of expression.54 Indeed, many of my own
interviews with first wave rappers trace their exposure to rap to a certain generation of
African American musicians. Mos Def, Gangstar, Public Enemy, Wu Tang, Nass, the

for specific nationalities is a real obstacle – I think ultimately hinges on romanticizing international
collaboration. This privileges the musicians’ identity over any other aspect of their participation, a gesture
most musicians I spoke with resent (as I explore later in this chapter). Generally, I consider these networks
of collaboration positive, but I am hesitant to project upon them certain politics: the crippling immobility
imposed upon Palestinian – and recently Syrian – musicians by geo-political forces, not withstanding. (For
arguments about the liberating potential of international and transnational collaboration, see Sunaina Maira,
“‘We Ain’t Missing’” and Janne Louise Andersen, “Transgressing Borders,” among others.)
54

“Slingshot Hip Hip official trailer,” YouTube video, 1:55, posted by “Fresh Booza,” May 17, 2012,
accessed November 14, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYCe17MEkDQ&ab_channel=FreshBooza.
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Fugees, Talib Kweli, and others appear in the recollections of Boikutt, Asifeh, Rami GB,
Sotusura, and other rappers present on the scene by 2004-2005.55
It has been popular among leftist circles for some time to connect African
American struggles against racism, poverty, and ghettoization in the US to the Palestinian
struggle against Occupation. Some of this work highlights the productive exchanges
between black and Arab organizers and experimenters with political strategy in attempts
to connect important struggles.56 Other examples do important work connecting the
strategies of empire.57 Sometimes, however, and especially in the case of Palestinian hip
hop today, understanding the Occupation as an iteration of urban suffocation and intracommunal strife in the Bronx can perhaps offer only a facile understanding of either
experiences of oppression. In analyzing the political processes of listening and making
meaning in second wave rap, I want to caution against this kind of connection-making
and political theorizing.58
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Rami GB’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/ramigb;
MWR’s YouTube channel, accessed April 19, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/user/MWRHipHop?spfreload=10?&ab_channel=MWR-PalestinianHipHop.
56

See for example, Alex Lubin, Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political
Imaginary (Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 2014).
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See for example, Keith P. Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2015).
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In Chapter One of this dissertation, I pointed to blackwashing as part of the phenomenon of neoliberal
orientalism that drives the discourses of resistance I deemed problematic in representations of Arab rappers.
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I suggest this caution is necessary because, in our interviews, second wave
rappers readily offer that the experience of the US ghetto that grounded much early US
hip hop was altogether too strange to have proved directly influential in their own music
making, lyricism, or political awareness. Some of these musicians pointed to the
incomprehensibility of the slang used in this hip hop, not used in other forms of popular
culture available to them at the time, rendering lyrical expression hard to follow.59 Others
pointed to the availability, during their own teenage years, of other kinds of rap on outlets
like MTV and others in Palestine. And others still pointed to their own relationship to the
streets and clubs of their own neighborhoods in Ramallah. For example, Haykal offers
that a conservative upbringing kept him from socializing with kids in his neighborhood
from a young age. In his case, and in his analysis, this prevented a strong sense of
identification with the kinds of urban sociality referenced in early US hip hop.
Rather than identifying with African American life in the US ghetto as expressed
in early hip hop lyrics, most all the second wave rappers I spoke with remember that
Eminem was their first significant exposure to rap music. The political assumption of
shared black and Arab experience in the attraction to rap as a medium requires serious
reconsideration when the Palestinian rapper offers that his initial attempts at lyric writing
were driven by the desire to reproduce the multi-syllables in Eminem’s work, or that
looking back, he finds in his early lyrics teenage angst against his mother (a frequent
college students in North Carolina in the fall of 2014. And plain racism can be seen in the hip hop scenes in
the Arab world themselves. The much touted “first Arab rap battle” held in Mar Mkhayel in Beirut in 2014
between Edd Abbas and Dizaster is one example. Abbas is half Ivorian. Dizaster’s raps returned more than
once to his opponent’s skin color and the corresponding worth he should be accorded in Lebanese society.
(“The Arena – Dizaster vs. Edd Abbas (First Official Rap Arabic Battle) #MobaRap,” YouTube video,
13:29, posted by “The Arena ME,” July 10, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPQ-PC5HfS0&ab_channel=TheArenaME.)
59
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theme of Eminem’s), as opposed to rage or frustration against racism and systemic
oppression. This of course is not to deny the relevance of first wave rappers’ testimony. It
is rather to point to important shifts and changes among rappers and their audiences.
To be sure, the second wave’s aesthetic and lyrical choices – more in line with
trends in electronic music than with traditionally understood hip hop sounds – have also
garnered criticism from some of the veterans on the scene, who express frustration with
the more brazenly experimental forays of these artists. In our interviews, older musicians
frequently shook their heads in reference to some of this younger work. Commentary like
“it’s not hip hop,” “something’s been lost in translation,” or “I don’t even understand
what this guy is saying here” frequently appeared in these testimonies.
Regardless of how much one appreciates the new sounds or not, the recognition of
different influences by musicians is an important shift that very much deserves attention.
Moreover, all of these musicians expanded their range of musical exposure in the process
of becoming musicians, and now relate to and digest much more than their teenage idols.
If a distinguishing feature of the second wave is the kind of rap they remember being
initially exposed to and compelled by, a second defining characteristic, also rooted in
performer histories, comes from the shared recognition of different approaches to rap in
Arabic. Second wave rappers, unlike the first wave, were not the first to rap in Arabic.
This means they had the opportunity to discern aesthetically between musical and lyrical
approaches to rap in Arabic, something musicians several years their senior would not
have had the opportunity to do. Moreover, the second wave shares ideas about the kind of
rap after which they are interested to model their own work. Referencing the kind of
music they look for, the kind of music they found in early mentors, the kind of music
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they like, and/or the kind of rap they aim to produce, Haykal, Dakn, al-Nather, Sotusura,
Boikutt and others used the phrase “biʿabi el rass,” Arabic for “fills the head.”
In his work on tarab, ethnomusicologist A.J. Racy writes that the “the ineffability
of the tarab state is illustrated by the prevalent use of metaphors that explain how the
music is ‘felt,’ as in such expressions as ‘filling the head.’”60 Interlocutors’ testimonies
lead me to suggest that second wave rap is premised on feeling the music in a certain
way. Asked to explain what this feeling consists of, my interlocutors contrasted the thing
they seek (music that fills the head) with music that “hypes.” In Chapter Two of this
dissertation, I referred to the uniqueness of tarab as a performatic phenomenon: that while
it may employ call and response, it cannot be reduced to it. The specificity of second
wave rappers’ articulations of the kind of music they seek to create and that which they
seek to avoid precisely plays on this distinction.
Asked to elaborate, the distinction between “hype” and “filling the head” was
frequently illustrated by my interlocutors by distinguishing between two bands. The
Ramallah Underground and DAM made up a big part of the rap scene that existed in
Palestine during the Second Intifada (so they make up a majority of rap that makes up the
“first wave”).61 While DAM is still together and producing rap music, Ramallah
Underground has since broken up. Interestingly considering the relative lack of critical
attention they have received, my interlocutors credit the Ramallah Underground with a
continuing influence. Haykal told me:
60

A.J. Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: The Culture and Artistry of Tarab (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 2004), 202.
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DAM’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/damrap; Ramallah
Underground’s YouTube channel, accessed December 9, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/user/Ramallahunderground?&ab_channel=Ramallahunderground.
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[The name] “-1” isn’t really different from the phrase “Ramallah
Underground.” It’s almost the continuation of RU. We are -1 from
Ramallah. It’s the Underground of Ramallah. We became a kind of a
continuation of what the Ramallah Underground was.
Observers agree. The DJ Sotusura, who never raps himself, explained to me that,
“Ramallah Underground is a school when it comes to Arabic hip hop. DAM is a school
and Ramallah Underground is a different school.”62 This observation points to a
significant aesthetic and political spectrum in Palestinian hip hop.
Most second wave rappers and producers were barely teens when Ramallah
Underground and DAM performed in Ramallah what were, for many of them, the first
live concerts of the kind.63 Al-Nather was twelve when he first saw Ramallah
Underground perform, a concert he and childhood friend Dakn, remember vividly.
Al-Nather: Of course I remember [the first rap concert I heard]. It was
[Ramallah Underground] at Pianos. It was revolutionary for everyone who
was there. We didn’t have anybody doing this kind of thing in Ramallah.
It was the first time ever - It was like who are these guys? What are they
doing? Are they really one of us? From here?
Dakn: Yes. Yes, that’s exactly how it was. […] They saw things
differently, and this perspective filled my head [biʿabi rasi]. You know
what I mean?64
In these remarks, the two second wave rappers identify a political process of listening in
which they aligned themselves with one aesthetic over another. Continuing, Dakn
recounts the following about a concert of both DAM and the Ramallah Underground at
the Qasaba theatre in the middle of the Second Intifada:
62

Interview with the author September 11, 2015, Amman. Subsequent quotations from Sotusura are taken
from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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For thick description and analysis of DAM’s concerts and their performance styles see McDonald, My
Voice is My Weapon.
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Interview with the author, March 30, 2015. Subsequent quotations from Dakn and Al-Nather are taken
from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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I came with the local neighborhood club [nadi] where we had been
playing basketball. The majority of people there were from the club, kids.
I was very young and most of the crowd was my age. I’d heard of DAM, I
knew some of their tracks. But I hadn’t heard Ramallah Underground
before. DAM took the stage and everybody got on their feet and started
dancing, and I did too. Their track “Meen Irhabi?” [Who’s the Terrorist?]
in the middle of the intifada really captured people’s imaginations [ktir
bitaʿqed kanat ], every line was like what we wanted to hear. But then I
heard the track “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let me live,” by Ramallah
Underground]. And that was like, wow [wa kanat yaʿni aha]. It was from
the street. It was different: a different approach to the people.
It is important to note here how the two pieces performed live are juxtaposed in Dakn’s
memory. While Dakn and Al-Nather both admit they were excited by DAM’s piece in
performance, it was Ramallah Underground’s track that really touched them. This points
to the song’s effect as one of both lyrics (something I’ll return to in the next section) as
well as delivery. The distinctions between the two help to parse the difference between
“hype” and “filling the head” as reflected in audience dynamics in Arabic rap.
Haykal remembers DAM’s stage presence as “more like comic,” and
nationalistic.65 Al-Nather called it “acting.” Elaborating on this difference between the
two bands’ performance styles, Sotusura explains,
DAM are good performers, they’re good on stage, capturing the crowd,
and communicating with the crowd. I think in this part of it they’re
stronger than the others. They’re the first crew that did live shows and had
a proper interaction with the crowd and had a proper live show.
Haykal describes it like this:
DAM have, like, signatures. Like “Rrrrrrramallah!” all the time. They
want to keep people hyped, in a fun way. “Yalla! [let’s go!] Let’s have
fun!” “Yalla heyyyy! [he claps].”
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He offered “more like comic” in English. I return to the question of performing Palestinian national
identity below. (Interview with the author, August 16, 2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from
Haykal are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.)
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This, Haykal, Dakn, and Al-Nather confirm, is in marked distinction to the
performance style of the Ramallah Underground. Haykal told me:
The way [that Boikutt] delivers, it’s not his concern if people like him or
not. He’s informing. There is informative behavior in both of them [Asifeh
and Boikutt]. They like for the effect on people to come from… the words
themselves, how they control the sound, and how they use hip hop for
what it is, as music. DAM do it up more like a show.
The differences Haykal and Sotusura point to are similar to the differentiation I described
in Chapter Two between the emergence of tarab in audience-performer interaction based
on specialized listening and the excitement or hype produced by more generic call-andresponse. There, I argued that tarab is a kind of call-and-response, but should not be
reduced to it. Second wave rappers offer that the ability of a piece of Arabic rap to “fill
the head” depends in part on an articulation of politics that lets the listener think or feel
beyond the immediate excitement of the live performance, the latter always more or less
always charged with some kind of energy. Explaining how this works lyrically requires
another contextualization, this time in terms of political discourse.

*

*

*

In this section, I have sought to contextualize the emergence of what I call a
second wave of Palestinian rap within the context of recent neoliberal economic growth
in the Occupied West Bank. I have identified a concentration of rap and hip hop
production that finds its home within the cosmopolitan growth of Palestine’s “de facto
capital” following the Oslo Accords. In recognizing the emergence of the second wave, I
have pointed to new patterns of collaboration among musicians and differences in their
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influences and exposure to rap in English and Arabic. In so doing, I underscore the
influence of the Ramallah Underground, a “first wave” band (made up of Asifeh, Boikutt,
and Aswat) that has since broken up. Importantly for understanding the musical and
lyrical influences and of the second wave, I include Asifeh and Boikutt’s recent work in
the category “second wave.” Unlike DAM, a first wave hip hop crew that are still
together and which figure in every study of Palestinian rap and hip hop, the influence
aesthetically and politically of the Ramallah Underground has been critically
understudied. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I maintain a focus on the
influence of the Ramallah Underground and especially the work and mentorship of
Boikutt in understanding the aesthetic and political experimentation in the second wave
as well as the social collaboration patterns evident in this network.
Finally, I have suggested that the driving thread of the second wave is the search
for and the making of music that “fills the head.” I suggested this is different from rap
music that “hypes” and pointed to some initial differences in performatic styles to which
my interlocutors testify. These testimonies about the differences between the Ramallah
Underground and DAM are integral to my argument about the emergence and
particularity of a second wave of Palestinian rap. To understand further how second wave
lyrics discursively “fill the head,” I now turn to a contextualization of these lyrics within
political discourse about Palestinian struggle.
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Part Two: Political Discourse

Second wave rappers offer that the ability of a piece of Arabic rap to “fill the
head” depends in part on an articulation of politics that lets the listener think or feel
beyond the immediate excitement of the live performance. In our interviews, second
wave musicians and fans relate the effects of listening as a political process, where the
lyrics, delivered in a certain way, have the capacity to produce a powerful political
feeling. As the observations that concluded the preceding section alluded, this capacity
for rap music to “fill the head” depends on particular qualities of the live delivery as well
as the form and content of the lyrics themselves. I return to the musical components of
sound and the ability of these sonic elements to produce affect in the concert space in the
third and final section of this chapter. Here, I want to explore how the intellectual
engagement in second wave lyrics lies in diversion from and inversion of representations
in existing narratives of Palestinian struggle.
My argument is that historical discourses of Palestinian political struggle are
classed in specific ways. Ways of framing Palestinian-ness and the struggle for national
liberation since before 1948 are built on a classed imagination of Palestinian fighters and
their society. The material political and economic developments in the oPt means that
these political imaginations conjure figures that no longer reflect the material reality of
Ramallah. In this context, second wave lyrics paint a different class picture of Palestinian
society. Their commentary on Ramallah’s growth, their cynicism about the uses of sabr
[patience], sumud [resilience], their refusal of performances of turath [heritage], and their
disavowal of mouqawameh [resistance] point to politics in formation. Far from the
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theorization of certain kinds of political action, these reflections are closer to
observations and analysis than calls to arms or rallying for struggle. At the same time,
they have real affective power. I argue this kind of lyrical work, most noticeable when it
actively inverts mainstream, historical, and romanticized narratives of Palestinian
struggle, is central to the ability of second wave rap to “fill the head.” That is, this lyrical
expression helps to produce the tarab that distinguishes the political feeling in these
concerts.

Sabr and sumud

Discourses of struggle against the Occupation – as well as the political, legal, and
military discourses that sustain it – have frequently assumed its temporary nature. During
the Second Arab-Israeli war in 1967, when Israel seized the Gaza Strip from Egypt, all of
the West Bank up to the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the
Golan Heights from Syria, its territory tripled in a matter of days. However, the “new”
territories were never annexed; they remained contested territories.66 This, Neve Gordon,
Eyal Weizman, and others have argued, allowed Israel to sidestep the Geneva
Conventions concerning the responsibilities of an occupying power.67 Less tangibly, it
also helped produce a certain fluidity regarding the hard reality of the Occupation and
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Press, 2009), 322-344.
67
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how to contest it. Gordon suggests that following Israel’s defeat of the Arab armies,
“Temporariness was… used to prevent opposition and to thwart Palestinian resistance.”68
A similar application of “temporariness” was achieved during the Oslo Accords.
The first of the Oslo agreements, the “Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements,” illustrates the central feature of all of the following
agreements: namely, they were built on the premise of an interim agreement until the
establishment, after the interim period, of a sovereign Palestinian state.69 The status of
Jerusalem, the question of refugees, the geography of international borders, and relations
with neighboring countries were all left unelaborated and unsettled, to be returned to at
the end of the interim period.70 Moreover, the veritable maze of barriers, checkpoints,
roadblocks, gates, dikes, trenches, and ‘flying’ checkpoints – what Eyal Weizman calls
68

Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 25.
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The Declaration of Principles reads: “The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current
Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the
whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” (“Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements,” September 13, 1993, accessed March 22, 2015,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx.)
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force” responsible for “maintaining internal security and public order” even as it authorized the
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September 28, 1995, accessed March 22, 2015,
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“structured chaos” – was made possible by the Oslo Accords. Effectively designed to
maintain the difference between these territories, it thereby deepened and extended the
Occupation Israel administered since 1967.71 If indeed the Oslo Accords succeeded in a
further entrenchment of the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories, they have done
so in part by reaffirming the manner in which the Occupation was talked about and
conceived. Central here has been a sense of impermanence – that the Occupation will not
last.
Historically and into the present day, this sense of impermanence has thus had
profound effects on the ways in which Palestinians articulate and develop tools of
struggle against Zionist dispossession. The state of limbo – the sense of the Occupation’s
imminent dissipation, despite much historical and material evidence to the contrary –
persists in Palestine today. While the terms used to describe or invoke struggle against
the Occupation have changed over the decades, two widespread discourses in particular
speak to the idea of the need to hold out for a limited time. The discourses of sabr
[patience] and sumud [steadfastness, resilience] date back to before Israel’s defeat of the
Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967, preceding the formal military
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the period between the nakba– the
violence and expulsion that accompanied the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948,
and the 1967 war, strategies for dealing with what was then understood to be a temporary
71
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condition were first developed as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
organized abroad. Discourses around both sabr and sumud developed during this period
and imagined the condition of estrangement from Palestine, via exile or occupation, to be
temporary. Both were developed in order to strengthen Palestinian communities during a
period understood to be interim.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Palestinians and Arabs worldwide reeled from
the defeat of Arab armies and the blow to Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s Pan-Arabism that this
defeat had dealt. Salim Tamari suggests that an official iteration of sumud [steadfastness,
resilience] began during this period “as a form of passive resistance.” According to
Tamari, the application of sumud grew out of a “survivalist ideology,” which envisioned
the economic dependency on and dispossession by Israel to be finite. In this iteration of
Palestinian struggle, Palestinians needed “survival programs that would make life
tolerable and leave the fabric of community life intact.”72 Sumud was a way of
encouraging patience, resilience, and the setting aside of personal difference or personal
gain for the sake of the larger struggle. This iteration of political strategy was based on
the notion that “all Palestinians suffer equally under the yoke of occupation.”73 It was
intended both to unite a populace that was disjointed – with populations living the misery
of exile and occupation in different ways; and to connect a leadership, itself in exile, with
its people.74 The discourse around sumud was also specifically connected to the
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in 1970-1971, Lebanon became the base for the PLO. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the
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commemoration of the sacrifices of the Palestinians living directly under occupation. In
this way, leaders abroad could invoke solidarity with their countrymen, a-samdeen [the
steadfast ones] under occupation. During the first intifada, discourses of sumud were
additionally invoked to help sustain an “ascetic culture of resistance.”75
Many of my interlocutors – musicians, fans, or bar owners, express skepticism
and impatience about the proposition of patience, resilience, or asceticism accompanied
with the expectation the Occupation will not last. They are extremely cynical about
strategies or invocations of sabr [patience].76 For example, consider these lyrics, dripping
with sarcasm, in a track released in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Israeli
bombardment of the Gaza Strip:
zay el jahsh lazem intah enta w ana/
zay el hamameh ʿal beit dalak sabr enta w ana
[You and me, like beasts, we keep goring/
You and me, like the pigeons on the roof, got to be patient]77

PLO relocated to Tunis where they remained until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. (See for
example, Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994].)
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A good example of the dark sense of humor in much second wave rap, in this track Shua
spins a trope about staying patient with dignity into a caricature of the pathetic position of
senseless repetition and stagnation. Pigeons’ inability to imagine anything but sitting on
the roof of his house and the beast’s stubborn charge are juxtaposed with the mode of
sabr or patience. In the wake of Israel’s 2014 attack on Gaza, the lyrics are a fresh (if
extremely cynical) take on discourses of “holding on.” Needless to say, there is also a
quite pronounced sting in them – which may be alternatively alienating, refreshing, or
incomprehensible depending on the listener.
Less dark but equally frustrated, the lyrics in Stormtrap’s “Zey ma sar mbareh”
[“What Happened Yesterday”] also refuse the narrative of patient waiting.78
Significantly, Stormtrap refuses sabr while connecting it to being bought: pointing to
negative uses of sabr in the context of Palestinian politics:
Linno el waqt ʿam yisbaq
Biqillak jay el salam bas asbar
Bidak tistana? Hay el hitat biʿamorha ma bazbot
Biydfaʿlak qad ma biddak ʿashan tiskot
[Because time is racing
He keeps telling you peace is coming just be patient
You want to wait? These plans never succeed
He’ll pay you as much as you want to keep quiet.]79
As Tamari duly notes, the usage of sumud by the PLO and its foreign sponsors eventually
lost its revolutionary meaning. In 1978, Arab State leaders gathered in Baghdad decided
78
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to aid the “sumud” of the oPt with cash in the amount of $150 million annually. In doing
so, Tamari suggests that the phrase, “daʿm sumud ahluna fi al-dakhil [in support of the
steadfastness of our people inside] became the official Arab ‘guilt money’ for abandoning
the confrontation with Israel.”80 Tamari argues that via this appropriation, the discourse
of sumud was transformed, from passive resistance to “aggressive nonresistance.”81 In
this way, the uses of sumud by the PLO and its foreign partners came to be described
with cynicism. That is, the transformation of struggle in discourses of sabr and sumud
into something that can be bought showed itself to be completely evacuated from both
revolutionary ethos and liberatory praxis. Tamari writes:
The word sumud became a term of cynical self-denigration often used as a
mocking reference to the nouveau-riche recipients of patronage money.
Only to the external observer did it retain any positive content of
glorification thus enhancing its irony.82
In his lyrics reflecting the post-Oslo reality of the West Bank, above, Stormtrap points to
similar connotations of corruption and buying off within the discourses of sabr and
patience.
Tamari also points out that, concerned as they have been with Palestinians staying
on the land, discourses sabr and sumud have also been tied to a particular agricultural
80

Tamari, “The Palestinian Movement,” 61.

81

Ibid.

82

Ibid, 63. To be sure, as the First Intifada in many ways rebelled against the nepotism and elitism that
characterized these years of the PLO and its foreign donors, the valences of sumud changed again. It was
during this period that the revolutionary socialist arm of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) actively reinvented an application of sumud in order to reflect changing political
dynamics. They invoked sumud as an official, broad-based strategy for confronting the Israeli Occupation.
Specifically combatting the problem of the efficacy of Israeli torture techniques on Palestinian prisoners in
Israeli detention, sumud became, under the leadership of the PFLP, a set of strategies through which
prisoners refused to confess under torture or threat of torture. Prisoners shared torture techniques and
strategies to resist them. Demonstrating sumud by not confessing became a badge of honor whose public
recognition the PFLP actively promoted. (See Lena Meari, “Sumud: A Palestinian Philosophy of
Confrontation in Colonial Prisons,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 113[2014]: 547-578. I am indebted to
Omar Qassis for initially referring me to this historical moment and usage.)
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imagination. Sabr, which is also the Arabic word for a species of cactus, conjures the
patient determination with which Palestinians remain on their land.83 The olive tree – an
obvious visual placeholder for Palestine – as well as the cactus, wheat, dates, and citrus
have all been mobilized at different times to evoke Palestinian land and Palestinian
struggle.84 Given this agricultural imagination, the human figure associated with sabr, the
Palestinian fellah [peasant; fellaheen, pl., fellaha, feminine] and the traditions associated
with rural Palestinian society, like embroidery, handicrafts, cuisine, the dance of the
dabkeh, among others have similarly come to represent Palestinian struggle.
Contemporary invocations of the figures of sabr, especially as found in the search
for “authentic” expression, can be found encouraged in contemporary art scenes in
Palestine and internationally where Palestinians artists are featured, especially where
female artists are concerned. These may be manifest in the production of traditional
embroidery or in wearing traditional clothing. For instance, Palestinian-UK hip hop artist
Shadia Mansour’s decision to perform in the traditional Palestinian robe or thob, can be
seen as an example of this kind of manifestation of sabr and the imagery of the resilience
of traditional Palestinian society that it evokes.
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Ted Swedenburg describes the practical use of the sabr in identifying Palestinian homesteads well:
“When Palestinians sight cactus plants (sabr) on the Israeli landscape, they know immediately that an Arab
village formerly stood on that spot. Arab farmers planted the cacti to fence off their property… Palestinians
claim that the Israeli authorities, despite unceasing efforts, cannot eradicate sabr. Even when burned to the
ground, the plant always springs back to life. Cactus has thus become a folk metaphor for the indelible
Arab character of the land. Since sabr means “patience,” it equally connotes persistent Arab steadfastness
on Palestinian territory.” (Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the
Palestinian National Past [Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 2003], 62.)
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The olive tree famously thrives in rocky soil with little water.
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Figure 3.1: “Shadia Mansour in thob.” Shadia Mansour often performs in a thob or traditional
Palestinian gown. Photo by Ridzdesign.
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Tamari rightly points out that the uses of both sabr and sumud, relying as they do on a
romantic notion of the land and on traditional Palestinian society, have often been quite
socially conservative in their application.85 Tamari writes:
In the West Bank, sumud also evolved as a form of asserting the
traditional virtues of rural society (attachment to the land, the fecundity of
Palestinian women, and self-sufficiency). In effect, there was something
very retrogressive in this attitude. Attachment to the land took the form of
an idealistic glorification of peasant society that never existed in reality.86
For her part, Sherene Seikaly has fascinatingly documented how in the 1930s, Palestinian
middle classes and elites actively excised laborers and peasants from national narratives
of what constituted an upstanding Palestinian and who contributed to Palestinian society.
She shows how it is only in the 1940s,
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The fact that public opinion in Ramallah is increasingly conservative came up frequently in my
conversations with interlocutors, especially venue owners. The dominant political discourses, which I
suggest second wave rappers refuse and invert, have real material implications – especially on the privately
managed venues in which second wave concerts are increasingly held. For example, in April 2014, the
municipality closed, to considerable media fanfare, a popular restaurant-bar called “Beit Aneeseh” (it
reopened as “Radio” in January 2015). When I arrived in July it had been closed for nearly three months
and was still a regular subject of conversation. The managers of Beit Aneeseh referenced social
conservatism and political infighting as responsible for the (unexplained) closure. They explain that when
public opinion pressures as-sulta, the Authority responds by occasionally closing bars and restaurants.
When this plays out in the environment of the political divide between Fatah and Hamas, the two main
Palestinian political parties, that political rivalry can and has been literally played out on the backs of
Ramallah’s leisure scene. As Sami Said of Beit Aneeseh explained,
Aneeseh became like a hanger. Everybody could hang his own problems on it. Say
Hamas has a problem with Fatah or the PA. So Hamas starts writing on its websites that
the PA is responsible for the opening of places like Beit Aneeseh, and that therefore the
PA encourages licentiousness, things that are haram [forbidden] and so on.
In other words, the existence of the bar became the terrain through which local political parties vociferously
articulated their politics. When the municipality closes a drinking establishment to prove it does not
succumb to vice, it is engaging ideas about the proper forms of politics informed by traditional ideas of
“Arab Palestinian culture” (which is here implicitly Muslim, it should be noted). The prevalence of this
conservatism, or at least this conservative reiteration of identity and culture is not that different from the
conservative turns in other Arab and Muslim countries/politics (see Tarik Sabry, Cultural Encounters in the
Arab World: On Media, the Modern, and Everyday Life [London: IB Tauris, 2010], 48).
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[i]n the face of both wartime constraints and the rapid erosion of political
possibilities [that] men of capital expanded their understanding of the
middle class to include what they called the authentic Bedouin and fellah
[peasant], who they feverishly and belatedly sought to represent.87
These considerations of the discourse of sumud and the incorporation of what are today
the idyllic images of Palestinian struggle lead me to the observation that the discourses of
Palestinian struggle are socialized in specific ways. Specifically, I suggest that they are
“classed” in specific ways. When I say “classed,” I mean a specific socio-economic idea
of Palestine and its caretakers are mobilized to serve a specific political imagination.
In Chapter One, I suggested that the neoliberal orientalism of the mainstream
press and US state department cultural programming racializes representations of Arab
rappers on world stages. That is, by blackwashing, neoliberal orientalism mobilizes ideas
of “black”ness in order to understand and incorporate Arab politics. Here, I suggest a
political imagination that imagines and idealizes the Palestinian peasant class is at work
in much discourse about Palestinian struggle. Discourses of sabr and sumud, especially
through representations of turath [heritage] illustrate this classed imagination vis-à-vis the
fellaheen [peasantry]. The problem with this political imagination, especially the
declarations and performance of specific ideas of “Palestinian-ness” – in addition to the
conservative overtures that Tamari identifies, is that the romance of these ideas persist
despite the changing shape of Palestinian politics, continued land dispossession, and
economic realities.
This is especially significant when we recognize that the once widespread
experience of the fellah tending his plot of land within an extended family/kin network is
87
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no longer the reality for a majority of Palestinians, an increasing number of whom are
urban, laboring poor. The reality of Palestinian dispossession means that most
Palestinians today are not farmers but laborers, who sell their labor to Zionist (or
predatory Palestinian, Arab, and other transnational) capital to survive. It is in this
context that the refusal of second wave rappers to reproduce the discourse of sabr and
sumud as attached to images of turath has the capacity to be politically powerful.88
By observing that second wave rappers also largely avoid performances or
associations of turath, I mean that they avoid performing widely-recognizable Palestinian
identity. Almost always dressed in t-shirts, hoodie sweatshirts, and jeans (rarely sporting
even a kaffiyeh) second wave rappers are largely not interested in being identified first as
Palestinian. On the contrary, they speak of a constant negotiation with international
curators, with the press, and with fans in which they insist on being recognized as
musicians first, not Palestinians. Similarly, their recollections of the kind of music they
like reflect this political choice. This explains for example, the refusal of the “comic
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This is not to suggest that these aesthetic choices disavow the insistence for the land, the oldest and most
fundamental of Palestinian political demands. I am suggesting that there are ways in which romantic
posturing about the land and its caretakers has distanced political discussion and strategy from the reality of
the existing relationship between the historical class of the Palestinian fellaheen and the land. That is, there
are ways of celebrating the farmer that mask the contemporary challenges she faces. Some second wave
lyrical work rejects this distance between the romance in political discourse and the material reality.
I have been asked here to expand on how this critique of romanticism applies to the demand of
“return” for Palestinian refugees. I maintain that similarly, any consideration of Palestinian return needs to
acknowledge the material and economic changes over the last sixty years. Without a serious restructuring
of capitalism in Palestine (and elsewhere), the influx of both capital and unskilled labor when return is
achieved will be very trying on the existing population, one that has already suffered considerably under
occupation. This material analysis should also apply to the contexts from which refugees will return. Of
course, the political discourses of resilience and return have also been used, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and
the Gulf States as excuses not to integrate Palestinians into the local economy and society. This doesn’t
mean that “return” should cease to be a central demand. But, alongside the narratives I’m outlining here,
the goal of return is frequently romanticized, a romance which is achieved by not considering the material
realities of the Palestinian economy and its political geography. The hard-hitting lyrics in Ramallah
Underground’s “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” (discussed in Chapter Two) excoriate the political posturing of the
diaspora who demand resistance by Palestinians under Occupation, while they live comfortable lives
abroad.
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nationalism” some listeners located in DAM’s work. Haykal explains his reluctance to
embrace bands of the “first wave” of Palestinian rap, MCs like Rami GB and DAM as
follows:
[This music had] a very strong Palestinian character [tabaʿa] that was
very close to the general taste, or the taste of weddings, etc. As part of the
middle class, my taste was closer to pop and Western music. I wasn’t
accepting wedding music, to me that was trash, even though I grew up in
Al-Bireh [outside of Ramallah]. Rami GB and DAM were close to this
Palestinian character that I didn’t use to like.
Here, Haykal admits he felt more at home in more globalized cultural contexts “closer to
pop and Western music” – and was less interested in the outward, recognizable
representations of “Palestinian” identity in some popular culture and music. His statement
“to me that was trash” could be understood as an anti-populist bias (one not that
dissimilar from the refusal of “pop” culture elsewhere).89 But it could also be interpreted
as a refusal of the stereotyped image of “Palestine” and “Palestinian-ness” which have
long framed both Palestinian cultural production and politics, and which Haykal
distinctly felt did not represent him.90
The distancing from traditional celebratory discourses of sabr, turath and the
fellah, need not necessarily trigger an aloof, “comprador” middle class image for Haykal
and his peers.91 Nor should it necessarily attribute to them an anti-peasant political
position. On the contrary, their refusal of the traditional political narratives attached to
the land and the agricultural imagination may more compassionately reflect the continued
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dispossession and re-entrenched distance between young Palestinians today and the land
itself. So when Shua raps cynically in the middle of the 2014 bombardment of Gaza in
the lyrics reproduced above, he is specifically lambasting a political imagination that
exalts agricultural imagery and staying steadfast on the land as the stalwart Palestinian
ideal. He turns it inside out, stripping the humanity from sabr, rendering it dumb,
repetitive, self-destructive.
To be very clear here, I do not consider that the musicians of the second wave of
Palestinian rap deny their Palestinian identity. These rappers and their fans identify as
Palestinian. They just don’t feel the need to perform this identity outwardly. Musicians
feel that when they do, it closes off the possibility of being understood as a musician first
and foremost. Additionally, it pressures them to articulate politics and identity in specific
ways: this they eschew – not their actual identity or the real struggle against the
continued dispossession of their land by the Occupation or Zionist settlers. My point is
the dominant political discourses around reclaiming the land in Palestine are increasingly
out of touch with the material reality under neoliberal occupation. They continue to rely
on historical tropes that do not today represent the majority of Palestinians.92 Otherwise
well-researched, left-leaning Palestinian policy papers regularly advocate a return to
“sustenance farming” with very little acknowledgement of the fact that this is literally
92

Moreover, the exoticization of Palestinian land and its caretaker the fellah, in discourses and
deliberations of Palestinian struggle have often come at the expense of the experience of both the refugee
and the exile. Besides their sometimes radical potential, these discourses often envisioned a framework for
ideal Palestinian being that is completely untenable to most Palestinians, be they internally displaced, or
refugees in other countries. The continuing prevalence of the idea of the fellah as the Palestinian mode of
resistance par excellence creates an idea of Palestinian struggle inaccessible for both the refugee and the
exile. That is, if the Palestinian struggle is imagined as being fought by the peasant on the land, what room
does this leave for political engagement for people not on the land? The answer historically has been
sumud: just hold out until you get on land and can resist like the fellah. My argument is that today, all the
failure of Oslo made obvious, this is not empowering politics. Sensing this, the second wave rejects them.
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impossible for the vast majority of Palestinians in the economic and material landscape of
the West Bank post-Oslo, and perhaps only partially possible for some parts of an urban
upper-middle class. 93 When these rappers treat representations of turath and Palestinian
identity with some disdain, I think they are reflecting the urban reality of Palestinian
dispossession today, not disrespecting the historical peasantry.
Furthermore, considering the history of discursively incorporating, holding up,
and excluding the peasantry that Seikaly has laid out, we can see how the second wave’s
refusal of these discourses is part of a longer history of the Palestinian middle classes
incorporating or leaving out the peasantry. In other words in both cases (the period
Seikaly addresses in the 1930s and 1940s and mine 2004-2014), this incorporation or
exclusion is not actually about the peasantry, but about what works as a political symbol
for Palestinian struggle. The rappers are saying that the romanticized construction of the
fellah and his [sic] society – what frequently, even today, constitutes “Palestinianness” –
does not represent them. This doesn’t have to be disingenuous or politically deplorable.
In fact considering the extent to which this romancitized fellah continues to be held up in
Palestinian political discourse, refusing that figure and the imagined trappings of this
society could actually be politically productive: demanding alternatives in its stead that
actually reflect the increasing urban poverty of the occupied territories today.
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I explore this more in Rayya El Zein, “Re-evaluating Capital and Labor in a ‘Resistance Economy’ in the
Agricultural Sector of the Occupied West Bank: The Case of Amoro Farms,” (under review, Journal of
Palestine Studies).
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Mouqawameh

In addition to discourses of sabr, sumud, and turath, discourses of mouqawameh
[resistance] in Palestine are also classed, though differently. If sabr and sumud invoke an
imagined peasantry, mouqawameh similarly relies on a classed imagination, but here
more closely attached to the urban, working class, than to the peasantry. This classed
imagination of more valiant resistance existing in poverty allows West Bank residents
generally to readily identify (and romanticize, actually) citizens of Gaza as the real agents
of resistance. It is the same imagination that encourages the Ramallah middle classes to
locate more authentic resistance in the stone-throwing youth of the refugee camps. Both
citizens of Gaza and denizens of refugee camps, in contradistinction to the middle classes
of Ramallah, regularly bear the brunt of Israel’s security operations, are less upwardly
mobile financially, and at the same time occasionally defend themselves physically.
All my interlocutors refused the notion that their work may be resistance or
should be referred to as such. Haykal referenced the distance between Arabic rap and the
Palestinian “street” when he told me,
I never wrote about myself “I am resisting” or “I am resistant”
[mouqawem]. The looks you will get from the street here will be like: Who
are you kidding, man? [inta esh tithabal?] It’s impossible for someone to
come down [and rap] “I am resisting” if the street rejects you [tafef
ʿaleyk].94
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Testimonies like this one are the primary reason I do not find more recent assessments of pleasure or
consumption “as resistance” under Occupation in the context of the growing middle class in Ramallah to be
a compelling alternative to the asceticism of sumud. That is, my interlocutors were much more ready to
disavow the existence of resistance at all in their work than they were to claim the presence of resistance in
cultural activity not typically seen as such. (Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis.”)
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His testimony reflected sentiments articulated by most of my interlocutors. This
disavowal, I perceive, is part a deferral of respect, part an assertion of cynicism. In the
summer and fall of 2014, “mouqawameh” most immediately evoked throwing stones and
firing rockets, i.e., physical resistance. I heard many iterations of, my music “isn’t
resistance like throwing stones is”; or hosting or attending a concert is “hardly launching
a rocket.”
The second wave refusal of discourses of mouqawameh may also reflect their
recognition of the romanticization of urban poverty as resistance. Consider Boikutt’s
lyrics off his most recent album in the closing track “Akher Kilmeh” [Last Word]:95
Biysawrou abyad w aswad dakhl ras “Old School”
ʿarfeen ino el kuffiyeh ʿarabiyeh bas wallah el mukhayam mish “cool”
[They film in black and white, pretending to be “old school”
we know that the kuffiyeh is Arab, but I swear the camp is not “cool”].
In these lines, Boikutt directly juxtaposes trappings of resistance (the kuffiyeh) with its
current romanticized location (the refugee camp) while critiquing those who seek to
appropriate political struggle or political reality for their own benefit. The camp is “not
cool” means they are not there to be appropriated as cultural capital – political or
aesthetic.
The lyrics and performatic elements in second wave rap disavow discourses of
resistance and refuse to embody traditional representations of “Palestinian-ness” that are
classed in certain ways. If this is the case, what are the implicit or built class positions
assembled through these refusals and disavowals? As I will explore in the next and last
95

“Akher Kilmeh,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:28, posted by “Muqataʿa boikutt,” accessed November
14, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/boikutt/wtc64ttewvtm. (The track is off the Haiwan Nateq album,
released late 2014.)
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section, second wave concert culture is middle class, urban, globalized, and relatively
elite cultural production. That said, I see no reason to assume that the appeal of its lyrical
content should be confined to this demographic. Especially since, as I hinted to in the
beginning of this section, evidence of politics in formation is most obvious in second
wave lyrical work when it describes the political and economic contradictions of life in
Ramallah.
Consider Boikutt’s description in “Risaleh min Muqataʿa” [Letter from
Boikutt].96
I’m reading in the paper
About roads newly paved
Speed bumps removed, a lot of other useful stuff!
Certain individuals benefit
Funding from here and there
Organizations are plentiful, but freedom is far-fetched
…
Let them wait for foreign aid until they die
Spinning in circles within the apartheid wall
Into unlimited mazes, taking up unlimited space
That are renewed to fit settlement expansion
Violation, occupation
But not for everyone
There are people here in Palestine living “the good life”
I don’t know what they’re think
Seems like they don’t know one day we’ll be gone
And all these shops will close.97
In this piece that he regularly performs, Boikutt paints a quotidian picture of Ramallah (“I
sit reading the paper…”) wherein the inequality and corruption in the city’s political
reality are almost banal, so regular are they in his perception of the current landscape.
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“Boikutt – Risaleh Min Muqataa,” YouTube video, 1:40, posted by “arabhop,” November 26, 2011,
accessed December 8, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVMMq-lcBw0&ab_channel=arabhop.
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Arabic lyrics provided by the artist. Translation by the artist with Loubna Bilali in “Exploring Popular
Literature,” 72-73.
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Disdain and criticism of money, shopping, and the commercialization of Ramallah
frequently appear in second wave lyrics, as do characterizations of the city as fertile
ground for corruption, coldness, and anonymity. The hypocrisy of the former is
frequently put into relief by juxtaposing these neoliberal elements with the role of
Ramallah as “de facto” capital – as supposed seat of resistance since it houses the
administrative offices of the Palestinian National Authority. For example, Hakyal offers
in his track “Haqqan” [Truthfully]:
Sigara bara: lefet hawa
ʿImara qarabat tetsawa
Guevara wallah ma biddho yatsawq
Ramallah sharnaqah ili batbawaʿ el saytara el wiskha
Khush nsban fawran el saytara btskha
A cigarette outside: a change of air
Another building about to be leveled
I swear [Che] Guevara doesn’t want to be taken to market
Ramallah is a cocoon that cradles corrupt control.
Hide behind a monument, and control stains immediately.98
Here, Haykal takes us with him as he goes out for a cigarette break. In front of him,
another building is about to be leveled to make way for a shopping complex. Revolution
does not want to go shopping, though, he offers. And then the “Ramallah Bubble”
emerges in his recollections as a cocoon holding corruption in. How does listening to
lyrics like these function? The words themselves point to politics in formation: not quite
calls to action, articulating shared observations about changes and developments in the
city can nonetheless have powerful political effect.
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“Haqqan (Prod. Boikutt),” Sound Cloud audio recording, 2:16, posted by “Haykal,” accessed December
9, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/haykalonol/haqqan-prod-boikutt. Arabic lyrics posted by the author at
the aforementioned link. Translation is my own.
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In Chapter Two I proposed tracing the emergence of tarab as a way to re-center
the processes of listening to rap as significant. In our interview, second wave rapper
Haykal specifically noted that listening is a political process that can yield different
results. For example, Haykal offered that listening to DAM’s lyrics was a political
process with limited potential. He explained:
DAM have this lyric, “Why are children free everywhere else, but I don’t
have freedom?” I used to repeat this line for like six months after I heard
it. But then I thought about it some more and it occurred to me that the
children of the world aren’t free and actually this phrase is really
dangerous. Your capacity [istʿabak] for resistance itself really disappears
here. You erased the idea that there are children that are much more
oppressed than the Palestinians, and you’ve made it so that the Palestinian
deserves more respect than the rest. Now you’ve become like everybody
else. You didn’t take me anywhere. You’re repeating the same thing, like
Najwah Karam.99 You didn’t do anything with brain. You just repeated
what everyone says, and got me to repeat it.
His description of listening to this first wave band hinges on the lyrics not opening new
ways to consider his place within the larger horizon of political struggle. On the other
hand, Haykal’s description of the political process of listening to the Ramallah
Underground (the first wave band that much of the second wave looks up to) is very
different. Boikutt’s lyrics were for him much more stimulating, intellectually, and as a
result, stronger politically.
When Boikutt says this line, “aktar moustahlekeen lil bidaʿa/ fa
tarakoulna el hayat” [we’re the biggest consumers, that’s why they keep
us alive], he solves a lot of personal problems for me. I couldn’t
understand before […] But when he gives me the idea of economics: [he
tells me] basically ‘don’t think that you’ve performed some great
resilience [ino samadet]. Don’t think that you are strong.’

99
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Haykal’s reflections on the political processes of listening locate the appeal of the
Ramallah Underground in their ability to articulate lyrics (and Palestinian politics) in a
way that opened avenues for further exploration, not repetition. This band offered a kind
of expression that encouraged questions not mantras. Importantly, this feature is central
to the band’s ability to “fill the head” – or to produce a certain kind of political feeling.

*

*

*

In this section I have endeavored to draw out some of the innovation in second
wave rap lyrics in order to locate how this music produces specific tarab. I have
suggested that refusals or inversions of dominant discourses of Palestinian struggle can
readily be found in second wave lyrics, which likely has wider demographic reach than
live concert culture in Ramallah. Moreover the political potency of this lyrical innovation
may be able to produce that feeling of “filling the head” because the dominant narratives
of Palestinian struggle, classed as they are in specific ways, cannot or do not reflect the
changing, material Palestinian reality. So, this lyrical work may be significant in the ways
in which it contributes to political discourse. For now however, this lyrical innovation is
indicative of politics in process: not yet the formation of actual political positions.
Importantly, the appeal of these lyrics and the rejection of romance in Palestinian
political discourse cannot be attached to a specific class identity. This is so despite the
often exclusionary nature of second wave concerts themselves. In the next section, I
consider these concerts, with a discussion of how these lyrics contribute to the formation
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of tarab and the political feeling unique to the second wave. As I will explore, the ability
of these lyrics to fill the head depends on a negotiation of self and community.

Part Three: Al-misfah, Tarab, and Alienation

Al misfah [the filter]

In Chapter Two, leaning on Judith Becker’s work on listening, I suggested that a
lyrical analysis of music in the absence of a consideration of how this music is felt in
performance promises to maintain a Cartesian split between mind and body. Having
explored how second wave rappers innovate lyrically, my concern is now to round out
that analysis with an examination of how this music is felt. Here I will build on the model
built in Chapter Two, which offered that tracing the building of tarab in live concerts is
an ethnographic technique to recognize ways of being with others that are politically
potent. In developing this model, I expanded on Gatens and Lloyd’s explication of
Spinoza: especially the idea of the inseparability of individuality and sociability. That is,
central to my proposition to trace the emergence of tarab as a way to track politically
potent sociality is the idea that one’s sense of self is conceptualized through one’s body,
which is always felt in relation to other bodies.
Thursday. I arrived at La Wain around 10 with an Italian woman I had met
at a capoeira class and a [male, Palestinian] friend of friends I’d been out
with before. The cover was 30 NIS [around 7 USD]. Our male companion
left almost immediately upon entering the bar, but after paying the cover.
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The Italian and I sat at a bar and ordered a beer. It was easy to hear each
other above the [recorded] music playing.
By the time Boikutt took the mic I lost track of the Italian, having moved
up within the first two rows of people; energy was concentrated up by the
stage, maybe a dozen people, very close together, standing, dancing and
responding to the MC. All were focused forward, listening. It was very
warm; cigarette smoke was thick.
Despite the warmth, the energy throughout the bar had holes and gaps in
it. Even close to the stage responses were not uniform. A few people
danced, a few people smoked, some smiled and tried to make eye contact
with the MCs, obviously positively engaged. With others body language
was more reserved. Obvious interest. Boikutt clearly had their attention.
But it was like each of us was in her own space. Arms folded. Straight
faces. [See Figure 2]
The crowd was less concentrated immediately behind me. Thin, even.
People chatting, laughing, sitting, standing, disinterested, allowing other
things to pull them away from the stage. By 11:30 the musicians had
stopped. There was no encore. Police crowded the door on my way out,
confirming suspicions they were responsible for the evening’s abrupt
finish.100
The concert at La Wain was Boikutt’s release of his album Haiwan Nateq (see Figure 3).
It happened the same evening the Qalandia International Festival concluded. Earlier in
the evening, the Ramallah Cultural Palace was mostly full for the indie rock concert of
Bil3ax, hosting a couple hundred listeners. After the concert, groups of friends connected
and expanded to greet the weekend. Several hours later at La Wain, there were maybe
fifty people by the time the concert started, around twenty-five acting as a group of
engaged samiʿah [listeners]. Even this group dwindled as the concert continued, some
allowing themselves to be distracted by socializing, going for fresh air, etc. The group

100

!

Author’s field notes, November 2014.

244

Figure 3.2: “Haiwan Nateq release concert.” La Wain pub Ramallah, November 13, 2014. Photo by
101
Alaa Gh.

that remained gathered tightly to the stage, but conducted a heterogeneous exchange with
the performers, where their reactions were anything but uniform.
The tarab that was present at La Wain that night was not built on a revolutionary
ethos that appeals to Palestinian identity or anti-Occupation politics in order to engage,
attract, or gather the largest audience. Rather the rhythmic union built in this concert, like
in other “second wave” rap concerts, was rather premised on the slightest bit of irritation,
which was actually designed to alienate a portion of a given audience. This rhythm of
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filtering is developed through various techniques, some of them sonic, built into the
music, and some of them performatic, enacted gesturally by the singers/MCs. Sonic
filtering elements may include sound that’s just a little bit too loud for the space, unclear
vocals, generated noise. Gesturally, MCs may incorporate a degree of disdain for the
audience or the fact that they are performing into their act. In our discussions, Al-Nather
confided that an influential part of Boikutt’s performances, that he’s been paying
attention to since he was a young teen, is that “when [Boikutt] performs, it’s completely
his own personality. He doesn’t give a fuck. [It’s not like with other bands] you can see
how they’re fucking acting.” Similarly, as I explore in Beirut in concerts of Touffar, an
enactment of disgust is central in the filtering process which produces tarab.
Based on my experience at the Haiwan Nateq release concert described above and
others, I want to suggest that the exchanges in second wave rap concerts can be
understood as a negative call and response. In Chapter Two, I pointed to the centrality of
call and response in the building tarab in rap concerts. Negative call and response is a
variation on that tradition of the rapper calling out and inviting a response of engagement.
When an MC starts off too loud, or the sound is not clear and audience members leave,
this too is a call and response, but of disengagement, from which musicians learn and feel
with their audience. While a balance is required so as not to alienate all listeners,
successful negative call and response succeeds in making more engaged intimacy, but
with a smaller percentage of the audience that has gathered. That is, the exchange, despite
being built on initial invitations to disengage, is nonetheless an active communication
between performer and audience. My own experience affirmed this as evidenced in the
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field notes quoted above. None of the people I came into the concert with were with me
during the musical climax of the event.
This concert is a productive jumping point to explore this musical philosophy in
more detail. The concept of filtering is Boikutt’s; and the word al-misfah [the filter] titles
the opening track on his latest album. Boikutt describes how a kind of filtering in his
work may function by quoting a phrase from his own lyrics: bastafizzek ʿa beat kharra
zay wijjek. Hard to render in English, the phrase literally translates “I dare to impose on
you a shitty beat, like your face,” or more lyrically perhaps: “The shitty beat’s in your
shitty face.”102 Boikutt explains,
[T]his phrase expresses, if you like, a little about all of my work. […On
my recent album] the name of the [first] track is “Al Misfah” which means
“the filter.” This is the concept. It’s part of my message [khitabi], part of
my “discourse.”103 I like filtering [al-filtera] in music. I believe in this. It’s
not necessary for everybody to like what I’m doing. There needs to be a
conscious reaction. Some people hate it, some people like it, some people,
whatever no reaction. [These reactions] allow me to process, they give me
a kind of tracking [iqtifaʾ] of my own work. It relieves me that there is a
real response from people; that they aren’t just waiting for me to finish
and then clapping politely. No, there are people who like it, and people
who don’t. There’s “filtering” that happens. It brings out the reality of
what’s happening.
You don’t aim to reach as many people as possible?
No, it’s not that. It’s just that it won’t work. And I’m not going to change
myself and how I do things [rasi] in order to be able to reach everyone.
That’s the point. It’s important to me to do the work that I like, how I like
it, and that’s why I make music anyway. To connect what’s here [in his
head] to the outside world... I would love it if everybody liked my work,
obviously. That wouldn’t upset me. But I believe it’s not possible.104
102

“Qabl w Baʿl,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 5:15, posted by “Muqataʿa boikutt,” accessed November
14, 2015 https://Sound Cloud.com/boikutt/qabl-w-bal.
103
104

Words in quotations were originally articulated in English.

Ticket price for the concert is noted above. Some of this revenue will go to the artist. None of the
musicians I spoke with in Ramallah make a living exclusively off of their music. They all hold down day
jobs (in marketing, film/media, journalism, among others) and most DJ for money (see note 40). Music is
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Here, Boikutt explains how istafaza (or disrupting, disturbing, imposing) and
filtera (filtering), structure the building of rapport with an audience. Importantly,
he articulates this as a process between him and a listener [bastafazak], not
something that happens in a vacuum or in isolation [bastafaz is the verb without a
direct object]. At the same time, he recognizes and respects, in fact, that this
rapport built through the music is not an open invitation to just any listener.
The rhythm of filtering is built on a negative call and response and actively
negotiates solitude and togetherness. Second wave rappers and fans consistently recount
how the iteration of a specific line or a particular flow sequence stops them in their
tracks, reaches something inside, and shakes out a conceptualization of consciousness
(wahi, is frequently the term invoked) the listeners knew they possessed but were not
aware of. The realization that someone else not only feels similarly but articulates it
powerfully can be overwhelming, the effect of which is frequently not increased
community but solitude. This explains in part why the filtering philosophy behind this
music is so appropriate. The tarab I am recognizing is a sort of reverberating return to the
self that is always connected to the presence of others, even as it actively keeps them at
bay.

primarily disseminated on social media and thus is, for the most part, free of charge. In my research,
musicians making money off of their music did not come up a lot in Ramallah or Beirut, but it did all the
time in Amman. The musician’s career and the monetization of hip hop and other forms of alternative
music in the Arab world is a central focus of the Amman chapter.
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Figure 3.3: “Event Flyer, for the Haiwan Nateq release concert.” The text reads: “A speaking animal
at La Wain? Boikutt performs with Julmud, Shua, Dakn, and Al-Nather, Thursday 13 November.”
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Moreover, it is this tension of feelings – disgust, disdain, cynicism, impatience
irreverence, anger mixed with the delight, surprise, and relief of hearing another
articulate it, – that constitute the “emotional blending” in this tarab. That is, a feeling
articulated by an MC of disgust or cynicism about the neoliberal incursions in Ramallah,
for example, changes when it is heard and received by active listeners. When heard, that
disgust or cynicism, can relieve, give pleasure, excite or encourage the listener, who
having heard out loud and delivered powerfully something she thought was hers alone, is
forced to recognize others were similarly moved by the music. This surprise or relief
points to how clearly second wave lyrics diverge from mainstream conceptualizations of
Palestinian politics and just how thirsty audiences are for alternatives that more closely
reflect their own observations in their city. It is important to reiterate however that, as
tarab, this feeling is more of an ethos that is felt rather than a specific something
conceived or visualized. This means for example that the emotional blending I identify as
political feeling in second wave tarab could happen as a result of listening to any of the
lyrics I have translated in this chapter, and is not tied to specific subject matter. I consider
this lyrical work to represent politics in process: I do not consider them articulations of
specific political positions.

Feeling through space

In order to avoid romanticizing the presence of this tarab, it is now necessary to
spatialize its emergence. I conclude this chapter by rounding out an analysis of the
presence of some powerful affective interactions in second wave concerts by considering
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the accessibility of these concerts in Ramallah. While Al-Nather and Dakn remember
attending DAM and Ramallah Underground concerts as kids as part of the local nadi, the
growing and changing nightlife in Ramallah (of which second wave rap is a part) attracts
a different crowd with different cultures of consumption. Haykal, whose more
conservative upbringing prohibited him from limited concert culture (at Pianos, for
example) as a teenager, still resents the bar atmosphere, which he calls “completely
bourgeois.” Which is to say that even while rappers readily acknowledge that the live
concert is of the most important opportunities for the building of rapport with their
audiences, they regularly recognize the limits on the reach of the live concert in
Ramallah. For example, when I asked Sheʿrab if rap in Ramallah was shaʿabi [popular]
he laughed. Then he continued:
No, it’s not shaʿabi. It could be, in 20-25 years. People embrace it when
they hear it, sure. But they don’t hear it everywhere. [Shaʿabi is where]
people can find it, like at a wedding, or in a car…. [Can you imagine] in
the middle of a hafleh shaʿabiyeh [a popular party/concert], like at a
wedding, someone taking the mic and singing a rap song? That’d be
hilarious.
There are at least two things to underscore in these remarks. First, Sheʿrab assumes a
particular definition of the term “shaʿabi” – describing musical events like a large
weddings and the popular music that typically features within them. His laughter at the
idea of taking the mic and singing rap at such a gathering and his refusal to apply the
adjective “shaʿabi” to his own work is first and foremost a question of genre and material
accessibility, not political relevance. This points to my observation above that concert
culture and lyrical content point to different demographics, not exclusive to each other.
That is, Sheʿrab specifically is not talking about who his music might speak to, but how
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one has access to it (“people embrace it when they hear it, but they don’t hear it
everywhere”). His recognition of the limited, material reach of his music despite what he
considers its potentially much more widespread appeal, is critical.105 Sheʿrab and others’
recognition that their work is only slowly reaching poorer audiences (almost categorically
not reaching them live) is an important articulation of self-awareness.
For their part, venue owners and programmers also recognize that they cater to
specific a specific demographic. What’s particular about their reflections, however, is
their refusal to apply a class qualification to their clientele. Sami Said reflects, “Most of
the places that open in Masyoun are upper class restaurants. For our part, we were aiming
for [something else]. I wouldn’t call it ‘middle class’ and I wouldn’t call it ‘shaʿabi’
[popular, of the people]; I’d call it shabab [youth].’” The owners and managers of both
Beit Aneeseh and La Wain used the word shabab to describe their clientele. Shabab is a
masculine plural noun, literally meaning young men; is not connected grammatically to
the adjective shaʿabi. In the context of the general clientele of music venues, it refers to a
mixed gender grouping, roughly 21-40 years old, to which a class make-up is hardly ever
ascribed. In an example of this evasion of class, Sami Said offers “youth” as an
alternative to upper class, middle class, and popular (“I wouldn’t call it ‘middle class’ and
I wouldn’t call it ‘shaʿabi’”). It is to this evasive demographic that the growing
“Ramallah bubble” caters. As I have been arguing, second wave rap concert culture
largely depends on the same demographic.

105

His admission is in quite obvious contradistinction to the ethos adopted by more commercial artists,
DAM prominent among them, who allow themselves to “speak for Palestinians” and seem to be interested
in representing “Palestinian” issues to local as well as international audiences.
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I surmise that concert culture is predominantly middle class based on the reality
of where and when concerts are held (private bars after dark), what kind of venues host
them (establishments that serve alcohol and employ bouncers that deny entry to groups of
young men unaccompanied by women), and the neighborhoods in which these are found
(predominantly the neighborhood of Masyoun, the heart of suburban sprawl in
Ramallah). I offer these reflections as a contextualization of what I argue is powerful
political feeling conducted in these concerts, built by sonic, performatic, and lyrical
elements. That is, in this chapter I have testified to the presence of political feeling in
second wave concerts, as attested to by audience interactions, musicians’ recollections,
and my own participant observation. At the same time, I have found it necessary to
recognize the limited physical access to these sites and the middle class demographic to
which they are geared. This should serve to limit any new romanticism attached to the
politics in process I identify here. Considering the political innovation in second wave
aesthetics as well as the obstacles Ramallah’s new urbanization present in terms of class
accessibility point to the contradictions of growth – cultural and economic – under an
Occupation facilitated by the PA.
Conclusion
“There was this huge revolution at some point here in Palestine. All the shabab
[young people] became rappers. And then it all died out.” Muhammad Mesroujy, the 22year old producer and rapper who goes by Al-Nather tells me. He’s referring to the
growth in Palestinian rap production in the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading up to and
during the Al-Aqsa (Second) Intifada. This first wave was prominently marked by the
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emergence and popularity of DAM from Lyd, MWR from Akka, Rami GB from Jenin,
and the Ramallah Underground from Ramallah. This rap production “died out” as the
Second Intifada ended (c. 2006), as a host of economic policies focused popular attention
on growth and development, as political division between Palestinian political parties
polarized political discourse, and as groups like Ramallah Underground broke up. In the
wake of the Arab Uprisings (2011-2013), it has been popular to claim that Palestinian rap
has returned, influenced and encouraged by the nearby revolutions and the explosion of
cultural production, including rap and graffiti, that accompanied the political stirrings in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.106
In this chapter, I have proposed a different narrative of Palestinian rap production.
Like Al-Nather, I recognize that there was a concentration of rap production leading up to
and during the Second Intifada (2000-2006; what I call the “first wave”). Following this
however, I have argued here that the period Al-Nather describes as “dying out” (roughly
2005) to the present (2015) may be productively characterized as a second wave of
Palestinian rap. Considering that its early coalescence can be noticed as early as 2007, the
formation of a second wave of Palestinian rap has less to do with the spectacular Arab
Uprisings as it does with local musical mentorship, patterns of exposure to different
forms of pop and rap music, and the economy of alternative leisure and live music in
Ramallah, the latter shaped by the twin forces of neoliberalism and Zionist occupation.
In the first section of this chapter, I described the shared characteristics among a
group of collaborating rap musicians that emerge against the backdrop of neoliberal
incursions in Palestine, structured as they are by Zionism and the Occupation.

106
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Establishing that the second wave is heavily influenced by and aligns itself with the
aesthetic experimentation and lyrical modes of the Ramallah Underground, especially the
quest for music that “fills the head,” I turned to a contextualization of second wave lyrics
within Palestinian discourses of political struggle. I argued that the second wave largely
refuses narratives of sabr [patience], sumud [steadfastness], or mouqawameh [resistance]
while rejecting outward trappings of turath [heritage]. I argued that these narratives are
classed in specific ways and that rappers’ refusal of them point to significant politics in
process.
In the third section, I moved on to describe the specific political feeling in second
wave concerts, built through a tarab premised on alienation and what I termed negative
call and response. I suggested that this alienation works as political feeling by performing
the inseparability of individuality and sociability: after aurally initially isolating the
individual, lyrical expression ultimately connects her with other listeners. Finally, I
spatialized this analysis of political feeling by considering the relatively exclusive venues
in which these concerts are held. Ultimately, considering what Massey calls “the fact of
spacing” in the Ramallah Bubble forces the recognition that tarab built on the filter, as
exciting as it may be to an avant-garde consuming audience, may be exclusivist in
practice. I argue that this needn’t discredit the genre of cultural production or its
producers and consumers. But it should recalibrate widely-held assumptions of politics
and resistance in Palestinian rap.
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Chapter Four: Amman1
Resignation and longing in the emerging “cultural hotspot”
Overview

Figure 4.1: “Bu Kolthoum’s New Year Resolution.” Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum fled violence in his
home city of Damascus and has resided in Amman since 2012. The sentiment he expresses in this New
Years' Resolution posted on Facebook is a good example of the celebration of musical productivity in
Amman coupled with a desire to leave that I explore in this chapter. Bu Kolthoum’s latest album,
“Inderal,” named for the anxiety medication on which he depends, was released in October 2015.

My research in Amman documents the recent emergence of the city as a regional
cultural hub together with an overwhelming, articulated desire of young people to leave
Amman behind. The material growth of the city, the growth of a cosmopolitan middle
class, and the increased number of and attendance at musical festivals has promised to
make Amman something of a concert hub. This density of cultural production is
encouraging hints of Amman coming to beginning to catch up to the regional superiority
1

Research for this chapter was made possible by an IIE Fulbright Student Research grant. I spent
approximately nine months in Amman from January 3 through October 10, 2015 supported by the
International Institute for Education and facilitated by the Jordanian-American Commission for Educational
Exchange (the Bi-national Fulbright Commission in Jordan). I would like to thank Alain McNamara for
accommodating an unorthodox start date for my tenure (in order to accommodate research in Palestine) and
Iman Abdul-Wahid, Hiba Shtayeh, Aya Al-Abdallat, and Abu Firas for their help and support over the
course of these months in Amman. Thanks also to Jermaine Taylor at IIE in Washington DC for his
attentive logistical support.
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of Beirut, Cairo, and Dubai and the historical importance of Baghdad and Damascus as
centers for Arab cultural production. Nevertheless, more than in Ramallah or Beirut, my
conversations with interlocutors were laced with a recognizable desire to move from and
beyond the city. Many cultural producers were both proud of the new role Amman plays,
especially in alternative music production in the region, at the same time that they were
quick to bemoan the felt impossibility of producing culture, especially live music, in
Amman. Rappers and producers pointed to the increased opportunities to showcase their
work live and their growing fan base at the same time that they decried audiences’ ability
to respect or give back to musicians and their work.
This chapter is laid out in three parts. The first explores the growth of Amman
that has made it an increasingly cosmopolitan capital city. I trace the flows of
demographic and financial capital in the context of regional upheaval that shape the
growing opportunities for musical production in Amman. In Part Two, I build from
assumptions of Jordanian “stability,” central to its attraction as accessible regional host
for cultural production, to explore in more detail the heavy hand of the Hashemite regime
in discouraging political dissent. In this section, my interlocutors’ conflicting testimonies
about the presence and degree of state censorship drive my recognition of a political
feeling of resignation produced in some Jordanian rap lyrics. In Part Three, I explore in
more detail what “performed resignation” looks like when it is reflected in audience
behavior. In particular, I am concerned how audiences’ divided attention, especially in
concerts in public spaces in Amman, impedes the regular emergence of tarab. This drives
the recognition and analysis of the political feelings particular to rap in Amman.
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Part One: “Cultural Hotspot”
[Red Bull] labels every country in a tier. There’s a “tier
three,” “tier two,” “tier one,” and “cultural hotspot.” A
country like Egypt, because of their theatre and music and
film scene, they are a “cultural hotspot.” Lebanon is a
“cultural hotspot” because of [its] nightlife. Since 2013,
Jordan has been a “culture tier two.” Before that it was
dead: it was a “tier three.” In the beginning of 2015, we
moved into “culture tier one.” Because of all the concerts
and festivals, it’s coming alive with music. So now the goal
is becoming a “cultural hotspot.”
~ Raed Serhan, Culture Manager for Red Bull,
Jordan2
If these guys don’t live off their music, it’s a waste of
talent. It’s a shame [haram] for someone like El Far3i to
work a 9-5.3 He’s a crazy drummer, he plays guitar, he has
a nice voice, he writes crazy raps: he should live off of this.
But of course he can’t do it alone. He can’t write, and
record, and make melodies, and do promotion and
marketing, and book his own gigs. We need an industry.
Little by little this will become an industry. Why don’t any
of our rappers have websites? Why are none of our guys
able to sell their music online? Why is it all free
downloads? Each one of those artists should be treated like
products. If [these artists] are going to live off their music,
it has to go like this.
~ DJ Sotusura4
Amman’s status as an emerging cultural hub is most readily identified with the
emergence of a series of successful independent musicians/bands over the past ten years

2

Interview with the author, August 23, 2015; all subsequent quotations from Mr. Serhan taken from this
interview, which was largely conducted in English.
3

In the case of the stage name of Tareq Abu Kweik and the band Morabba3, addressed in this chapter, I
have used the transliteration the musicians use, which substitutes the number “3” for the Arabic letter ʿain
(see Transliteration Note). From the musician’s Sound Cloud page: “El Far3i means coming from a branch
which is a symbol of growth and reaching outwards to the world by feeding from the roots.” (El Far3i
SoundCloud page, accessed January 19, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/El Far3i.)
4

Interview with the author, September 12, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Sotusura are taken from
this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own. “Sot u sura” means “sound and picture.”

!

258
and with increasing numbers of, and attendance at, music festivals.5 Bands like
Morabba3, Jadal, Autostrad, and Zaed Naes are redefining not only the sounds of Arabic
indie rock, but non-commercial paths to musical success.6 While Arabic indie rock, indie
pop, alt-rock, and of course hip hop, have been growing in the region over the past
decade, much of it has focused in Lebanon and out of Beirut: with bands and trajectories
like Mashrou3 Leila and singer-songwriters like Yasmine Hamdan and Zeid Hamdan.7
Since the emergence of Autostrad and Jadal in particular, and Morabba3 most recently,
Amman is emerging as another important hub of musical production.
In addition, while small-scale bars have doubled as concert venues or
“discotheques” in Amman for decades (like Caesar’s for example), influx of capital into
the city has encouraged the opening of more such venues.8 More than a dozen
café/bar/lounge venues now host musical acts and DJs in Amman.9 My interlocutors
5

Madeline Edwards, “The Promise of Amman’s Independent Music Scene,” Your Middle East, May 13,
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/the-promise-of-ammansindependent-music-scene_32052; Staff, “Rebels Against the Arabic Music Business,” Your Middle East,
August 12, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/jordanian-bandwants-to-make-music-thats-true-to-the-arab-street-video_34193; Reuters Staff, “Jordan Music Festival
Moves Away from the Mainstream,” Al-Arabiyya, May 30, 2013, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2013/05/30/Jordan-music-festival-moves-away-frommainstream.html.
6

El Morabba3 BandCamp page, accessed January 15, 2016, https://elmorabba3.bandcamp.com; Jadal
SoundCloud page, accessed January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/jadal; Autostrad SoundCloud page,
accessed January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/autostrad; Zaed Naes SoundCloud page, accessed
January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/zaed-naes.
7

For example: Jad Salfiti, “Mashrou3 Leila: the Lebanese Band Changing the Tune of Arab Politics,” The
Guardian, September 13, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2013/sep/13/mashrou-leila-lebanese-arab-politics; Stephanie
Farah, “Breaking Musical Tabbos: Interview with Oscar-nominated Yasmine Hamdan,” Al-Arabiyya,
February 24, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/lifestyle/entertainment/2015/02/24/Breaking-musical-taboos-Interview-with-Oscar-nominated-YasmineHamdan.html.
8
9

Interviews with Shermine Sawalha and Raed Serhan.

To name a few: Canvas, Bargos, the Flip, Corners Pub, Fann w Shai, Bonitas, Blue Fig, Jadal, Books@,
JetLag, Laconda, and Maestro. Consider in Ramallah during my research there were basically two
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suggest this is an increase since around 2011. Over the same period, musical festivals
showcasing regional talent have established themselves and attract increasing audiences
every year. The most obvious example of this is the Al-Balad Music festival (held biannually, inaugural season 2011). But the recent Word is Yours Festival (2015), efforts to
host the local bands listed above, and specific corporate-sponsored initiatives, like Red
Bull’s “Soundclash” concerts are also a part of this growth.10 This is the energy Raed
Serhan refers to when he speaks of Amman moving from “tier three” towards “cultural
hotspot.”
The curious rating system used by the Austrian energy drink manufacturer is not a
scientific gauge upon which to base a critical appraisal of Amman as environment for live
concert culture. But this transparent codification is a succinct articulation of hopes and
expectations I heard voiced repeatedly by other cultural producers and consumers in
Amman. The stability Jordan boasts relative to the region and an influx of transnational
as well as regional capital alongside the emergence of more independent musicians points
to a hopeful future for Amman’s independent cultural production: the building of an
infrastructure that would allow Jordan’s musical talent to sustain themselves off of their
music.
The emphasis on quantity of production in laying claims to the development of
independent music production over the particular parsing out of qualitative texture stuck
out to me in my conversations with interlocutors. Asked about the challenges they faced,
functioning venues and in Beirut at time of writing there are also two or three venues available to rappers
for the live performance of their work.
10

“Soundclash” is a Red Bull “concept” that has been used as concert structure around the world. In 2014,
Red Bull staged a “Soundclash” between Morabba3 and Autostrad. Both bands played a sequence of
variations on their own and each other’s work in a concert structure that has been used between different
bands in other countries. Serhan estimates 3,000 people attended. Tickets were 10 JDs.
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most musicians, producers, and events coordinators bemoaned the small number of
venues (despite these being three and four times what is available in other cities in the
region) and the paucity of people willing to coordinate events. In other words, just more
was needed. Serhan’s answer when asked him how a country moves from “tier one” to
“cultural hotspot” are indicative of this trend:
You just have to do more. You have to become a point of interest. It has to
be a place that people actually depend on. Let’s say if there’s a festival
that happens every year that everybody pays attention to in the region, that
creates a lot of buzz: that’s the right direction, that’s towards becoming a
cultural hotspot.
The “doing more” that is making of Amman a “point of interest” is happening amid
neoliberal incursions specific to the urban shape and political history of Amman. In
establishing the neoliberal context that audiences traverse to attend hip hop concerts in
Amman, I am concerned on the one hand with the “industrialization,” to interpret
Sotusura’s words, of musical talent in Jordan and the hopes and expectations attendant
upon the establishment of a profitable, independent music industry. On the other, I want
to pay attention to the patterns of exclusion that are accompanying these changes, and the
curious negative perceptions that also shadow the hope and excitement of this growth. I
use my own experiences navigating Amman’s expansion as an initial map to chart this
neoliberal growth. This offers one reading of the context to Serhan’s comments about
Red Bull’s grading system.
I moved eight times in the ten months I spent in Amman in 2015. Seven of the
eight moves were driven by structural deficiencies in the living space (no heat, no hot
water, bed bugs), and all eight apartments were located in what is commonly referred to
as “West Amman”: the sprawl westwards from the city-center, roughly along Zahran
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Boulevard, marked by the eight numbered traffic circles.11 This part of the city is what
urban literature on Amman consistently describes as “Westernized (read: Americanized)”
and where, as one US master’s student told me, life was “as comfortable as it was ‘back
home.’” 12
The first flat I lived in off of the Seventh Circle near Dheir Ghbar, one of the
city’s new gated communities, put me in walking distance of both the upscale Cozmo and
Safeway markets and a Porsche dealership; close to the airport road and near a half hour
by car from the bars and festivals that would become the focus of my research. The malls
and markets within walking distance fit into the model of what Christopher Parker has
described as the “well-lit and privately policed site[s] of global consumption.”13 The
covered parking lots and wide streets illustrated the assumed reliance of the area’s
residents on a private vehicle. That is, along with the “tech city” and the newer Carrefour
hyper-market and City Mall past the Eight Circle, the first area in which I was living in
Amman was, its rather bleak landscape not withstanding, obviously catering to globallyoriented (or at least globalizing) tastes.14

11

The traffic circles increase in number the farther west from the city center. So First Circle is closest to the
downtown area separating “East” from “West” Amman, while the Eighth Circle is the farthest.
12

Géraldine Chatelard puts it this way: “Amman is typically described along two axis, which are presumed
immovable: the first, economic and geographic, cuts the city into two parts: the prosperous and
Westernized (read: Americanized) West and the miserable and traditional (almost Islamist) East; the other,
ethnic/nationalist, separates Palestinians from the ‘native’ Jordanians.” Géraldine Chatelard, “Amman, et
pourtant c’est une ville” in Jordanie, le Royaume Frontière, ed. Riccardo Bocco (Paris: Autrement, 2001),
4. Translation from the French is my own.
13

Christopher Parker, “Tunnel-bypasses and Minarets of Capitalism: Amman as Neoliberal Assemblage,”
Political Geography 28 (2009),” 117.
14

Amy Guttman, “Jordan Banks on Tech, Tourism, Tax Benefits, and a Peaceful Place to Park Money in
the Middle East,” Forbes, November 30, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/amyguttman/2015/11/30/jordan-banks-on-tech-tourism-tax-benefits-apeaceful-place-to-park-money-in-the-middle-east/#2715e4857a0b2d4757fd3af8.
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Another flat in Shmeisani, off the Fourth Circle, put me in the center of relatively
older flows of transnational capital, in the nest of the affluent banking community
established by the influx of immigration from the Gulf in the wake of the first Gulf
War.15 It was here that I first saw skateboarders and b-boy dancers in Amman,
occasionally gathering under the watchful eyes of police, on the wide central plazas of
Thaqafa Street. Continuing east, the flats in which I resided in Jabal Amman were in one
of the oldest (West) Amman neighborhoods. Here, the flows of transnational capital were
visibly manifest in a mixed neighborhood demographic largely unseen in other areas of
West Amman. African and South Asian migrant labor crossed paths with European and
North American NGO and US workers, and fruit and gas sellers paraded their wares from
open bed trucks that blared recorded sale offers. During Ramadan, community drummers
still woke the neighborhood for sahour [the meal to precede the fast], a tradition no
longer present in the city’s newer neighborhoods.

15

Many Palestinians who immigrated to the Gulf following the 1967 war with Israel were forced to
relocate again in the leading up to and aftermath of the First Gulf War. This is especially true of the sizable
Palestinian community in Kuwait (approximately 400,000), who were expelled by Saddam Hussein.
(Toufic Haddad, “Palestinian Forced Displacement from Kuwait: The Overdue Accounting,” BADIL
44[2010], accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.badil.org/en/component/k2/item/1514-art07.html.) The
influx of people and capital to the neighborhood of Shmeisani in the early 1990s reflects this geo-political
context. See also Laurie A. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of
Jordan’s 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis Policy," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13(1991): 1-46.
I am indebted to Susan MacDougall for the referral to Dr. Brand’s work.
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Figure 4.2: “Thaqafa Street.” The central plaza running the length of Thaqafa (which means
"culture") Street in the Shmeisani District. The smooth tile and banisters were occasionally used by
skateboarders and bboy dancers when they gathered at twilight hours. Most of the time the plaza
was empty. Photograph by the author.

Nearby, Rainbow Street was the site of perhaps the only successful re-vitalization
of public space by private organizations to date in Amman. Renovated starting in 20052006 by Rami Daher and the NGO he runs, TURATH, Rainbow is a one-way street
leading from the First Circle and dead ending in tight streets which lead to the downtown
(al-balad). It is a one-kilometer, cobblestone street which was developed over the past
decade to host a dozen nargileh [waterpipe] and coffee shops, several “Western” style
coffee houses, the British Cultural Council, the Rainbow cinema, a showroom of the
!
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Jordan River Foundation, and several restaurants offering Armenian, Jordanian, and
Western cuisine.16 Now for the most part snubbed as “commercial” by the increasingly
hip alternative scene in nearby Al-Weibdeh, mostly young men and families stroll
Rainbow Street and the park at its entrance, eating pumpkin and sunflower seeds or corn,
and smoking nargileh.17 More than any other place in West Amman, it is shaʿabi
(popular), public space.18
Another, very different, privately designed project for remaking public space is
the much criticized “new Abdali downtown.” While incomplete, Abdali is modeled off of
the Solidere revitalization of downtown Beirut in the 1990s and has garnered similar
criticism.19 On land owned by the Jordanian military, the project is slated to host five-star
hotels, retail and office space, and an open-air “public” boulevard touted as the “new

16

The Jordan River Foundation is a royal NGO. The showroom on Rainbow Street displays products from
the Jordan River Design Project, the Bani Hamida Weaving Project and the Wadi Al Rayan Project – they
are handicrafts that highlight a range of heritage and environmental concerns. On NGOs and Royal NGOs
in Jordan see Laurie Brand, “Development in Wadi Rum? State Bureaucracy, External Funders, and Civil
Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 571-590.
17
18

I return to discuss Al-Weibdeh in more detail, below.

Furthermore, the range of establishments hosted on the street mean that it is also a place where social
classes mix. High-end bars hold prime real estate floors above falafel and burger joints. The renowned
Sufra restaurant, popular with ministers and foreign guests, is steps away from the open-air plaza hosting
corn and salted lupine bean vendors.
19
The Solidere projects in Beirut – largely responsible for the post-civil war reconstruction of the
downtown and Beirut’s Central Business District – have been critiqued for stealing the public downtown
and transforming it into a playground for Gulf and other foreign capital, barring access to the city’s original
consumers, producers, sellers. The Abdali project shares designers and investors that backed the Solidere
project, prominent among them the Saudi Arabian company Oger. The problematic incursions of Solidere
into Beiruti urban space make up a central consideration in the development of political critique in the
Beirut chapter, which follows. (See among others, Gildas Coignet, “Régénération urbaine ou
dégénérescence de l’urbanité?: Le Projet de nouveau centre-ville d’Al-Abdali à Amman, Jordanie,”
Annales de Géographie 4(2008): 42-61; and Aseel Sawalha, “The Dilemmas of Conservation and
Reconstruction in Beirut,” in The Emerging Asian City: Concomitant Urbanities and Urbanisms, ed.
Vinayak Bharme [Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2013], 148-157.)
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Figure 4.3: “Jabal Amman off of Omar Ben Al-Khattab Street (in West Amman), overlooking Jabal
a-Nazeef (in East Amman).” The downtown, which separates West and East Amman, starting with
Ras el-Ein, is located in the valley between these hills. The difference in infrastructure between West
and East should be discernible, heading down the hill towards the East. Compare especially with the
construction in Figures 2, 5, and 6 both in West Amman. Photograph by the author.

downtown.”20 Public is in quotation marks here to underscore the project’s problematic
vision of replacing the historic and still existing actual downtown of Amman (al-balad)
20

MAWARED (the National Resources Investment and Development Corporation)’s accelerated
development of Abdali rerouted the public transportation system coming out of Amman’s historical
downtown area, while buying out its original inhabitants. It is financially and administratively independent,
but technically Parker notes it is owned by the military and its proceeds go to the military pension fund,
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with a decidedly more private and securitized space. Géraldine Coignet explains that a
percentage of public opinion holds that the downtown souq is “too popular” [trop
populaire – with a meaning in French here similar to the Arabic shaʿabi] – that is, too
close to “the people.” In contrast, she suggests, the creation of a “new downtown
Amman” is the opportunity for its organizers to “remake the image, discourse about, and
representations of the city” and is made possible via “an accessibility filter… to the
detriment of social mixing.” She continues, “The people who, according to the
‘legitimate’ population, are undesirable in these public spaces, however accessible to
everyone they are in theory, do not have a place in these future high places of urbanity in
the Jordanian capital.”21
In other words, the Abdali project hopes to remake an image of Amman by
screening out behavior and actors deemed not modern or cosmopolitan enough for the
emerging Arab metropolis. Or further, it hopes to do this by attracting Ammanis to a
completely remade space in which actors are screened and behavior policed to fit into
cosmopolitan norms. As in the malls of West Amman and unlike the more open
atmosphere of Rainbow Street, young men without the company of women are not
permitted entry to the new “public” boulevard by private security services. (I’ll return to
this shortly.)

among other military projects (Parker, “Bypasses and Minarets,” 115). Most alarming, perhaps, is the
confluence of public and private sectors in the service of non-Jordanian capital in this project. As Parker
notes, “Stage agencies become ‘entrepreneurial’ in these arrangements by joining forces with, rather than
acting as an external source of regulation upon, the private sector.” (ibid.) See also Jillian Schwedler,
“Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices of Aspiration and Consumption,” Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 30 (2010): 547-562.

21
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Coignet, “Régénération urbaine ou dégénérescence de l’urbanité?,” 58.
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Figure 4.4: “Vibrant Cosmopolitan Lifestyle.” A sign announcing the promised offerings of the New
Abdali Downtown. Photograph by the author, August 2015.

On weekend evenings in warm weather, the Abdali “boulevard” is alive with
people. Thursday and Friday nights hosted small bands on the top of an awkward stepsituation (half of the audiences had their backs to the band, and both halves of the
audience and the musicians faced a large, open fountain). One of these acts that played
here regularly were the Nomads, a Libyan-Jordanian outfit headed by Fuad Ramadan
Gritli. Gritli’s political commentary in sung-form won him death threats in his native
Libya following the 2011 popular uprising against General Qaddafi.22 In Amman at the
Boulevard, but also at Blue Fig restaurant in upscale-Abdoun and Corners pub off the
Second Circle (among others), the Nomads band plays Arabic and Western covers in a
sing-along, dance-along, family-friendly set.

22

Amman hosts a considerable Libyan expat community in the wake of the uprising against Qaddafi,
boasting a spectrum of political views. On the political resonances of Gritli’s work in the Libyan context,
see Leila Tayyeb, “Nduwash bel Malgy: Performing the Civil in Post-Revolution Libya,” talk at the Sijal
Institute, Amman, Jordan, August 12, 2015.
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Far from the suburban aesthetics, upscale supermarkets, malls, and development
projects filling what was empty desert west of the city center, East Amman, starting with
the open air souq [market] in the downtown is markedly poorer, its social patterns more
conservative. In contrast to the wide, newly paved boulevards and multiple level parking
lots of Shmeisani and Abdoun, the streets of Jabal al-Natheef, and Ashrafiyeh are tight,
steep, and littered with potholes, frequently not wide enough for two-way traffic.
Children play in the street and between parked cars, noise marks the soundscape, and the
expanding construction proliferates its pattern of sand-colored, rectangular cement boxes
with seemingly little regulation or urban planning.23 As Jillian Schwedler has put it:
Amman today is not so much a different city from what it was a decade
ago, as it is two cities: cosmopolitan West Amman, where development is
unfolding at breakneck speed and foreign investment has skyrocketed, and
East Amman, the bustling, dusty home to a majority of the city’s poor and
working-class residents.24
The population density of East Amman has been markedly effected by the
spectacular influx of Syrian refugees since 2012, most of whom have not moved into the
camps designated for refugees. The increasing pressure the refugee crisis has put on state
resources in terms of public services and utilities like electricity and water has
additionally affected the (already significantly lower) quality of life the city’s poorer

23

Mohammad Alfdeilat, “Jordan’s Capital Split Between Rich and Poor,” trans. Rani Geha, Al-Monitor,
February 19, 2014, accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2014/02/ammanjordan-divided-capital-rich-poor.html.
24
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Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 547.
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Figure 4.5: “Abdali Boulevard by night.” The four-member band should be visible under the neon blue
lights of the escalator, center. The audience sits beneath them, however, and faces away from them.
Photograph by the author, August 2015.

neighborhoods.25 To be sure, Amman has for decades acted as host to various refugee
populations fleeing violence or expulsion. In the latter half of the twentieth century these
refugees were mostly Palestinian, quickly outnumbering the local Jordanian population.26
In the 1990s, emigration and capital from the Gulf States flooded into Amman, building
its financial districts and establishing the first of West Amman’s suburban enclaves, the
neighborhood of Shmeisani. The early nineties also saw the first influx of Iraqi refugees,
25

Water is frequently the source of contest between poor communities in Amman and outside of it and the
influx of Syrian and other refugees have placed considerable demand on this already limited resource. See
for example, Hal Bernton, “Syrian Refugees Struggle in Jordan, Aid Money Low,” Seattle Times,
November 19, 2015, accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/syrian-refugeesstruggle-in-tense-jordan-as-aid-money-runs-low/.
26

This led to political instability and eventually to a state crackdown, led by then King Hussein,
notoriously remembered as “Black September” in 1970. See Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making
of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), 240-245.
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fleeing the Gulf wars.27 And since roughly 2012, Amman has been host to refugees from
both Libya and Syria, fleeing the aftermath of civil uprisings in both countries. Al-Zaatari
refugee camp, located north of Amman was in 2015 home to 81,000 people, making it
Jordan’s fourth largest city.28 This is only one of any number of spectacular statistics to
illustrate the role of host Jordan’s stability – relative to neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
Palestine, and Egypt – has conferred upon its capital city.
Moreover, the influx of refugees and concurrent humanitarian crises has led to
Amman becoming a more important base for humanitarian, NGO, and UN workers, as
well as students of Arabic (as a second) language.29 This demographic influx of largely
European and North American students and workers has put a different stress on both the
economy and demographic of West Amman: manifest in rising rents, a larger, paying
clientele for cultural production, demand for luxury services including five-star hotels
and upscale restaurants, and marked increase in other forms of globalized, cosmopolitan
leisure. Moreover, if North American and European capital is flowing into Amman in a
new way since the Syrian, Libyan, and Iraqi quagmires, Arab capital is also taking
advantage of Jordan’s relative stability. The numerous development projects in West
27

Human Rights Watch, “The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq: Surviving in Jordan” Human Rights Watch
(18) 2006.
28

Phoebe Weston, “Inside Zaatari Refugee Camp: the Fourth Largest City in Jordan,” The Telegraph,
August 5, 2015, accessed January 7, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-thelargest-Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html.
29

Humanitarian crises attend both the refugees in camps in Jordan and those still in Syria, in Turkey, and
elsewhere. Amman is a hub to coordinate this aid for crises outside of Jordan as well as inside of it. (Harriet
Grant, “UN Agencies ‘Broke and Failing’ in Face of Ever-Growing Refugee Crisis,” The Guardian,
September 6, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugeecrisis-un-agencies-broke-failing; Jackie Northam, “For Syrian Refugees, Needs are Growing and Aid is
Declining,” NPR, September 14, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/14/440280540/for-syrian-refugees-needs-are-growing-andaid-is-declining.)
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Amman point to the impressive regional capital pouring into the city. Hopes to make of
Amman a “new Beirut (before 1975)” or “another Dubai” underpin development projects
from the new “tech city,” to the Jordan Gate Towers, to the new Abdali Downtown.30 The
influx of all this capital – human and financial – contributes to the feeling that people and
things are constantly and increasingly arriving to Amman – more specifically that they
are arriving on the run from somewhere else, and especially that they are perhaps only
there in transit. This feeling of limbo persists despite the obvious explosion of
construction this influx of human and financial capital is bringing, to host both poor and
wealthy clients, consumers, and residents.
Thus, the neoliberal context in which the increase of rap concerts in Amman must
be understood is one shaped by both a booming humanitarian economy – in the increased
presence of NGOs, UN, and related agencies as Amman becomes the regional hub to
address the Syrian crisis – together with the influx of Arab and other international capital,
similarly taking advantage of Jordan’s relative stability, and the large and increasing
numbers of vulnerable persons without material resources or the right to work.31 The
influx of capital is facilitated by the Jordanian monarchy’s close ties with the West, the
US in particular, and with Israel, the latter of which facilitates the free passage of goods,

30

That is, Beirut before the eruption of its sixteen-year civil war, when its reputation for nightlife and
leisure earned it the nickname “Paris of the Middle East.” (See for example, Gildas Coignet, “Régénération
urbaine ou dégénérescence de l’urbanité?,” 53.)
31

Syrian refugees in Jordan have largely been barred from receiving working permits in Jordan, the latter
reserved for Jordanians. This policy on refugee labor mirrors that of other countries and has dictated policy
since the 1948 exodus of Palestinian refugees. For example, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, some of
whom have been there for over half a century, were only in 2010 granted basic work permits. (Jim Muir,
“Lebanon Grants Palestinian Refugees Right to Work,” BBC, August 17, 2010, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11004945; Abbas Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil
Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25 [1996]: 36-45.)

!

272
while the former buoys the Jordanian state with aid money.32 The monarchy’s
participation in the US-led Wars on Terror, in coordination with the draconian Jordanian
secret police [mukhabarat], have so-far clamped down on civil dissent and disobedience
and are working hard to stay on top of growing religious fundamentalism.33 Outside of
Amman, this steadily growing fundamentalism – fueled by decades-old tribal rivalry with
the Hashemite ruling family – has over the past few years repeatedly pointed to the
possibility of a more volatile political situation in the future.34 Moreover, the advent of
the Islamic State, in particular the gruesome execution of the Jordanian fighter pilot
Muath Al-Kasasbeh in January 2015 (he was locked in a cage and burned alive), have
increased support for the monarch, whose Schwarzenegger-like gusto in response to AlKasasbeh’s killing has endeared his patriarchal protectivism to international as well as
Jordanian observers.35 It is important to remember, in the context of alternative music
32

Parker, “Tunnel-bypasses and Minarets,” 113.

33

Protests inspired by the “Arab Spring” movements in neighboring countries led to a series of reforms and
an eventual fizzling out of protest energies. (Sasca Lubbe, “The Brief Jordanian Spring: Interview with
Tamer Khorma,” Qantara.de, September 28, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
https://en.qantara.de/content/arab-protest-movements-the-brief-jordanian-spring.) For a more in-depth
analysis of the Hirak movement which helped to mobilize these protests, see Ziad Abu-Rish, “On the
Nature of the Hashemite Regime and Jordanian Politics: An Interview with Tariq Tell,” Jadaliyya, August
22, 2012, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6979/on-the-nature-of-thehashemite-regime-and-jordania; Lama Abu Oden, “Materialist Analysis in the Service of a Nationalist
Thesis,” Jadaliyya, September 17, 2012, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7238/materialist-analysis-in-the-service-of-a-nationali; Tariq Tell,
“On Jordan, the Hashemite Regime, and the Current Mobilizations,” Jadaliyya, September 17, 2012,
accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7385/a-rejoinder-to-the-response-oflama-abu-odeh_on-jo.
34

See Tariq Tell, “Early Spring in Jordan: The Revolt of the Military Veterans,” Carnegie Middle East
Center, November 4, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_Tell_Jordan_Eng_final.pdf.
35

For examples of the enthusiasm greeting King Abdullah II’s response to ISIS, see: Amanda Macias,
“Eleven Photos Showing King Abdullah II of Jordan Being a Total Badass,” Business Insider, February 5,
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/king-abduallh-of-jordan-is-a-totalbadass-2015-2; Staff, “Jordan King Cites Clint Eastwood in Revenge Vow,” Al-Arabiyya, February 5,
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/05/Jordanking-cites-Clint-Eastwood-when-expressing-wrath-.html; Gianluca Mezzofiore, “No, Jordan’s King
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production the subject of which is frequently political, that the Hashemite monarchy also
maintains a firm grip on the limits of expression. The mukhabarat as well as the police
were present at every concert I attended in Amman.
If Ammani cultural producers hesitate to criticize the State or the monarchy on
record, they are, like my interlocutors in Occupied Palestine, critical of local and
international NGOs.36 When I asked what the outside sources of his funding were, Nasser
Kalaji of the production house Immortal Entertainment responded casually: “Well,
NGO’s are a no-no for me; and the State is broke. So that’s it. All we have is ourselves.”
At the same time however, the rush to lambast NGO affiliation, or the simplicity with
which these opportunities are dismissed in conversation, is often coupled with
contradictory practice. For example, Shermine Sawalha, a prominent concert organizer,
told me:
USAID and NGOs - they’re the ones destroying the world: why the fuck
would I take their money to create art to make [the world they destroy]
look better? They’re the same [people] who destroy everything: then, they
put money into NGOs to hide the effects of their wars. These are [not
partners] I am interested in. But I would be interested in some projects
funded by these people who go directly to kids and victims of abuse and
whatnot.37

Abdullah II is not Personally Flying Planes against ISIS,” International Business Times, February 5, 2015,
accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/no-jordans-king-abdullah-ii-not-personally-flyingplanes-against-isis-1486742. For a critical appraisal of this phenomenon, see: Ziad Abu-Rish,
“Manufacturing Silence: On Jordan’s ISIS War, Arab Authoritarianism, and US Empire,” Jadaliyya,
February 14, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20856/manufacturing-silence_on-jordans-isis-war-arab-aut.
36

On NGOs and RONGOs (Royal NGOs) in the Kingdom, see Laurie Brand, “Development in Wadi
Rum?”
37

Shermine Sawalha, interview with the author, June 7, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Ms. Sawalha
are taken from this interview, which was largely conducted in English. Sawalha grew up in Amman but
spent many years studying and working in Toronto, Canada. She returned to Amman in 2011. She runs the
production company MALAHI and is the mover and shaker behind TBA Collective, an events platform.
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Considering the contradiction in responses like these, it is prudent not to
exaggerate the politics at work in the refusal of NGOs in Amman. I recognize that there
are few options for cultural producers outside the neoliberal humanitarian framework
imposing itself on the region. Theoretically, I agree that neoliberal funds may be used to
non-neoliberal ends. The refusal of NGOs, when it is enacted, is in part a declaration of a
political position. However in my observation, this refusal in Amman is largely not
informed by a larger rejection of neoliberalism or of capitalism. The criticism of NGOs is
an articulated refusal of (usually US and European) influence and interference, but it is
rarely coupled with a refusal of private, for-profit capital from the same locales. Red Bull
(via their Culture Department) and Winston Cigarettes (as “Freedom Music”) in
particular have a palpable presence in the alternative music scene in Amman. Producers
and musicians readily attest to their collaborations with both. Further, they consistently
praise both companies for their support. Sotusura calls Red Bull the “only” company that
entered Jordan and had a positive impact on cultural expression, specifically in the
mitigation of risk involved in live concerts.38
Moreover, the friendships and collaborations involved between Red Bull and
local rappers are developing without disavowal of the for-profit orientation of the
company. Raed Serhan explicitly did not hide these motives when he explained to me:

38

Sotusura told me: “Red Bull is the one company that came to the country and put support behind all of
those alternative bands: they pushed them and they helped them all do concerts. It was a problem, you
know, organizing a concert is not easy: it’s not easy to be able to pay for everything a concert requires and
also pay the musicians. When Red Bull came to support these things, that risk dissipated. It became that
you can’t lose money doing a concert anymore. It’s ok to do a concert and whoever comes, comes:
nobody’s going to lose 2,000 lira from his own pocket anymore. No, now the musician can think: Red Bull
is pushing us and they’re paying for the stage and the equipment, now all that’s on us is to bring our people
and do a nice show. So, for sure, this is important and it helped a lot.”
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Red Bull started out with extreme sports. Ten years ago they decided they
should get into culture as well. Basically, [they were] supporting all the
athletes and sports and everything, but nothing was happening on the
cultural side. And if you think about it, like 90% of people listen to music.
But how many people actually play sports?
So it’s about expanding [Red Bull’s] product market?
Let’s say, yea, it’s about reach. […] People are not dumb anymore, people
are not stupid. They can tell if something [is forced]. If you see an artist
[holding] a can, the first thing you’ll be thinking is, ‘I wonder how much
they paid him just to hold that can.’ But when you come to [Red Bull], we
never do that. It’s about you [the artist]: it’s up to you, if you want to do it,
do it, if you don’t, don’t. It’s about being genuine. It’s about building
relationships. Having a relationship with that person and growing that
person: it always goes back to “giving wings.”39
But what’s the point of “giving wings”?
Once a person has reached a certain status, they’ll appreciate you. And
you’ll be tagging along with them.
So they will bring your product to other markets?
Yea, without even forcing it. You won’t even have to ask.
The embrace of this private capital by musicians and producers – in the form of
collaboration with the “cultural departments” of gigantic, transnational corporations is
significantly different from the embrace of the private sector by rappers and their fans
that I pointed to in Ramallah.
In Chapter Three, I identified a trend in musicians’ testimonies in Ramallah. In
order to avoid concert opportunities offered by NGOs, I suggested that performers were
turning to the stages of privately-owned bars and venues. In Amman, the venues
available to artists for concerts were the same with or without corporate sponsorship:
sometimes concert venues were private bars, sometimes they were public, open spaces,
39
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Red Bull’s single advertising slogan is “Red Bull gives you wings.”
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appropriated for the occasion. Sometimes concerts were part of festivals; sometimes they
were one-off events. Moreover, working with Red Bull or Winston or having either
company as a sponsor did not necessarily mean that an NGO was not also involved. That
is, this corporate sponsorship of concerts in Amman did not change the shape of concert
opportunities except to mitigate the risk on the individuals organizing.40 In Amman,
turning to private capital (in this case corporate sponsorship) was not an overtly political
negotiation, as turning to private capital (in privately-owned bars in order to avoid
affiliation with an NGO) was in the occupied West Bank.
It seems to me that the much more developed collaboration with Winston and Red
Bull in Amman rather reflected first and foremost a different emphasis on musical
production for musicians in this city.41 As I have hinted, rappers working in Amman
eventually recounted concerns about making a living off of their art. The monetization of
independent or alternative music production in a city that is becoming increasingly
expensive drives the shape of affiliation and collaboration. Frequently, this
industrialization of music is recounted in relation to the eventual opportunity this music
may provide the musician to leave Amman. This trajectory has become all the more
tangible in the imagination of many since Tareq Abu-Kweik, (the rapper who goes under
the stage name El Far3i), successfully transplanted a music career from Amman to
London (with the experimental collective 47 Soul) in 2014.42

40

See footnote 38.

41

Both Red Bull and Winston (as “Freedom Music”) have a presence in the West Bank and inside Israel.

42

47 Soul “is an electro-mijwez, shamstep, choubi band.” It is made up of El Far3i, Walaa Sbeit, Z the
People, and El Jehaz. (“47 Soul” Facebook Page, accessed January 7, 2016,
https://www.facebook.com/47soul/?fref=ts.)
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Figure 4.6: “Jordan is just one big waiting room.” Laith Al Huseini, the rapper who goes by the stage
name Synaptic, posting on Facebook in January 2016.

My interlocutors articulated a range of these feelings of anxiety around departure.
Many of these were in direct relation to discussions about opportunities in Amman. For
example, a discussion between Boikutt, Dakn, and Al-Nather (all members of the “-1”
collective, see Chapter Three) about the opportunities available to them in Ramallah and
Amman put concert venues and opportunities in direct relationship to the willingness of
colleagues to stay or leave Amman.
Dakn: In Ramallah, it’s always risky.
Boikutt: Here too, it’s always risky.
Al-Nather: But here there are venues.
Boikutt: True, but it’s not only venues, it’s people. Like Shermine
Sawalha… She is single-handedly making things happen in Amman. If
tomorrow Shermine goes to Canada, there will be nothing here.
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Al-Nather: You’re right.
In this exchange, Boikutt gently chides his younger colleagues about the differences they
perceive in the opportunities available to them in Ramallah and Amman. Strongly
resonating is the point that a colleague’s imminent departure is always possible (“if
tomorrow Shermine goes to Canada”), without whom musicians feel the infrastructure
that allows for opportunity in Amman will collapse. This anxiety about there not being
the infrastructure to receive their work came up with others as well. The rapper Satti told
me, for example:
Everybody gets to a point where they feel like they’re not making it.
Everybody. Even if they’re super active: making music and having shows
and everything. When you do all that and feel that you’re still in the same
place you were before, for sure you will want to go and see change.43
In these comments, Satti almost seems to undo Raed Serhan (of Red Bull)’s assertion that
“just doing more” will suffice. Satti’s feeling of “even being super active” and still
feeling like “you’re still in the same place you were before” illustrates the limits of
Amman’s cultural growth.
Moreover, Satti’s relative ease with the city as this kind of stepping stone differs
affectively with the feeling of frustration and suffocation that the Syrian rapper Bu
Kolthoum expressed, for example, while both related a similar desire to move on. In the
Facebook status that opened this chapter, Bu Kolthoum connected his musical production
with a relief of the stress he feels living in Amman: this for him was both affective and
material. The material connection was made by juxtaposing “a new album” with “getting
the fuck out of here” – implying perhaps that one will lead to the other. Affectively, the
43

Interview with the author, August 20, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Satti (Ahmad Yaseen) are
taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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music had another function: of releasing emotions attached to the frustration of being in
Amman. Bu Kolthoum explains:
Every track I work on is a product of pressure. Each track is an expression
of stress [daghet]. I get home, suffocated, no one to talk to, I write a track,
I’ll talk to those couple thousand people that listen to my music.44
This confluence of hope and suffocation; growth and stagnation characterizes
Amman’s recent and emerging importance as a regional center for cultural production for
a specific economic cross-section of the population. It is the double bind of wanting to
build and wanting to leave, and the quickly successive expressions of hope and despair
that give needed texture to recent declarations and celebrations of the city as de-facto hub
for regional exchange, emerging capital for alternative music.

Al-Weibdeh

Rappers’ testimonies about frustration, impatience, suffocation, and disgust
mirror the everyday reactions and expressions of many of the young Arabs I spoke with
in Amman. Many, many of the people I met and spent time with in the city also
expressed a kind of split personality about the city: it was both home and stagnating, both
comfortable and oppressive, both changing and not changing enough. Many hoped to,
and some were just returning from, travel. The marked exception to this general rule was
a handful of very adamant cultural producers to whom I was introduced (though none of
the musicians I interviewed), who, upon returning to Amman from some time away, have
44

Interview with the author, March 31, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Bu Kolthoum are taken from
this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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made something of a shtick of aggressively attesting to both Amman’s high quality of life
and the density of its art and cultural scenes. These individuals, almost all of whom were
educated or had lived outside of Amman, were then building, investing, or otherwise
helping to expand cultural activities in Amman. I almost only ran into these types in the
neighborhood of Al-Weibdeh.
Here, a cozy but populous scene of artists, designers, musicians, or simply
educated and employed 20-40 year olds drink tea or coffee on the corner sidewalk of
Rumi café, or on the balcony of the gallery and coffee shop Fann wa Shai (meaning “art
and tea”), gather for openings in the Darat al-Funun gallery, and party at the newly
opened Laconda Hotel and Canvas bar. It is here that many cultural producers –
enthusiastic about Amman or otherwise – attest to feeling the most comfortable. Many of
the rappers and producers I interviewed, who express a range of attitudes about Amman,
live in the neighborhood. All attest to a series of drastic changes that have befallen the
area over the past five-to-ten years. Some refer to these changes positively. As Satti, who
lives and works in the neighborhood explained to me, recent openings of cafes and other
places “become a part of you and what you do. It can change how you see your own
society.” But some of my interlocutors also inferred that this growth of an alternative
cultural scene in Weibdeh was having negative effects. DJ Sotusura admitted:
We can say that Al-Weibdeh was ruined because of this growth. It’s the
first time I see [here] something like what happens in other European or
American cities: where you have a place where all the artists hang out and
then all these other people come in – the hipsters and whatever – and the
artists have to leave. Three years ago, this was the artists’ hangout. Now,
it’s full of foreigners [Europeans and North Americans]. You come to rent
an apartment now in Weibdeh, the prices are very high. It’s unfortunate
because I feel like it’s the one Ammani neighborhood that was nice and
it’s being ruined. I don’t know what’s the next location that [artists] will
relocate to, but I hope we can find a nice neighborhood.
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Sotusura bemoans here both gentrification and Amman (“the one nice neighborhood…
and it’s being ruined”).
It is in contrast to preppy Abdoun and moneyed Abdali that the obviously artsy,
graffitied streets of Al-Weibdeh provide such an insulation to the city’s educated,
tattooed, artistic, or otherwise alternative population. Historically settled as an Armenian
neighborhood, its (relatively) lush gardens and stone buildings attracted and were built by
the city’s elite. Nasser Kalaji, who grew up in the neighborhood, remembers that, “you
used to look down the street and you could see, this is the minister’s place, or this is that
business man’s family, and so on.”45 As new construction entered Amman and with the
establishment of upscale neighborhoods like Abdoun, many residents of Al-Weibdeh
relocated their families to this new construction. For a time, rents in Weibdeh were of the
cheapest in West Amman: in comparison to the new construction, these buildings were
older, more run down, and less desirable.
The cheaper rents attracted artsy, freelance, self-employed types. Then with the
influx of North American and Europeans, intrigued by the alternative vibe, rents began to
climb, as Sotusura noticed, above. All of my interlocutors who celebrate Al-Weibdeh
were also concerned with the changes to it.
Some expressed anxiety about the “loss” of Weibdeh’s alternative exclusivity as
the neighborhood’s popularity extends beyond Amman’s artistic and intellectual
community, as its rents rise, and as its streets fill with more popular modes of
socialization. This latter anxiety about the change of the neighborhood’s character is
45

Interview with the author, September 15, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Kalaji are taken from
this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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inseparable from a class anxiety about the mass culturalization of an elite artists enclave,
while not entirely reducible to it. When cultural producers worry about the
“commercialization” of the neighborhood, they are predominantly referring to patterns of
behavior and consumption, not the scale of private capital invested or mobilized. For
example, Rumi Café is one project of several owned and operated by the same team
(including two other “Rumi” locations). All have similar intellectual, or soft, warm
aesthetics. In contrast, the venue usually pointed out to me as proof of the neighborhood’s
“commercialization” is Volk’s Burger (also an independent operation, whose prices and
menu are geared to the same clientele that frequents Rumi). The burger joint has
fluorescent lights, bright colors, and a predictably “American” fast food aesthetic. That
this business is connected with the fact that the neighborhood is attracting more foot
traffic (from outside the neighborhood), or the increase in its vehicular traffic on weekend
evenings, should point to a confluence of taste and class anxiety. That is, worry about
losing the alternative “vibe” of the neighborhood in a more “commercial” aesthetic is
interchangeable with the perceived popularization of Al-Weibdeh.

*

*

*

In this section I have tried to navigate the split hopes and disappointments
accompanying a growing music industry in Amman in the neoliberal context of the
pouring into the city of different kinds of financial and human capital. The discourses
with which Amman’s emerging role as urban and cosmopolitan center and Jordan’s
relative stability are touted are fundamentally classed. Unsurprisingly, this reflects the
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problematic contours of discussions of cosmopolitanism generally (see Chapter Two).
But the ways in which the city and its growth are classed are actively occluded in
discussions of growing cultural production in Amman. And this deserves recognition
considering the undeniable class segregation in this city. In juxtaposition to Amman’s
emergent urban cosmopolitanism, homage is frequently paid to the city’s “poor” by
referencing the “refugees” and “the camps.” These latter categories objectify and
exoticize while reducing a host of social problems (and a considerable economic swath of
the population) to one political demographic and one particular set of specific material
concerns. Amman has serious problems with class mixing that are enforced by the city’s
infrastructure: and this has little to do with the influx of Syrian refugees.46 Attempts to
address economic diversity in audiences of cultural production usually center around
“outreach” in and to the refugee camps, not the integration of denizens from West and
East Amman in a single, shared space. It is in this context that musicians, producers, and
fans in the know speak of “exposing,” “teaching,” or “educating” “the youth” and
exposing new sounds to new audiences. Crucially, cultural producers speak of
introducing them and catching them up to not only genres of music or art, but also the
socially accepted behavior accompanying the consumption of that art. As Shermine
Sawalha explained to me when I asked her about her target audience:
Foreigners love the platform: they feel right at home. Even people from
here feel right at home. Sometimes we get people from refugee camps,
Syrians and whatever, that have never been in spaces like this. They feel
very awkward. I see them: they come a bunch of boys – usually we try to
prioritize mixed [gender] groups – but I give them all a chance to come
and learn […] Ninety-nine percent of the time we don’t turn away groups
of men. But I lecture them before they come in.. I make them wait for a
46

For reflections on the General Amman Municipality (GAM)’s infrastructure planning, see Parker,
“Tunnel-Bypasses and Minarets.”
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little bit and then I give them a brief about what they’re going into and if
they fuck up what’s going to happen them. Cause I don’t want to turn
people away who want to come and learn - an education that’s more
important than any school can give them. If they come in and behave
themselves and are really into it, they’re hooked, and they’re always
accepted. We always try to give people a chance.
In these comments, Sawalha offers a good example of the collapsed distinction between
urban poor and refugee (“Syrians and whatever”)47 – wherein the “other” to Amman’s
new urban, globally-exposed, cosmopolitan is imagined as refugee.48 Significantly, in
Sawalha’s remarks about audiences “behaving themselves,” she invokes social patterns
of behavior that are learned. Sawalha connects the live presentation of independent,
alternative music – performed by Arabs or others – with patterns of public behavior and
social interaction with which some communities may not be familiar (“they feel very
awkward”). “Learning” becomes both about new music and sounds at the same time that
it means adapting to globalized standards of cosmopolitan social interactions at night: in
particular in this case, it becomes about learning how to navigate different gendered
environments than those available in other public spaces in Amman. Speaking more
generally about how her production work addresses both musicians’ and audiences’
needs, Sawalha offered:
People are dying for content. They are dying to go to shows, to go out and
dance and learn and go to exhibits and go see things that will open up their
minds. Since 9/11 there are so many things that are about closing up their

47

If these comments also seem contradictory: “foreigners” feel at home but Syrians feel awkward – it may
be because the word for “foreigners” [ajaneb] invokes non-Arab, not non-Jordanian subjects. This
understanding of the term is the same across the Levant (and is often more accurate than the “European and
North American” parentheticals I have been substituting for “Western” in this study – non-European/North
American nationalities are included in this demographic).
48

Syrian exiles actually make up a significant part of the musical acts Sawalha has hosted with both Malahi
and TBA, the rapper Bu Kolthoum and electronic musician Hello Psychaleppo perhaps most prominent
among them.
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minds in the region. [Where] it’s all about religion. That’s all fucking
brainwashing.
The conceptualization of specific kinds of cultural production as a force of
liberalized modernity and social progress, capable to counteract perceived regressive
forces like intolerance, religious fundamentalism, and sexism is not unique to the
Jordanian context.49 In the third section of this chapter, I will return to flesh out the class
dynamics at play in two musical festivals in 2015, both of which centrally featured hip
hop acts.
Before moving on however, I want to offer a point of clarification via comparison
on the subject of public space. Neither of the other two cities in this study are models of
integrated class mixing. But both Beirut and Ramallah boast more public space, more
interaction between classes, and more fluidity between class lines in different
neighborhoods under the same municipal jurisdiction than Amman. Despite all the elitist
construction and dispossession of the past fifteen years, Beirutis from all walks of life
still can and do gather on the open-air Corniche. Throughout the city (and throughout the
city’s history), neighborhoods of different classes border and flow into each other. In
Ramallah, while the suburban enclaves of Masyoun and Al-Tireh are expanding and
different modes of shopping and transportation are becoming increasingly exclusive,
Ramallahawis are still not completely divided or segregated by geography and habit (and
they are all subjected to the Occupation). Manara Square and the hisbeh market are
shared public spaces while Rukab street is a common thorough way regardless of
economic class. Obviously neither of these cities is a class-less utopia, either. But a

49

See for example, Jessica Winegar, “Culture is the Solution: The Civilizing Mission of Egypt’s Culture
Palaces,” Review of Middle East Studies 43(2009): 189-197.
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complete dearth of actually public space – to which all citizens regardless of class or
gender have access and in which they can find some degree of ease – is not something
Beirutis nor Ramallahawis confront in their cities. The same does not hold true in
Amman. The almost complete absence of public space, the difficulty of mobility and
transportation, the hilly terrain, and the lack of sidewalks make moving through the city
difficult and mixed gathering in public extremely rare. Most obviously, the East/West
divide coupled with the lack of reliable public transportation makes even seeing how the
other half of Amman lives unlikely for most – East and West Amman residents, alike.50
Moreover, attempts to construct public spaces have proved to be divisive. For
example, the uniqueness of Rainbow Street’s public accessibility in West Amman is
rendered most visible by the density of young, unaccompanied men. Other, new public
and semi-public spaces used by Ammanis for strolling or promenading in West Amman –
the various malls for example, or the new Abdali project – are barred to young men who
wish to enter without the company of women. One effect of the unregulated public access
on Rainbow Street is that it is not terribly hospitable to women, veiled or unveiled,
walking alone or with other women.51 As in other Arab contexts, and as Laleh Khalili has
noted, “public” places are often laced with an implicit threat for women, and being in
them need not always be a relaxing, much less liberating, experience.52 The policy

50

Importantly, this works in both directions. Familiarity with the opposite “side” of Amman is rare among
both sectors.
51

In my experience, most unveiled women walking on this street at night were not Arab, unveiled Arab
women preferring to avoid such encounters. See next note.
52

Laleh Khalili writes, “rules of proper and decent behavior for women demand a certain degree of
‘privacy’ in public which is not easily provided by unsegregated spaces… where men’s exuberant and
sometimes aggressive behavior would threaten the women’s ability to partake of a safe conviviality.”
(Laleh Khalili, “The Politics of Pleasure: Promenading on the Corniche and Beachgoing,” Society and
Space 0 [2015]: 7.)
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barring groups of young men access to spaces like private malls and the new Abdali
Boulevard is implemented with this reality in mind: in order to police public and semipublic spaces for gender-specific violence and to prevent group harassment of girls and
women. At the same time, it nevertheless effectively excludes young men from most new
leisure spaces in West Amman.53 I return to questions of access in the third section of this
chapter. Now, I turn to further the political context in which rappers intervene lyrically
with a look at the political discourses rappers identify in their work and the music and
sociality encouraged and discouraged by the state.

Part Two: Performing Resignation
To be honest, people overestimate — rappers especially —
the influence of hip hop. Like, if I spit this verse there will
be a revolution tomorrow! No, that’s not how it works. And
you’re not “waking up” the people, or feeding them
consciousness, or whatever.
~Nasser Kalaji
During Mounir Troudi’s concert halfway through the Al-Balad festival in July
2015, the Tunisian singer unintentionally and charmingly acknowledged a particularity of
the Jordanian context in which he was performing.54 Between songs, during light-hearted
banter in which he was attempting to communicate with the Jordanian audience in his
very Tunisian Arabic and French, two uniformed police officers entered the stadium and
53

In a society where many young men are not permitted to socialize with young women until a formal
engagement, social outings with peers of the opposite gender that are not family members is predictably
difficult. (One might surmise that this increases the frustration that causes gender-based violence in the first
place, but this is unfortunately not the subject of this study.)
54
Mounir Troudi is a Tunisian jazz musician. He performed with his band Nagouz at the Odeon theatre on
August 1, 2015 as part of the Al-Balad music festival.
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remained standing, unimpressed, near the entrance, their arms folded.55 Troudi, still in
Tunisian dialect, made a joke at their expense – something about their seriousness –
which the Jordanian audience largely didn’t understand.56 Remembering himself, Troudi
quickly turned his jibe into a public gesture of thanks to the Jordanian military,
encouraging his audience to offer them a round of applause, which they obliged. Troudi’s
save, something like when one unknowingly disparages a host in their presence and turns
it into a compliment, points to another consideration of musical concerts in public spaces
in Amman.
In the first pages of this chapter, I acknowledged the strong hold the Hashemite
monarchy maintains over civil dissent. The presence of the state intelligence [or secret
police, as it is often translated, the mukhabarat] and the regular police (in uniform) was
visible at every concert I attended in Amman. The producer Nasser Kalaji confirmed to
me: “We see them, the guy who comes with a pen and a note pad, they’ll always be there:
two guys standing in the back.” But, Kalaji was also keen to dismiss the implications of
their presence:
At the end of the day, what’s it going to effect? Five hundred people came
and heard these couple lines? [It’s like they’re thinking,] ‘Let’s leave them
be and we can claim we have a high standard of freedom of expression.’
You know? It goes both ways. We [the producers and musicians] are able
to have the show and they [the State] take the credit that we have the civil
liberty standards of Sweden, or whatever.
55

The Tunisian dialect is both different from the Jordanian local dialect (very similar to the Palestinian
dialect) and quite far from the classical Arabic (fusha), which is the language of the Qu’ran and taught in
all the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Since the Jordanian dialect is closer to fusha,
North African Arabic speakers can often understand this dialect. The reverse is not the case. So that
someone speaking Tunisian, Libyan, or Moroccan Arabic is not easily (or at all) understood by a Jordanian,
Palestinian, Lebanese, or Syrian audience. Moreover, the colonial history of especially Tunisia and
Morocco has dictated that French is an easier second language than (in some cases classical Arabic as well
as) English. In Jordan the opposite is true (English being the second language). So Troudi’s addresses to the
audience – which were in Tunisian Arabic and French – were difficult for the Jordanian audience to follow.
56
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This kind of tolerated symbiosis was related to me by other event managers, producers,
and performers as well. Despite personally seeing her juggle and attempt to negotiate
arbitrary, last-minute police decisions (regardless of having secured necessary permits
and documentation) at more than one event, Shermine Sawalha also denied antipathy for
municipal or state authorities, cheerily recounting their rapport was “great,” and that they
“never had any problems.” The presence of state authorities is something most all of my
interlocutors were interested in downplaying. Kalaji, who was eager to declare himself a
“royalist,” told me:
I find it frustrating sometimes, you know? Especially in interviews with
people doing academic work, or for a magazine, or whatever. They want
to give it so much more than what it is. [For some researchers] it’s like,
you have to be risking your life to do this. Like “there are snipers on the
buildings and they’ve tapped my phone!” No, man, it’s not like this [...] I
always mention my political stance in interviews. But people’s reactions
when I tell them this, it doesn’t fit their framework: like, “Fuck, man! This
guy is messing up my story!”
In these comments, Kalaji articulates a productive hesitancy around the subject of
censorship. Perhaps like Janelle Reinelt’s invitation to complicate our understandings of
what she calls a “common-sense catchword,” Kalaji invites the researcher to trouble what
an assumedly ominous censorship looks (and feels) like.57 There is no need to exaggerate
the presence or impact of state censors on rappers’ political expression, their willingness
57

Reinelt’s interests are different from mine here. She is interested in investigating the line between
censorship and free speech (which is almost exclusively presented in her essay in the context of different
accusations of hate speech). There is very little concern with hate speech in my context here. In my
estimation, the Jordanian case is more straightforwardly about limiting expression critical of the regime and
its policies. But I have found that Reneilt’s assertions about how naming censorship “proclaims it” resonate
with my interlocutors’ testimonies about how political pressure in the Jordanian context operates. (Janelle
Reinelt, “The Limits of Censorship,” Theatre Research International 32[2007]: 3-15, quoted here and
above, 3.)
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to experiment politically, or listeners’ ability to respond. Indeed, it is significant that
Amman’s hip hop and rap scene has not faced the kind of physical confrontation with the
Jordanian state that other alternative music scenes in Jordan have. In the 1990s, Amman
hosted a sizeable heavy metal scene. Local bands sang in English, playing covers from
popular US and European metal bands, and large outdoor concerts and festivals drawing
hundreds were held outside of Amman. The Jordanian state was quick to respond to this
enthusiasm with arrests and accusations of “Satanism.” The threat and use of state
violence eventually killed the scene.58 This is not a kind of censorship or suppression that
hip hop and rap artists and audiences in Amman today face. At the same time, the felt
presence of the state is an undeniable part of the Jordanian context. If this presence
doesn’t physically stop rappers from saying what they want, a general atmosphere of
caution around political subjects in general pervades social interactions in Amman when
in the presence of strangers. Importantly, however this latter sense of caution is not only a
product of state control, but the result of the particular confluence of material, social, and
affective factors in Amman.
In this section, and somewhat differently from work on censorship and countercensorial strategies in other Arab contexts, I begin to locate what I call performed
resignation in some Jordanian rap.59 This is made up of conscious deliberations and
active negotiations of political concerns, culminating in a performed tolerance of or
58

Unlike in Lebanon, Iran, and Morocco, state force in Jordan was successful in suppressing the
development of the scene. The Jordanian state police was not dissimilar in kind, just degree, from state
policy towards heavy metal elsewhere in the region. (Interviews with Tareq Abu Kweik and Raed Serhan in
particular. On heavy metal in the region see Mark LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the
Struggle for the Soul of Islam [New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008].)
59

For example, Lisa Wedeen has explored similar dynamics of public deliberation – what she calls
performing belief and “unbelief” in Syria. (Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric,
and Symbols in Contemporary Syria [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015], Kindle edition.)
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resignation to the status quo. Considering how rappers arrive at these positions is an
important political process: one that demonstrates the contours and texture of politics
particular to Amman. My concern is to demonstrate how the political feeling of
resignation built in some Jordanian rap points not to passivity but to politics in process.
Performing resignation is an active political negotiation, one that is obviously not
“resistance” to the status quo, but neither does it indicate complete control by the state or
submission to it, or even that the state is the most prominent censoring force involved.
Moreover, the significance of performed resignation for my study of rap in Amman is the
relationship of this political feeling to tarab. What is the effect of apparent resignation on
the ability of rappers and their fans to connect and communicate in concert spaces? How
does the feeling of not wanting to rock the boat, or the refusal to confront or challenge the
status quo engender or impede the flows of tarab described in Chapter Two? What is the
relationship between resignation and the mode of longing I suggested underpins the
emergence of tarab in Arabic rap? Is performed resignation congruent to performed
disgust or articulated refusal in its ability to host call and response between musicians and
listeners? Is there a difference at all?
I argue that performed resignation in some rap lyrics is imbued with the same
kinds of longing I identified in rap in both Beirut and Ramallah – an affective framework
that led me to propose considering more carefully the textures of politics in progress and
to build the model of tracking the emergence of tarab in rap concerts in the region.
However, the obstacles and tensions particular to public space in Amman, incidentally
some of the same tensions that drive expressions of resignation lyrically, stymie the
regular emergence of tarab in concerts in Amman. The effect is that audience attention
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appears much more divided in Amman than it does in either Beirut or Ramallah. This
reflects back on musicians’ frustrations with and desires to leave the city. Importantly
however, this configuration of political feeling and audiences’ divided attention need not
suggest that Jordanian rap is less political or less powerful than rap I discuss in either
Ramallah or Beirut.
In the Ramallah case study, I suggested that second wave lyrical experimentation,
following in the example of the perceived impact of the Ramallah Underground, seeks to
“fill the head.” I suggested that successful examples of second wave “filling the head” –
second wave tarab – work in part by inverting political narratives. For example, turning
inside out romanticism about resilience or steadfastness [sumud and sabr] and rendering
it deaf or dumb was able to surprise and engage listeners, despite an adopted aloofness in
these avant-garde iterations of the genre. In Beirut, as I explore in the next chapter,
performed disgust in the heart of Ras Beirut excited and engaged listeners who travelled
from outside the cosmopolitan avenues of capital, following rappers who voiced local
and ghettoized concerns on central stages of the capital city. In both Ramallah and Beirut,
kinds of refusal – manifest as cynicism, rejection, impatience, disgust, inversion – drive
the ability of rap lyrics to surprise and engage listeners, and to “fill the head.” A wholly
different kind of refusal operates in the Ammani context.
Rap in Amman approaches decidedly fewer explicitly political subjects than in
Ramallah and is performed with an almost opposite affect of that in Beirut. Amman
concerts boast a considerably “lighter” tone. They are not as concerned as Ramallah’s
second wave with experimental sounds and they are much more concerned with not
alienating an audience (much less offending one). As an example of how rap in Amman
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evades the overtly political and carries a lighter mood, consider that Satti’s most recent
album was entitled “Bars with Benefits.”60 The tracks on the A side of the album relate
frustrations with dating in a digital world and are underscored sonically with recorded
laughter. Indeed, the sonic reflection of a retreat from the political is especially
pronounced in rap in Amman and can be found in the search for “lighter” sounds.
“Politics can be too heavy” Kalaji told me. The use of “lighter” sounds came up
repeatedly in my interviews and points to the active negotiation of audience tolerance and
attention in how politics are articulated and presented.
The diversification of the sounds as well as subject matter of Jordanian rap is
frequently credited at least initially to El Far3i. Sotusura, Kalaji, as well as El Far3i
himself attest that the lighter sounds and quotidian subject matter in the latter’s work
were easier for Jordanians, especially those not already indoctrinated in hip hop sounds
and culture, to accept.61 They suggest that El Far3i was able to reach wider audiences in
his solo rap work not only by using acoustic instead of electronic accompaniment, but by
rapping about different subject matter: university life, rapport between young men and
women, neighborhood dynamics, and other elements of work and play.
Interestingly, my interlocutors referenced the Jordanian or Ammani quotidian that
appealed to expanding audiences as a shift away from the subject of Palestine in Arabic
rap. Unprompted by me, rapper after rapper in Amman expressed their refusal to touch
the political question of Palestinian liberation, which they variously referred to as
60

I’m not suggesting the album is free of politics. I am suggesting it is not pointedly inverting political
narratives in the ways the work discussed in Ramallah and Beirut do. Satti himself acknowledges the
relative “lightness” of these tracks in his song “Bilaʿtmeh” [“In the dark”], addressed in some length below.
61
Many of my interlocutors were keen to point out the increasing number of women, especially veiled
women, attending rap and hip hop concerts as part of the changes of the scene in Amman over the past five
to ten years, a factor they also credit to El Far3i’s content and performance style.
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“mainstream” and “tired,” asserting that “there’s nothing left to talk about.”62 Further,
rappers and producers testified that rap “trying” to be political quickly picked up this
subject. Jazz tha Process told me cynically, “any rapper that wants to make it has to rap
about Palestine.” He identified this move as disingenuous. The Syrian rapper Bu
Kolthoum concurred:
How many times have I mentioned Palestine in my music? Not a single
time. Not once. Why? Because it’s enough, Palestine is understood.
There’s an occupier, he has to leave. There’s nothing left to talk about.
Arm yourself and go fight, or shut up about it. At the same time, I’ve
never lived in Palestine, nor have I visited — though I hope to, of course!
So, I am not going to sit and write Palestine and sigh and write about
nostalgia — nostalgia for what? You want to talk politics, be my guest.
But you want to come and describe to me, and sing me tracks about
Damascus, and Homs, and Aleppo, and whatever, and you are not Syrian,
and have no history with the streets of Syria? What are you coming to
write poetry about? That means you just want views, man. And that means
you can eat shit.
Here, Bu Kolthoum extends cynicism about rappers’ intentions when they choose to rap
about Palestine to the Syrian crisis as well. He considers addressing these subjects –
especially perhaps lamenting the loss of these places (“I am not going to sit and sigh and
write about nostalgia”) to be sanctimonious and insincere (“that means you just want
views”). I infer from these kinds of comments that in Amman rappers were especially
conscious of political posturing in their lyrics despite sharing much of the same politics
as rappers elsewhere in the region (distrust of NGOs, critical of local corruption and
nepotism, against the Israeli occupation and for the most part critical of foreign
intervention).
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Interviews with Mohammed al-Hijazi, DJ Sotusura, and Bu Kolthoum, respectively. The interview with
al-Hijazzi (Jazz tha Process) was conducted on August 31, 2015. Subsequent quotations from al-Hijazi are
from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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Significantly in my opinion, the subject of the Jordanian monarchy, even in the
context of Palestinian liberation, is not the direct concern of a single Jordanian rap track
of which I am aware.63 In other words, to “make it,” some rappers turn to political
subjects which they hope will win them listeners: the occupations of Palestine and Iraq,
the chaos of Syria, orientalism – subjects on which most listeners, despite different
political strategies, will largely agree. Others are critical of especially the pressure (from
NGOs and frameworks they perceive as “orientalist” offered by European and North
American journalists and researchers) on rappers to produce this discourse.64 But even
these rappers do not seek to address immediate political realities of the Jordanian context.
They are not turning from the – now obvious – problem of the Occupation to address the
more complicated issue of Jordanian state complicity with it. Rather, Hijazzi told me for
example that he is looking for more “subliminal” expression. Bu Kolthoum explained,
When you want to communicate an idea, and you yourself are this
wounded [la hal qadeh majrouha], you also want to wound [inti kaman
bidek tirjahi]. Most of my tracks are full of curses. I swear a lot. For me
the solution is no longer political. You can’t translate feelings politically.
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Readers will recall the role the monarchy played in crushing the Palestinian resistance in 1970-1971. On
the relationship between Palestinian identity, Palestinian liberation, the “resistance,” and the Hashemite
ruling class, see among others, Laurie Brand, “Al-Muhajirin w-al-Ansar: Hashemite Strategies for
Managing Communal Identity in Jordan,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East,
ed. Leonard Binder, 279-306 (Gainesville, FL: UP of Florida, 1999) and more recently Laurie Brand,
“Jordan: Unwilling Citizens, Problematic Expatriates,” in Brand, Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the
State in the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), Kindle edition.
64

In our interview, Synaptik talked at length about the initial opportunities that he pursued writing raps in
order to make some money for equipment and travel. These included a competition sponsored by the
European Voluntary Service, a concert sponsored by the Royal Cultural Ministry and performed in front of
King Abdullah II, and a competition on a local radio station sponsored by Stolichnaya. He told me “but
when I started taking myself seriously I started hating my work [the work he wrote for these kinds of
competitions and audiences].” He told me, it’s just like “being a wedding singer” – except instead of being
hired to sing popular hits, you’re hired to spout “popular” politics. (Synaptik himself comes from a family
of popular Palestinian wedding singers.) He concluded, “there’s no such thing as real political rap. It’s all
lies.” (Interview with Laith al-Husseini [Synaptic], August 31, 2015. All subsequent quotations from
Synaptic are form this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.)
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The shift towards the “subliminal” expression and articulations of feeling without politics
might seem to follow trends in postmodern lyricism and performance, which have been
criticized as depoliticized and aloof in different contexts. However, when successful, I
think the turn to the Jordanian quotidian and the invention of “more subliminal”
expression (as I elaborate in two examples below) performs an active negotiation of
politics, rather than points to the development of a politically disconnected or apathetic
rap culture. Performing resignation is an active refusal with particular political affect. The
refusal to confront the immediate, Jordanian status quo directly does not avoid political
feeling, but it affects its texture.65
Moreover, the retreat from specific political expression, is marked by feelings of
frustration, impatience, anxiety, and malaise. Satti offered:
Listen, the ceiling on expression here is very open. In a sense, there is
freedom of speech, let’s say. But like, I don’t want to be just a column in
the newspaper, you know? Everybody’s really into politics now. People
read a lot and they are hearing all sorts of different things already…
What’s it going to change if I come and rap about the same things? This
stopped being really interesting to me. It’s not about getting in trouble or
anything. I’m just sick and tired of it.
Satti’s hesitancy in these remarks to assert definitively that there is freedom of speech
(“in a sense there is… let’s say”) is indicative of a kind of second-guessing about the
existence of censorship that other interlocutors also expressed. In the latter half of his
comments, he’s also referring to a shift in an approach to political subject matter in his
65

As Bassam Haddad has argued in the context of Syria, preference for the “status quo” is a complicated
negotiation of hope and fear – but also a strategic, logistical navigation of possible gains and losses.
(Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience [Stanford:
Stanford UP, 2012]). Moreover, as Christa Salamandra points out, this is not new. The deliberations over
sense of self, allegiance, change, and authenticity in the consumption of popular culture are negotiations
that mark the current period as they have for generations (Christa Salamandra, A New Old Damascus:
Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004]).
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music, especially since the Arab Uprisings. This reflects a change in the sociality of
political discourse (“everybody’s really into politics now”), something Satti doesn’t feel
like it’s in his music to compete with (“this stopped being interesting to me”). Moreover,
his decision not to address politics is marked by exhaustion or frustration (“I’m just sick
and tired of it”). Khotta Ba expressed similar feelings when he also articulated a retreat
from politics, saying:
I no longer have the heart to run after politics or go down to protest.
Khalas [enough]. You feel like you’re not going to have an effect, nor are
you going to accomplish anything. Because seriously what you’re up
against is huge, so don’t waste your time. If it’s going to work out, it will
work out on its own. Not because of me or anyone else.66
Khotta’s resignation here is laden with exhaustion (“what you’re up against is huge, don’t
waste your time”). Importantly however, as he continued, he also communicated a
pronounced anxiety.
I don’t know where I’ll be in a year or two years. You really don’t know.
Maybe you’ll find yourself doing great and maybe you’ll find yourself
with nothing in the street. That’s what’s happening everywhere around us.
Honestly, I don’t know what’s coming. And I don’t feel like what’s
coming is going to be nice in the end. It doesn’t look that way.
To be sure, part of the concerns addressed by Satti and Khotta Ba reflect a general mood
of depression, caution, hesitation, or worry that has become more pronounced among
Arab youth since the counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt, Libya, and Syria seem to be
gaining the upper hand (2013-2015; see relevant discussion in Chapter Two). But despite
the caution and confusion about the state of regional affairs many rappers expressed to
me in all three cities, the remove Khotta and Satti articulate here is quite pronounced. The
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Interview with the author, August 12, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Majd Kamal, whose stage
name is Khotta Ba, are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.
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damper the spectacular Syrian civil war and accompanying rise of ISIS has put on
political hopes across the region is considerable. But the political mood of resignation in
Amman as expressed here by these two prominent rappers is particular to the Jordanian
context.
The feeling Khotta articulated that the undesirable current status quo is
preferable to some unknown and assumedly dire future (“I don’t know what’s coming
and I don’t feel like what’s coming is going to be nice in the end”) is widespread. Sarah
Tobin has suggested that a comparative framework – wherein Jordanians are encouraged
by state power to consider Jordan’s problems in relation to regional strife is a powerful
strategy of the Hashemite regime to maintain both a sense of precarious Jordanian unity
as well as the status quo.67 She writes that the Hashemite government supplements
“consumerist distractions” with comparison to neighboring countries’ strife to “help
distract from internal divisions.”68 That is, the political narrative of Jordan’s stability in a
region wracked by violence and chaos – Jordan as balad al-amn w al-istighrar [land of
security and stability] – is built by looking warily at the violence next door. Tobin
suggests that compared to situations in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, “most Ammanis agree”
that the reforms desired “are not worth” risking another civil war or a US-led invasion.69

67

Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” Middle East Policy,
19(2012): 100-101. I am indebted to Christine Sargent for referring me to Dr. Tobin’s work. Nationalism
and Jordanian identity did not come up in my interviews with rappers, audiences, or concert organizers, but
it is a thoroughly researched topic. See, among others: Andrew Shryock, Nationalism and the Genealogical
Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: U of California P, 1997);
Betty S. Anderson; Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State (Austin: U of Texas P, 2005);
and Massad, Colonial Effects.
68

Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 106.
Economic comparisons at the regional level also play an important part here. Tobin illustrates that the
idea of Amman as a relatively wealthy space contributes to the appeal of an aspiring and possible “middleclassness” as unifying project. In this perception of Jordan vis-à-vis its neighbors, widespread poverty is
not here but “out there” – specifically, Tobin suggests, in Egypt. According to Tobin, Ammanis do not
69
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The eye cast on the chaos in Jordan’s neighbors is a widespread and demobilizing
political force. It encourages the feeling of not wanting to rock the boat.70 As Khotta Ba
said, “If it’s going to work out, it will work out on its own.” This resignation happens
while not addressing the anxiety that “what’s coming is not going to be nice in the end.”
Paralysis and anxiety feed into each other.71

consider the economic problems to be so great as to risk the country’s relative stability. (Tobin, “Jordan’s
Arab Spring,” 106.)
70

Tobin’s piece was published in 2012. While the influx of Syrian refugees has grown considerably since
then with effects on the country’s economy, I do not see reason to suggest that her argument about
Jordanian perception of wealth (especially in Amman) vis-à-vis the rest of the region has changed much
since. (Neither does Tobin: see more recently Tobin, Everyday Piety: Islam and Economy in Jordan
[Cornell, NY: Cornell UP, 2016], 184-194.) Writing about Syria, Lisa Wedeen has suggested a very similar
kind of ambivalence is a direct result of the shape of neoliberal governance and the aspirations and hopes of
citizens navigating these incursions. (Lisa Wedeen, “Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from
Syria,” Critical Inquiry 39[2013]: 841-873.)
71

The video for Kazz Alomam’s track “Dahab” [“Gold”] is one of few examples that counters this trend.
The lyrics are not so explicit, but the visual images in the video clearly implicate the narratives of security
in the suppression and repression of the average Arab citizen, and of the working class specifically. To
describe it very simply, the video stages a young car mechanic, strapped for money, in a boxing ring up
against Arab capital (as stereotyped man in suit). Before the hero can throw a punch, two men in black
masks and hoodies, with the words “amn” [security] and “aman” [safety] painted in white on their backs
carry the mechanic off. This staging associates narratives of security and safety with corruption (the hooded
thugs are called in by the man in the suit before he enters the ring); with collusion with Arab elites – that is,
“safety” and “security” protect the rich, not the poor; with torture or other punishment of dissent (the
mechanic is dragged off and not seen from again). Most obviously, the video associates the discourses amn
and aman with violence. At the end, the victor, who invoked safety and security to beat the mechanic,
shoots off the pistol he was carrying the whole time. It is noteworthy that this negotiation of symbolism
does not happen lyrically but is only reflected visually in the video.

[Figure 4.7 “Screen grab from ‘Kazz Alomam “Dahab,”’” 6:17.]
(“Kazz Alomam ‘Dahab,’” YouTube video, 6:56, posted by “Indiemaj,” April 21, 2015, accessed March 2,
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZ03X6XZXQM&ab_channel=Indiemaj|%(+,-(.)
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Slightly differently from Tobin, I want to suggest that in order to recognize how
the wavering towards and away from political positions in rap in Amman functions, it is
important to acknowledge that this paralysis and anxiety is not only a product and effect
of the strong arm of the state. The Hashemite regime and its operations are considerable,
but all my interlocutors identify that its hold on power is only one problem of many
facing Amman’s denizens, the region, or Arab youth even more generally. Kalaji hinted
at this when he expressed frustration with narratives of state censorship in Jordan
(“Researchers want to give it so much more than what it is”), implying that the state is
not responsible for everything – but importantly, he did not deny the presence of
problems, either.
That is, while Kalaji comfortably stated a political position when he called
himself a supporter of the regime, he also recognized the need for political processes of
deliberation. He put it this way:
We Arabs for the last God-knows-how-many-years have not been able to
express ourselves. And that has created a lot of identity issues, a lot of
political issues, a lot of racist issues [among Arabs]. We like to say “the
West doesn’t understand us” but in reality we don’t understand ourselves,
because we haven’t been talking to each other for the last century. You
know what I mean? Ultimately I don’t think [hip hop] is about creating
change. I think it’s about creating the atmosphere first and second the
inspiration to say whatever the hell you want to say. I think at this stage in
the Arab world, this is the main push. Because you need to break a lot of
constraints, and not just from the state.
In other words, despite what I interpret as Kalaji’s pragmatist political positioning
aligned with the Jordanian monarchy, he also recognized the need (“at this stage, this is
the main push”) to break “a lot of constraints.” Kalaji himself considers the regime has a
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positive role to play in allowing these processes to take place.72 Important to me at this
juncture however is his assertion that some hip hop, despite not being able to bring “a
revolution tomorrow,” is able create an “atmosphere” to express “whatever the hell you
want to say.” To me this points to the role rap may play in staging political processes.
El Far3i, stage name for Tareq Abu-Kweik, expressed the censorship situation in
Amman somewhat differently than Kalaji but he shared the latter’s emphasis on
encouraging expression. On Skype from London, the Palestinian-Jordanian rapper told
me:
The Jordanian government doesn’t need to stop you. We’re born [as
Jordanians] with the self-censorship. We get it, that we can say certain
things and we can’t say others. It’s all about finding your way to say what
you want to say in a way that works with them. But… I… I… I… you
know… people will tell you like, no you’re not a threat to them, you’re
just like a bunch of hipsters in some West Amman bar. But the other
reality is that there are people listening to this all over the place. And you
know. Because you know that in some neighborhoods in Syria people
were getting arrested for listening to your shit. You know this for a fact. It
did get there. […] You yourself know that [in Jordan] you can actually
push it further but you’re just not ready to go for the fight.73
The potential threat of censorship in El Far3i’s remarks is, like in Kalaji’s, again drawn
by a regional comparison – to the Syrian security apparatus. But while he is keen to
recognize that Jordanian security pales to the Syrian one, he stutters to articulate the
actual impact of this configuration of listening and state power on his own expression. El
Far3i testifies that the reality that censorship today does not frequently manifest itself in
the hip hop scene in a spectacular displays of force gives a different, self-policing

72
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Whether one agrees with him on that issue is a matter of politics.

Interview with the author, August 20, 2015. All subsequent quotations from El Far3i (Tareq Abu Kweik)
are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.

!

302
dimension to Jordanian state power (“the Jordanian government doesn’t need to stop you,
we self-censor.”)
This diversifies how we might understand state power as one of several forces
effecting rappers’ expression in Amman. First, implying “self-censorship” is at work
complicates censorship in ways Kalaji was keen to dismiss. More importantly, however,
El Far3i’s refusal to call out state censorship as the primary obstacle (“You know you
could push it further but you’re not ready”) points to other factors holding him back,
besides state power. His “not readiness” is central to the announcement of resignation I
identify in rap lyrics: El Far3i’s articulation of a “maybe, but not yet” is indicative of
politics in progress. Throughout our conversation, El Far3i stayed vague about what
“pushing it further” might mean, or in what direction one might want to “push” things,
refusing to suggest that outright criticism of the state is something he wished to articulate,
but couldn’t. Our conversation remained with in the realm of encouraging a vague
“expression,” or encouraging others to “express themselves.”
The “expression” that both El Far3i and Kalaji refer to as important in much rap
in Amman is significant because it relates active political deliberations. That is, I infer
that it is more than a simple advocacy of a neoliberal or humanitarian “free speech.”
Recall that all the rappers I spoke with acknowledged they are relatively free to say what
they want. At the same time, all also expressed fatigue or boredom with “politics,” stating
that they were looking for other expressions (more “subliminal”; pure “feeling”; that is
able to “wound”) in their lyrical work. When rappers relate their attention to the feelings
of being watched, of not having political options, or of the uselessness of political debate,
and announce a subsequent decision to do nothing (or, importantly, say “nothing”) as a
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result, they draw attention to externally and internally imposed modes of censorship and
negotiate between positions that are both exhausted and exhausting. The attention to the
malaise, the frustration, and the declarations of doing nothing are perhaps the expression
that both El Far3i and Kalaji want to encourage. These are politics in progress. My
concern here is how these processes, what I call in the Amman context performed
resignation, function politically.
An especially good example of the phenomenon I am addressing is El Far3i’s
track “ʿAqrab al thawani” [“The Second Hand”], released in early 2014.74 With over
twenty-nine thousand plays on Sound Cloud, it is one of El Far3i’s most-listened-to solo
pieces. The song walks through a solitary deliberation and culminates in resignation.
Sitting cross-legged on the floor, in a room where a friend sleeps
I have a dream and a craft but fate is floating in it.
Like everything in this country, the subject is paralyzed:
He promised but did not show; what should I do?
Of course he called, not once but like ten times:
What’s this music called? And who distributes it?
Down with propaganda and dumbed-down rhetoric
Unfounded suggestions: they found you empty when they peeled you!
Me and my career, we play 1-2 offense
So that they don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change things
You confused the kid when you put him in school
And then they let him loose in society he got up and got a tattoo
I’m not hating: that’s the point, to each his own.
Everyone speaks his mind in his own way, in the way it serves him,
If I change my mind, I imagine I’ll want handala on my back:
So that when I swim in the Dead Sea, you can see his face on my chest.75
74

Sound Cloud tracks do not include the date of publication. The time stamp rather reads backwards in a
vague articulation of time since it was published. For example, in February 2016 at the time of writing, the
time stamp for this track read “2 years ago.” “El Far3i- A’qrab El Thawani,” Sound Cloud audio recording,
3:27, posted by “El Far3i,” 2014, accessed February 28, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-far3i/el-far3iaqrab-el-thawani.
75

“Handala” is the name of a cartoon by Naji al-Ali, popular in illustrations of Palestinian resistance. The
drawing is of the back of a child with his hands crossed or tied behind his back. So here, when El Far3i
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We’re still being kicked out, “ethnically cleansed,” so the show’s not over
Daddy-o, this is the rap of the lowest point on Earth76
And to the people that see that something’s missing in the write-up:
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance?
“Second hand” :
You changed my place,
You switched the meaning
You made me doubt my history
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance?
Our playground was sold as scrap metal77; I bought a swing instead
We wanted to entertain the people because the television is a horror film
And the street is hard; the simplest bite is tiring.
So who is to blame? It depends.
There are the farmers, but they’re not at market because they got angry;
There are the merchants clowning cockily to earn a penny;
And there are those on the western borders, smuggled in crates of grapes.
More than one request, a log on fire, an angry nerve lives in each of us
It blocks every photon of light that comes towards us.
A small country but the planet is strange:
How things come together and, in a push, become a mess.
So where is the best place in the room to hang the calendar?
Because tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about the present.
Where the changes have put me, I cannot locate my location:
The clock I have is digital I can’t see the second’s hand!
Products produced with intention, but the choice is mandatory.
I bought a new car but there’s no front seat;
How to turn it on to go return it to the factory?
I am compelled to sit in the back and be subjected to the design!78

describes handala tattooed on his back, he’s envisioning the flip side of the cartoon, or the boy’s face,
appearing through his body (“on his chest”). The Dead Sea is dangerously high in salt content. The best
way to “swim” in it is to float on one’s back.
76

At some 1,000 feet below sea level, the shores of the Dead Sea have the lowest surface elevation – they
are the “lowest point” – on Earth. The phrase here has a metaphorical meaning as well, referring to the
status of “Palestinian” among other nationalities – or equally to the resistance at its weakest.
77

The word El Far3i used, which I translated as “playground,” is “Al Jubeiha” – referring to an amusement
center in Amman that was closed and sold (personal correspondence with the artist, February 29, 2016).
78
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In this piece, El Far3i’s expression walks the listener through a deliberation that
ends in resignation. Articulating the process of how he arrives at this “back seat” is
illustrative of politics in process – his recounted deliberations demonstrate this process
and the piece points to the activity involved in arriving at resignation. At the same time,
declaring that he is “compelled to sit in the back” encourages the listener to recognize
that the artist is consciously not saying more. In this way, El Far3i encourages the
acknowledgement in the listener of her own resignation, her own self-confinement to the
back seat. While the piece recounts a self-conscious removal from politics deliberated in
private, the description of arriving at this position drags politics back into the public
sphere.
Sitting on the floor while a friend (which could be another incarnation of the
speaker) sleeps (another mode of being frozen), we imagine El Far3i in a kind of
meditative pose. He daydreams, finding his future floating on the surface, “frozen” like
“everything else in the country.” This light expression of frustration with the status quo
prompts a paranoid reaction. His mind drifts to an imagined, unknown caller, wanting to
know about his music and how he distributes it (“he called not once but ten times”). The
paranoia that someone is asking about his lyrics is countered in the next lines by the
doubt El Far3i stuttered through in our interview: “Unfounded suggestions: they found
you empty when they peeled you!” That is, he casts the fear of someone listening as selfinflatedness: in the end, there is no there there.
In the next verses, the lack of substance in his own “dumbed down rhetoric” is
traced to a confused childhood (“Don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change
things”). Amman’s playground was dismantled and sold as scrap metal. In its place he
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bought a swing – a childish plaything that allows him to move while staying still. The
images of childhood confusion (“you confused the kid when you put him in school”) and
impotent attempts at resistance (“he got up and got a tattoo”) carry through to vague
evocations of Palestinian struggle. El Far3i invokes Palestinian resistance in the boyish
figure of Naji el Ali’s handala, the boy cartoon, whom he takes “on his back.” This
seems to imply he’s taking on the resistance, identifying with it, but his support
(swimming with him on his back) either drowns the cartoon since he can only float face
up in the Dead Sea (another clear metaphor), or by exposing the cartoon’s face, changing
the figure of resistance altogether. Further, with this he admits that he, with the
Palestinian resistance beneath him, is “at the lowest point on Earth.”
Who is responsible for this state of affairs? He is unable to articulate a subject
responsible for the malaise he’s feeling (“Who’s to blame? It depends”). Even the
speaker’s gestures towards possible culprits are so vague that we are unclear whether he
means actual farmers and merchants, or growers and traders as abstract metaphors for
political figures or ideologies. As a nod to those looking for a more precise articulation of
politics (“to those who think there’s something missing in the write-up”), he responds by
evoking a dull, abstract pain (“who says we can’t make broken hearts dance?”)
Throughout, the quiet march of time – in the second hand, which he can’t even
see (“my watch is digital”) – ticks on. The invisible but felt menace of time helps to
communicate the confusion he feels (“tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about
the present”), while a lack of direction is affirmed in the last couplets. He buys a car but
doesn’t know which way it faces (“there’s no front seat”). Frustrated with it, he can’t
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figure out how to turn it on to return it, compelling him to give up and accept the flawed
design (“I am compelled to sit in the back and be subjected to it”).
Musically, the piece is not an example of El Far3i’s acoustic work. On the
contrary, electronic keyboard and synthesizer score a fast, descending arpeggiated minor
triad that repeats throughout the track, giving a tense suspense to the piece. The beat,
alternating clap and snare, enters one verse in (around the 0:30 mark), adding momentum
and contributing to the build and release of the synthesizer. The tone of El Far3i’s voice
is confident, persuasive, even accusatory. Which is to say, this is not an example of his
pieces with “lighter” sounds. It plays like a ballad; making, it seems to me, the political
positions to which it arrives particularly poignant. Musically in the synthesizer and beats,
sonically in the tone of the rapper’s voice, as well as lyrically, the track is a good
example of how performing resignation can be conceived as an active standing-down.
The performance of resignation – the calling into attention of its arrival or
enactment – stages a political process. El Far3i’s admission of resignation encourages
listeners to recognize how they too retreat from politics. The expression of feelings and
recounting active deliberations before arriving at a sort of temporary defeat (accepting the
flawed design) is what constitutes performing resignation. The recognition of the listener,
of the listener’s political expectations, is an important part of performing resignation.
Indeed, not only do El Far3i’s lyrics interpolate the listener, they recognize the listener’s
recognition. “To those who think there’s something missing in the write-up,” can be read
as an articulation of disdain common in hip hop in any language (à la: “haters gonna
hate!”). But I think it’s more likely that the line serves as a sign to listeners: I am not
speaking, it breaks my heart, but I am dancing anyway. This is crucial for how performed
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resignation operates. The listener, while she identifies with the line, is similarly instructed
to play along and “dance.” Broken hearts dance after all, El Far3i reminds us, twice.
The relationship here between resignation and longing is important. I have been
arguing in this dissertation that articulation of something missing by rappers is laced with
longing. This longing encourages the emergence of tarab: a near out-of-body experience
between the performer and the listener, which can provoke strong physical reactions in
the latter, marked by seemingly spontaneous interpellations, a feeling of ecstatic
“emotional blending.” Longing can be seen and heard in the rap lyrics I’ve addressed
here. The couplet I underscored above (“To those who thing there’s something
missing/Who said broken hearts can’t dance”) is an articulation of longing, if a defensive
and guarded one. Longing and resignation is obvious in the recorded tracks of others.
Kazz Alomam’s track “Ghabareh” [“Dust”] describes a similar arrival to
resignation; Satti’s track “Bilʿatmeh” [“In the Dark”] relates similar meditations on
frustration and confusion.79 In the interest of space I will only address the latter of these
two. Satti’s track is produced by the US-based producer and rapper Russ. It starts like the
latter’s own track “Goodbye.”80 Both Russ and Satti’s pieces open with a sample of
Esther Phillips singing “I Wish you Love.” Satti’s track mirrors Russ’s use of the sung
refrain and then sharp shift into the lyrical rap. But while Russ’s rap involves a not
terribly complex, largely misogynistic take down of a former girlfriend, Satti bids
farewell to a former version of himself. This piece among other examples of performed
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“Satti- bil3atmeh – prod by (russ) instrumental,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:48, posted by “Satti,”
2015, accessed March 2, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/ay-satti/satti-bil3atmeh-prod-by-russ-instrumental.
80

“Russ – Goodbye (Official Video),” YouTube Video, 4:12, posted by “DIEMONDOTCOM,” February
11, 2014, accessed March 2, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nA0fXQDKyho&ab_channel=DIEMONDOTCOM.
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resignation in rap in Amman is especially germane to my discussion here because the
affective mode of longing alongside performed resignation is particularly pronounced.
The used sample in this piece reflects the use of sampled tarab I referred to in my
discussion of “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” by the Ramallah Underground in Chapter Two. The
use of the sample in Satti’s track reflects a widespread strategy among rappers of
softening the beats and rounding out the rapper’s expression with specific emotional pull.
In other tracks, “tarab” sampling helps to frame an affective longing. The sampling of
Esther Phillips functions in this way in Satti’s track “In the Dark.” Furthermore, the
longing affected in Satti’s voice in this track in recording – an affect that is distinct from
that which he normally produces – is significant. As the song proceeds, he sounds almost
on the verge of tears, interrupting himself with emotional interpellations of “ya Satti!”
[oh, Satti!], mimicking the tarab-like responses of an audience that does not exist. As he
articulates what he’s feeling: a slow recognition of his apathy, he gets progressively more
upset, so that when he gets to the third iteration of the refrain there is no hiding the
emotion in his voice.
The lyrics after the “I wish you Love” sample (“Good bye, no use leading with
our chins…” etc.) go like this:
It’s no good to know what you want; they stop you
There’s always someone to throw something heavy; watermelons thrown
in the way
I remember my seat in my room like it’s today; it’s a motivation
I really feel like I’m at attacker of the goal, I wait for greatness
See where I was and where I am at now; I’m no longer in my place
I wrote so many poetic lines you feel like I built buildings
I paid attention to what I listened to, I was patient ‘til I grew up to never
screw up
I know what it means to lose; I buried so many close people with these
hands,
I stood there in front of a judge, staring at the floor, not guilty
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If you want the truth, between myself and I, I was ashamed
My lungs are dying, turned to black from inhaling all this smoke
This is a local product, nobody touches it, there are no bags in the store
I’m kinda worried from all the thoughts in my head, it’s getting darker
The last few songs I dropped stupidly, I dissed myself81
You know when you’re feeling musical and you feel like composing?
You need to be in the same state of mind and understanding in order to
know:
Refrain:
Who ’s the loser? Look in the mirror
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do82
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone
behind me
As far as I go, I say and respond to myself, I’m coming
(repeat)
They attacked with open mouths, my eyes opened and turned red from
anger
I organized my thoughts but it feels like they are sheep, they wander off to
graze elsewhere
I walked barefoot, knowing there were embers and broken glass
It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed
I don’t know if you’re worth anything if you got no audience
I don’t know what bitterness is because I’m always forced to foolishness
Your brother’s no hero, I got used to the idea of submission
I’ve got to go, I want to piss on the subject, but I can’t the gallstones are
so bad
Shooting everywhere, up and down, I feel my life turned into an art
lecture83
For three years I’ve been sleeping on the sofa, I’ve forgotten the bed
Once I got fed up and told myself let me know my destiny
I tried to read my fortune from a coffee cup and cards; its hipsterism that
caught me!84
I felt numb because in my head I was lost, I couldn’t write, so I left a
fingerprint
81

This is the reference to vapidity in his recent work I referred to earlier in the chapter.

82

Shoes are forbidden inside the mosque. Worshippers remove them before they enter, leaving their shoes
at the door.
83
84

“Shooting” is pissing, here.

Reading coffee grounds is a way of telling fortunes. The cup is overturned once the coffee has been
drunk. The pattern of the grains describes the drinker’s future.
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I asked the prof; he told me look towards the Vatican, he is wise
I can’t breathe without spitting rhymes, it’s like I’m a fish with gills
I’m so high up in the clouds, I lost gravity. I’m on the top of the pyramids
just like the dots in the letter sheen.85
Refrain.86
Like El Far3i’s “Second Hand,” this track also walks the listener through similar
deliberations and realizations of politics. Specifically, Satti is confronting a “foolish”
(majbour ʿal-habal) version of himself, castigating his hesitations (“I was waiting for
greatness”) and his preoccupation with senseless things (“I dissed myself”). He castigates
himself for his hesitation (“I waited ‘til I grew up not to screw up”) and his “familiarity
with submission.” The process of recognizing these failings prompts his suggestion that
the real “loser” is himself, is “in the mirror.” In his iteration, he is more lost than used
slippers, even these have a place in front of the mosque (where users remove them before
prayer). The sheer repetition of “I don’t know” and “I feel” in this track is notable, lyrical
work that underscores the confusion and pain in Satti’s recorded voice. Moreover like El
Far3i’s track that ends in the speaker giving up and “being subjected to the design,”
Satti’s track here also succumbs to the aloofness that causes the pain he’s been
describing: at the end, he’s so high “even gravity” can’t touch him.
Satti’s emotional self-critique in this piece can be read politically, as in the line “I
always feel like there is someone behind me” – evoking notions of being watched – and
in the line “It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed,” which seconds the
kind of paranoia El Far3i also rapped about. Alternatively, the lyrics can be related to his
development as a musician and related to his musical career, as in the line “I paid
85

The Arabic letter sheen [., sh] is topped by three dots in a triangular shape, like a pyramid.

86

Arabic lyrics printed in Appendix D. Translated by the author with the artist.
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attention to what I was listening to, I was patient until I grew up” and “I don’t know what
you’re worth if you have no audience.” Indeed, the strength of the lyrical work lies in the
fact that it’s not clear whether he’s bemoaning the lack of his political development – the
articulation of a strong stance – or the incompleteness of his musical career. “Good
people were buried,” “I was ashamed,” “my life is an art lecture” are all expressions that
can either point to political failure or to frustrations with the music scene and
collaborations therein. Moreover, the longing he expresses in his voice, aided by the
sample, is more earnest and less defensive than the affective mode in El Far3i’s track.
That is, the combination of longing and resignation is more pronounced here. He longs to
overcome his resignation, his apathy, his foolishness. But it is unclear if he is ultimately
successful, despite the repeated sample singing “Good bye.” Importantly, Satti locates the
feeling he expresses as product of his environment: “this is a local product, nobody buys
it.” This piece in particular makes clear that the lyrical, musical elements necessary for
the emergence of tarab are present in rap written in Amman. Considering I only rarely
observed tarab emerge in live concerts in Amman however, this suggests that the
problems of arousing tarab are specific to the Ammani material context of performance,
not the music itself. And it is to the material context of the concert that I now turn.

*

*

*

In this section I have attempted to pin down articulations that illustrate one
particular political feeling, that of resignation, in Amman. I have argued that by invoking
vague terminology and relying on evasive images, active political deliberation is a part of
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arrival to resignation, which I imagine as an active – and importantly as a performative –
standing down. In my time in Amman, I initially struggled with the lukewarm posturing
of many of my friends and interlocutors. Most sure of itself when it is calling out
orientalism and most vague when it attempts to articulate specific positions or desires,
this kind of political discourse can seem wishy-washy compared to the political
observations, refusals, or inversions in both Ramallah and Beirut. I think it would be a
mistake, however, to suggest that individuals in these latter cities – and specifically that
Palestinian or Lebanese rap – are “more” political than in Amman. When situated within
a history Jordanian political culture, this performed resignation points to an active, if
frustratingly non-committal, negotiation of political concerns.
Finally, it is not only in the lyrics where the active negotiations of politics in
process can be discerned. The seeming resignation to the status quo, to avoid
confrontation, and to avoid politics in public is also arrived at in active negotiations in
concert spaces and outside them, between concert-goers and those who recognize
concerts take place and decline to participate – what I call concert observers. In the next
section, I turn my attention to the pauses, stutters, and stares that emerged repeatedly in
my observations and discussions in Amman concert spaces. I suggest that these are all
active negotiations – risk assessments, calculations – not the absence of politics. This
tension of not really knowing what is holding one back (or holding it all together) is
manifest in El Far3i’s stutters about the nature of censorship, in Khotta Ba’s “not
knowing what’s coming,” and as I suggest in the next section, in the distance between
concert goers and concert observers. This seeming stillness and silence, the performed
resignation to the status quo, demonstrates politics in progress.
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Part Three: Divided Attentions
Basically, I hate dancing. Not break dancing, I don’t mean
that. And of course head banging is “part of the process,”
like when you hear a beat, that’s part of it. But it’s
impossible for me to offer my work [if people] are dancing,
dancing. Like, aren’t you coming to listen?
~Bu Kolthoum

In the previous section, I suggested that performed resignation in rap lyrics stages
politics in progress. In this section, I explore to what extent these processes of deliberation
are received by audiences and reflected in audience behavior. Specifically, in order to
situate the affect rappers produce musically within the wider landscape of political
feelings in Amman, I consider affective dynamics before and after concerts (what I called
“warm up” and “cooling” in Chapter Two), as well as during them. Through thick
description of concerts at two festivals in 2015, I explore tension in public spaces and
divided attention of audiences.
My exploration begins by considering that rappers frequently find themselves not
the center of their audiences’ attention. I follow musicians’ complaints about audience
reception in Amman with concert organizers’ reflections about reaching and “exposing”
audiences. The frustrations about audience reception I find surprising considering the
musical and lyrical work and astute navigations of politics I suggested in the previous
section. I consider how refusals to participate in concerts can be read alongside other
frameworks for understanding social interactions and the consumption of leisure in
Amman. This leads me to argue that constantly divided attention in public space in
Amman is not conducive to following along with the performed resignation in some rap
lyrics. Political negotiations during concerts fall on not receptive ears. Rappers read this as
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disrespect while audiences struggle, and perhaps even resent, keeping up with the
competing demands both on public space and their attention.
As in Ramallah and Beirut, most of my interlocutors in Amman affirmed the
presence of tarab during rap concerts. Asked to provide examples of this tarab, however,
all described concerts outside of Amman. Kalaji discussed its presence in Cairo; Khotta
Ba described it in Copenhagen; Satti elaborated at length about Beirut audiences’ ability
to give back to a performer; and Boikutt compared performing in Ramallah favorably
with performing a very similar set in Amman just months apart.87 That musicians locate
the best examples of tarab outside Amman does not mean the phenomenon is alien to the
Jordanian context. Their comparisons, however, point to their disappointments
performing in Amman.
At the end of our interview Satti told me,
The one thing I’d really like to see in this country is for people to really
give an opportunity to this music, from their hearts, because they’re loving
it. I want to see people giving this music this energy and respect because
they really love it. Let’s call it a wish.
Satti’s comments belie real anxiety about reaching listeners and getting the kind of
feedback in Amman that he has received elsewhere. His frustrations are shared with his
colleagues. Khotta Ba told me that despite the growth in music production in Amman,
[People] aren’t used to coming to concerts. They’re not used to knowing
what to do in a concert. They don’t know if they’re supposed to clap at a
punch line or what. Some people want the song to be over at a punch line
and start clapping. They’re not accustomed to a hip hop show where you
come and enjoy and bob your head and go home. Lots of people
understand hip hop as poetry, like they want to come listen to a reading.
Others come too hyped up.
87

There was one exception to this trend; Kalaji also located tarab in his description of a concert Immortal
Entertainment organized at the Rainbow Cinema on Rainbow Street in Jabal Amman in 2012.
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Khotta’s complaints about audience reactions are tangible and reflected in specific
behavior (clapping and “bobbing your head”) while Satti’s are more abstract (“from their
hearts, because they’re loving it”). But both rappers’ reflections point to misfires with the
audience. In other words, a problem performing rap in Amman is not only that “there is
no fan base” as the rapper and producer Mohammed al-Hijazi of Obsolete Records told
me in an interview.88 It is also that the desired modes of communicating, of “feeling
with” the audience are regularly stymied even when audiences do gather. Specifically,
rappers and DJs recognize this as particular to Amman.
In a conversation about opportunities in Amman compared to Ramallah, rappers
and DJs Al-Nather and Boikutt elaborated:
Al-Nather: It’s better here [in Amman, compared to Ramallah]. Because
there is culture here. Not culture like we would like, maybe. But there is a
music culture. There are more people who support music. It’s a much
bigger city.
Boikutt: […] I don’t agree that there’s more culture here. I don’t see that
there’s even more people willing to support culture or attend concerts.
Even the proportion in Ramallah is higher considering the size of the city.
Like in Jadal [a venue run by Fadi Amireh] the other night there were
maybe less than half as many people as there were in December at La Wain
[discussed in Chapter Three].
Al-Nather’s recognition of the presence in Amman of “culture, but not culture that we
would like” deepens the paradox about the opportunities the city offers its artists, with
which I opened this chapter. While Al-Nather recognizes that Amman offers different
(perhaps even “better”) opportunities to perform, there is nonetheless something missing

88

Hijazzi explained, “If you have one hundred people listening to you, that’s not a fan base. Last year we
did a concert… and put fourteen of the rappers with us on the label on stage. Fourteen people, and of them
the biggest names in Amman, so they say of themselves. One hundred and fifty people came to the show.
Fourteen people, that’s ten percent of the crowd – on the stage. Don’t tell me there’s a fan base. Where’s
the music scene? Where’s the respect for this music? There isn’t any.”
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in these opportunities. Boikutt confirms this with his rejection of the notion of “more
culture” in Amman, a city home to twenty-three times the population of Ramallah.89
Moreover, Khotta Ba’s observations about what audiences are “accustomed to” and
Boikutt’s declarations about “culture” are not abstract constellations about taste. The
assertion that audiences do not know how to “come and enjoy” are specific complaints
about the kind of feedback audiences in Amman give and that musicians are able to
receive on stage.
It seems to me necessary to ruminate on the frustration musicians expressed about
the inability of their audiences to consistently react in ways they feel are appropriate.
This is, after all, a driving reason why some of these musicians are not content producing
and performing their music in Amman. What is preventing the smooth exchange between
musicians and listeners during concerts? Why the repeated complaints about a lack of
listening culture or respect for musicians? In the wake of the hype about Amman’s
emergent role as host to cultural production, why are audiences not getting it?
Learned familiarity with sites of cosmopolitan leisure and the representation and
performance of selfhood within them has been the subject of fascinating ethnographic
work in Amman. Jillian Schwedler and Sarah Tobin have addressed how “aspiring
cosmopolitans” and enacted “middle-classness” function politically in the Jordanian
context. Schwedler has argued that learning cosmopolitan behavior – how to consume
global brands and enact pleasure in elite leisure spaces – is central to the identity of both
Ammani elites as well as segments of the middle and lower classes employed in the
89

Demographic estimates put Amman’s population around 1.9 million in 2015. In the same year
Ramallah’s population (together with neighboring Al-Bireh) was estimated around 82,000 people.
(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, accessed March 4, 2016,
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/ramallah.htm and World Atlas, “Jordan,” accessed
March 4, 2016, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/jordan/jofacts.htm).
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service sector in West Amman. She calls “aspiring” cosmopolitanism those “practices of
survival, creativity, and reimagination” produced “at the blurry boundary of
inclusion/exclusion.”90 Her study works to reinsert texture – and agency – into neoliberal
critiques of exclusion. For Schwedler, the patterns of marking public space that I pointed
to in the first section need not be exclusively oppressive, as East Ammanis also actively
negotiate and incorporate neoliberal changes into their perception of self and community,
progress and opportunity.91 For her part, Sarah Tobin identifies more critically a political
project in the assumption of cosmopolitan consumption patterns. She calls a “ middleclass orientation” that which promised to “displac[e] overtly political nationalism and
replacing ethnic, religious, and other forms of elitism, factioning and sectarianism.” 92 As
I explore here, this kind of orientation towards consumption intersects with the
frameworks and presentation of alternative music as cosmopolitan.
I want to consider here how some Ammanis refuse the invitation to participate in
cosmopolitanism that is specifically not staged in elite spaces. I do not mean how
religious authorities oppose certain concerts or festivals. I mean instead to draw into
relief how Ammanis decide to participate, or not, in outdoor festivals in public space.

90

Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 549 and 559.

91

But Schwedler stops short of claiming aspiring cosmopolitanism is liberating, concluding: “Whether
these sites and forms of engagement are ultimately emancipatory or destructive remains an open question,
with the answer likely contingent upon one’s own perspective of the liberatory possibilities of capitalism.”
(Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 549.)
92

Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 100, emphasis added. Schwedler puts it like this: “[W]hat is being
consumed is not limited to material goods and services, but also includes cultural codes and even spaces, a
particular cosmopolitan aesthetic.” (Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 553.) This idea of consumption
as an “equalizing” force, subsuming ethnic or sectarian difference into the desire to shop, has had salience
elsewhere in the region as well as outside of it. On this narrative in Lebanon see Craig Larkin, Memory and
Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Lisa Wedeen and
Bassam Haddad address it in the Syrian context, see: Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, and Haddad,
Business Networks in Syria.
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Specifically, I want to consider how refusals to participate are noticed by and effect the
participation of others. I am concerned with how attention is divided among audiences
and between concert participants and concert observers. Refusals to perform
cosmopolitanism or to act “cosmopolitan-ly” need not only suggest the presence of
conservative forces. They also stage tense but muted contests over city space.

Concert-goers and concert-observers

The Word Is Yours Festival was a two-day “urban street art festival” organized by
Shermine Sawalha, Tia Thorpe, Nereya Otieno, and Samantha Robinson in October
2015.93 Day One of the festival hosted live rap, skateboarding competitions, a b-boy
battle, beatboxing challenges, and skateboard building and painting workshops in the
newly opened 7Hills Skatepark in the Al-Weibdeh neighborhood.94 Day Two largely
focused on film screenings and artist talks at the Laconda Hotel, also in Weibdeh. I focus

93

Sawalha represented the local Jordanian production company MALAHI and the event platform TBA
Collective; Thorpe the Danish NGO Turning Tables; and Robinson the British NGO AptART. Malahi and
TBA Collective, through Sawalha’s work, were responsible for securing local services, many of which
were donated to the festival free of charge. Red Bull Kuwait and Red Bull UAE sponsored artists travelling
from those countries (Malikah and Sons of Yusuf). Turning Tables ended up not contributing directly to the
festival. On AptART – which stands for “Awareness and Prevention Through Art” and their sources of
funding see http://www.aptart.org/about/, accessed January 15, 2016. The festival was supposed to rely
predominantly on crowd-funding. However, both IndieGoGo and AfkarMENA campaigns were only
successful in raising about half the funds requested (less than 42% of the $10,000 goal had been raised by
October 1, 2015 [“The Word is Yours- Hip Hop in the Middle East,” IndieGoGo, accessed January 18,
2016, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/the-word-is-yours-hip-hop-in-the-middle-east#/story]).The rest
Sawalha largely paid out of pocket. (Personal correspondence with Sawalha, January 19, 2016.)
94

The 7Hills Skatepark, largely “run” by Mohammed Zakaria, was built in December 2014 with the
support of Make Life Skate Life, a Belgian/US NGO that collaborates with “local communities” to build
skate parks in developing countries. (Unrecorded conversations with the author. See also Hiba Dlewati,
“Amman Skatepark a ‘Melting Pot’ for Locals and Refugees,” National Geographic, October 14, 2015,
accessed January 21, 2016, http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/14/7hills-skatepark/, among
others.
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my remarks here on Day One, when the live concerts – a total of seven hip hop acts –
were held. 95

Figure 4.8: “Panoramic of the Word is Yours Festival.” The central stage for rap performances was
under the black RedBull umbrella, far left. Shade was limited to where most people are seated, along
the near back wall. Photograph by the author (at the 7Hills Skatepark in al-Weibdeh around 5pm,
October 2, 2015).

In many ways the first day of the festival was a success: for an entire day, the park
was full of a mix of people: local and expat, from different neighborhoods, men and
women, with the knowledge of the police and local religious authorities. In many other
ways, the festival was a failure. The structure of funding meant that travelling musical
acts were paid while the local acts weren’t. There were last minute changes, cuts,
substitutions, and contingency plans, leading to mistrust between the performing artists

95

They were Malikah (Lebanon/Dubai); Satti (Jordan); Almukhtar (Jordan); Sons of Yusuf (Kuwait);
Synaptic and Jazz Tha Process (Jordan); Kazz (Jordan); Arab MC’s (Jordan); Bu Kolthoum (Syria/Jordan).
Showcased artists also included DJs, beatboxers, and bboy dancers. For full line up see “The Word is
Yours Festival October 2: Street Art, Skateboarding, Live Rap, Beatboxing, DJ’s, B-Boy Battle and
Workshops!,” hosted by “The Word Is Yours Festival,” Facebook Event page, accessed January 21, 2016,
https://www.facebook.com/events/400190190170359/. Day Two of the festival featured film screenings
and artist and producer talk-backs. For full lineup, see “The Word Is Yours – October 3: Artist Talks,
Workshops, DJ Sets, Film Screenings, Street Art, Exhibitions,” hosted by “The Word Is Yours Festival,”
accessed January 21, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/events/405036743027305/.

!

321
(the time of whose sets and the duration were changed multiple times) and the
organizational team. When Sawalha managed to convince the police to allow the event to
continue (despite her already having secured the permits to do so), local religious figures
protested the continuation of music, dancing, and gender mixing in a public space,
leading to a muted confrontation between the police and the religious authorities.96
These dynamics of misunderstanding and contest over the power to use the space
or to declare what kind of behavior was appropriate in it were between the organizers and
local authorities (civil and religious) and the fall out of these negotiations was largely
between the organizers and the musicians. But this does not mean the unusual occupation
and transformation of the park staged by the festival was otherwise harmonious. It would
be a mistake to pit the festival attendees as a heterogeneous group united in love of
“urban culture,” facing the censorship and disapproval of state and religious authorities.
Rather, in my observation, the festival staged a prominent, charged transgression in
Ammani public space, awareness of which was shared by dozens of disparate groups of
people, who used the opening the festival provided differently. Moreover, participants
and observers were aware of others’ decisions to participate and how they chose to do so,
marking constant negotiations over proper behavior and use and meaning of public space.
I first noticed the divided attention held by different users of the park the day before the
concerts, while I, along with other volunteers cleaned up the park.

96

The police eventually convinced the religious authorities to back down by arguing that the event was
mostly “for” ajaneb [foreigners]. Needless to say, this insulted the (Arab) musicians and local participants
who heard this was the agreement to which they arrived, while they were simultaneously relieved the event
could continue.
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Carrying a black trash back between us, Rana and I set out along the South
end of the park, which runs up on Arar Street.97 We each wore one of the
pink plastic dish gloves I had brought. We were talking as we worked,
ignoring the shouts and beckoning of men drinking coffee outside the shop
across the street. At one point in my gathering of trash, I picked up
something heavy. It felt like a rug perhaps, but I could not tell what it was.
I lifted it at arm’s length to see it more clearly. Finally, I understood. It
was a dead cat. I dropped it and yelped. Rana screamed. Peels of laughter
rang out from across the street, where the men had obviously been
watching the whole time.98
These moments in the build-up to the concerts the next day illustrate a distance
and difference I felt in this festival and others conducted in public spaces between
concert-goers and what I call “concert-observers.” Concert-goers (and concert organizers,
volunteers, other participants) come to these public spaces infrequently, with firmly held,
specific expectations of how to act and what to do in public space. They are noticed by
concert-observers (everyday users of the space), who tolerate the incursions but markedly
avoid participating. In this example, the men across the street clearly noticed my and the
two other volunteers’ presence and recognized what we were doing. To the men, who
work across from the park, the sight of the (clearly not local) women cleaning the park
with their hands was humorous (instead of, say, embarrassing).99 Obviously, this wasn’t
women’s work, whatever the intentions of these newly-arrived “Good Samaritans” were
– a perception that was confirmed when Rana and I both startled at the sight and touch of
the dead animal. Similarly, she and I both quietly tolerated the taunts and jeers while

97

The park is elevated above the street, making us visible to young and middle-aged men, sitting outside a
carpentry shop drinking coffee. Rana is not her real name.
98
99

Author’s field notes, October 5, 2015.

Rana is surely not a “foreigner,” having grown up in Amman. I am also Arab. We spoke together in
Arabic. Nonetheless, our activity (cleaning up garbage), to some extent our dress, or some other
combination of factors clearly indicated to the men across the street that we were not locals. They called
out to us in broken English.
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remaining fixated on tidying the park, which we both perceived was in the best interest of
the neighborhood users, despite not having used the park previously ourselves. Neither of
us – Rana and I nor the group of men – directly confronted the other. Though we did not
directly acknowledge each other’s presence, awareness of their recognition of our
intrusion marked the volunteers’ attitude in and towards the space. Their laughter and
jeering made us aware of our foreign-ess in the space, despite perhaps our own
perceptions of the value of our presence.
While the physical distance between the two groups in this instance is
exceptionally stark (a two-lane road runs between myself and the other volunteer and the
men in the shop), the dynamic between us was one I also noticed during the Al Balad
festival hosted downtown, where the distance and division was less extreme. For
example:
Crossing the street into the park, my companions and I dodge boys and
girls with soccer balls, veiled women and young fathers holding babies
and young children, toy vendors sending lit plastic tops spinning on the
stone ground or flashing boomerangs soaring into the air. On benches or
against the walls of the large theatre, young men and teens sit spitting
seeds and smoking. As we neared the Odeon (the smaller of two roman
theatres), flags advertising the festival marked a sort of fabricated entrance
corridor. These flags built a queue for audiences, who stood in between
them as they arrived and waited to enter or to buy tickets.100 Opposite the
queues, folks clearly not intending to enter, mostly young men and boys,
sat on stone structures and quietly watched the queues of people entering.
Exiting the theatre, the scene was similar to when we entered it. […] I
wished to use the restroom before and after the concert, something my
companions advised me against and outside of which they waited patiently
lest I be left to traverse the square alone.101

100

The opening night concert was July 29, 2015. The concert was Tarabband: an Iraqi-Swedish folk band.
Tickets were 10 JDs. For festival schedule, see http://al-balad.org/al-balad-music-festival-2015/, accessed
March 30, 2016.
101
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Dressed up for a night out, the parade of concert-goers waiting to purchase tickets
for the Al-Balad Festival concerts was something of a spectacle for the regular users of
the space, many of whom informally queued themselves to watch this crowd. Here the
spatial difference between “concert goer” and “concert observer” was less marked.
Nevertheless, the delineations between “concert goer” and “concert observer” were not
only obvious, they were actively performed. My female companion’s dress (more
conservative than she would wear otherwise) was designed to downplay this difference,
whereas the queue of those watching the actual concert queue made no effort to mask the
difference they observed. I think it worthwhile to consider the negotiated tolerance
between these groups in these moments before the concert began and upon its conclusion.
The refusal to ignore, overtly reject, or embrace the festival and the new arrivals
to the downtown space points to fissures in organizers’ discourse about reaching as wide
an audience as possible, not to mention obvious class tension (the divisions are much
more obviously class-related in the Al-Balad example than they were at the Word is
Yours Festival in 7Hills). At the same time, my companions’ tight attention to staying
within the lines the festival organizers had drawn for concert-goers (evidenced in their
attentiveness and recommendations) recognizes the thin tolerance that concert-observers
enact. Both recognitions of “the other” – for concert-goers of concert-observers and vice
versa – under the watchful eyes of different kinds of security, are indirect and muted.
Importantly, these interactions are not direct confrontations. Again, I am not drawing
attention here to the repeated complaints by observant Muslims and local imams about
musicians playing during the adhan’s call to prayer. Nor by recognizing the refusal of
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concert-observers am I referring to the interventions of religious authorities complaining
about men and women mixing in public space.
Rather, the affective configuration of concert access and audience behavior
described here helps to recognize a flipside of aspiring cosmopolitanism and “middle
class-ness.” Especially in Amman’s expanding music scene, there are staged
opportunities for the performance of cosmopolitanism – in venues that are specifically not
exclusive (both spaces described here are public parks) – that Ammanis actively refuse.
That is, when privately run festivals clearly trading in the “cosmopolitan international”
enter and appropriate lower-middle-class and working-class space, they are pointedly not
greeted by the frameworks of aspiring cosmopolitanism Schwedler talks about.102 This is
not to suggest that aspiring cosmopolitanism does not exist in other places and at other
times. It is however to note that in particular it does not seem to exist here, at the
intersection of bifurcated East and West Amman, among ordinary users of park spaces.
This is so despite or perhaps because of the framework mobilized by concert organizers.

102

“Cosmopolitan international” is Schwedler’s phrase. To be sure, Schwedler locates most aspiring
cosmopolitanism in the malls, traffic circles, and clubs of West Amman, not in East Amman. She doesn’t
address the negotiations of cosmopolitanism in “shared” public space, like the downtown plaza, that I am
addressing here. (Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan.”)
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Figure 4.9: “Dhafer Yousef during the closing concert of the Al-Balad Festival.” This concert was
held in the larger Roman Ampitheatre, Note the continuation of regular use of the downtown space
outside of the theatre (beyond the proscenium walls, lit in blue). Entrance to the auditorium is
through the proscenium walls for both musician and audience. There is no enclosed “back stage”
space. The smaller Odeon theatre is off to the left in this photograph. Dhafer Yousef is a Tunisian
jazz musician and composer. Photograph by the author, August 3, 2015.

Raed Asfour, the artistic director of the Al-Balad theatre and of the bi-annual
music festival of the same name, also spoke of introducing audiences to different sounds
and to new music. He was keen to emphasize that the festival was for “everyone.”
Specifically, Asfour told me that the festival’s ideal audience is “the people” [el nass] …
in every shape and form: age, economic class, education level.”103 Over the course of our
conversation, Asfour continued to deny any outward characteristic that could delineate
the make up of el nass (age, economic class, education level). Curiously then, in our
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Interview with Raed Asfour, Artistic Director of Al Balad Theatre; August 16, 2015, Amman.
Translation from the Arabic is my own.
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conversation about the relationship between the festival organizers and attendees and the
ordinary frequenters of the downtown plaza where the Roman theatres are located,
Asfour automatically made a distinction. He told me, “No one goes there to build
relations with them, to teach them about art… and unfortunately their economic level
doesn’t allow them to attend a play regularly.”104
Despite asserting that the festival’s target audience had no “economic level,”
Asfour here easily identifies real difference between the Ammani citizens who notice the
festival is taking place – concert observers – and those who actually attend – concert
goers. Asfour related to me how this difference has historically been embodied in
animosity, when the concert goers arrive and “steal” the plaza from those forced to
observe the dispossession: its everyday users. The concert goers’ arrival, typically
accompanied as they are by the police, internal security, and mukhabarat (because the
festival is an official event), effects the layout of the public space (corridors are
constructed, the theatres roped off) as well as changes who has access to which parts of
the plaza (tickets are implemented). All of this happens without “us” [the festival
organizers and concert goers] asking “their” [everyday users of the space] permission.
Asfour concluded, “of course they don’t have the power for you to ask their permission
anyway. These things are tied up with the municipality.”105 Here is the staging of middle

104
105

Added emphasis.

In the late 1990s, the municipality planted trees in the downtown plaza that is historically home to the
smaller Odeon theatre and the larger Roman ampitheatre (they are both ruins of the Roman city of
Philadelphia). At night at that time, the plaza was unlit, dark, and very sketchy, known to be the hang out of
zaʿran [“troublemakers”]. Asfour recalls during their first efforts to host events in this space, people from
outside the neighborhood (the target audience) refused to attend, and young men and boys from the
neighborhood regularly threw stones at them. In 2012 the municipality cut down most of the trees and tiled
the plaza, adding lights. It is now a popular, shaʿabi, space frequented by inhabitants of the neighboring
hills of East Amman on every night of the week: families, young children, couples, and groups of young
men alike. Asfour claims that the rapport between the artistic community, its audience, and the regular
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class consumption as “inclusivity” in full relief. Clearly, organizers are keen to draft an
“inclusive” cultural product, staging it against the stunning backdrop of Jordan’s ancient
heritage.106 This is despite the obvious divisions the festival stages between audiences
and potential audiences in the downtown plaza.
Asfour claimed organizers offered free tickets to interested parties once they sold
as many as they could. He took pains to describe to me one pre-adolescent girl who
attended five concerts for free, accompanied by a female festival volunteer, who would
“pick the girl up” from her mother (who was in the park around the theatre but did not
wish to enter) and return her to her family once the concert was over. With the exception
of Mounir Troudi (Tunisia), Morabba3 (Jordan) and Tarraband (Sweden/Iraq), however,
the venue hovered around half empty.107 During the hip hop acts performed by Boikutt
(Palestine), Khotta Ba (Jordan), and El Rass (Lebanon), the theatre was less than half
full.108 The point here is not only about exclusion at the point of ticket pricing, however.

users of the space is improving, a status he described thusly: “They have to get used to the fact that there’s
[going to be] art there.” Adding, “even if individuals are just hearing from the outside [of the theatre], they
are still hearing something different – not to say better or worse [than they would otherwise] – just
different.” This, for Asfour, speaks to the social value the festival brings to Amman and to Jordan.
106

This, Parker elaborates, is part of the Hashemite narrative as well: using Jordan’s spectacular natural
landscapes and ancient heritage as part of its specific appeal (specifically for its tourism industry) against
whose backdrop its emergent modernity is all the more precious and spectacular. (Parker, “TunnelBypasses and Minarets,” 111-112.)
107

The one concert I did not attend was that of the Jordanian indie rock band Zaed Naes.

108

Tickets for Boikutt and Khotta Ba’s concert was 7 JD, the cheapest concert in the festival. This cheaper
ticket was a compromise with Boikutt who requested a 5JD donation as a condition for participating in the
concert. My own perception, shared by some of the musicians who performed, is that more could be done
to lessen the very obvious class barriers operating in a public, Ammani space. Khotta Ba told me:
To be honest I’m against doing a show in a place like this and not letting the
neighborhood kids in. These kids were running around behind the backstage and
throwing stones [at us]. Man, let these kids in, the theatre was empty anyway. But that’s
how the organizers think. At the end of the day, they want to break even. They’re not
here to solve society’s problems.
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The large refusal to enter the concert space, if Asfour’s claims to offer tickets to
interested parties for free are truthful (think especially of the mother of the girl Asfour
mentioned – even to accompany her daughter she preferred not to enter), do more than
highlight the misfires of the inclusive intentions of the festival organizers. In them we can
begin to see a pattern of deliberation, calculated negotiation, and certainly palpable
affective tension conducted between Ammanis in and around concert venues. Importantly
for the effect it has on musicians and their ability to communicate with their gathered
audiences, these tensions do not stay outside the theatres but enter concert spaces, as
well.

Divided attention

When dusk fell on Day One of the Word is Yours Festival, the environmental
challenges of the day (the sun, schedule changes, negotiations with local authorities)
faded. But audience attention remained divided. The gathered crowd nearly erupted in
fistfights more than once. As Satti, Malikah and Bu Kolthoum took the stage for their
final sets, groups of boys took to teasing each other. One adolescent in particular nearly
found himself knocked out more than once after repeatedly spraying water at strangers in
the crowd. Sawalha herself intervened at least twice. Which is to recognize that even at
the climax of the event, two experienced rappers still did not hold the audience’s
attention.
This seemed obvious enough to the performing rappers. On stage, Malikah
frequently appeared removed, not connected to her audience, an irritation she expressed
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vis-à-vis problems with sound, rolled eyes at mic problems, sarcasm about the (small)
size of the stage (making it difficult for her and Bu Kolthoum to move), as well as
frustration with the crowd itself. She seemed to be rapping over them, above their heads,
not with and to them. Months earlier, under rain in the garden of the Jadal cultural center,
Bu Kolthoum was able to hold an affective exchange that was much more focused and
powerful than the much larger, sprawling audience at 7Hills at night.109 The Word is
Yours Festival, despite being truly accessible, held in public space, free, inviting a range
of audiences and modes of interaction, was not able to provide the conditions for a
widespread, felt connection between rappers and the gathered audience.
Awareness of how others were using the space constantly absorbed audiences’
attention. The teen teasing the audience by spraying listeners with water observed and
attempted to take advantage of how some were using the space. At the same time, others
noted with apprehension the behavior of this teen and those who responded to him. These
contests operate below and beyond the more official deliberations between organizers
and musicians and between organizers and different Jordanian authorities. Nonetheless,
these attentions compete with that which rappers seek from their listeners.

109

At Jadal, I suspect the crowd was much more self-selecting, less heterogeneous (predominantly Syrian),
and familiar with his work. Here, in a context open to the public, the attention audiences spent on each
other prevented an earnest engagement with the rappers and their work.
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Figure 4.10: “Divided Attentions.” Audiences during Malikah and Bu Kolthoum's set at the Word is
Yours Festival in the 7Hills Skatepark were distracted from the performers. Photograph by the
author, October 4, 2015.

*

*

*

The nuances in lyrically performed resignation are missed when audiences are not
listening, or when other factors compete with their attention.110 As I elaborated in the
previous section, given that rappers are increasingly invested in more abstract and less
explicit navigations of politics, their work suffers when audiences are distracted or when
listening is not focused. The configurations that distract audiences from rappers in
Amman – the meticulous attention to different attendees and observers, the recognition of
110

DJ Sotusura credited the growth in the hip hop scene in Amman to the printing of CDs, which allowed
audiences to listen on their own, on their own time. (Interview with the author.)
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divided (and contests over) public space – dissuade tarab from emerging. These same
factors and the divided audience attention contingent upon them, contribute to musicians’
frustration performing in Amman.
At the same time, when the divisions between concert goers and concert observers
are as pronounced as they were in the festivals I discuss in this section, the nuanced,
poetic political deliberations that rappers in Amman offer are competing with muted but
very real and blatant contests over public space. Audiences’ inability to connect is often a
refusal of cosmopolitanism and the class package it often comes in. For the most part,
rappers’ strategies to connect with these audiences and overcome this perception are
limited to negotiations with concert organizers over ticket prices and recognition amongst
themselves that concerts are exclusive. Rappers interpret a lack of respect for their work
in listening behavior that is not focused on, and cannot appreciate, their often quite dense
lyrical experimentation and contemporary musical innovation. But audiences and
potential audiences (and especially those potential audiences who refuse to engage) are
constantly – if with restraint – performing their perception that concerts are not designed
to respect nor communicate with them.111 This gap of expectations is of course at the
heart of the neoliberal constellation of cosmopolitanism, growth, and cultural production
that physically divides the city and that nurtures so much of the malaise, anxiety,
frustration, and disgust so many of my interlocutors expressed in Amman.
Conclusion
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This is something many interlocutors credited El Far3i with overcoming, ever so slightly, in how he was
able to engage different audiences in different venues. (Interviews with Sotusura, Nasser Kalaji, and El
Far3i.)
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In this chapter, I have attempted to account for some of the affective
contradictions accompanying the recent establishment of Amman as something of an
independent music concert hub. In Part One “Cultural Hotspot,” I considered the
expressed desire to leave Amman expressed by musicians and music producers that
persists despite the growth of concert opportunities in Amman. I suggested that this
desire underscores the political quagmire that is worsening in the city, despite, or indeed
because of recent flows of financial, demographic, and humanitarian capital. In Part Two
“Performing resignation” I focused on some of the ways in which some rap in Amman
navigates this political reality. I suggested that one prominent political feeling expressed
in some powerful rap in Amman is resignation and that performing this resignation points
to politics in progress. In that section I underscored the musical, affective, and lyrical
elements in this work that are conducive to the emergence of tarab.
In the final section, “Divided attention,” I wondered why, despite these musical
and affective elements, tarab seemed particularly evasive in Amman. Here, my own
participant observation balanced out rappers’ testimony expressing frustration with
audience behavior. This led me to an exploration of concert access and audience
behavior, specifically in an assessment of the tension between concert goers and concert
observers. Ultimately I argued that divided audience attention in concerts in public spaces
distracts listeners from the nuances in rap lyrical work, which especially for audiences
unfamiliar with the genre, often culminates in dismissal or ignoring the performer,
instead of intense connection with them. At the same time, the cosmopolitanism of rap
concerts similarly dismisses swaths of the population in pretends to serve, despite artistic
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or political intentions of the rappers themselves. These realities influence the affective
texture rappers are able to conduct.
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Chapter Five: Beirut
Poetics of Disgust
Overview
The state of the Arab world is disgusting. So I said
to myself, I’ll throw up on a city filled with shit,
that’s paved with grime.
~Raed Ghoneim (Sot Gilgamesh),
“Istafrigh” [“I throw up”].1

Figure 5.1: “Graffiti on Dbayeh road in Beirut.” Graffito reads, “You disgust us.” Graffiti is almost
2
legal in Beirut, a considerable creative industry has sprung up around this fact. Photograph by the
author, September 2012.

1

“Istafrigh | Raed Ghoneim ‘Sot Gilgamesh’” [“I throw up | Raed Ghoneim ‘Voice of Gilgamesh”], Sound
Cloud audio recording, 4:57, posted by “Gilgamesh,” accessed April 1, 2016,
https://soundcloud.com/sootgilgamesh/s0nt2e9dmty8.
2

For analysis of Beirut’s graffiti and its history see Marwan Kraidy, “A Heterotopology of Graffiti,” in
Proceedings of the Conference “Inverted Worlds: Cultural Motion in the Arab Region,” Beirut, October 418, 2012, published August 16, 2013, accessed March 18, 2016,
http://www.perspectivia.net/publikationen/orient-institut-studies/2-2013/kraidy_graffiti and Rasha Salti,
“Urban Scrolls and Modern-Day Oracles: The Secret Life of Beirut’s Walls,” Third Text 22(2008): 615627.
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Like the previous two case studies, this chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first
section, I establish the neoliberal context of the cosmopolitan growth of the city of Beirut.
As in Ramallah and Amman, in Beirut I also locate rap concerts within the gentrifying
energies of the cosmopolitan avenues of the capital city. In the opening section of the
chapter, I trace the configuration of capital and geography unique to Beirut that has
allowed for its specific patterns of gentrification. The sectarian configuration of the
oligarchy, the seeming weakness of the state, the presence and pull of the Lebanese
diaspora, and growing anti-sectarian protest movements affect how Beirutis conceive of
and move through the city while determining where concerts are held and who can
attend. Like recent literature critical of Beirut’s urban development, I suggest that paying
attention in particular to the rapid growth and death of Monot Street, Gemmayzeh Street,
Hamra Street, and Armenia Street (Mar Mkhayel) allows for a critical appraisal of
Beirut’s “creative industries.” Situating rap concerts at the confluence of these
gentrifying energies helps to understand how audience dynamics in them operated. In this
section, I also point to affective configurations that have emerged in response to the
particular constellation of uneven cosmopolitanism and neoliberal incursions in Beirut. I
suggest widespread articulations of disgust point to particular politics in progress.
In the second section, I explore how rap lyrics diverge from Lebanese political
narratives, especially around discourses and reasoning of power-sharing, identity,
nationalism, and sectarianism, and romanticism about ideas of the city of Beirut. Starting
with rap songs that take as their subject the city of Beirut, I explore how articulations of
disgust open ways to express alternative politics and social interrogations that run against
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the grain of mainstream political discourse. This allows me to begin formulating how
expressing disgust informs the emergence of tarab in some rap in Beirut.
In the third section, I build on this analysis of tarab by circling back to an analysis
of audience dynamics and performer-listener communication. As in the previous case
studies, in the final section of the chapter I consider how considerations of concert access
inform a class reading of audience dynamics. In particular, I address how the refusal
enacted in articulations of disgust are mirrored in audience behavior when audiences
travel with the performer from outside the cosmopolitan avenues of the capital. Hearing
and responding to local, ghettoized concerns on central, cosmopolitan stages allows for
an enactment of disgust in audience behavior that is as politically palpable as it is
aesthetically integral to rappers’ presentation of their work.
Throughout this chapter, I propose understanding the dynamics held in tension in
rap in Beirut as a product of affective disgust. Disgust is indicative of politics in progress.
It is affectively different from performed resignation I identified in some rap in Amman,
but it points to similar grasping for and working through both material and affective
realities in Beirut.3

3

Research in Beirut was conducted intermittently between 2011 and 2016. Two travel grants from the
Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut, funds from Professor
Judith Milhous’ Chair as well as a GC Doctoral Students’ Research grant helped in part to facilitate this
research. I am grateful for the trust all of these put in my research. Some of the content in this chapter will
appear in El Zein, ““Resisting ‘Resistance’: On Political Feeling in Arabic Rap Concerts” in Arab
Subcultures: Transformations in Theory and Practice, ed. Tarik Sabry and Layal Ftouni (London: I.B.
Tauris, forthcoming 2016).
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Part One: “How is there ‘no state’”?
There is a state. And this is what it looks like.
~Jana Traboulsi
People aren’t comfortable but they will still go and
party. They think like, look, they just hit a Shiʿa
neighborhood, and then they hit a Sunni
neighborhood, now it’s the turn for a Christian
neighborhood. So I won’t go out in Gemmayzeh.
~Camille “Camo” Najm, owner of
Yukunkun pub4
This is no capital of culture. It’s a wrestling wring.
~El Rass, “Borkan Beirut” [“Beirut’s
Volcano”]5

In the protests that rocked Beirut in the summer of 2015, a series of memes
circulated on social media. Originally created by Jana Traboulsi, they all read “How
come there is no state? There is a state, and this is what it looks like.”6 The text was
superimposed over images of police brutality against peaceful protesters.7 The memes,
which were shared as part of the protest energies surrounding the “#Tol3et_Re7etkom” or
#YouStink protests following the 2015 garbage crisis, highlighted and inverted the

4

Interview with the author, August 28, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Najm are taken from this
interview. Translations from the Arabic and French are my own.
5

El Rass, “Borkan Beirut,” on the Kachf el Mahjoub [Unveiling the Hidden] album, released 2012. Lyrics
translated by Moe Ali Nayel, published in “Exploring Popular Literature: Arabic Hip hop,” edited by
Rayya El Zein, Shahadat Winter 2012, 64-69.
6

Ziad Abu-Rish and Jana Traboulsi, “Lebanon: What Do You Mean There is No State?,” Jadaliyya,
August 29, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22506/lebanon_whatdo-you-mean-there-is-no-state.
7

Outrage over police brutality emerged around the August 19, 2015 turning point. See among others
Robert Mackey, “Lebanese Police Beat ‘You Stink’ Activists in Beirut,” New York Times, August 19,
2015, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/middleeast/lebanese-policebeat-you-stink-activists-in-beirut.html.
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popular Lebanese complaint wein al-dawleh? [where is the state?].8 The meme’s
response to the question: “there is a state, and this is what it looks like” overlaid on
different images played with disdain, derision, and outrage in response to the popular
complaints about the absence of a state that served people’s interest. The meme worked
to further protest energy by emphasizing that there was a state: a corrupt, dysfunctional,
powerful state mobilized against its own people.
The Lebanese government has been crippled by a political stalemate for years.
Largely the result of an impasse between the “March 14” and “March 8” coalitions, the
deadlock reflects the “confessional” power-sharing system (muhasasa taʾifiyeh), on
which Lebanese domestic politics are based. Posts in the government and seats in the
legislature are distributed according to religious sect as stipulated in the Lebanese
Constitution (1926) and the Taʾif Agreement, which ended the Civil War (1989). The
impasse also reflects the power sharing agreements enshrined in the Lebanese
constitution since independence from the French in 1943 and the continued hold on
power of a handful of oligarchs and political families (many of which are the same who
led warring militias during the country’s fifteen-year civil war [1975-1990]).9 The
impasse finally reflects regional struggles for power: the so-called “March 14 Coalition,”
led by the Future Movement, is supported by Saudi Arabia and the West while the
“March 8 Alliance,” led by Hizbullah, is supported by Syria’s Bashar al-Assad (support
8
9

http://www.youstink.org, accessed March 12, 2016.

The Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) was catalyzed by the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies in Israel, the
expulsion of Palestinian fedaʾyeen and the PLO from Jordan in 1970 and the confessionalism built into the
Lebanese constitution. The war was ostensibly fought on sectarian lines (Maronite Christian, Sunni
Muslim, Shiʿa Muslim, Druze, and so on) and divided the city into largely Muslim West Beirut and
predominantly Christian East Beirut, separated by the notorious “Green Line.” On the civil war and
competing narratives over myth and fact in Lebanese history, see Kamal Salibi, A House of Many
Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: U of California P, 1990).
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which has been reciprocated by the intervention of Hizbullah fighters on the side of the
regime in the Syrian conflict) and Iran. 10 At time of writing, the country has been without
a president for nearly two years (since May 25, 2014).11 Reflecting the relationship of
private capital to state institutions that has led Laleh Khalili to refer to Lebanon as the
“neoliberal state par excellence,” when political deadlock occurs, public services in
Lebanon suffer. 12 The Lebanese have seen increasing crises in education, transportation,
electricity, and even basic services like trash collection, as was the case in 2015. At that
time, the government contract with Sukleen, a waste management company, expired and

10

“March 14” is so named for the start date of the “Cedar Revolution” which began on the one-month
anniversary of the assassination of then Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri by a truck bomb on February 14,
2005. Those responsible for the bombing have never been caught, despite the UN’s Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (as is the case with those responsible for a slate of assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians and
journalists between 2005 and 2007). The March 14 alliance is fronted by the Future Movement (the party
of the assassinated Prime Minister – largely Sunni Muslim) and includes the Kataeb party (Maronite
Christian) and other groups. The “Cedar Revolution” (named for the Cedar tree, national emblem of
Lebanon and featured on its flag) involved weeks of marches by supporters. One of their primary demands
was the end of Syrian influence in Lebanese politics and the withdrawal of Syrian soldiers and intelligence
officers from Lebanese territory. As a result of the demonstrations, Syrian forces completely withdrew
from Lebanon on April 27, 2005. On the Syrian-Lebanese relationship see, for example, Bassel Salloukh,
“Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed,” Middle East Report 35(2005), accessed March 12,
2016, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer236/syria-lebanon-brotherhood-transformed.
“March 8” is so-named for counter, pro-Syrian protests that occupied the downtown plaza
beginning on that date in 2005. It is made up primarily of the Shiʿa groups Amal and Hizbullah, but
includes other parties and sects as well. The March 8 coalition’s popularity and prestige grew considerably
following the Israeli bombardment of the South of Lebanon and Beirut in 2006. On the polarization of
Lebanese political discourse into these two camps, see Maya Mikdashi, “The Space Between: March 14,
March 8 and a Politics of Dissent,” Jadaliyya, August 6, 2011, accessed March 12, 2016,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2333/the-space-between_march-14-march-8-and-a-politics-.
11

This is not the first time Lebanese parliamentarians have been unable to come to an agreement about the
role of the presidency. The 2008 election that put Michel Suleiman in the position of president was
preceded by twenty months of deadlock (during which the position was left vacant). For context on the role
of the president in the Lebanese constitution, see Elias Muhanna, “The Lebanese Presidency, Twenty-Five
Years after Taʾif,” QifaNabki, April 26, 2014, accessed March 12, 2016,
http://qifanabki.com/2014/04/26/lebanon-president2014/.
12

Laleh Khalili, “The Politics of Pleasure: Promenading on the Corniche and Beachgoing,” Society and
Space 0 (2015): 7.
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Figure 5.2: "How is there no state? There is a state and this is what it looks like!" meme by
Jana Traboulsi (Ziad Abu-Rish and Jana Traboulsi, “Lebanon: What Do You Mean There
is No State?”) This iteration in the series plays with derision. Note that the policeman on the
left holds a baton, not a gun. The photograph of the desperate policeman used in this meme
went viral in August 2015. The effect of its use in the meme was to draw attention to the
pathetic and frightened reactions of the state to peaceful expression of the protesters.

was not renewed, leaving thousands of people without waste collection for weeks. While
not the first time this had transpired, in the summer of 2015 this garbage crisis catalyzed
the “You Stink” protests – a spontaneous, non-sectarian outpouring of largely youthful
protesters, concentrated predominantly on scheduled week-end protests between Riad al-
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Solh Square and the Serail (Parliament building) in August, 2015.13 Of course the lack of
public services are only the most recent reason to recognize the twisted shape of the
Lebanese state. For years, the inability of the state to provide basic security for its
citizens has been the more pressing concern.
The most recent mobilizations against corruption and the sectarian government
are part of ebbs and flows of both capital and confidence in the city’s stability. A detailed
history of the city, even of just the past ten years, is outside the range of this chapter. But
pointing to a few significant flows of capital and affective energy will serve to root my
discussions of specific rappers and their concerts in the pages that follow.
Many studies of post-civil war Beirut have focused on the oligarchy that led the
reconstruction of especially the downtown area, re-opening Beirut as a playground for
Saudi, Gulf, and diasporic Lebanese capital.14 In particular, much attention to and
criticism of Beirut since the civil war has focused on the private company Solidere and

13

The Palestinian refugee camps in and around Beirut have long suffered basic lack of services, including
the distribution of water and garbage collection. (Rapper, producer and Bourj el Barajneh camp resident
Osloob recounted how he used to work distributing water in the camps, before blowing out his shoulder
and injuring a foot and focusing his attention solely on musical production.) In addition, the populations of
the South of Lebanon as well as the Bekaaʿ have notoriously been neglected by the State. This of course
has allowed the popularity of groups like Amal and Hizbullah, who besides working to present these
ignored interests in the state also work as basically social service networks, providing some of the services
the state does not. This was especially pronounced in the reconstruction of Southern Lebanon following
Israel’s 2006 bombing. The interruptions in the provision of services in these communities largely have not
drawn the attention of the general Lebanese populace. But a similar crisis of trash collection did draw
attention in 2012. See for example, Nora Stel and Rola el-Husseini, “Lebanon’s Massive Garbage Crisis
isn’t its First. Here’s What that Teaches Us,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2015, accessed March
12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/18/this-isnt-lebanons-firstgarbage-crisis-and-what-that-should-teach-us/. For wider implications of this, see Nora Stel and Irna van
der Molen, “Environmental Vulnerability as a Legacy of Violent Conflict: A Case Study of the 2012 Waste
Crisis in the Palestinian Gathering of Shabriha, South Lebanon,” Conflict, Security and Development
15(2015): 387-414.
14

The downtown area, which featured an open market and was the city’s foremost mixing ground across
both class and sectarian lines, was completely decimated more than once during the fifteen-year civil war.
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Figure 5.3:" Solidere will end in 2019." Private contest over space and political power is openly
deliberated and hashed out in the public sphere. The St. Georges hotel and marina, pictured here,
was surrounded by a joint venture between Solidere and Stow – what was transformed into the
“Zaitunay Bay” complex (opened 2011). Unable to force the St. George hotel owner Fady Al-Khoury
to sell, Solidere instead blocked the St. George’s access to the sea. Since 2009, the abandoned hotel -which ironically perhaps is directly in front of the spot where the former Prime Minister was
assassinated, marked with a large bronze statue (not visible here) – has sported this giant “Stop
Solidere” sign. In late 2015 the building’s façade was also outfitted with lights, so that at night
passersby can see written in block letters above the sign “St George will prevail” in white lights and
below the sign” Solidere will end in 2019” in red lights. The blue and white trilingual signs in the
foreground (which appear every couple hundred feet around the property) read, “You are in the St.
Georges Bay” in English, French, and Arabic. They are part of the attempt of the latter to name and
claim space. Photograph by the author, October, 2015.

former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri’s influence in that company’s buying and selling
off of the city’s most touted real-estate.15 This literature has highlighted the continued
15

See for example, Aseel Sawalha, “The Dilemmas of Conversvation and Reconstruction in Beirut,” in The
Emerging Asian City: Concomitant Urbanities and Urbanisms, ed. Vinayak Bharne (Oxon: Routledge,
2013), 148-157; Saree Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age
of Solidere,” Critical Inquiry 23(1997): 660-705; C. Nagel, “Reconstructing Space, Re-Creating Memory:
Sectarian Politics and Urban Development in post-War Beirut,” Political Geography 21(2002): 717-725.
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tension in post-war Beirut, examined how discourses of consumption have attempted to
unify the disjointed, war torn populace, and focused on campaigns of civil resistance to
Solidere.16 These studies have importantly worked to trouble the narratives Solidere and
other developers have imposed on the city, while exploring the tenuously-held together
reality of the Lebanese state.17
On this note, it is common knowledge in literature on Lebanon that the Lebanese
state has never exhibited features of a Keynesian apparatus common in Western
contexts.18 For better or worse, an important swath of literature on Lebanon has identified
it as a textbook example of a “weak” or “failed” state.19 This literature has led Nikolas
Kosmatopoulos to name Lebanon a “prestige zone [for] theorizing” the concept of the
failed state.20 To be sure, Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing agreement is in quite
marked distinction to the authoritarian monarchies and other autocratic regimes in the
16

Aseel Sawalha, Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and Space in a Postwar Arab City (Austin: U of Texas
P, 2010), Kindle edition; Craig Larkin, Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the
Past (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
17

For an application of the theory of the “right to the city” to Beirut’s reconstruction efforts, see Mona
Fawaz, “Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from Beirut’s Periphery,” Development and
Change 40(2009): 827-852. For examples of civil resistance see: Civil Campaign to Preserve the Dalieh of
Beirut, “Revisiting Dalieh: Beirut-Based Events,” Jadaliyya, May 28, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21737/revisiting-dalieh_beirut-based-events-31-may_-12-j. Laleh
Khalili, “This Sea is Mine: A Review,” [review of the Dictophone Performance Group’s piece “Why This
Sea is Mine?”], Jadaliyya, September 4, 2012, accessed March 12, 2016,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7205/this-sea-is-mine_a-review.
18

Marieke Krijnen and Christian De Beukelaer write, “contrary to most Western contexts that have a
history of Keynesian state interventionism and welfare provision, the state role in Lebanon has never been
that of a social provider.” (Krijnen and De Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict: the Various Drivers of
Diverse Gentrification Processes in Beirut, Lebanon,” in Global Gentrifications: Uneven Development and
Displacement, ed. Loretta Lees, Hyun Bang Shin, and Ernesto López-Morales [Bristol: Policy Press, 2015],
288.)
19

See among others: Farid El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (Cambridge MA:
Harvard UP, 2000) and Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a
Nation, New Edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
20

That is, Kosmatopoulos criticizes the tendency to over-theorize Lebanon’s failed state status. Nikolas
Kosmatopoulos, “Toward an Anthropology of ‘State Failure’: Lebanon’s Leviathan and Peace Expertise,”
Social Analysis 55(2011): 115-142, here 177.
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region.21 Moreover, the propensity for suicide bombings to paralyze cities or
neighborhoods,22 for militias to act outside the jurisdiction of the state, not to mention the
systemic neglect of the South, North, and East of the country,23 has made the subject of
the state’s whereabouts a constant subject of conversation among Lebanese outside of
academic circles, as in the discussion of the popular meme that opened this chapter.
This discourse continues, indeed is amplified by, a volatile security situation
drawn out over more than a decade. As the club owner Camille “Camo” Najm told me,
“People aren’t comfortable but they will still go and party,” employing as they do so a
rationale partly informed by political dynamics, and partly in denial of them. He
continued, “They think like, look, they just hit a Shiʿa neighborhood, and then they hit a
Sunni neighborhood, now it’s the turn for a Christian neighborhood. So I won’t go out in
Gemmayzeh,” as if one can predict, better than, or in absence of a state, how to protect
oneself. Moreover, the sporadic appearance of a draconian state cracking down on
individual, peaceful citizens (as highlighted visually in Traboulsi’s memes) further
structures sociality and mobility in Beirut. For example, in January 2014 Lebanese

21

Nora Stel, “Mukhtars in the Middle: Connecting State, Citizens, and Refugees,” Jadaliyya, December 4,
2015, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23290/mukhtars-in-themiddle_connecting-state-citizens-a.
22

The bombings of the past ten years – from the truck bomb that assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq AlHariri, to the most recent bombing in November 2015 – number in the dozens and have taken hundreds of
lives. Lebanese performance artist Rima Najdi interrogated the sociability of fear these bombings generated
in January 2014 with her performance art piece “Madame Bomba.” Strapped in comically-rendered
dynamite (red cardboard with bright yellow wires), she walked the iconic streets of Beirut, drawing
attention to the anxious fear Beirutis were carrying with them but not overtly addressing. See: Ellie Violet
Bramley, “Why is a Woman Dressing Up as a Bomb on the Streets of Beirut?” The Guardian, January 14,
2014, accessed March 16, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/jan/14/why-womandressing-up-bomb-beirut; and “Madame Bomba,” Facebook Event, posted by “Rima Najdi,” January 12,
2014, accessed March 16, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/events/1414168678822797/.
23

See for example, Anne Marie Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East: Kin Mutual Aid
Associations in Jordan and Lebanon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2010).
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security forces arrested the Lebanese rapper Hussein Sharafeddin, known as Abu Ali
(Double A) The Preacherman because his beard and baggy pants gave him a “Salafist”
appearance. He was arrested in the Southern Beirut suburbs of Dahiyeh the day after a
suicide bombing killed four people in the neighborhood and held in the anti-terrorism
unit before being released without charge.24 The arrest ripped through Beirut’s rap and
hip hop community, with friends and observers expressing the same kinds of disbelief,
shock, and derision that underscore Traboulsi’s memes (as in Nasser Shorbaji [the rapper
who goes by the stage name Chyno]’s Facebook post, below). In Beirut as elsewhere,
rappers are keenly aware of, and often fiercely critical of, the involvement of the state in
“anti-terrorism” operations, initiatives they occasionally related to “Western,”
specifically US, interference.
Thus, the privatization involved in the reconstruction of Beirut and the dynamics
contributing to the fracturing of Lebanon’s “failed” state are two, inter-dependent, initial
considerations in laying out the political and economic forces shaping Beirut today. A
third element is the considerable influence of the Lebanese diaspora.25 The size and
importance of the Lebanese diaspora in local dynamics are relatively unique in the
region.26 Before I moved with my father back to the city of his youth in 2006, my own
24

Staff, “Police Detain Bearded Beirut Musicians over ‘Terrorism’ Suspicions,” Al-Akhbar English,
January 22, 2014, accessed March 22, 2016, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18340.
25

For a track that explores the diaspora, playing for it, and receiving their feedback, see especially El Rass
and El Far3i, “Fi el-Jaleed” [“In the Ice”], on the album Adam, Darwin, and the Penguin, released May 27,
2014. (“Fi el-Jaleed – maʿ el-Far3i” [“In the Ice – with El Far3i”], BandCamp audio recording, 4:48,
accessed March 18, 2016 https://elrass-munma.bandcamp.com/track/--6.) This track is discussed in further
detail in the Conclusion to this dissertation.
26

It is an effect of the Lebanese civil war, but also of patterns of migration for at least a century. Famines
on Mount Lebanon at the turn of the twentieth century propelled a sizable Lebanese exodus to South
America, for example. A considerable Lebanese population travels to and from Brazil yearly. Brazil hosts
an estimated seven million Lebanese (Lebanon itself only hosts around four million citizens). Claudio
Munoz, “The Lebanese Diaspora: A Tale of Two Traders,” The Economist, March 16, 2013, accessed
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Figure 5.4: “Two examples of rappers in Beirut posting on social media about the concerns of
securitization in the city.” Left, Nasser Shorbaji (Chyno) posts on Facebook with derision about
Double A the Preacherman's arrest, sarcastically suggesting that a decal of a cartoonish bomb on
Double A’s car was evidence for arresting him on suspicion of terrorism. (Facebook post, January 22,
2014). Right, Mazen El Sayed (El Rass) writes, “The rap scene is infatuated with the rapport of black
Americans with the police. I swear, brother, I have never in my life done a workshop to learn rap from
Americans, but you should ask the [Lebanese] security forces how many workshops they’ve done with
the US police.” His comments both refuse accusations that his rap is a “Westernized” product while
drawing explicit attention to the neoliberal connection and collaboration between US and Lebanese
security. (Facebook post, September 6, 2015)

relationship with Beirut and with Lebanon mirrored that of much of the Lebanese
diaspora flung across the US, Europe, Central and South America, and Australia. We
spent parts of the summer and the occasional New Year with extended family in Beirut,
meeting up both with family living elsewhere and family permanently residing in
Lebanon. As my cousins and I grew older, we spent more time discovering the city on
our own, away from the living rooms of aunts and uncles.
By 2006, diasporic visits like mine helped, among other things, to shape a pattern
of socializing on two important avenues in the city: in Monot and Gemmayzeh (on streets
March 12, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573584-business-people-lebanon-fare-betterabroad-home-tale-two-traders. See also Carolyn Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an
Open Economy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) and Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon
(London: Pluto Press, 2012).
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referred to by the neighborhood in which they are the main artery). Both Monot and
Gemmayzeh are one-way streets in otherwise residential neighborhoods that for several
years attracted intense investment in bars, clubs, pubs and other nightlife establishments,
sky-rocketing the rents. From 2000-2005, Monot hosted a potpourri of clubs and bars.
The street showcased the first concentrated investment in nightlife since the
reconstruction period and capitalized on the neighborhood’s central location. By the 2006
war with Israel [also called the July War, or harb tammuz] and the occupation of the
downtown by March 8 supporters in 2006, the street had “died.” From 2002 to around
2009, Gemmayzeh street emerged and then exploded with popularity. Capitalizing on a
“pub” aesthetic and leaning heavily on the Francophone traditions in Ashrafiyeh [East
Beirut], Gemmayzeh countered the relatively more posh club scene of Monot and the
increasing numbers of high-end roof top bars like “Sky Bar” “Le White” and “Le Gray”
boasting DJs and requiring bottle-service reservations.27 At the peaks of their popularity,
both Monot and Gemmayzeh were thronged by people in summer evenings, making it
difficult to move, much less move a vehicle. Starting in 2008/2009, Beirut’s famous retail
district, Hamra Street, witnessed a similar pattern of frantic nightlife investment in the
opening of dozens of small pubs and bars, an enthusiasm which carried through the first
years of the Arab Uprisings.28 Some of this energy capitalized on the historic role Hamra
has played as home of Beirut’s intellectuals and the Left.29 Around the same time

27

The rapport between Beirut’s Christian community, rooted in East Beirut, and the French has historically
been stronger than the latter’s rapport with other communities.
28

At time of writing, this nightlife has petered off significantly. Live music is focused at the underground
Metro Al Madina cabaret-theatre and Mizyan bar/restaurant.
29

This intellectual vibe was historically sustained by the nearby presence of several universities, especially
the American University of Beirut on parallel Bliss Street. On cosmopolitanism in Hamra, see Steven
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(2009/2010), investment picked up past the far end of Gemmayzeh street, on the other
side of town. On Armenia Street in Mar Mkhayel an especially intense pattern of
gentrification that started with bars hosting alternative music and hip hop has expanded to
include galleries and high end apartments that specifically cater to the Lebanese
diaspora.30
The development of all four of these districts is related to, indeed in some ways
hinged on, the presentation of live music. Since 2000, local Lebanese hip hop and rap has
played on stages and in venues that were part of each phase of growth. The popular ‘Eid
al Musiqah [Fête de la Musique, annual Music Festival] was staged in the early 2000s in
Monot and Downtown. Rap acts Fareeq al-Atrash and Katibeh 5, among others, were part
of the presentation of local music. In Gemmayzeh, hip hop acts played at Behind the
Green Door, and more recently at Yukunkun (opened September 2012). In Hamra, one of
the first venues sporting a “local, authentic, not corporate vibe” while “prioritizing
cultural programming and political freedom with prices accessible for young people” was
the café, library, and art space Tah Marbouta.31 Katibeh 5, Fareeq al-Atrash, Touffar, and
bands like Mashrou3 Leila all played at Tah Marbouta between 2006 and 2012. Since the
cafe was priced out of its original location and moved, Metro al-Madina in the heart of
Hamra has consistently showcased local, alternative music, including hip hop (it opened
Seidman, “The Politics of Cosmopolitan Beirut: From the Stranger to the Other,” Theory, Culture, and
Society 29(2012): 3-36.
30
31

Krijnen and De Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict.”

Interview with co-owner Bilal El-Amine, August 30, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. ElAmine are taken from this interview, which was primarily conducted in English. Tah Marbouta opened in
2006, days after the Israeli bombardment of Beirut. It initially opened (by accident) as a kind of relief hub
where different political and non political groups coordinated relief efforts. In 2011 they were bought out of
their location on the ground floor of the Pavillon Hotel and relocated to the alley between Starbucks and
Laziza (both locations are in Hamra.) They reopened in April 2012.
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New Years 2012).32 Finally, Mar Mkhayel’s gentrification was arguably initiated by two
important new music venues: EM Chill (named for the “electro-mechanic” auto-repair
shop which it transformed) and Radio Beirut. It is impossible to ignore how the
presentation of local musicians, hip hop a constant genre among them, has been involved
in the frantic, sporadic growth of different areas of the city and the aesthetic development
of its nightlife.
If alternative, local music was part of the aesthetic appeal of these gentrifying
energies in different neighborhoods at different times over the past decade and a half,
international capital was responsible for its existence at all. It is difficult to over
emphasize the role the diaspora has played in sustaining as well as driving the climbing
rents in neighborhoods like Mar Mkhayel and Hamra. Marieke Krijnen and Christian de
Beukelaer underscore how new apartment complexes in Mar Mkhayel are specifically
catering and selling to the diaspora.33 Bar owners I spoke with corroborated this narrative
and emphasized how necessary the diaspora was to their economic survival, as well.34

32

Tah Marbouta is still in Hamra but in a different location. The particularities of the space forced the
owners to focus on the restaurant side of the operation and pulled them away from cultural programming.
Bilal El-Amine told me:
I really felt like when we left the other space that they had killed us. The whole
neighborhood was being gentrified and places like us that prioritized cultural
programming and political freedom with prices accessible for young people was not
going to be possible anymore.
Metro al-Madina is an underground “cabaret” theatre that opened New Year’s Even 2012 in the small
theatre of the Masrah al-Madina complex. Since it has opened, it quickly established itself as an important
venue for local, non-commerical, musical acts and theatre productions. They also intended to open in 2006
but delayed opening because of the July 2006 war. The theatre’s artistic director, Hisham Jaber, actually
relocated to Cairo, Egypt for a time before returning to open the venue in 2012. (Interview with Hisham
Jaber, August 23, 2013. Subsequent quotations from Mr. Jaber are taken from this interview. Translations
from the Arabic are my own.)
33

Krijnen and de Beukelaer specifically locate the diaspora as one important group of Beirut’s new
“gentrifier.” (Krinjen and de Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict.”)
34

!

Interviews with Bilal El-Amine and Camille Najm.

351
When we spoke, the Swiss-Lebanese co-owner of the basement club Yukunkun in
Gemmayzeh was concerned about a constricted clientele. When I asked him if the
neighborhood in which his venue is located was part of the problem (by that time,
Gemmayzeh was “dying” and Mar Mkhayel was “booming”), Camille “Camo” Najm
related to me:
This isn’t a problem of Gemmayzeh or Mar Mkhayel. The problem is
people are offering big entertainment with which you can no longer
compete. The second thing is there aren’t tourists in Lebanon. Even the
Lebanese themselves aren’t coming [back]. And when they do, they aren’t
spending.
Here, Camo relates the importance of the diaspora in fleshing out both local and foreign
audiences. Camo’s comments also reflect the competition he feels this frantic growth puts
on his venue (“people are offering big entertainment with which you cannot compete”).
Other bar and café owners also readily related that the unsustainability of this kind of
investment when neighborhoods gentrify may be owed to money laundering. This reflects
their perception that some of their competition doesn’t seem to be concerned with making
or losing money to stay afloat.35
Especially remarkable in comparison to the other cities considered here, the
gentrification of at least five neighborhoods featured in my research in Beirut.36
Interestingly, however, this has led not to the proliferation of enduring or reliable venues
within which rappers are eager to present their work. At time of writing, there are
effectively two main venues for hip hop concerts in Beirut: Metro al-Madina on Hamra
Street and Radio Beirut in Mar Mkhayel on Armenia Street. That is, while every few

35

Interviews with Bilal El-Amine and Camille Najm.

36

These are: the Downtown, Monot, Gemmayzeh, Hamra, and Mar Mkhayel.
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years over the past decade and a half the returning diaspora was treated to new sets of
bars in a new neighborhood, this has not resulted in tangibly greater opportunities for
musicians. The rapper and producer Osloob told me, “There’s no music scene in Beirut.
There’s no movement. There’s no place for music. You know what’s the dream of the
musician in Beirut? To play with Ziad Rahbani and Fairouz.37 Of course, they’re fine
musicians, I respect them too. But there’s no creativity in [this ambition].”38 Countering
the enthusiasm of rappers from other cities who come to Beirut, Osloob suggests that
audience exposure and eagerness aside, there still is little infrastructure supporting
independent musicians in the city.
Finally, the side effect of the rising rents has meant that less and less of Beirut is
accessible to its permanent residents. Gentrification in Beirut depends on the
return/investment of the diaspora at the same time that it dispossesses Lebanese and
limits resources available to them. The frantic growth of different neighborhoods and the
official disavowal of others creates what the rapper and producer Osloob called
“schizophrenia” [infisam] in Beirut. He told me, “Lebanon is schizophrenic [fi nouʿ min
al-infisam]. The places and sociality are so different from each other. I would have
invited you to come back to the studio [in Bourj el Farajneh, in Dahiyeh], but it’s all
checkpoints and security these days. It looks like a different country.”
I return to explore the implications of the audience dynamics Osloob points to
here, when audiences travel into the cosmopolitan heart of the city to hear bands voicing

37

Ziad Rahbani and his mother Fairouz are arguably Lebanon’s most famous living musicians. For analysis
of the family’s musical legacy see Christopher Stone, Popular Culture and Nationalism in Lebanon: The
Fairouz and Rahbani Nation (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).
38

Interview with the author, September 3, 2013. All subsequent quotes from Osloob are taken from this
interview. Translation from the Arabic is my own.
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local grievances. Moreover, Osloob suggested that this schizophrenia positions rap
concerts as easier in some neighborhoods and more difficult in others. He told me that
“it’s easy to do a concert in Hamra, it’s hard to do one in the camps. It’s easy to do a
concert at Metro [al-Madina, the underground cabaret in Hamra]; it’s hard to do one in
Tripoli.” These reflections point to the uneven cosmopolitanism in Beirut. Gentrification
in Beirut seems to happen in strips, radiating in dials pointing away from each other,
concentrating intense activity on one street for a few years before moving on to another
street in another neighborhood. The concentration of investment on individual streets in
West and East Beirut is in marked contrast within a specific neighborhood. At the same
time, the investment, sociality, and cosmopolitanism in these neighborhoods is wholly
different from that in Beirut’s “periphery” – in Dahiyeh, Beirut’s southern suburbs or in
the refugee camps of Sabra, Shatilla, Bourj el Barajneh, and others “outside of” Beirut.39
The widely different infrastructure and sociality in different neighborhoods engenders the
“schizophrenia” Osloob talked about. As other researchers have documented, traversing,
or conversely, being confined to specific parts of the city (either by choice, or by shared
ideas about safety within neighborhoods) contributes to the sociality of Beirutis and
defines a geographic understanding of the city that is inherently political.40 It also, as I
39

On sociality and cosmopolitanism in Dahiyeh see Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, Leisurely Islam:
Negotiating Geography and Morality in Shiʿite South Beirut (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2013) and Lara
Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shiʿi Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP,
2006).
40

Samir Khalaf speaks of a “geography of fear” (Samir Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj
[London: Saqi Books, 2006], Kindle edition, locations 2453-2578); Steven Seidman writes of the
“territorialization” of confessional identity (Steven Seidman, “Streets of Beirut: Self and Encounter with
‘the Other,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung in collaboration with Idafat: Arab Journal of Sociology, March 3, 2014,
accessed March 22, 2016,
https://lb.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2010/09/steven_seidman_streets_of_beirut.pdf; and Craig
Larkin reproduces young peoples’ testimony recounting their self-confinement to different parts of the city
(Craig Larkin, Memory and Conflict in Lebanon, 96-138).
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will explore below, informs how attending concerts can function politically for ostracized
residents of the city. Rap has emerged in Beirut that navigates this materially-induced
social condition lyrically (as in El Rass’s track).41 Moreover, audiences confronting this
schizophrenia is part of what structures the emergence of tarab in some concerts.
Thus, privatization, sectarian oligarchy and a weak state, sporadic gentrification,
and the diaspora shape the material “uneven”-ness of neoliberal incursions in Beirut.42 A
final consideration that influences flows of affect among certain demographics in the city
is the condition of non-sectarian politics. Since 2006 the voices of anti-sectarian
dissenters flare up sporadically – and I think, following the 2015 protests – it is safe to
say with increasing vitality. But the inherently fractious nature of this organizing is also a
part of the political feelings of exhaustion and disgust discussed and articulated by many
of my more politically active interlocutors. Bilal El-Amine of the café-pub Tah Marbouta
explained:
You’ll sit at the table with ten people and they’ll all have wildly different
opinions about what to do. And there are no traditions that have been built
up, not even cores of people to navigate these differences. Once relief
work [in 2006 following the July war] was gone, there was nothing to hold
people together. Even the Arab Spring, which was the best opportunity for
people to build something, what was attempted was a disaster. During the
attempt here [“a-sha’b yureed isqat a-nizam a-taʾifee,” or, “the people
want the fall of the sectarian regime”] literally in every protest, in every
meeting, there were physical fights between people, between activists.
Really nasty, horrible meetings. [First], it was something to open up that
big: it brought in a whole array of political problems specific to Lebanon.
And [secondly] the core activists took this kind of ultra-revolutionary
approach, like they didn’t want to discuss any kind of strategy, they just
41

The subject in El Rass’s track “Anti-Schizophrenia” (2013) is not facing different parts of the city but
different sides of oneself “{Anti-Schizophrenia} El Rass aka El Sayyed,” YouTube video, 3:14, posted by
“El Sayyed el Rass” January 2, 2013, accessed March 22, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnW165RtZZo&ab_channel=!"ﻟﺮ%ﻟﺴ(ّﺪ%.
42

Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, “Cities and Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,’”
Antipode (2002): 349-279.
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thought it was a revolutionary time and people should just go with
revolution. I think this kind of atmosphere developing in Lebanon is now
kind of dead and buried.
El-Amine expresses here not only acknowledgement of the fractious Lebanese history
and politics (“an array of political problems specific to Lebanon”), he also expressed
frustration with the attitudes, (what he calls a lack of “strategy”) in new, emerging
political mobilizations. As it turns out, these independent, anti-sectarian politics and some
of the accompanying attitudes he identifies did re-emerge in the August 2015 protests,
despite El-Amine’s assessment in 2013 that anti-sectarian protest was “dead and buried.”
The “ultra-revolutionary” attitude he bemoaned also returned and similarly alienated
large swaths of the Lebanese populus, even those supportive of the protests. This attitude
was also importantly reflected in the rap scene, as I explore in the next section.
All of these factors – the attitude and fractiousness of anti-sectarian protests, along with
the factors influencing Beirut’s uneven cosmopolitanism and neoliberal growth identified
above – converge to influence the structure of political options and political feeling in
Beirut.
In her work on Beirut during reconstruction, anthropologist Aseel Sawalha has
productively located a lingering affective malaise in the post-war city. She identified
among her interlocutors a state of “limbo” that operated as an “ongoing ‘state of
emergency.’” Sawalha suggested that the “postwar case of uncertainty” permeated
through “all aspects of daily life for most residents of the city” and echoed in various
claims by Beirutis to “wait and see.”43 My own research documented similar patterns of
anxiety and confusion. My interlocutors’ testimonies mirrored in some ways the limbo
43
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Sawalha located. Many of the individuals I spoke with expressed hesitancy about
investments or next steps, iterating that they would also “wait to see what happens.” At
the same time, however, I also noticed something else in the tones of voice, expressions,
and analyses my interlocutors offered. As the Arab Uprisings and the short lived “ashaʿab yureed isqat a-nizam a-taʾifee” [“the people want the downfall of the sectarian

Figure 5.5: “Map of Beirut showing the four boulevards of gentrification discussed here.” From West
to East these are: Hamra, Monot, Gemmayzeh, and Mar Mkhayel. Other areas discussed, like the
Downtown and Dahiyeh, also situated for reference. (Map is drawn by the author and not to scale.)

regime”] occupation of the downtown fizzled out, more and more people spoke of
leaving Beirut, and a pronounced tin-like tone marked even these more hopeful
pronouncements of the future. Disgust permeated many, many of my conversations:
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about local racism and local classism, about especially the lack of opportunity for young
people in Beirut, about the corruption and oligarchy of the government, about the lack of
electricity and internet, about the lack of support for culture, about the stranglehold of
NGO funding structures on art production (and other things), about the complicity of the
diaspora or the dismal social prospects accompanying a move outside of Lebanon, about
sexism and patriarchy, about religious hypocrisy, and so on. In my fieldwork, I perceived
that the limbo that Sawalha wrote about in the early 2000s was hardening; it was
becoming darker, more cynical, more introverted, less hopeful. As Amine Younes, the
owner of a chain coffee houses, who opened the first local café (not an international
chain) in Hamra in the 2000s (Younes café), told me, explaining a shift he noticed in his
café between 2006 and 2013:
People used to come, students or young professionals, spend half an hour
order something, and go to their work or back to their studies. Now with
social media and the Internet, people come and spend three or four hours
on an espresso or a sandwich. Of course this effected us financially, but
I’m not talking about this. Socially, the talk is different. There is
pessimism. It’s not always so serious, of course. But there used to be more
positive vibes, people would be laughing. Now there’s something negative
in things. You can see it in people’s faces. Like three years ago (2010), I
started noticing this change. I cannot explain it. You have to see it, then
you notice it. It’s in their eyes. Their eyes are empty.44
Palpable in Younes’s comments here was both nostalgia and frustration. Moreover, the
statement “their eyes are empty” articulates a distance between himself and those he
spoke about, a distance marked by particular affective register. Importantly, Younes did
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Interview with the author, August 28, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Younes are taken from
this interview, which was conducted primarily in English. Like Tah Marbouta, Younes café in Hamra also
opened right around the Israeli bombing of Beirut in 2006. Younes kept a blog during the heady days of the
war: who came into the café, what they talked about. He remembers this period as particularly vibrant,
optimistic days, despite the violence. See: A Lebanese Café During the War, accessed March 16, 2016,
http://www.yawmiyat-yawmiyat.blogspot.com.
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not really express disgust here. But his comments are indicative of the darker sadness I
perceived in the testimonies of many of my interlocutors.
Disgust in Beirut is expressed as the affective result of the tension between the several
factors I have pointed to in this section. It is the recognition that the city is being stolen
from its inhabitants; the frustration with the status quo; the utter dissatisfaction with the
government; resentment towards people who leave; and the identity crises that result
upon return. As such, I consider that expressions of disgust are specific, active
navigations of politics. By distancing themselves from dysfunction, corruption, neglect,
or racism in a particular affective register, the speaker of disgust works around available
political affiliation by refusing and circumventing in specific ways the trite, disappointing
narratives of politicians, the humanitarian aid industry, and local as well as regional
nostalgia. In turn, the listener to expressions of disgust shifts weight, adopts focus, and
expresses similar or related affect. These are politics in process.
In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on expressions of disgust in rap lyrics and
performances of disgust in rap concerts in Beirut. I suggest something politically
productive operates in these performatives: in both the expression of disgust lyrically and
its enactment gesturally by MCs in live concerts. My proposal to explore a poetics of
disgust in rap in Beirut is similar but distinct from Sara Ahmed’s work on what she calls
the performativity of disgust.45 Like hers, my concern is what happens when
disgust is articulated. Differing from Ahmed’s model, however, I propose to consider the
lyrical work of disgust together with its sounding in public. Expressions of disgust

45

Ahmed centers her discussion of politics and disgust around the statement “That’s disgusting!” taking in
particular responses to the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 as an example of these political
performatives. (Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion [New York: Routledge, 2004], 82-101.)
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separate subjects and ideas from the affects they typically carry, allowing for a parsing
out of nostalgia and romanticism.

Figure 5.6: “Graffiti, Bliss Street.” Graffito right reads "state of garbage"; graffito left reads "fall of
the government of hooligans.” Photograph by the author, February 2016.

Secondly, I suggest that effect of the sound of disgust – when it is voiced out loud
– is not exactly the formation of community Ahmed writes about. Yes, a community of
listeners is required and also formed by expressions of disgust. But these expressions
encourage the articulation of disgust in return. Spitting back is neither necessarily
indicative of community formation and neither does it automatically reinforce the disgust
initially articulated. Rather, spitting back as another articulation of disgust furthers the
process of deconstruction: it is just as likely to undermine or to deconstruct the first
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speaker as it is to further the initial disgust that speaker articulated. This radiation of
invention, distancing, and critique in expressions of and listening to disgust is the politics
in progress I explore in this chapter.
Like the performance of resignation in some rap lyrics in Amman (see Chapter
Four), expressing disgust in Beirut navigates material and affective realities and points to
politics in progress. My attention in this chapter does not suggest that all rappers or all
Beirutis only voice and articulate disgust, or that they do so in a constant or consistent
register. Nonetheless, the political feeling of disgust I work to locate and describe is
palpable both in the way rap lyrics in Beirut function and in the way MCs engage concert
audiences during live events. In the pages that follow, I work to explain how this disgust
works.
*

*

*

The rapport between gentrification of certain neighborhoods of cities in the
Levant and rap that I explore in this dissertation was first encouraged by rap I heard in
Beirut, where the city is itself is a frequent enough subject of rap tracks to count for a
considerable minority in the genre. More than in Ramallah and in Amman, Beirut is often
personified as an important figure in the political and social configuration of the worlds
rappers describe. Beirut emerges as both traitor and confidante, hope and despair, culture
and barbarity, love and hate, modernity and heritage, cosmopolitan and artless. The
growth of and sociality in its streets is something rappers consistently take as a subject.
This oscillation is obvious in the track “Borkan Beiruti” [Beirut’s Volcano], a line from
which is excerpted as the epigraph to this chapter (“This is no capital of culture, it’s a
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wrestling ring.”). El Rass’s lyrics paint a picture of Beirut as ready to explode, in part as a
result of the tension of holding together all of its contradictions (similar to Osloob’s
“schizophrenia,” above). The last line of the song is “al-diʿareh wa waraqah el tout/ bimedinet beirut ʿalm“ [literally: “prostitution and the fig leaf, in the city of Beirut, is a
science]. 46 That is, the navigations between impropriety and modesty in Beirut take time
and perfecting: they are a science. These navigations may be personal, social, or political.
In this section, I have sought to outline some of the considerations that rappers
and the audiences navigate in Beirut. In the next section I consider rapped articulations of
disgust – where the subject is Beirut and otherwise – to flesh out further how rap actively
negotiates Beirut, pointing to politics in progress.

Part Two: Spitting Disgust

Revolt-ing

In the wake of the Arab Uprisings, Jeddah-based radio host Hass Dennaoui (alias
Big Hass) started a hip-hop radio blog (now also print magazine magazine) called Revolt.47 His initial posts were enthusiastic about the “revolting” youth of the MENA region
and the connection of urban culture, hip hop, graffiti, break dancing, and other forms of

46
47
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Moe Ali Nayel and El Rass, “Borkan Beirut,” 66-67.
Big Hass, Re-Volt: A Hip-Hop Blog, accessed March 12, 2016, http://revoltradio.blogspot.com.
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creative expression, to the political changes sweeping the region.48 Reading these pieces
in 2011 and 2012, I found myself frequently jarred by the use of the word “revolting.”
While Hass used it to mean “rebellious,” “revolutionary,” and “rebelling,” all I saw was
“disgusting.” I begin this section by clarifying how I intend to build an understanding of
expressions of disgust and politics in some rap in Beirut.
In her book Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal
Britain, Imogen Tyler teases apart the symbolic synonym I tripped on reading Big Hass’s
blog. Her subject is the productive tension between political discourses of disgust and
new mobilizations of protest in the UK.49 Tyler lays out two intersecting interpretations
of “revolting” from which I want to distance myself here. She suggests that there is
productive intersectionality between groups cast out as “disgusting” – fearsome, pitiful,
or otherwise abject (“bogus” asylum seekers, gypsies, the Irish Travellers, the homeless,
and others) – and new protest movements rising up against the state (including Occupy
Wall Street-type occupations, anti-war mobilization, and anti-eviction work). In
constructing her argument, Tyler leans on understandings of political disgust similar to
Sara Ahmed’s, pointed to above, when disgust is used by conservative politicians and
social commentators to cast out the “national abject”: the intruder, infiltrator, threat, and
stain on the body politic.50
The first distinction to be made is that the disgust I locate in rap in Beirut is not a
part of this kind of political narrative, the “abject politics” Tyler writes about, even
48

His enthusiasm for politics has since become more subdued. Personal correspondence with Big Hass,
October 2015.
49

Imogen Tyler, Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (London: Zed
Books, 2013).
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though the affective frameworks of fear, anxiety, and othering that Ahmed and Tyler
locate in the UK, Australia, and the US are not alien to Lebanese politics. The
Palestinian, the Syrian, the Southerner, and the Bekaaʿ, all embody a narrow space
between victim, object of sympathy, and intruder, burden, and threat. The articulated
disgust I locate in this chapter for the most part works in the other direction. That is, the
disgust I identify as politically productive in rap in Beirut is often directed at the failures
of the state, of capital, and of the hypocrisy and failure of “the Left,” “cosmopolitan”
society, and the hypocrisy of various groups. Sometimes this disgust is articulated by
those who have been conjured as victim-threats. It is not, however, the disgust of social
“pollution and contamination” – to use Mary Douglas’s phrase – that conservative
commentators invoke.51 That is, the disgust I am tracing here is not the disgust that Tyler
and Ahmed identify as political when they speak of “abject politics.”
Second, neither is the rap I am interested in Beirut the rap of protest or revolt.
And here it is actually worth drawing attention to the very recent overlap of protest with
rap in Beirut, a connection that has in the past year been made more explicit than it has
been in any city in the Levant at any time in the history of rap in the region. During the
“You Stink” protests that rocked the city in August 2015, rappers El Rass and Naserdayn
al Touffar pushed an explicit relationship between rap and protest. The song “Nihna w a
zibl jeeran” [“We have Shit for Neighbors”] was written during the protests, channeled
anger directly at the current government, its corruption, and even more specifically
Solidere by name (“ma fi reehah bi solidere, ma fi zbaleh bi solidere, hiyeh a-zbaleh
solidere” [There’s no smell in Solidere, there’s no garbage in Solidere, Solidere is the
51

Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concept of Pollution and Taboo (Oxon and New
York: Routledge, 1966).
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garbage]).52 The track reflected both rappers’ participation in the protests. The video for
the piece opens with protest footage featuring crowds chanting and ends with protesters
clearly deliberating how to protect each other from advancing police. Lyrically, the piece
opens with an incitement to protest, with the lines
They strangled you, starved you, estranged you, rise up!
They spit on you, beat you, imprisoned you, rise up!
They trapped you, put a price on you, tied you up, rise up!53
This kind of incitement to protest is related to lyrics in other Naserdayn/El Rass
collaborations, as in their refrain, “revolution is in the street, not on the screen” in their
track “Anbaʾ Hammeh” [Important news].54 In August, 2015, pieces by the two rappers
were regularly referenced by observers to the political developments.55 Further still,
songs by the duo were actually used during street protests. Their 2013 collaboration in

52

“Bu Nasserdyn al-Touffar w El Rass – nihna w a-zabl jeeran – video” [Nasserdyn al-Touffar and El Rass
– We Have Shit for Neighbors – Video (in Arabic)], YouTube video, 3:25, posted by “Naserdayn al
touffar,” August 31, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTdlfAkwpJ0&ab_channel=Naserdaynaltouffar. The song’s title plays
on Fairouz’s famous track, released in 1960, “Nihna w al-qamar jeeran” [The moon is our neighbor].
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Following the January 25 Egyptian Revolution, Edd Abbass of the group Fareeq el Atrash collaborated
with Egyptian rapper Deeb to produce the track, “Rise, Egyptian.” The refrain played with a similar
incitement to “rise,” though it was sung in a different affective register. (For Arabic lyrics and translation
see Deeb and Edd Abbas, “Rise, Egyptian!,” translated by Farah ElRewaissti, in “Exploring Popular
Literature: Arabic Hip Hop,” 16-23; for the track itself, see: “Deeb-qoum ya masree (Stand Up Egyptian)
feat. Edd,” YouTube video, 4:09, posted by “deebhiphop,”August 5, 2011, accessed March 18, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rIxIHjUWA_I&ab_channel=deebhiphop.
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“Anbaʾ Hammeh – ma’ Nasserdyn al-Touffar” [Important News – with Nasserdyn al-Touffar], Sound
Cloud audio recording, 3:18, posted by “El Rass,” early 2015, accessed March 12, 2016
https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-head/anba.
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See Azza El Masri, “Three Songs to Listen to before the Next YouStink Protest,” Step Feed, August 29,
2015, accessed March 12, 2016, https://stepfeed.com/more-categories/big-news/the-3-songs-you-need-tolisten-to-right-now-before-the-youstink-protest/#.VuapTsfF7zI; Elias Muhanna, “The Death of Ideology
and Beirut’s #YouStink Protests,” Qifa Nabki, September 1, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016,
http://qifanabki.com/2015/09/01/the-death-of-ideology-and-beiruts-youstink-protests/; and in Arabic: Fadi
el-ʿAbdallah, “El Rass w el-Touffar w el Rahl el Kabeer: Baheth el-Jeel ʿan Southo,” Ma3azef.com,
September 1, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, http://ma3azef.com/(/'(0-/(12'(#-'*(/'(#-/$34'(-5*3$%'(/; and Mohammed Ali, “El Rap fi Shawareʿ Beirut,” Ma3azef.com, September 6, 2015, accessed April
1, 2016, http://ma3azef.com/3(/'(-$1-)/(#.-6#/$3/.
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particular, “Beirut Khaybetna” [Beirut, Our Disappointment], discussed in more detail
below, seemed to prove its resonance with listeners in the street in late August. Footage
online captures a crowd of protesters reciting Naserdayn’s verse in its entirety in the
company of the rapping duo.56 (I will return to this shortly.) Lebanon, Palestine, and
Jordan had not yet seen this kind of explicit connection between rap and protest.57
While rappers and audiences testified to DAM and the Ramallah Underground’s
lyrical work being important political engagement with the Second Intifada (Dakn told
me: “every line was like what we wanted to hear,” see Chapter Three), none had this
explicit connection to the act of protest. Even in nearby Egypt, where rap grew
considerably with the energy of the January 25th, 2011 uprising against then President
Hosni Mubarak, there was not, to my knowledge, a use of rap lyrics during protests (as
there was with the lyrics of the singer Ramy Essam, for example).58
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“Fi al-yom a-thaleth” [“On the Third Day”], YouTube video, 1:49, posted by “Mak Man,” August 24,
2015, accessed March 12, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy45jFnNM5o&ab_channel=MakMan.
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In the summer of 2015, footage of rap in protests in Basra in Iraq also surfaced online. There are key
differences between the two videos of protest in rap in each city. I explore further the use of rap, its
aesthetics, and class make up even in protests in the Lebanese case below. The Iraqi context is largely
outside of my scope in this study. I do want to note however, that the rappers in this video in Basra are
clearly using the context of the protest to stage their music video. None of the crowd with them – which is a
mixed aged group of men – from boys to older gentlemen – is familiar with the track. The two rappers are
constantly pointing their neighbors’ attention towards the camera during shooting, none of whom sing
along. Musically, the piece plays like a protest anthem and the predominant lyricist is wrapped in a
kuffiyeh throughout the track. The piece ends with the rappers and the crowd chanting the popular protest
chant, bil roh, bil dam, nafdeek ya Iraq [With our souls and with our blood we will sacrifice for you, oh
Iraq]. The Lebanese iteration has none of these qualities in terms of staging, musicality, or integration with
protest chants, as I explore below. “Aghniya rab maʿ al mutazahireen (ana ʿaraq min intoum)” [Rap song
with the protesters (I am Iraq, Who are you?)], YouTube video, 4:28, posted by “Fahed al-Basra,” August
16, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3KcdSIu0vr4&ab_channel=&/73'(,81.
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As was most obvious in his piece “Irhal,” [Leave] which earned him massive popularity as well as torture
at the hands of the Egyptian authorities. For the song “Irhal,” see “Ramy Essam – Irhal [leave],” YouTube
video, 1:41, posted by “Ramy Essam,” May 6, 2011, accessed March 12, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrNIF4gLkvo&ab_channel=RamyEssam; on Essam’s detainment and
torture, see: Steve Inskeep, “Ramy Essam: The Singer of the Egyptian Revolution,” NPR Music, March 15,
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Rap concerts also became explicitly politicized in late summer 2015 in Beirut. At
the end of their concert at Metro al-Madina in Hamra on August 7, 2015, El Rass took the
mic and delivered an impassioned diatribe to the gathered audience, urging them to join
him in the streets the following day for a scheduled protest. The speech was
uncharacteristically romantic, bordering on revolutionary melodrama (particularly
surprising for an artist who usually casts himself as intellectual outsider), asking his
audience to remember those who have less of a voice (declaring at one point, “If Lebanon
isn’t for all of us, it’s for none of us!”) and culminated with audience and rapper
repeating “revolution is in the street, not on the screen.”59
The rapprochement between rap in Beirut and political protests in late 2015 are an
important part of the history of rap in Beirut and in the region. They are important
because of the engagement in both explicit politics and specific political strategy.
However, much of the affective tension held in the pieces mentioned here, and especially
the concert in Metro on August 7, are not representative of the poetics of disgust I am
interested in unraveling in this chapter. Rather, the performative disgust I am interested in
locating and analyzing emerges at a remove from the adrenaline-laden, no-time-forstrategy, you’re-with-us-or-you’re-against-us attitude the push to the street in August
2015 demonstrated. I am concerned with expressions and gestures of disgust that allow
speakers to navigate between options and realities, all of which are unfavorable, when
there does not seem to be an alternative. The rap that contributed to (but to be fair, should
2011, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/15/134538629/ramy-esam-the-singer-of-theegyptian-revolution.
59

For interviews and recordings from this concert, see Moe Ali Nayel, “From Underground to Arabic
Street Rap: Shad 3asab [Arabic],” Jadaliyya’s Status Hour 3.1 (Winter 2016), accessed March 22, 2016,
http://www.statushour.com/from-underground-to-arabic-street-rap-shad-3asab.html. For event promo and
line up see: “Shed ʿAsab” [Pulling nerves], Facebook Event, posted by “Metro Al Madina, August 7, 2015,
accessed March 12, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/events/1654745888075097/.
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neither be reduced to) the #YouStink movement, was part of affective political
production that quickly – and despite my continued support, unfortunately in my opinion
– closed down options for debating strategy and politics that were not in some way
manifest in the spectacular representation of bodies in the street. I have been at pains
throughout this dissertation to suggest that “revolution in the streets” is not the only
worthwhile political deliberation or engagement at play in the cities I study here (or
indeed, anywhere). Yet so much of the discourse of protesters, especially in rap written
and sung and played around it, emphasized this representation of politics at the expense
of other considerations. In many ways, the affective narrating by dominant voices among
the #YouStink protesters closed off politics in progress, insisting on a specific incarnation
of political action “in the streets” – similar perhaps to what Bilal el-Amine decried as the
“ultra revolutionary” stance of protests in 2011-12.
So I start this conversation about disgust and politics in Beirut with this distance.
Others will no doubt take up the affect and enthusiasm of August 2015 – which provides
ample evidence of “rap as resistance.” There are interesting politics here – especially of
how this rap and these protests ultimately fizzled, morphed, and retreated from the
positions and enthusiasm with which they started. But they will not be my concern here. I
turn my attention instead to those pieces and concerts where the expression of disgust is
not revolting but performs political deliberation. In these cases, expressions of disgust
function to release or distance the speaker from the held tension of bad options in the
political impasse in Beirut. These articulations of exhaustion by, frustration with, and
rejections of omnipresent debility and fatigue express disgust while acknowledging loss
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Figure 5.7: “Big up to all the Freedom Seekers.” Ashekman, a "street art crew" and "urban design
studio" specializing in urban street wear as well as Arabic "calligraffiti" art projects and logo design
posting on Facebook on September 17, 2015. In this post they identify a protester wearing one of
their t-shirts, which reads “hurriyeh” [freedom] in Arabic calligraphy. Ashekman is a two-man crew
made
up
of
identical
twins
Omar
and
Mohammed
Kabbani.
See:
http://ashekman.com/studio/en/about-the-artists/ (accessed March 12, 2016). Their post reads, “Big
up to all freedom seekers, justice strivers, rightful protesters and to that brave dude (whom we don’t
know) wearing #ASHKEMAN Freedom #huriyyeh T-shirt in the middle of yesterday’s protests!
Photo by AP/Bilal Hussein spotted in #Daily Star #Beirut #thestreetisours.” I include this as another
example of the momentary alignment between Beirut’s hip hop and “street art” scene and the August
#YouStink protests.

and longing. This is another example of the emotional blending ethnomusicologist A.J.
Racy attributed to tarab and which I suggest powerfully “fills the head” in some rap in
Beirut. To do so, I propose what the specific performative I am looking at – spitting –
looks and sounds like. Spitting is both lyrical and gestural. I explore specific examples of
the former here, and of the latter in the last section of the chapter.
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Tfeh!

In his book Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political,
Tarek El-Ariss analyzes Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq’s Kashf al-Mukhabbaʾ ʿan Funun
Urubba [Revealing the Hidden in European Civilization], published in 1863.60 The latter
work is a travelogue of the Lebanese writer-in-exile’s experiences in England and France
over a nine-year period. El-Ariss focuses in part on descriptions of what he calls alShidyaq’s “aversion to civilization.”61 El-Ariss suggests that al-Shidyaq’s descriptions of
revulsion to English food, city living, and rural poverty invert the narratives of
modernization and civilization English imperialism was at the time forcing on much of
the planet. He suggests that in al-Shidyaq’s writings, “the body of the Arab traveler is
staged as a site of ingestion and expulsion, incorporation and rejection of European food
and ideological models.”62 In making his argument, El-Ariss rejects a psychoanalytic
reading of the retching, fainting, and queasiness al-Shidyaq describes in his experiences
in England. El-Ariss, referring to Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection, suggests that alShidyaq’s “visceral reaction to rotten meat and disgusting food could not be reduced to a
collapse in the ego.”63 Instead, he suggests that the “shameless” omnipresence of decay in
the conditions al-Shidyaq describes “is never really repressed.”64 That is, disgust in al-
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Shidyaq’s work cannot be read as a Kristevan “collapse” of the self, because the thing
with “perverse erotic fascination” is in pure view – indeed, it is everywhere. The object
of disgust in al-Shidyaq’s case is instead “rather constitutive of that which is seen and
experienced.”65
My own context is quite different, but El-Ariss’s contextualization of alShidyaq’s aversion within a context of disgust that is “constitutive” of what the author
lives is crucial to the way I also understand disgust to operate. El-Ariss’s teasing out of
Kristeva is crucial here in separating how my political account of disgust differs from that
of both Imogen Tyler and Sara Ahmed, both of whom rely in significant part on Kristeva.
Kristeva proposes that abjection is a tension of both erotic desire and “primal” revulsion.
The abject “fascinates desire” while producing revulsion. Kristeva writes that the abject
“simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject.”66 This tension “draws [the
subject] towards the place where meaning collapses,” where the border between self and
other is no longer perceptible.67 Tyler and Ahmed use this reading of ambivalence in the
abject to theorize how racist political discourses operate. This is valuable in their
contexts. It is less applicable in mine.
In my observation, the ambivalent desire that Kristeva talks about – Menninghaus
calls it a “subconscious attraction” – is not really present in expressions of disgust in rap
in Beirut.68 In this expression, like in El-Ariss’s reading of al-Shidyaq, the abject is
65
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constitutive, not repressed. In Beirut, articulated disgust with the political system or
disgusted elaborations of a number of its very real problems (which, for me here,
constitute the abject) does not imply that these speakers of disgust are somehow drawn
back, despite of themselves, to the scene of corruption, crime, abuse. The specificity of
how I suggest disgust can also work politically – not to describe the marginalized intruder
as Ahmed and Tyler do, but to frame systemic problems of corruption, inefficiency, and
oppression as expressed by those who experience them – hinges on recognizing that the
ambivalence in abjection that Kristeva describes is not at work here. As El-Ariss
recognized, there is no hope of “return” to the scene of the abject – the decaying corpse,
the rotting meat, and so on – because, in fact, there is no exit from this stage of decay and
rot. The “constitutiveness of decay” that El-Ariss located in al-Shidyaq’s “aversion to
civilization” also frames the spitting I suggest rappers and their fans occasionally engage
in when they express their disgust in Beirut.
Conversations with my interlocutors in Beirut make this omnipresence of the
abject clear while connecting this reality to a specific understanding of what constitutes
“the political” in this context. For example, when I asked Mazen El Sayed, the rapper
who goes by the stage name El Rass [The Head], about “politics” in his work, he rattled
off a list of things he has addressed in his lyrics, including: women’s rights, religious
hypocrisy, masculinity, the interference of the Gulf states, and the selling-off of the
Syrian Revolution. Then he asked me,
Is this political? I don’t know. For me it’s not. It’s my everyday vecu
[lived experience], my life. I don’t know if our lives here are too
politicized. But again I don’t know what that means. We have this
exploded reality [here, in the Arab world] where everything is mixed. If I
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talk about the policeman taking fifty thousand [LL]69 in his pocket to let
someone get into the front of line, to me this is not political: it’s what I
confront everyday. Lucky for the French that don’t have to live that, but
for me it’s still the case.70
Here, Sayed notes that the political problems he discusses – and which I note below in
more than a few instances are expressed with disgust – are so omnipresent that they are
themselves the fabric of his “everyday vecu.” In Sayed’s formulation, the “political” – is
inseparable from an “exploded reality” where “everything is mixed.” Disgusting realities
then are not fascinating in their morose appeal (“lucky for the French that don’t have to
live them”): they are suffocating in their seeming permanence (“for me it’s still the
case”). Expressed disgust in this context is as much suffocation as it is revulsion, as much
exhaustion as it is disavowal. Raps that channel this exhaustion or frustration as
articulated disgust do not so much signal abjection as a “collapse of the ego” as they are
political performatives that enact the taking in of breath through, not away from, the
contamination of the pollutant. The “stickiness” of this disgust has less to do with a
simultaneous desire for the object of disgust as it does an impossible desire to actually be
rid of it.71 Indeed, one’s inability to rid oneself of the disgusting mess is a big part of why
it disgusts, thereby driving the lyrical and gestured tfeh! – of spitting. Spitting on the
disgusting thing defiles it further. But when one spits –not on a beggar or the racialized
Other – but on social filth, systemic corruption, and institutionalized theft, it is not clear
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Interview with the author, January 14, 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent quotations from El
Rass are taken from this interview, which was largely conducted in English. French and Arabic words only
appeared sporadically.
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how much distance one actually gets from it when one does so. Especially since, there is
nowhere to go to be rid of it anyway.
In any language, rappers, (like good actors) literally spit to enunciate. My
argument here is that spitting in rap also conducts specific symbolic and affective energy.
Rappers spit their verses in the cipha, or improvised performance “battle,” and onto
recordings. To read “spitting” affectively recognizes that lyrical work deconstructs
rappers’ realities: flung into the cipha, these produce certain affects, which once flung,
are no longer in the rapper’s control. Spitting starts a political process, or furthers one. In
turn, spitting back may happen gesturally in live performance – when rappers spit directly
to specific audiences in particular concert spaces. It may also happen individually, in a
more introverted manner. This is the capacity of spitting to “fill the head.”
I am interested in the articulation of disgust – what the spitting in rap in Beirut –
does. Ahmed suggests, “to say something is disgusting is… to ‘make something.’”72
What does disgust make? Are all declarations of disgust alike? Are there different
registers to spitting? How do these affective textures differ? My navigation in this section
of “dissing,” “disavowal,” and “spitting back” – all different strategies of articulating
disgust – shows how spitting points to politics in progress.

Dissing and disavowal

The past few years in particular have seen a fracturing of Beirut’s rap scene into
cliques of socialization and collaboration. This has been manifest lyrically as well as
72
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socially; rappers have engaged their lyrical energy in so-called “diss tracks” while
reflecting their allegiances in patterns of collaboration. As I explore here, “diss tracks”
are composed with either one specific person or a general mode of being in mind. The
composition of diss tracks is of course not unique to Beirut or to Arabic rap, but the
development of the sub-genre over the past few years in Beirut is considerable,
contributing to an increasingly ugly series of falling-outs. It exploded recently in a most
public split between arguably two of the scene’s heaviest hitters – former collaborators El
Rass and El Far3i in February of 2016 (I return to this in the dissertation’s conclusion).73
Diss tracks in Beirut have evolved from more positive renderings of “working on
oneself” as in Fareeq al-Atrash’s “Njoom ʿam tiʾrab” [“The Stars are Getting Closer”]
(discussed below) to live improvised street battles, like that between Edd Abass and
Dizaster in 2014 in Gemmayzeh,74 to virulent expressions of distaste with fellow rappers
(like the two tracks referred to above, but also Edd Abbas’s “Shou hal mashkleh” directed
at Nasrdayn al-Touffar in early 2015).75 Diss tracks channel sometimes hyperbolic
disgust with “the competition,” asserting that one is not bothered while expressing
disgust with the interference the competitor poses to the speaker’s “mood.” Consider
Abbas’s verse in “The Stars Approach”:
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For an overview of this exchange see: Tareq Azzeh, “Barakeen That el Maʾ” [“Volcanoes Under
Water”], MMDRAP.com, February 23, 2016, accessed April 1, 2016,
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“The Arena – Dizaster vs Edd Abbas (First Official Arabic Rap Battle) #MobaRap,” YouTube video clip,
13:29, posted by “The Arena ME,” July 10, 2015, accessed March 18, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPQ-PC5HfS0&ab_channel=TheArenaME. See also Chapter Three.
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“Sho Hal Mashkleh (Prod Al Nather),” Sound Cloud audio recording, 1:41, posted by “Edd Abbas,”
early 2015, accessed March 18, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/eddabbas/sho-hal-meshkleh-prodalnather?in=eddabbas/sets/edd-abbas-tracklist.
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I’ll stay in this mood
Didn’t I tell you? The stars are getting closer
I’ll stay in this mood until I touch these stars
Even if I have to launch an attack on all the stars
I’ll make the Earth rotate around my finger, I told you
[…]
Every time he opens his mouth he spews them out
He lives in terror and all he does is curse
I wouldn’t throw him in my garbage, just so you know
I’ve irritated thousands and never been irritated in my life
Here, the “I’ve irritated thousands and never been irritated” expresses disgust by taking
the high road. The burn is there even while the tone is positive.
A similar mode of distancing oneself from “the competition” can be seen in a
mode of political commentary bemoaning others’ lack of action or apathy. Edd Abbas
again gives us several examples of this kind of work, as in the very popular collaboration
with Ramallah-based rapper and producer Sheʿrab (see Chapter Three), “El Rad el Salb”
[“Negative Response”].76 Consider his verse in that track:
Sitting between two screens
Witnessing two disasters
The first is in Brazil from all the goals that hit the net
The second is in Palestine, so painful that it shows
How meaningless the World Cup is compared
To the death of a people in a battle for their land
Maybe you don’t see my meaning
This isn’t juxtaposition
This one’s for those who stand in the ranks of the resistance
This one’s so you don’t forget when you’re watching football
That there’s a massacre happening next door Arab rulers are standing idly by,
crushing up painkillers
Aren’t concerned with anything besides which mall you’re going to have iftar
It’s so real It constricts the heart, it’s not a game
76

At time of writing, the track boasted 191 thousand views, far and away more than most of the tracks I
discuss in this study. “El Rad El Salb with Sheʿrap (Prod Edd),” Sound Cloud audio recording, 4:43, posted
by “Edd Abbas,” early 2015, accessed March 18, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/eddabbas/el-rad-el-salbwith-sherap-prod edd?in=eddabbas/sets/edd-abbas-tracklist.
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As for the lot of you, the only discomfort you feel is heartburn
The only thing you’re good for is grazing like goats
Your fellow Arabs are dying and it’s as if the matter doesn’t concern you
I’d imagine we’d find your conscience in a toilet bowl somewhere
Otherwise, you would have expelled the Israeli ambassador from your country
The least you can do is take a stand You don’t have to be there on the ground
Indeed, you can raise your voice against it
Even if you’re not under the bombardment
You can lend your support with a song
You can lend your support with a photo
You can lend support with the truth when you’re told a false rumor
We’re going through difficult times
So your silence is not welcome
We are in need of awareness and ancillary assistance
They’ve been so cruel to you, Gaza And there’s barely anyone that feels for you
The Lord has reserved the greatest plots of land for you in paradise.77
Here, Abbas evolves the one-on-one diss of a fellow rapper to expressions of
disapproval of his fellow citizens (“your silence is not welcome”). He expresses visceral
disgust for their inaction (“As for the lot of you, the only discomfort you feel is
heartburn/ The only thing you’re good for is grazing like goats/ Your fellow Arabs are
dying and it’s as if the matter doesn’t concern you/ I’d imagine we’d find your
conscience in a toilet bowl somewhere”). The affective distance between the speaker and
the object of speech is pronounced and the vituperative spitting is sharp. Importantly, the
“diss” of the listener is a disavowal of their passive political stance. “The least you can do
is take a stand” - “You can lend your support with a song” implies at least the speaker is
doing something. Here, it shares characteristics with the diss track, which emphasize the
speaker’s superiority compared to everyone else.
Admittedly the lyrical work this track offers a political negotiation– of supporting
Gaza from afar – that is palatable to a wide Arab audience. But disgust works as
77
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disavowal in other, more complicated ways as well. Of the more compelling expressions
of disgust are those that expel romanticism or idealism. In these, nostalgia and
romanticism are also spit from the body of the rapper as if illusions contaminate or
poison the speaker. In the work of the rap duo Touffar, Katibeh 5, El Rass, and others, we
can see the disgust for certain kinds of politicized romanticism as a rejection of what
Lauren Berlant calls a “desire for the political.” In this sense, the disgust for and
articulated disavowal of certain kinds of nostalgia and romanticism is a conscious
rejection of “cruel optimism.”78
A younger generation of Beirutis in particular increasingly identify the misfires of
narratives of pan-Arabism, Beiruti cosmopolitanism (the oasis of “the good life” in a
region plagued by conservative religiosity and authoritarianism), and reject or refuse the
optimism these images conjure, identifying them as “cruel” but also as false,
disappointing, ineffective, pathetic.79 Despite all the damning evidence of the death of
pan-Arabism, for example, its complete and total prostitution by the league of Arab
states, it is still regularly held up and spoken to as an ideal. The Arab Uprisings of 20112013 were especially cataclysmic in how they reignited these hopes. Disgust, without
trying to be “resistance,” productively disavows affects of hope, nostalgia, and
romanticism. This is similar to the refusal of sabr, sumud, and mouqawameh I identified
in the context of the second wave of Palestinian rap.
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Much rap about the city of Beirut fits into the model of disgust I am building here
and refuses the romance with the city. “Beirut Khaybetna” [“Beirut Disappointed Us”] is
a good example of the emotional blending of longing and disgust. The piece is a
collaboration lyrically between Naserdayn al-Touffar and El Rass, with music and
production by Wattar, of the Syrian group Latlatleh. Naserdayn’s verse opens the piece,
the beginning of which berates the “left” of Beirut:
This is talk of [the Right of] Return, it goes best with mazzeh,
Jaffa won’t be liberated unless the sushi is fresh
And the free, leftist revolutionary
Won’t bring up “the issue” unless there is Alamaza and young women
You like Najji el-Ali so much?
The cartoon Handala turned his back [to look] at tits
The hammer and sickle became an umbrella and the white dove of
secularism
But by the order of the religious authorities and history, the color red,
blood, and the DshK80 turned pink from the ground meat of UNESCO
Tell me how did the Left become democratic? Money came from Europe
to keep its voice down
Brother, return the Left from those who stole it – that guy sweating from
his forehead, about to break his glass of arak.81
Nasserdayn here berates a particular kind of Beirut sociality, likely situated in the pubs
and restaurants of Hamra street where self-proclaimed leftists engage in political
discussion over traditional plates of Lebanese food (mazzeh). Here, with Lebanese beer
(Almaza) and in the company of sabaya (young women – the open sociality with
Lebanese women being another romanticized Lebanese stereotype), these “leftist
revolutionaries” discuss the Right of Return to and liberation of Palestine. But Naserdayn
calls out this posturing and cosmopolitanism as invested in only a sense of Arabness
80
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The DshK is a Soviet-era heavy machine gun.

“Beirut khaybetna – Naserdayn al-Touffar and El Rass (Intaj Wattar)” [“Beirut Disappointed Us –
Nasrdayn al-Touffar and El Rass (Produced by Wattar”], YouTube video clip, 5:18, posted by “Naserdayn
al touffar,” January 11, 2013, accessed March 22, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPgDp2z3nc&ab_channel=Naserdaynaltouffar.
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(mazzeh and arak – an anise-flavored alcoholic drink), which is invoked to flirt or worse,
to womanize (Handala’s back is turned because he is distracted by women’s breasts).
Naserdayn continues to spit on the failures of the Left (“the hammer and the sickle
became the white dove”), announcing that revolutionary red (communism), spilt blood,
and engaged struggle has been diluted (“turned pink”) by the waste (“ground meat”) of
the UN. His call, “Brother, return the Left from those who stole it!” is both an indictment
pronounced with disgust at the failures of the Left and what it has become, and a
statement riven with longing, wishing for the mobilized return of something worth
believing in.
The situation of this critique of the Left within a song entitled “Beirut
Disappointed Us” makes its statement about the selling out of a political idea (“How did
the Left become “democratic”) also a criticism of social posturing particular to Beirut. In
his verse, Naserdayn clearly expresses disgust with talk and no action but also the
posturing of Beiruti liberals (and their consumption) as they masquerade as vestiges of
the Left. His verse is an example of recent rap energy in Beirut that is pronouncedly
Leftist – that is, that specifically invokes the heroes and strategies of the Arab Left in the
twentieth century.82 Musically, the whole track is underscored by a single ʿoud. The trills
on the stringed instrument counter the disgust of the lyrical spitting with the pronounced
expression of loss and longing. As the three musicians declare their attachments to cities
and places outside of Beirut, the “disappointment” in the track’s title, its chorus, and the
82
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disgust in the lyrics stages a disavowal of the romance with Beirut as home of “the good
life,” with “revolutionary leftists” as the vanguard of politics, and with romanticism of
both of these things together – of Beirut as home to any worthwhile left-leaning
socialization.83
This disappointment and disgust with Beirut’s sociality (left-leaning or otherwise)
is widespread. The sentiments Naserdayn expresses are echoed by my interlocutors
throughout this chapter – as in Osloob’s diagnosis of “schizophrenia,” and El Rass’s
lyrics in the track “Beirut’s Volcano.” It appears in the track “Ya bahar khudni maʿk,”
[“Oh Sea, Take Me with You”], as well. (I return to this track below.) In “Beirut
Khaybetna,” the speakers are keen to emphasize that their perspectives come from
outside of Beirut. The three collaborators echo where they are from – Damascus, Tripoli,
the Bekaaʿ – in the interpellations between verses and in the chorus. These expressions of
disgust with Beirut are most often voiced most forcefully from these “voices from
outside.” I now want to examine more carefully how these deliberately “not”
cosmopolitan voices are consciously cast “from outside” Beirut, and how this effects the
texture of expressions of disgust.
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Moreover, it is particularly important that this is the verse cameras captured a coterie of protesters
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Spitting back

As I mentioned above, theorists have explored how disgust is mobilized in
conservative political discourse narrating the fear of foreign or poor threats to the body
politic. In the US, Australia, and Western Europe, especially the UK, Sara Ahmed and
Imgoen Tyler have examined how especially cross-cultural encounters navigate disgust
and abjection, in the conjuring of what Tyler calls “social abjection.”84 Similar castingout of the body politic has happened in Lebanon. The Palestinian, recently Syrian, and
Iraqi refugee and immigrant populations have long been set apart as the national abject –
pathetic subjects deserving pity, but also those cordoned off in camps to avoid
contamination of the “true” Lebanese body politic.85 Understanding that these racist and
economic discourses have also figured in Lebanese politics helps to unpack how some
rap refuses dominant political narratives. Here, I want to recognize the affective spitting
that responds to conservative narratives of disgust. The ways in which refusals of racism
are articulated spit back at images built for “the Palestinian” and the “camp dweller” in
important ways.
In the track “Hadini iza feek” [“Hold me back if you can”] by the Palestinian
group Katibeh 5, disgust boils over. The refrain speaks not only to “holding back” but to
calming – hadini literally means, “calm me down.” This reference to being calmed, being
told to calm down, or to lower one’s voice echoes repeatedly in rap in Beirut. For
84
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example, Raed Ghoneim, in the track excerpted in the epigraph to this chapter (the song
“Istafrigh”), raps “biqoulouli wati sotak, shi hadan minhon yismaʿak/ bideesh, ishbaʿt”
[“they tell me lower your voice, or else one of them will hear you/ I don’t want to, I’ve
had my fill of that”].86 In the opening verse of “Maʿrktee” [“My struggles”], a track with
a very different sound but similar expressions of disgust, El Rass raps,
Strangled, I cried a lot inside so much that my chest became a sea
And the lock to it has been stolen
It’s possible the skyline is burned up
It’s possible for ones’ chest to become a trunk
And its lock in the eyes
Stop telling me to calm down87
So Katibeh 5’s track “Hadini iza feek” plays with narratives of explosive discomfort and
reactions to expressions of that distate that appear repeatedly in Lebanese rap. But the
track also pushes these refusals of politeness further.
Not simply refusing to be calmed, the MCs dare the listener to do the calming if
they are able. In this way, the track reinvents the image of the Palestinian in Lebanon: not
as pathetic victim, but as powerful aggressor. What we have in this track then is disgust
with disgust. By expressing disdain for and distancing themselves from the abject image
of the dispossessed Palestinian common in Lebanese society, Katibeh 5 spit back at a
Lebanese audience. This allows for recognition of the idea with which the Palestinian is
framed in Lebanon. It also rejects this idea. In so doing, it casts the “abject” in a position
of knowledge, access and power. Consider when the group raps:
86
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Great!
As long as you are taking my point of view seriously
You’re allowed to be taken aback and to show your irritation
Just like you show your irritation at my presence
Because I am a friend to all the images that are not desirable
This is how we live out these images and no one chooses their life specifically
I’ll tell you
The pressure of bullets and gunpowder does not allow you to move away
Experience will guide you on the road
Hold me back if you can88
When they say, “As long as you are taking my point of view seriously/ You’re allowed to
be taken aback and to show your irritation,” Katibeh 5 acknowledge the (Lebanese)
audience listening, anticipating their surprise and irritation. At the same time, they dictate
the terms of that reception, both “allowing” their surprise, while framing it with derision
(the sarcastic “ʿaal!” “great!” that opens the verse). The disgust throughout – first as
derision, then as power (“I am the friend to all images that are not desirable” – casting the
speaker as accepting hosts [in contradistinction to the Lebanese]), and finally as
frustration (“hold me back if you can”) is palpable.
The track reflects of course the perception of the Palestinian in Lebanese society.
As Osloob explained to me when he recounted the experience of performing as part of
the Fête de la Musique in Monot in the early 2000s:
I mean we knew these were not our audiences. The Lebanese are used to
seeing the sad, poor Palestinian. We didn’t fit that image. The Palestinian
that is a little violent: this image bothers lots of people. Not everyone is
able to stand this idea. I think like sixty or seventy percent of Lebanese
can’t stand to see a Palestinian in this image.
Even people coming to your concerts?
Of course. Even Touffar, even Gaafar’s audience and fans. Even this
audience is not always willing to see a Palestinian in a strong position. The
88
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Lebanese audience needs to see the Palestinian as a victim. It’s a
stereotype, of course.
Katibeh 5’s track “Hadini iza feek” is one particularly strong example of how the group
worked to counter these images of Palestinians in Lebanon. Much more recently, Gaafar
of the duo Touffar released a track one might call “on behalf of” Palestinians in Lebanon
that doubles down on the disgust and frustration Katibeh 5 point to. Especially notable in
Gaafar’s track “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” [“Oh sea, take me with you”], produced by
Osloob, is the explicit pronouncement of disgust – explicitly expressed as hatred – that
the Palestinian speaker articulates. The first half of the track is Gaafar’s rap. 89 The lyrics
of the second half of the piece with its chorus, reads like this:
He has the weakest faith, he who hates something called Lebanon
I have the weakest faith; I hate that thing called Lebanon
Oh Sea, take me with you
Oh wave, take me away
Hope is cut off here
A hellish life
Hello? They told me that Hassan left for Sweden: there, Palestinians meet
amongst themselves90
Our country is narrow;
The European is expansive, he speaks Hebrew
And he works in an NGO, spends his money, as Leftists do, in Hamra
In the camp, time is less narrow
People are wider, chest-width between the wires
So what held back those who stayed?
Hassan left for Sweden he didn’t take you with him
Because you are not handsome nor European! Hassan met David
And David is beautiful and blond
David saw Hassan the informer
89

Full Arabic lyrics in Appendix E. Note how the rap reproduced there echoes Naserdayn’s lyrics quoted
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And Hassan drew for him a bridge in David’s name: happy Hassan
Hassan boarded his flight with no tears in his eyes
Because in Lebanon, there was nothing to see him off but pain
He left one message on the phones of his friends:
The Palestinian doesn’t love Lebanon, he hates Lebanon, and he hates the
Lebanese
They want us, instead of a bundiqiyyah, to paint over our words of
Palestine, without work91
without identity
and as an insult to refugees
[…]
My brothers! You are without tomorrow here
Follow me to Sweden! The Palestinian does not love Lebanon
He hates Lebanon and the Lebanese
The Palestinian does not love Lebanon
He hates Lebanon and the Lebanese
At the door to the camp, the guard dog stops me
He craves my meat, my dreams, my knowledge
The cedar is fuel for the fires of hell, I say
And the length and breadth of this country, its people and its land, are
damned
At the door to the camp, the guard dog
and the politician
and the organizations of slavery
stop me from entering Palestine
In some ways, “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” presents an affective paradox. The lyrics
are so sharp and they are voiced with so much acerbity that, lyrically and affectively it
seems unlike so many of the tracks I have discussed in the study: the meaning in the
lyrics is so pronouncedly straight forward, there is little room to interpret ambivalence or
blending in their meaning. However, precisely like so many of the pieces I have
discussed, the musical arrangement of the piece offers an “emotional blending” that is
almost stunning. Jaafar sings a mawwal as the refrain, which he repeats under Abd alRahman Jassem’s poetry. A single, electric cello underscores the whole piece. The
91
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musical elements of “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” round out the cold, sharp lyrics and are
remarkably full of longing, of pain, and of loss. It is the juxtaposition of this loss and
longing with the pronounced sting in the fast dialogue of the lyrical section that makes
the piece a spectacular example of tarab, political feeling, and the affect of disgust I have
been discussing in this dissertation and in this chapter. Even though the last line
“Prevents me from entering Palestine” is potentially a little predictable, the preceding
poetry about the dog at the door of the camp, and especially the virulence with which
“the Palestinian hates Lebanon and the Lebanese” is articulated are especially powerful
pronouncements of political feeling.
In this piece, there is also a rejection of the optimism in the narrative of leaving Lebanon
for somewhere else. The experiences of the Palestinian Hassan, who leaves Lebanon
behind for Sweden, are articulated with pronounced disdain (importantly, by rappers who
remain in Lebanon). Likewise, the embrace of Sweden is bitterly sarcastic, reflected in
the tone of Jassem’s voice as well as the hypocritical interactions Hassan is narrated to
have with the “blond” David. The combination obviously resonated with listeners. At
time of writing, the track had nearly forty-two thousand views on Sound Cloud, Gaafar’s
second-most-listened-to track.

*

*

*

In Chapter Four, based on my fieldwork in Amman, I suggested that one
prominent political feeling that is conducted particularly well in rap in that city is
resignation. My attention there was to how lyrical expressions that narrated political
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deliberations culminating in resignation functioned performatively. I asked what did
admitting resignation do? as a way of understanding politics in progress in Amman.
Instead of a simple acquiescence to monarchy and state power, I suggested understanding
performances of resignation as a navigation of the latter alongside social and cultural
considerations in a city that is especially aware of regional demographic and financial
flows towards it. My proposal in this chapter has been to consider that different affective
textures in expressions of disgust work in a similar way. That is, my attention to what
expressions of disgust do is to testify to active negotiations of political, social, cultural,
and identitarian concerns. Lyrical expressions of disgust point us to politics in progress.
In the next section, I round out these claims by considering how disgust is reflected in
audience behavior.

Part Three: Disgust and Ecstasy
As in the previous two chapters on rap in Ramallah and Amman, in this third and
final section of this chapter on Beirut, I will consider questions of access and audience
behavior to round out the claims I have been making about political feeling. In this
section, I consider the particular qualities of tarab related to listening to expressions of
disgust. My argument is that listening to disgust is able to amplify the emergence of tarab
in Beirut especially when it is accompanied by particular audience formations. I focus in
this section on concerts where audiences have followed an MC or series of them from
outside the most cosmopolitan avenues of the capital city in order to attend a concert. I
suggest that this configuration of audience attendance in concert venues stages
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particularly vibrant exchanges and is occasionally able to produce ecstatic responses. The
emergence of tarab in these situations reflects both the disgust expressed gesturally as
well as lyrically by the performer in live performance. In addition, it also reflects the felt
neoliberal incursions shaping the contours of access that impinge on audiences and
venues on their way to and during the event. I argue that these gestural embodiments of
disgust by MCs and their fans further the spitting back I located in some rap lyrics. Thick
description from two concerts in particular illustrates how this operates: one concert of
Katibeh 5 at Masrah Beirut in ʿAin el Mreisseh in 2004 and one of Gaafar al-Touffar
with Osloob at Metro al-Madina in 2013. I begin, however, with a contextualization of
the demographic reach of hip hop in Beirut as expressed by key rappers and producers.

“Leaving the street”

In both Ramallah and Amman, rappers and producers were quick to admit that rap
in those cities was not shaʿabi – it had not reached widespread popularity and was not
commonly heard in more populist contexts. At the same time, in those cities, my
interlocutors testified that the reach of rap had extended more deeply into well-educated,
globally-oriented and ajaneb [foreigner]-heavy contexts than the poor neighborhoods or
conservative socialities of many of either of those city’s less cosmopolitan
neighborhoods. In Beirut, the presence in the scene of the groups Katibeh 5 and Touffar
in particular – both of which hail from and initially performed in very different but
equally shaʿabi contexts – have succeeded in adding a different dimension to
demographic considerations of rap in Beirut.
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The rap collective Katibeh 5 was made up of five emcees who were, until 2013,
based in Bourj el Barajneh Refugee Camp in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The camp is
inhabited mostly by Palestinians who fled Zionist forces in 1948 and 1967, their children
and grandchildren, and also by poor Lebanese and refugees from neighboring countries.
The situation for second and third generation Palestinians in Lebanon, especially those
living in refugee camps, is difficult. The majority of Palestinian refugees do not have the
papers to work, to vote, or to travel, despite being born themselves in Lebanon. Neither
does the Palestinian Authority (nor Israel, obviously) recognize them and provide them
with travel documents. In 2013, Katibeh 5 was invited to perform at the Liverpool Arab
Arts Festival. Four of five MCs of Katibeh 5 went to Liverpool and performed. While
there, they applied for and received asylum. They have been in the UK ever since. At
time of writing, the fifth Katibeh 5 MC, Osloob, lives in France.
The rap duo Touffar was made up of two rappers from Hermel, in the Bekaa.
Naserdayn and Gaafar both grew up and worked in Hermel, where the latter still lives (in
2013 he was working as a painter). Naserdayn at time of writing lives in Beirut. The duo
split up around 2010. Hermel is a small town in the North Eastern Bekaaʿ Valley that has
recently been a flashpoint in the Syrian civil war. As a “stronghold” of Hizbullah, it has
been targeted by suicide bombings and other attacks aimed at affecting the Lebanese
public’s tolerance of Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syria. At the same time, it is part of
a historically neglected region. Education and services are poor. Often the only
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opportunities for young men are joining Hizbullah or the Lebanese army. Both are
“choices” that can have serious repercussions.92
Both Katibeh 5 and Touffar (as a group and individually) have built and boast
very strong connections with the audiences in the neighborhoods where they live and
work. They all performed first for their own communities, becoming popular with
neighbors, before being invited onto the more cosmopolitan stages of Beirut. Musically,
Gaafar’s work most pronouncedly reflects the context he writes from. Most of his tracks
feature him singing a mawwal as the loop, opening, or chorus (as in the track “Ya Bahar
Khudni Maʿk,” discussed in the previous section). This musical difference in the work
has prompted others to note: “They are rapping, but it’s not really hip hop.”93 That is,
some of this musical work is quite different sonically – as such, it is easier for listeners
not inculcated with hip hop sounds to accept and embrace. Moreover, as Katibeh 5 and
Touffar grew as performing musicians, they began performing outside of the camps (in
the former’s case) and outside of the Bekaaʿ, in Beirut (in the latter’s). When they did,
they took their audiences with them. I will return to this question momentarily.
Over the course of this study, when I asked rappers if and how rap has changed in
the region over the past ten years, most agreed that it has changed and most asserted that
rap and hip hop audiences have grown: that hip hop culture is less exclusive and that they
as rappers encounter less resistance or skepticism. Osloob of Katibeh 5 shared similar
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reflections about the acceptability of rap in Bourj el Barajneh. But he also offered this
reflection on changes in the scene as a whole:
Rap developed a lot the past ten years. Rappers stopped using simple
[tafha] rhymes – like makan, zaman, hanan, hunan what everybody can
think up. Now there is serious playing with words. This is a development
in the brains of the rappers. But something else is happening. Hip hop is
leaving the street. It’s becoming more “white color” [maktab] and
“cultured” [musaqaf]. These lines like: ithab muhajaran ka il-qurunful w
inta as-seif w al-qamar.94 What? What are you talking about? Someone in
the street can’t understand this. Not all rappers are able to get their voices
to the street, to shaʿabi society or shaʿabi neighborhoods. So when they
can’t do this, they take it elsewhere. A neighborhood like Hamra, the
people in it are more ready to accept hip hop than other quarters in the
city. And there’s a lot of rappers who are not interested in this experience,
in the trial [of getting the street to accept hip hop]. It’s hard, and
sometimes it tears you up inside. But it’s worth going through with it.
Because this is what hip hop is. It’s a lifestyle. If it’s just words not tied to
the ground, it doesn’t mean anything. Neither the words nor the beats have
meaning if you are really not present on the ground. If regular people
aren’t feeling you [ma ʿam bihisou feek].
In these comments, Osloob ties an essence of hip hop with being able to “feel with
regular people.” Importantly, these comments also reverse more of the more regular
commentary I heard about Arabic hip hop’s widening appeal. He does this by specifically
underlining the dilemma of “uneven” globalization or cosmopolitanism (“people are
more ready to accept hip hop in Hamra than in other quarters of the city”). This is exactly
the paradox about the relationship between cosmopolitan opportunity for the presentation
of hip hop live in the Arab world and its ability to reach audiences. That is, Osloob’s
comments here make vivid the emptiness of narratives of the Arab rapper as
representative of the “Arab street” (see Chapter One) when he has to select concert
venues that are removed from it. Osloob illustrates the hypocrisy of framing rap sung in
94
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gentrifying neighborhoods as speaking to “popular” struggle by emphasizing those
concerts are specifically staged not in the Arab neighborhoods where they would
encounter resistance from inhabitants less open or accepting of hip hop sounds and
experimentation.
His comments about language are important also. His mocking of the lyrical
experimentation in more recent rap (the work of El Rass, whose lyrics are particularly
poetic, comes to mind) – and the distance this implies from the “street.” One might
discern there is something anti-intellectual in his remarks, but I think in the context of his
comments, Osloob is more interestingly disavowing a romance with Arabic language as
necessarily a unifying force among Arab populations – especially perhaps when gaps in
access, education, and exposure are not considered. Usually, discourse about Arabic
language and comprehensibility favors the more classical Arabic over the local dialect as
universally-understood Arabic language (see discussion of the Tunisian musician Mounir
Troudi in Amman, Chapter Four). This is an almost taken for granted element of Arabic
language: that its most classical form – that enshrined in the Quran – is able to unite
Arabs across geography, across tribe, across sectarian difference, and so on. When
instead Osloob suggests that the more “classical” Arabic expression is incomprehensible
to the Arab street, he is insisting on a class reading of Arab society (that remains divided
by economics and, in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, access to national services
including education). Importantly, Osloob’s comments deconstruct romance and
enthusiasm about the direction of recent growth of Arabic rap and its access to audiences.
His comments help to unpack the significance of audience access to concerts and patterns
and behavior of audiences moving through the city to follow specific MCs.
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“Visiting Paris”

In a somewhat different register from Osloob, in our interviews, both Edd Abbas
(of the group Fareeq el Atrash) and Mazen El Sayed (El Rass) spoke with pride about the
heterogeneity of their audiences and the growth of the scene. El Rass told me:
I think we should take advantage of every line we can have to every kind
of people we can access. I don’t believe in this big “other” as in, “I want to
sing for ‘the people.’” Who are ‘the people?’ Everyone is the people. I
don’t necessarily want to perform for rich kids all the time, but rich kids
are people too, they have minds, you know? And I think it’s not
necessarily linked. Obviously the hip places want to get acts to perform in
their venue. When they see an act being successful, they draw them in.
This creates a circle of people that, for example, look like each other and
belong to the same thing that is linked to this artist in some way or
another. I cannot say that my listeners are from one social group, at all.
It’s very obvious in my gigs. Even the shows I do in hip places, there are
people there who never come to these venues. Who only come to watch
our gigs. People who sometimes come from remote regions in the
countryside, who come from Tripoli, normal people, students, people who
don’t really go out at night – they come. And that’s what’s really cool. It’s
not like they are concerts for rap aficionados and hip hop heads. It’s not.
There are people in these concerts that I can assure you don’t listen to rap.
And besides the few names of Arabic rap that they’ve discovered and are
attached to, they don’t listen to any rap outside of this.
El Rass’s testimony, quite different from Osloob’s answer to the same question,
underscores the positives that a concert in a cosmopolitan venue can provide. The rapper
from Tripoli is keen to emphasize that not all his listeners are hipsters, that in fact he has
a mixed following from different walks of life. My own participant observation confirms
this. More specifically, Abbas credited the increasing heterogeneity in the scene with the
work of the rapping duo Touffar and to some extent Katibeh 5. He acknowledged that the
different, not typically hip hop sounds these groups have incorporated into their work
brought different audiences into the scene. He told me “This is a huge step because nor
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me nor Mazen [El Sayed] would have been able to bring these people. This crowd is not
going to dig the more experimental stuff.”95 The intersection of different audiences in
cosmopolitan venues is what I want to focus on in the remaining pages of the chapter. I
establish how this mixing diverges from much ordinary use of cosmopolitan space before
exploring how disgust works in the context of this relationship between audiences and
MCs.
In 2010, Katibeh 5 released their second album, Al Tareeq Wahad Marsoum [One
Way Decree]. The release party was held at Masrah Beirut [Beirut Theatre] in the ʿAin
el-Mreisseh neighborhood.96 Katibeh 5 had been together since 2000, and as mentioned
above, has a large following in the refugee camps. For many years, they held their haflat
[concerts] in the camps themselves, playing directly for the audiences to whom their
lyrics spoke. This was not without its difficulties, as overcoming local conservatism
against a type of cultural production perceived to be “Western” was not always obvious.
However, the release party for the second album, like an increasing number of their
haflat, was held in ras Beirut at the then prominent Masrah Beirut.97 For these
performances, el shabab [the guys], as they’re often referred to/refer to themselves,
coordinated a carpool of sorts in order to facilitate their audiences getting to the venue.
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Without this coordination, the venue would be less accessible, if not inaccessible, for
their young fans residing in the camps.98
As crowds gathered outside the theatre, waiting for entry and for the concert to
begin, tension grew between youths from the camps who had come for the concert and
the owner of a nearby store. It was not long before the Lebanese army, which maintains a
presence in the neighborhood (as they do throughout different parts of ras Beirut) arrived
on the scene. The scuffle, which amounted to some pushing and yelling, and did not
come to blows or bloodletting, pitted the Palestinian youths against the local residents,
historically affiliated with the political group Amal, who had rallied behind the shop
keeper.99 As the army descended on the theatre, the artists and the crew succeeded in
intervening to hurry the majority of the audience into the theatre and to convince the local
residents and the army that the concert should carry on. The concert then began and
concluded smoothly.
The tension recounted by participants and witnesses points to specific historical
and ongoing material conflicts, which generally inform the lyrics of the raps Katibeh 5
deliver, but which they do not specifically address. (Katibeh 5’s lyrics were more
concerned with the contemporary conditions of life in the camps, the hypocrisy of NGO
work, and with corruption, rather than with historical or ongoing disagreements and
collaborations between specific political parties or religious sects.) The historical
confrontation between affiliates of the Shiʿa group, Amal, and the Palestinian refugees of
98
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Lebanon – especially those in the refugee camps where the massacres of Palestinians by
Amal and Phalangist forces took place in the mid 1980s – is not something Katibeh 5’s
lyrics specifically address. The concern in their lyrics is for the general status of the
second and third-generation refugee in Lebanon and the webs of corruption and
repression that make for such dim prospects for so many Palestinian youth in Lebanon.
The group’s work is received by many as refreshing, especially those who also reside in
the camps, and who recognize themselves in the group’s lyrics. The artists themselves
speak of producing music that speaks to, and resonates with, their audiences.
Indeed, an anecdote about audiences seeing themselves in Katibeh 5 helps
illustrate the value audiences put in seeing what they perceive to be representatives of
their experience on stage. During our interview, Osloob told me about concerts Katibeh 5
did all over Lebanon: in the refugee camps of Tyre, Tripoli, and other cities. He recounts
that often in these concerts, audiences assumed Katibeh 5 were residents of their camp.
He recalls:
Like when we went and did a concert in Tyre, the audience thought we
were from the Rashidiyeh camp. And not a one of us is from Tyre! This
happened more than once. When we went to Tripoli, to the Baddaweh
camp, they told us, why didn’t you talk about this and that that’s going on.
And we were like, really guys, honest, we’re not living here! We don’t
know about this and that.
Considering the context of the concerts outside the camps like the one in ʿAin el
Mreisseh I am discussing here, it is easy to extrapolate the symbolism for young fans
watching in the heart of Ras Beirut.
The arrival and performance of Katibeh 5 in the established and distinguished
venue of Masrah Beirut can be read as a progress narrative, pointing to the group’s
success and to the growth of the Beiruti art scene more generally. Indeed, welcoming
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Katibeh 5’s perspective from the camps into the more cosmopolitan center of Beirut was
and remains a progressive venture. One can read the performance at the established and
venerated venue of Masrah Beirut as a validation of Katibe 5’s testimony of the lived
experiences in some in Beirut’s marginalized ghettos. But the affective dynamics outside
the theatre also illustrate that such a presentation of events is perhaps too simple. Even if
the theatre’s curators and programmers sought to celebrate and welcome the work of
these artists from the camps, at the same time expanding the “resistance” perceived in
their work and a cultural capital of solidarity, the working class neighborhood of ʿAin el
Mreisseh, where the theatre was located, and the disenfranchised youth who came to
attend it, carried in their bodies the residue of the material realities which they live (see
Chapter One).
Aseel Sawalha has discussed how the neoliberal real estate development of the
Hariri-backed real estate company Solidere has exercised tremendous pressure on the
working-class neighborhood of ʿAin el Mreisseh. The neighborhood, traditionally
dependent on fishing, is now increasingly closed off from access to the Mediterranean.100
Residents of ʿAin el Mreisseh find themselves wedged between the quickly gentrifying
neighborhood of Hamra around the American University of Beirut and the ground zero of
Solidere’s transformation of post-war Beirut in the downtown area. As such, they are
living their own struggle against the cosmopolitan pressures that estrange them from their
own neighborhood. At the same time, the stakes for the Palestinian youth, who rarely
have the opportunity to travel to, or move around in, this part of the city, are also high. As
the Technical Director of Masrah Beirut Ahmed Hafez, who witnessed and helped
100
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coordinate the concert above told me with only a little embellishment, the kids coming
from the camps may just as soon have been “visiting Paris.”101 This is a recognition of
what Doreen Massey called a recognition of “the fact of spacing” (see Chapter Two).102
That is, considering the space and distance between audiences gives texture to the politics
conducted in encounters on their way to and outside of the venue. Further, it helps frame
how to understand dynamics unfolding in the live event, as I now explore in one final
concert. Observation at a final concert in Beirut will round out my discussion here.

“People here are rude”
At around 10pm there are maybe forty-five people in the Metro al-Madina
theatre, some seated, some standing. In and outside the theatre, Hamra is
very quiet. […] Gaafar bursts from behind the red curtain and straight off
the stage. He seems embarrassed or uncomfortable. He moves quickly and
sporadically, rapping almost to himself […] Osloob stands on stage with a
mixer and a laptop. He suggests multiple times, in different tones, some
commanding, some more jocular, that Gaafar slow down or repeat a verse,
so that people can understand the words. Gaafar refuses [...] Indeed, many
audience members already know the new tracks by heart. Despite being
treated with ostensible derision by the performer they are eager to sing
along with him. Gaafar frequently turns his back on the DJ and the
audience. He tosses the microphone away dismissively when the sound
accidentally cuts out of it and screams his verses into the void of the halffilled house without a mic. The audience shouts their approval. When he
has finished his set he leaves the stage quickly. He seems tired, irritated,
fed up. There is no encore.
Outside, after the concert, in front of the theatre, a young woman who
attended the performance asks to stand next to me until her ride arrives.
It’s not safe at night, she explains. “People here [in Hamra] are rude,” she
says and explains matter-of-factly they’ll make fun of her for wearing a
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veil. I ask her what she thought of the performance and she bubbles over
with enthusiasm. She has raps of her own she has shared with Gaafar.103
During the concert in Hamra, Gaafar’s pieces, like much of Touffar’s work
generally, addressed a range of class-based grievances lyrically, incriminating “polite”
Lebanese society. On top of these lyrics, Gaafar performed physical gestures of “distaste”
that performatively generated temporary community during the performance. This
enactment of distaste created temporary ties between audiences and performer – not
based on education, class, or literacy, as Bourdieu’s formulation of “taste” prescribes, but
affectively.104 The performer from Hermel almost seemed to be resisting the audience
itself, if not the very fact that he was performing. He turned his back on them, denied
requests from them, complained loudly about sound or light onstage, etc. Moreover, this
hostility, it seemed to be understood, was not directed at audience members or sound
technicians, but was ostensibly part of the politics of the performance itself. When Gaafar
performatively relied on enacting a feeling of distaste, he pronounced a specific politics
that may be interpreted in his lyrics, but which are not always a part of the aesthetics of
the venue, nor the hip part of Hamra where the venue was located. This was part of the
performance that his audience came to see and they responded with measured enthusiasm
to the disgust he spit (lyrically) and the distaste he embodied (gesturally, physically).
The audience gathered in Metro that night were largely fans of the performer, a
considerable number of them his family, extended kin, and others from Hermel who had
explicitly come to hear him, despite the tense and unpleasant political malaise that had
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settled upon the area of ras Beirut that night. When Gaafar performed disgust, when he
appeared irritated, fed up, disappointed, or otherwise unimpressed with his surroundings,
he was specifically connecting with this audience, who may also have been skeptical of
the hipster-esque dynamics of the (literally) underground theatre in which he was
performing. In the transmission and reception of this feeling of objection, audience and
performer embodied a raised middle finger that accompanied the lyrical one, which
denounced how cosmopolitan and upper middle-class Beirut actively others the Bekaaʿ.
The vociferous approval that received Gaafar’s gestures of distaste completed this
affective exchange. In this sense, it is important to note that the affective exchange was
distinguished from the lyrical one, it did not merely reflect the meaning of the words that
Gaafar shouted. Lyric and gesture together magnified the performance of disgust and
furthered the impact of either element in isolation.
Distaste and irritation were also evident in the stance of the young fan outside the
theatre. As she lingered next to me, a stranger, until her ride arrived, she objected to the
notion that its bustling cosmopolitan vibe might be inclusive or festive, trying instead to
protect herself against it. Her initial mode of reaching out to me was a gesture of distaste
or distrust. This gesture built on and the distaste Gaafar embodied in the theatre. Her
expression of distrust helped her navigate the foreign space that was Hamra street.

*

*

*

In this section, I have traced articulations of disgust in rap lyrics to gestures of
distaste in rap concerts via a contextualization of concert access and audience
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demographics in Beirut. In the previous section, I suggested that spitting disgust in rap
lyrics stages politics in process where speakers deconstruct material and affective
realities. This process, once started by an act of spitting can encourage others to spit back,
furthering a political deconstruction, outside of the control of the initial speaker. In
tracing how concerts in the cosmopolitan center of Beirut attract audiences from its
“periphery,” I have explored class and other exclusionary dynamics that structure
cosmopolitan concert opportunities, building on my expose of neoliberal incursions in
Beirut in the first section of this chapter. At the same time, interlocutors’ testimony about
mixed audiences encouraged me to look more carefully at the mixing of audiences that
happens despite the city’s uneven growth and its deliberate. I have thus noted different
ways in which audiences also spit back: via their simple presence, via their exchanges
with MCs, and via their refusals of the cosmopolitan vibes of the gentrifying hearts of the
city.

Conclusion

Time spent in Beirut both while conducting fieldwork over the past five years and
with family over the past ten years has led me to notice varying degrees and different
registers of disgust in this city. While the city’s denizens’ navigations of the abject was
made particularly obvious in the summer of 2015’s garbage crisis, frustration, exhaustion,
suffocation and different degrees of fed-up-ness have characterized political discourse
and affect in Beirut for years. In this chapter, I have attempted to locate some of the
specifics of this expression and behavior in one genre of cultural production – in Beiruti
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rap – in order to demonstrate how these expressions of disgust may be understood as
politics in progress. Very often, expressions of disgust are responded to with disgust – no
small amount of political debates with family and friends also stage this kind of
deconstruction of logic, options, and possibility. This formulation of performative disgust
– distaste that is meant to be heard – presents a different way to read politics in this
affect, diverging from psychoanalytic readings of the collapse of the subject in its
confrontation with the borders of the abject. It is also, I hope, another way to point to
politics in progress in this corner of the Levant.
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Conclusion
Politics, Positions, Presence
In 2011, I imagined that this project would be rooted in and reverberate around
the affective transformation of revolution: in the breaking of fear barriers, the crumbling
of apathy, and a (re)turn of the political that the events of that year would herald. In 2016,
it is clear that the majority of the research, writing, and listening I ended up doing instead
waded through the anxiety, despair, and despondency of counter-revolution and the
helplessness of both spectacular racism and spectacular violence. Five years ago, I shifted
gears to position myself as a scholar who could participate in what seemed to be the
inevitably new Arab politics that were emerging. In 2016, almost ten years to the week
after lying awake listening to Israeli bombs shelling Beirut, I – like so many others –
again admit that more caution than enthusiasm colors the search for logic and possibility.
But if in 2011 I proposed a study of the “processes of feeling politics,” it was
because even during the heady excitement of the fall of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak, it was clear that the political transformations in motion were far from the neat
articulations of established political positions and the replacement of one political
program or ideology with another. I remember, working on a piece Alex Ortiz and I
edited about the protest signs in the Egyptian revolution, struggling with the caption of a
photograph of a large banner that had been draped in Tahrir Square. The banner listed
“our demands,” and they were seven in number. I remember thinking it fantastically odd
that there could be a specific number of demands; and the number seven kept jumping
out at me like a harbinger of failure. Some months later, in a jail cell in East New York
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following Occupy Wall Street protests, I leaned up against the bars to ask the other
twenty or so women in the block, also from the protest, what they wanted or why they
were there. As soon as the words of the question left my mouth they felt empty. I agreed
with the requests others voiced, but they felt out of joint. Was campaign finance reform
really what had compelled each of us – individually and collectively – in a specific
moment to step into traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge under October rain?
If struggling to understand the incredible affective entanglements that pushed
many of us onto the streets of various cities in 2011 and 2012 helped me conceive of a
framework like feeling politics, struggling to accept and work through the flipside of
those feelings following crack down and failure has made me hold onto it. I had initially
conceived feeling politics would be a framework through which the ethnographer could
lead the reader to apparent but misinterpreted politics driving recent events and expressed
in cultural production. Instead, political feeling has become the framework through which
I have tried to richly illustrate the present (and perhaps the immediate past) as a testament
to the flows of affect that framed everyday political deliberations and negotiations. If I
have refused to correlate the music and performance I documented in each case study to
specific politics and outcomes, it is because, like my interlocutors, I cannot pretend to
know what is coming. But also because such connections did not seem to me to exist.
Even in the case of the explicitly more leftist lyrics of some rappers in Beirut (discussed
in Chapter Five), the production of political feeling that I suggested was so compelling
was for the most part not explicitly connected to specific political projects. Political
feeling very much became about processes of engaging with cities, audiences, and artists,
not explanations, solutions, or strategies.
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I want to bring this study to a close with a final meditation on the question of
political feeling in the immediate context of political events during the writing of this
dissertation. There are considerations of subjectivism that I acknowledge below while
addressing more recent criticism of “feelings” in political expression and debate.
Considering the engagement with intersectionality and solidarity in these critiques, I also
weave in reflections of solidarity as offered by some of my interlocutors. Here, I am keen
to explore some of the very real political divisions that have emerged in rap in the Levant
since the Uprisings. These political arguments – hashed out between rappers, between
fans, and between both are relevant negotiations of political concerns. I have so far not
addressed the shape of this particular position-staking in my identification of specific
political feelings and textures of tarab in the case studies above. Moreover, like the
politics in process I have lingered on, the claiming of political positions in some rap work
also roundly refutes simple frameworks of “resistance” in Arabic rap. This discussion
brings me to a final consideration of the ways in which social media and virtual networks
are central in the dissemination of this music. I close this study with a more developed
acknowledgement of the role of technology in allowing and permitting particular
enactments of solidarity and helping to conduct specific political feeling.

Politics

Despite their ready corroboration of the presence of tarab in rap concerts, political
invention in rap lyrics, and political processes of listening in both, my conversations with
interlocutors often snagged on the connection I was working out during my field work
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between politics and feeling in rap concerts. Consider this exchange with the Syrian
rapper Bu Kolthoum, in Amman:
I’m hearing you say that there is a difference between feeling and
politics?
Of course. 100%.
But this statement “I feel you” - it’s a political idea as well, no?
Maybe, it could be. But look, that’s why people go study Political Science.
Feeling can’t be studied. It can’t be produced [la yumantiq]. It can’t be
industrialized [la yousalsal].1
Bu Kolthoum’s separation here of “feelings” and “politics,” in particular his assertion
that “feeling cannot be studied” reflects in part a Cartesian division between logic and
feeling. But more importantly, I think, it reflects the distance the rapper perceives
between the work he does (the “feeling with” listeners) and the “politics” of politicians,
ministers, and other official representatives. This conceptualization was shared by others.
Many of my interlocutors – especially venue owners – testified to a “social” not
“political” impact or effect of their work.2 This reflects a difference in the understandings
and use of the word “political,” one which the rapper El Rass elaborated on at length
(quoted in Chapter Five), when he wondered if the issues he addressed in his lyrical work
were “political” or if they weren’t just part of his everyday life. These testimonies speak
to a refusal to “politicize,” by drawing into parties, camps, and ideology, the politics in
process in some cultural production. The issue here is to me not a misrecognition of
politics; it is a protecting of options and expression by refusing to partake in established
political discourses. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, these figurations of
1
2

Interview with the author, March 31, 2015. Translation from the Arabic is my own.

Interviews with the owners of Beit Aneeseh and La Wain in Ramallah; Café Younes (Amin Younes), Tah
Marbouta (Bilal el Amine), Radio Beirut (Jihad) in Beirut; and Al-Balad Theatre (Raed Asfour) in Amman.
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politics are necessary revisions of the framework of the “political” so frequently
projected on Arab subjects in cultural studies (see Introduction).
As one foray into the debate over alternatives, I have argued that looking for
“resistance” limits an understanding of what politics may be in progress in some Arabic
rap. In “Chapter One: Locating Politics,” I suggested that looking for spectacular
behavior that signals the arrival of agency (a protest, a strike, a tattoo, a ballad, a specific
response to a ballad) promises to continue to ignore the agency of individuals and the
deliberated politics of agents who do not act out. I suggested the pinning of a theoretical
framework on the emergence of resistance fails to testify to the texture of deliberations
that sustain political life in between and during the more spectacular displays of political
engagement. Against this framework, I set out to build an alternative. In “Chapter Two:
Feeling Politics,” I suggested that political feeling – held in tension in rap concerts and
expressed by MCs lyrically and performatically – point to political processes of
deliberation, negotiation, and refusal. I suggested that paying attention to these processes
by considering how these feelings are built at the intersections of specific material spaces
invites an analysis of ambivalence, wavering, failure, and invention. I have favored this
method of feeling politics over the search for the more spectacular instances of dissent,
unity, and “hype” that easily evoke “resistance.”
Over the course of the case studies that followed, my hope was to have testified to
the importance of thick contextualization of live events like rap concerts in order to
reflect on politics in live music – even music as dependent on lyrical invention as rap is. I
hope also to have testified convincingly to the aural undercurrents that run against the
spectacular politics of visibility and which continue to Orientalize and depoliticize Arab
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cities and their denizens. In this way, these aural subcultural practices reflect fluid
processes of interrogation and refusal. Without pretending to be harbingers of change or
revolution, some Arabic rap nonetheless reflects important patterns of deconstructing and
reconstructing politics and sociality. As Jacques Attali says in Noise: The Political
Economy of Music, “Our music foretells the future. Let us lend it an ear.”3 I have
proposed that the ear, but also that feeling is an important barometer to decipher politics
in process.
On the one hand considerations of feeling have been echoed in political
psychology for some years.4 The relevance of emotions in voter behavior, for example, is
a readily acknowledged, if still understudied, question in US Political Science. My
research has been invested in and continues to be committed to the notion that how we
feel about issues, behaviors, and each other determines our political positioning. But my
study diverges from one of political psychology. I am not interested in how feelings can
be harnessed for political projects, nor in how emotional responses can be measured or
quantified. The ethnographic work in my case studies documents tension, elation, disgust,
resignation – political feelings – without translating these into specific political strategies
or outcomes. Indeed, part of my point has been that strategies are in formation, it is this
processual reality that helps to generate the feeling I have documented.
On the other hand, recent critiques of progressive political discourse have come
down hard on notions of “feeling” in politics: especially during a US presidential election
year rife with spectacular racism. Backlash against mobilizing “feeling” in political
3
4

Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, 11.

See for example, David P. Redlawsk, ed., Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
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critique, description, and documentation increasingly circulates among leftist
commentators concerned with the affect surrounding contentious political issues,
especially perhaps when intersectionality and solidarity politics are at stake. For example,
Sarah Jaffe has suggested “feelings-as-politics” – where personal feelings block the
ability to understand real violence – occlude the mechanisms of oppression in systemic
racism.5 Similarly, Phoebe Maltz Bovy has explained how “feelings journalism” allows
even political allies to repeat or duplicate racism and classism.6 In the latter, the author
projects what others must be feeling without bothering to ask them. These critiques of the
mobilization of feeling within left-leaning, anti-racist, feminist circles present important
limits within which the model of feeling politics that I have proposed be understood or
used.7 The presence of certain feelings I have testified to in this study are not
substitutions for politics (as in Jaffe’s feelings as politics). I have not suggested locating
resignation or disgust at the expense of deliberating the real exclusions, incursions, and
threats that political realities pose to my interlocutors and their communities. Rather,
these feelings point to how those politics are deliberated. It is worth noting that
occasional and specific expressions of political positions appear within these affective
negotiations as well. These articulations of political positions, as I will now argue with a

5

Sarah Jaffe, “Are We Mistaking Feelings for Politics?,” Dame Magazine, March 2, 2015, accessed April
1, 2016, http://www.damemagazine.com/2015/03/02/are-we-mistaking-feelings-politics.
6

Phoebe Maltz Bovy, “The Rise of Feelings Journalism,” The New Republic, February 19, 2015, accessed
April 1, 2016, https://newrepublic.com/article/121097/feelings-journalism-feeds-jessica-williams-dailyshow-tweets.
7

See also Sarah Ahmed, “You Are Oppressing Us!” and “You Are Oppressing Me!” FeministKillJoys,
February 15, 2015 and February 17, 2015, respectively, accessed April 1, 2016,
http://feministkilljoys.com/2015/02/15/you-are-oppressing-us/ and
http://feministkilljoys.com/2016/02/17/you-are-oppressing-me/.
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specific series of examples, draws out further the deliberation of political processes
through expression of feeling.

Positions

Since the start of the Syrian uprising in particular (March 2011), the
announcement of specific political positions has appeared in some Arabic rap. The split
among Syrian rappers as some chose to support the regime against the uprising was
perhaps just the first in a series of public staking of political positions that further how to
understand politics in process in Arabic rap while definitively furthering the genre from
categorical expressions of “resistance.” Eslaam Jawaad’s early support for Assad’s
regime against the protests divided hip hop audiences in the Levant that were largely
riding the enthusiasm of the so-called “Arab Spring.” The affective and political backlash
against Jawaad – accusations of treachery went both ways – pinned the artist into a
reactionary corner long before the Islamic State and other fundamentalist militias coopted
the Syrian uprising and turned other artists, previously sympathetic, against the
opposition.8 While the Syrian crisis has cast high stakes for the expression of solidarity,
the politics in process on other issues have also led to the articulation of specific
identities or positions.

8

See for example, Greg Schick, “Eslaam Jawaad ‘Dudd al-Nizam’ (Syria),” World Hip Hop Market, May
2, 2011, accessed April 1, 2016, http://worldhiphopmarket.com/video-of-the-day-eslaam-jawaad-dudd-alnizam-syria/; and Rania Abouzeid, “Syrian Rappers Urge… Restraint? Protesters Find Little Support in
Popular Music,” TIME, July 4, 2011, accessed April 1, 2016,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2080548,00.html.
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In order to illustrate how the staking of positions is also a part of political
processes, I want to consider here the very public falling out between two of the Levant’s
heaviest hitters: El Far3i and El Rass in January of 2016. The growing exchange of “diss
tracks” I referred to in Chapter Five exploded in a nuanced, though vitriolic debate about
solidarity, selling out, and Arab identity. In the three tracks disseminated in the beginning
of 2016, no political party or affiliation is asserted (contrary to the articulation of
positions in Jawaad’s work in 2011), but very pronounced stances of authenticity,
identity, and where one positions oneself were debated.
In the first, El Rass, the Tripoli-born MC now living in Beirut, raps under the title
“Watwateh” or [“Being a Bat”].9 He writes, in abstract terms, about the selling off of the
qadiyeh [the issue]: the Palestinian cause.
Who do you represent? To what do you assimilate?
It happens. Who’s your audience? They love you.
On what grounds? Who makes a distinction?
You identify, you capture, you evade, you forget it, you count it among
your achievements:
That you were behind her at the time of citing
The track proceeds as a cryptic, but clear enough indictment of “giants” – people who
make it big – and their distance from the Palestinian cause, asserting that “small people”
are closer to the cause (“Glory to the dwarves, we are the issue”), and aligning himself
with the latter. Disgust, though a gentler iteration of it, reflective of the metaphor of being
“batlike,” affectively underscores the piece. The track opens with a series of alliterative
questions (meen bitmathel /ʿameen bitmathel/ bithasel/ lameen bitwasel) questioning an

9

“El Rass – Watwateh | intaj mouqataʿa” [El Rass – Being a Bat – Produced by Boikutt], Sound Cloud
audio recording, 3:34, posted by “El Rass,” January 2016, accessed April 1, 2016,
https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-head/wa6wa6a.

!

412
artist’s or perhaps an activist’s sense of audience, responsibility, and the effect of that
orientation.
It is not the first time El Rass or the producer of the track, Boikutt, have
entertained similar political questioning and commentary. Recall in Chapter Three,
Ramallah Underground’s track “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let Me Live”] also interrogated the
intersections of authenticity, distance, and political struggle. In that track, the lyrics
centered around the hypocrisy of a diaspora that asked more resistance of Palestinians
that lived in Palestine than those outside of it (the lines “You say you’re Palestinian but
you’re afraid to come for a visit,” “You turn off the TV we’re still here,” and “You want
Palestine? So do I. But I’m also a person,” come to mind). These questions of who can
best defend whose interests are reflected in the subject of much subsequent rap, as
explored throughout this study. Two tracks in particular – collaborations between El Rass
and El Far3i, no less – also interrogated dilemmas of audience make up, representation,
and audience reach. The piece “Fi el Jaleed” [“In the Frozen Land”] stages negotiations
of identity, community, engagement, and political commitment as the two MCs travel to
Sweden and Denmark on tour.10 The piece opens with El Rass describing interactions
with a European border security agent and proceeds to lambast orientalist perceptions of
the Arab rapper (“Don’t you dare think I came to sing for the Orientalists/ […] to play the
role of wounded kitten, victim/ And to offer up an original copy of the map of SykesPicot”). But what makes that piece interesting is that it gives voice to a range of
perspectives in Europe, specifically of the Arab diaspora. El Rass raps, “In Stockholm I

10

“Fi el Jaleed – maʿ el Far3i” [“In the Frozen Land” – with El Far3i”], Sound Cloud audio recording,
4:50, posted by “El Rass,” 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-thehead/filjalid?in=el-rass-the-head/sets/adb. This track is on the album Adam, Darwin, and the Penguin,
released May 24, 2014.
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heard ya ba [a common interpellation] more than I heard ABBA,” continuing, “And
when the Syrian girl thanked me with a single tear/ I saw the homeland as an immigrant/
I saw the revolution was still ongoing.” This lyrical work, in combination with the sounds
of electronic musician Munma’s scoring produce an engaged interrogation of the
positions and meaning of “Arab-ness,” all before the current spectacular misery of the
Syrian refugee crisis (the track was released in 2014).
The verse of El Far3i – the Amman-born Palestinian-Jordanian recently relocated
to London with the mijwez band 47 Soul –follows, and his verse in “Fi el Jaleed” stages
similar negotiations. He begins by asserting, “Don’t think that the knowledge of the
homeland is geographic,” pointing to a network of Syrian and Iraqi immigrants surviving
in “the frozen land.” His verse points to the important diasporic communities that also
make up Europe. He acknowledges the switches and weakness of language
accompanying these demographic movements “It’s ok my Arabic is weak… but I still
pronounce the qaf,” offering an expression of pride even in what is usually considered a
weak identity position (not knowing the language). In their verses and their attention to
the experiences of Arabs in Europe, both rappers are clearly conscious of complicating
positions voiced on a previous collaboration, “E-stichrak” [“Orientalism”].11 El Far3i
references it specifically in his verse: “we were worried Jimmy would respond with a
track called ‘Istighrab’ [‘Surprise’]”.
“E-stichrak” constructs a character “Jimmy” (hanging over whose bed at home is
a picture of Lawrence of Arabia), who arrives to the Arab world with an NGO job and in
the name of making things better. He condescends, steals jobs, changes the economic and
11

“El Far3i w el Rass – istishraq El Far3i & El Rass – e-stickrak,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:11,
posted by “El Far3i,” c. 2013, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-far3i/el-far3i-el-rass-estichrak.
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demographic landscape. (As I have discussed in each of the three case studies, the
political concerns with the presence of NGOs and the accompanying humanitarian
economy were a regular concern of my interlocutors.) El Far3i raps, “Political Science
students coming from abroad change the demographic of Ramallah.” Jimmy, El Rass
asserts, “doesn’t see the difference between himself and the Zionists who infiltrate our
protests.” The whole piece is underscored sonically with the whistling sound of a rocket.
“E-stichrak” is based in Amman, Beirut, and Ramallah and features perspectives from
those localities about the attitudes of those coming from abroad, including those Arabs
who “return.” “Fi el Jaleed” flips these positions. In the latter they point to questions of
orientalism but from the position of Arabs in Europe.
This is to point to a healthy development of questions of “inside/outside,”
diaspora and authenticity, and the politics attached to one’s geographic position and
mobility between these two MCs and in the scene in general. As I have mentioned, in
2014, El Far3i relocated from Amman to London with the electro-mijwez group 47Soul.
The group’s music is an electronic interpretation of “wedding music” musiqat el-aʿras,
setting the mijwiz music of the dabkeh and other folk music of the Levant to hip dance
beats. The group’s approach to and take on the music has proved appealing to Arabs in
the diaspora, Arabs in the Arab world, and foreigners. They played to sold-out crowds in
the UK and elsewhere throughout 2015.
The popularization of this traditional music and El Far3i’s relocation from
Amman to London has not been without criticism, however. For example, while Omar
Suleiman’s popularity among hipster-inclined audiences that took to his mijwez-techno
has for the most part not been interpreted as selling out, the “boy band” enthusiasm of 47

!

415
Soul and the accompanying pop-like framing of the music has alienated El Far3i in
particular from an audience that followed his solo lyrical rap work closely. The attitudes
of the group’s members – their obvious eagerness about the interest the new sounds
received, and their assertions about how their work re-invents while speaking for the
fellaheen [peasantry] – has perhaps not really helped much. Their boyish enthusiasm
about “making it” has been interpreted as condescending (if not plain absurd) by some of
their colleagues and accusations of “selling out” have accompanied the group’s assertions
about their own success.12 Here it is worth noting that the dynamic I observed in Amman
and wrote about in Chapter Four – about rappers being eager to leave the city –
confronted different expectations about the role of socially-engaged rap shared among
various audiences in Ramallah and Beirut, but also in Jordan. That is, the orientation
toward “making it” that is shared among many rappers in Amman, and that is reflected
for them in opportunities to perform and make a living off of their music outside of the
Middle East, ran up against the different expectations of others who, for a host of reasons,
invest authenticity and political grounded-ness in proximity, in local engagement, and in
addressing Arab audiences. Finally, the peak of 47 Soul’s summer successes coincided
with the overtly protest-oriented rap in Beirut surrounding the garbage crisis (discussed in
Chapter Five).

12

For example in our interview, the Amman-based rapper Synaptic (whose family, readers will recall,
boasts famous Palestinian wedding singers) spoke at length about how he saw the 47 Soul project as a
betrayal of local, traditional sounds and a selling out of these sounds to orientalist fantasies. In a comment
on the discussion board of the collaboration track “E-stichrak” [“Orientalism”] on Sound Cloud Synaptic
wrote without explanation, “47 Soul” in early 2016. El-Far3i responded “hmmm.” This is to point to the
latter’s obvious awareness of how others have interpreted and received some of his new work. In our own
interview, El Far3i spoke haltingly about his struggles to retain his former audiences, and his eagerness to
prove to them he was still the musician they respected.
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It is in this context that El Far3i responded to El Rass’s abstract musings in
“Being a Bat” in January of the following year as a personal affront. El Far3i clearly
interpreted the “giants” El Rass ridicules as himself. In response, he scoffs at the extraengaged politics of his former collaborator’s alignment with the “little people” who are
the real defenders of al-qadiyeh [Palestine]. His retort, entitled “Washwasheh”
[Whisperings] plays alliteratively on El Rass’s title [Watwateh], and starts by spinning
one of El Rass’s lines rapping, “Glory to the heroes.”13 He continues, rapping
sarcastically: “Dear committed rapper that has been betrayed… where are you going?”
The track pokes fun at the seriousness with which El Rass and others in Beirut (which he
calls cynically, “the city of rebellion”) couched themselves in the midst of the “You
Stink” protests. “Wow, a café we want to build a fight with our dreams!” he mocks,
drawing out the hypocrisy of progressive sociality others have also identified in Beirut
(discussed in Chapter Five). Unlike those Lebanese rappers that also offered expressions
of disgust with these forms of sociality, El Far3i invokes that hypocrisy not as reason for
rebellion but reason why the protests were not able to really take off. Sonically, the
vocals are not clear and El Far3i’s voice is low, as if he is whispering. But the barbs at El
Rass are pointed accusations of intellectualism and elitism. As in the lines “bihabouha el
moukh shou bihabouha el moukh, w el nokhbeh nokhbeh w liʾnha aslee.” [“They love the
brain, how they love the brain, and the elite remains elite because that is its origin.”] Here
El Far3i plays on the word moukh, which means brain, but also marrow, aligning those
who like intellectual matters with an elite vantage point on society.14 As discussed in

13

“El Far3i – washwasheh | El Far3i –Washwasheh,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:39, posted by “El
Far3i,” February 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-far3i/el-far3i-washwasheh.
14
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Chapter Five, this is similar to the critique Osloob leveled at rap that was “leaving the
street” as it embraced more formal forms of Arabic poetry.
El Far3i’s critique of the intellectual politics coming out of Beirut are welcome,
especially in the wake of a protest movement that by many accounts did stumble into the
politics of middle class respectability and accompanying exclusiveness that have played
out in other cities in the US and elsewhere.15 That is, his criticism of the self-inflatedness
of some organizers and particularly the political mood accompanying the exclusivity of
protests in Beirut are on point. But his personification of this problem in his former
collaborator may have (at least at time of writing) backfired. When El Rass responded to
El Far3i’s diss (it was impossible not to read it as a personal affront) he mobilized the
wave of recent skepticism engendered by his work with 47 Soul. His response track,
“Habout Idtrari” [“Emergency Landing”] denies categorically that he had El Far3i in
mind writing “Watwateh” and sprays a series of accusations back at his former
collaborator, in the process revisiting many of the subjects they covered in their previous
collaborations.16
The opening sample of El Rass’s response, a dialogue, precisely plays on this
narrative of “making it.” Heavily distorted sonically, the dialogue stages an interview
with the press. A reporter asks, how did you meet “Jimmy”? – the character El Rass and
El Far3i constructed in previous collaborations. The dialogue as a whole mocks a pursuit
of authenticity and “making it” [the word used is waselet – literally, you’ve arrived],
15

On the class make-up and class debate in and around You Stink protests, see for example, ʿAmr Mohsn,
“‘Al hafleh’: ʿan nazret a-tabeqah al-wasta ila nfsha,” Al-Akhbar, August 21, 2015, accessed April 1,
2016, http://al-akhbar.com/node/241096.
16

“Habout idtrari” [“Emergency Landing”], Sound Cloud audio recording, 5:15, posted by “El Rass,”
February 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-head/dissornodiss.
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conjuring El Rass as the interviewed artist and El Far3i as the orientalist “Jimmy.”17 The
recorded exchange frames the expertise El Far3i claims with 47 Soul as an accident of
being in the right place at the right time (“we met at a wedding”). The piece proceeds
from here to respond to El Far3i’s jibes, reciting back to him lyrics from their previous
collaborations. Sonically, El Rass is louder (there is no whispering here), but the whole
piece is couched in offended but sardonic laughter. There are pages of lyrical and
political analysis that could be offered here. The debate the rappers stage, despite the
personal acrimony that they fling at each other, is an important deliberation of what
counts as political, who counts as political, and who is truly able to represent “Palestine,”
the “poor,”18 and their musical traditions.19
The exchange over these several tracks discussed here is a good example of how
rappers negotiate political positions without aligning themselves with parties, politicians,
or ideologies. Moreover, the fluidity of these positions – as made especially clear by this
exchange between rappers who used to collaborate – points to how politics in process,
reflected lyrically and musically in this genre, is not an oscillation between fixed points
17

The dialogue plays like this:
- Can you tell us how you came to know Jimmy?
- I was in this place, and I asked him, ‘What are you looking for?’And he told me ‘I am
looking for mijwez.’ I told him, well you found it!
- Ah, you told him “you found it” because you yourself are an expert in wedding music?
- No, no. I told him, “you found it” because we were in a wedding. We happened to meet
at a wedding. He told me he was interested in wedding music and we were in a wedding,
so that’s how we met.

18

A particular good example of this is when El Rass retorts to El Far3i “you’re the one who made el
felaheen [the peasantry] felaaaheen [drawing out an exceptionally long Palestinian accent].” Here, El Rass
makes fun of the political representation of Palestine and its resilient stewards through this Orientalized and
depoliticized figure of the peasantry in the work of 47 Soul. This intersects nicely with the discussion of
“classing” political discourse in Palestine that I explored in Chapter Three.
19

For an impartial write-up of the exchange in Arabic, see Tareq Azzeh, “Barakeen Taht el Maʾ”
[“Volcanoes Under Water”], MMDRAP.com, February 23, 2016, accessed April 1, 2016,
http://www.mmdrap.com/2016/02/23/0(/'($)/1'(/.
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(with one party or against it). Rather these negotiations point to a wholly different kind of
motion: wading through realities where there seem to be no options. It is this wading
through and staking of positions (that then morph) that I suggested in the introduction to
this study points to the series of “third rails” or third options operating beside the political
status quo.20 This fluidity also affects how one might conceive of expressions of
solidarity – as this exchange here has already illustrated. Expressions of solidarity and the
fact that most engagement with this music, the exciting opportunities of live concerts not
withstanding, involves interfacing with a screen underpins my closing thoughts to this
study.

Presence

While I have focused my attention on the live concerts that are the intersections of
urban change, orientalist representation, struggles over the right to the city, and changing
perceptions about hip hop and hip hop culture, the vast majority of listener engagement
with Arabic hip hop and the MCs and producers who make it is not during live events but
mediated through technology. Sound Cloud, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are the
primary sites for hosting and disseminating this material. Bandcamp, Indiepush, and
Reverbnation, are less frequently used networks. This means that the primary mode of
interaction between rappers and their listeners are comments on tracks and the virtual
affectivity of “likes,” “shares,” and so on. My emphasis in interviews on the live event
often came as something of a surprise to musicians (see Chapter Two). They recognize
20

The Khat Thaleth EP featured El Rass, Touffar, Zeinnedine, Al Sayyed Darwish, Yaseen, and Al Haqq
on a collaboration album released by Stronghold Sound on January 22, 2013, accessed January 10, 2014
http://strongholdsound.bandcamp.com/album/khat-thaleth.
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that most of their interactions with fans are virtual at the same time that their assertions
about the importance of the concert in “feeling with” their audience are genuine.
Negotiating the politics of positionality and negotiating physical space during
years when parts of the Arab world are engulfed in occupation, siege, uprising, or war is
also a question of determining the shape of solidarity. Indeed, solidarity in these cases is
often specifically about negotiating engagement when one cannot approach physically: as
in the case of Lebanese and Syrians wishing to enact “solidarity” with Palestinians,
whose territory they are forbidden from entering, and vice versa. In Chapter Five, we saw
how expressions of disgust with an apathetic Arab populace worked as expressions of
solidarity with Gaza; in Chapter Four, expressions of resignation could similarly be
interpreted as muted expressions of solidarity with Palestinian struggle. In the most
recent tracks I have discussed here, how to express that solidarity also emerged as a
consideration. Solidarity, without being a political feeling, emerged in these cases as
politics in process. That is, the declaration of solidarity was not a statement but a
negotiation of and active engagement with the options available. When I asked El Rass
what solidarity meant to him and his work, if anything, he offered:
To me, solidarity is the system of how you make sense of your belonging
to different collectivities. You cannot just make sense by saying that
you’re in solidarity. Making sense involves a whole process of action, of
release, of spreading the word, of questioning things, of being critical, of
sometimes trying to get the morale back, of sometimes saying let’s take
two steps back so we can see the bigger image, sometimes people who are
in the struggle are maybe depressed or down, you understand that maybe
you have to take them to different kind of moods and thinking — I am
thinking about the music here.
Here, El Sayed offers a refreshingly active view of solidarity, one in which the individual
who expresses solidarity is also permitted to act, and not only in ways sanctioned or
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prescribed by those with whom one expresses this political affinity. In this way even a
position becomes a process, one that, with and through technology, is not only not
prohibited by distance, but in fact may also take advantage of it. Consider this social
media exchange between a late-night super market checkout clerk’s screen in Ramallah
and the Lebanese rapper El Rass, just quoted.

Figure 6.1: “Exchange between a late-night supermarket clerk in Ramallah and the Lebanese
rapper El Rass.” Mazen El Sayed, the rapper who goes by El Rass, reposts Ansar 3 AlRifai’s
photo. His caption reads: “When the guy is working all night in a Ramallah supermarket and
decides to make the customers listen to El Rass’s tracks.”
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The caption of the photo reads, “Because it’s a duty to spread culture… The entire
supermarket must listen to El Rass. Of course people couldn’t handle more than two
tracks and asked to hear Elissa or Wael Kafouri [Lebanese pop stars].” In response to the
photograph in which he was tagged, El Sayed’s caption reads, “When the guy is working
all night in a Ramallah supermarket and decides to make the customers listen to El Rass’s
tracks.” Here the virtual reality of the two computer screens – the one channeling El
Rass’s music into the super market and the one reflecting the aural soundscape and
reactions of the supermarket back to El Rass – emerges as a horizon in which listeners
and performers can meet despite the restrictions of space. (The ability of rap music to
play across boundaries is discussed in Chapter Three).
In the exchange above, the computer screen is figured as the primary medium
through which listeners receive and exchange with musicians while it simultaneously
draws the forbidden Lebanese voice into occupied Palestinian space. The clerk stages for
the viewer expectation, hope, despair, and solidarity – within the recognizably neoliberal
framework of the all-night supermarket, no less. Because culture is a “duty,” so the
hourly employee tells us, he weaves in instruction, exposure, and acculturation through
the tools available to him: the wifi and speaker system in the store. While he does not
hope to change their opinions overnight (“of course they could only stand two tracks
before asking for Elissa”), he nonetheless deems the experiment successful enough to
share it with a public audience – and to specifically bring it to the musician’s attention.
For his part, the musician is touched enough by the effort that he reposts it, with his own
interpretation of the impact – political and aesthetic – of his own work. This exchange on
social media frames a fluctuating spectrum of hope and despair that has anchored the
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affective political spectrum within which this study was composed. It also points to how
technology, and social media in particular, is able to generate and transmit presence,
substituting for the call and response of the live concert when geopolitics and logistics
render such embodied exchanges impossible.

*

*

*

In these pages I have attempted to draw this study of ongoing political processes,
aesthetic experimentation, and lyrical invention to a close. The moments in which these
pages were written affected the ways in which I interpreted the processual politics I heard
expressed and negotiated online, in live concerts, and in my recorded and unrecorded
interviews. The politics I observed and participated in have only stayed still long enough
to be captured in analysis. Nonetheless, in a world in as much flux as ours, listening has
suggested this is perhaps all one can ask for. Having recorded what I heard, it is now for
others to see what “fills the head.”

!
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APPENDIX A

”ﺧﻠ#ﻨﻲ ﻋ#ﺶ“
Ramallah Underground
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“Let Me Live”
Ramallah Underground

I try to forget my past life
But I put my hand in my pocket, and it is empty
And my mother still is not at ease
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint
I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
And I don’t want to take a bribe from anyone
Before I reach my hand out to anyone, I will end my life as a friend of nothingness
But there is hope
I am going to stand on my feet, just like a mountain, the winds will not move me,
There’s no time for foolishness
The hour hand is racing the future
And I will not accept anything less than my full rights
I won’t flatter
I will explode like weapons of mass destruction
So if you want to be dealt in
Know this: I will not represent you while you relax
They tell me to forget about you, and they are silent, not knowing how to express
themselves with words that don’t come
As if they are constipated
But the message is going to get out because Boikutt is coming for you
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint
I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
(x2)
You pretend you’re Palestinian but you’re afraid to come for a visit
Afraid to lose that big house and car
If that’s the case, you can take off the kuffiyeh and don’t speak in my name
You mess things up from afar, but that distance invades my body
You talk politics?
We have street talk and experience
With one glance people distinguish each other from the grave
You want Palestine? So do I.
But I am also human.
I need to eat, drink, piss, and sleep.
But you do not want peace.
You want us to keep fighting like in all those played out films
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While you sit in the US or Europe talking about your stolen land
The political situation has been hanged and strangled
You can turn off your television; we stay there
You want to liberate Palestine while we are extinguished? No!
Because these dreams will one day eat you up
In any case I’m not at ease with you
How many millions are you sitting on?
Looks like the situation is increasing your income
See where money will take you
It brings you and it takes you
And if you try to remember anything from your past, it lets you forget
It brings you and it takes you
And if you remembered anything from your past, it forgets you
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint
I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
(x2)
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APPENDIX B
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ﺑﺴ ّﻮ; ﻷ; ﻓﻮﺗﻮ fﺑ#ﺘﻘﺮّ] ﻣﻨﺎ ﺣﺠﺐ
ﺑﻠﺪ ﺻﻐ#ﺮ ﺑﺲ .ﻟﻜﻮﻛﺐ ﻋﺠﺐ
األمور كيف بتتر ّكب و بكبسة بتتكركب
فوين أحسن مكان بالغرفة الرزنامة فيه تتع ّلق
إلنه بكرة و مبارح قاعدين عم بسألوني عن ّ
هأل
الت ّغيرات وين حطّاني مش قادر أحدد مكاني
!الساعة إلي معاي "ديجيتال" مش شايف عقرب الثواني
خصيصا بس الخيار إلزامي
منتجات مصنّعة ّ
إشتريت سيارة جديدة بس مافيها مقعد أمامي
أرجعها على املصنع
كيف أش ّغلها و أطلع عشان ّ
!مضطّر أقعد بالخلف و للتصميم أخضع
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“The Second Hand”
El Far3i
Sitting cross-legged on the floor, in a room where a friend sleeps
I have a dream and a craft but fate is floating in it.
Like everything in this country, the subject is paralyzed:
He promised but did not show; what should I do?
Of course he called, not once but like ten times:
What’s this music called? And who distributes it?
Down with propaganda and dumbed-down rhetoric
Unfounded suggestions: they found you empty when they peeled you!
Me and my career, we play 1-2 offense
So that they don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change things
You confused the kid when you put him in school
And when they let him loose in society, he got up and got a tattoo
I’m not hating: that’s the point, to each his own.
Everyone speaks his mind in his own way, in the way it serves him,
If I change my mind, I imagine I’ll want handala on my back:
So that when I swim in the Dead Sea, you can see his face on my chest.
We’re still being kicked out, “ethnically cleansed,” so the show’s not over
Daddy-o, this is the rap of the lowest point on Earth
And to the people that see that something’s missing in the write-up:
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance?
The second hand
You changed my place,
You switched the meaning
You made me doubt my history
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance?
Our playground was sold as scrap metal; I bought a swing instead
We wanted to entertain the people because the television is a horror film
And the street is hard; the simplest bite is tiring.
So who is to blame? It depends.
There are the farmers, but they’re not at market because they got angry;
There are the merchants clowning cockily to earn a penny;
And there are those on the western borders, smuggled in crates of grapes.
More than one request, a log on fire, an angry nerve lives in each of us
It blocks every photon of light that comes towards us.
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A small country but the planet is strange:
How things come together and, in a push, become a mess.
So where is the best place in the room to hang the calendar?
Because tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about the present.
Where the changes have put me, I cannot locate my location:
The clock I have is digital, I can’t see the second hand!
Products produced with intention, but the choice is mandatory.
I bought a new car but there’s no front seat;
How to turn it on to go return it to the factory?
I am compelled to sit in the back and be subjected to the design!
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APPENDIX C

”ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺘﻤﺔ“
ﺳﺎoﻲ
ﻣﺶ ﻣﻨ#ﺢ ﺗﻜﻮ fﻋﺎ@ dﺷﻮ ﺑﺪ bﻏ#ﺮ bﻣﻮﻗﻔﻚ
=.Pﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪ .ﺑﺮﻣﻲ ﺷﻐﻠﺔ ﺛﻘ#ﻠﺔ ﺑﻄ#ﺨﺔ ﺑﻠﻘﻔﻚ
ﺑﺘﺬﻛﺮ ﻗﻌﺪﺗﻲ ﺑﻐﺮﻓﺘﻲ `; .ﻟ#ﻮ5 rﻣﺨﻠN#ﺎ Pﻓﻌﺔ
ﻛﺜ#ﺮ ﺑﺤﺲ ﺣﺎﻟﻲ ﻣNﺎﺟﻢ ﻋﺎﻟﺠﻮ 4ﺑﺴﺘﻨﻰ .ﻟﺮﻓﻌﺔ
ﺷﻮ=5 dﻦ ﻛﻨﺖ =5 5ﻦ ﺻﺮ jﺑﻄﻠﺖ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻲ
oﻠﻊ ﻣﻊ ﻛﺜ#ﺮ ﺑ#ﻮ jﺑﺘﺤﺲ .ﻧﻲ ﺧﻠﺼﺖ ﻣﺒﺎﻧﻲ
 j@Pﺑﺎﻟﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ .cﻧﻲ ﺻﺒﺮ jﺗﺎ ﻛﺒﺮP5 jﺧﻠﺖ
ﺑﻌﺮ dﺷﻮ .ﻟﺨﺴﺎ@ /ﺑﺈ=ﺪ; ﻧﺎ sﻋﺰ=ﺰP /ﻓﻨﺖ
5ﻗﻔﺖ ﻗﺪ r.ﻗﺎﺿﻲ @.ﺳﻲ ﺑﺎﻷ@~ ﻣﺶ ﻏﻠﻄﺎf
ﺑﺪ. bﻟﺼﺮ.ﺣﺔ ﺑ#ﻨﻲ 5ﺑ#ﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﻲ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺧﺠﻼf
ﺗﻌﺒﺖ .ﻟﺮﺋﺔ ﺻﺎ@ jﺳﻮ /Pﻗﺪ ﻣﺎ Åﺧﺬ jﻧﻔﺲ Pﺧﺎf
nﺎ[ ﻣﻨﺘﺞ ﻣﺤﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻨﺸﺎ 4ﻓ#ﺶ ﻛ#ﺎ sﺑﺎﻟﺪﻛﺎf
ﺷﻮ; ﻗﻠﻘﺎ fﻣﻦ .ﻟﻠﻲ ﺑﺮ.ﺳﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎﻟNﺎ ﺑﺘﻌﺘﻢ
èﺧﺮ ﻛﻢ Åﻏﻨ#ﺔ nﺠﻤﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﻟﻲ  qﻏﺒﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻠﺤﻢ
ﺑﺘﻌﺮ dﻟﻤﺎ ﺗﻜﻮ fﻣﺴﺘﻠﺤﻦ 5ﺟﺎ; ﻋﺒﺎﻟﻚ ﺗﻌﺰd
ﻻ` rﺗﻜﻮ fﺑﻨﻔﺲ .ﻟﺮ5 s.ﻓﺎnﻢ ﻋﺸﺎ fﺗﻌﺮd
ﻣ#ﻦ ﺧﺴﺮo. f.ﻠﻊ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﺮ;.
ﺑﻄﻞ .ﻟﻚ ﻣﻜﺎ fﻋﺒﺎ] .ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻊ `; ﺣﻔﺎ;
ﺻﺮ. jﻣﺸﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺘﻤﺔ .ﺣﺲ =.Pﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪ;.@5 .
ﻗﺪ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺒﻌﺪ ﺑﺤﻜﻲ 5ﺑﺮ Pﻋﺤﺎﻟﻲ #nﻨﻲ ﺟﺎ;
nﺠﻤﻮ ﺛﻤﺎﻣNﻢ ﻓﺘﺤﻮ ﻋ#ﻨﻲ ﺷﺮ @.ﻗﺪﺣﻮ
ﻣﺮ@ /ﺗﺒﺖ .ﻻﻓﻜﺎ@ ﺑﺲ ﺣﺎﺳﺴNﻢ ﻏﻨﻢ @ﺟﻌﻮ ﺳﺮﺣﻮ
ﻣﺸ#ﺖ ﺣﺎﻓﻲ 5ﻋﺎ@ dﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﺮ 5ﺟﺰ `.ﻣﻜﺴﻮ@
ﺷﻜﻠﻲ ﺗﻌﻮ jPﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺼﺔ .ﺿﻞ ﻧﺎﻗﺰ 5ﻣﻐﺪ@5
ﻣﺶ ﻋﺎ@ dﺷﻮ ﺑﺘﺴﻮ åﻟﻤﺎ ﺗﻜﻮ fﺑﺪ f5ﺟﻤNﻮ@
ﻣﺶ ﻋﺎ@ dﺷﻮ .ﻟﻤﺮ ﻋﺸﻨﻲ =.PﻤﺎﻋNﺒﻞ ﻣﺠﺒﻮ@
.ﺧﻮ bﻣﺶ ﺑﻄﻞ ﺑﺲ ﺗﻌﻮ PﻣNﻮ .ﻟﺒﻌﺼﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ
`ﺣﻤﺎ fﺑﺪ; .ﺷﺦ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮ qﻣNﻮ .ﻟﺤﺼﻮ /ﻋﺎoﻠﺔ
.ﻟﻄﺦ ﻓﻮ5 àﺗﺤﺖ ﺣﺎﺳﺲ ﺣ#ﺎﺗﻲ ﺣﺼﺔ ﻧﺤﺖ
.ﻟﻠﻲ ﺛﻠﺚ ﺳﻨ#ﻦ ﻧﺎ=ﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻨﺒﺎ; ﻧﺴ#ﺖ .ﻟﺘﺨﺖ
ﻣﺮ5 /ﺣﺪ. /ﻧﺠﻨ#ﺖ 5ﻗﻠﺖ ﺧﻠ#ﻨﻲ .ﻋﺮ. dﻟﺒﺨﺖ
ﻓﺘﺤﺖ .ﻟﻔﻨﺠﺎ5 fﻛﺮn j5ﺎ; nﺒﺴﺘﺮ. /ﻧﻔﻀﺤﺖ
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ﺗﺨﺪ@ jﻗﺪ ﻣﺎ .ﻧﻔﺼﻤﺖ ﻓﺎ ﺑﺼﻤﺖ ﻋﺸﺎﻧﻲ ﻏﺸ#ﻢ
ﺳﺎﻟﺖ .ﻟﺒﺮ d5ﻗﺎﻟﻲ ﺷﻮ. dﻟﭭﺎﺗ#ﻜﺎ fﻋﺸﺎﻧ yﺣﻜ#ﻢ
ﻣﺶ ﻋﺎ@. dﺗﻨﻔﺲ ﺑﺪ f5ﺗﻒ ﻋﻨﺪ; ﺧ#ﺎﺷ#ﻢ
ﻗﺪ ﻣﺎ .ﻧﺎ ﻓﻮ.@ àﺣﺖ .ﻟﺠﺎcﺑ#ﺔ .ﻟNﺮ rﺑﺤﺮ. dﻟﺸ#ﻦ
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ّ“In the Dark”
Satti
It’s no good to know what you want; they stop you
There’s always someone to throw something heavy; watermelons thrown
in the way
I remember my seat in my room like it’s today; it’s a motivation
I really feel like I’m at attacker of the goal, I wait for greatness
See where I was and where I am at now; I’m no longer in my place
I wrote so many poetic lines, it’s like I built buildings
I paid attention to what I listened to, I was patient ‘til I grew up to never
screw up
I know what it means to lose; I buried so many close people with these
hands,
I stood there in front of a judge, staring at the floor, not guilty
If you want the truth, between myself and I, I was ashamed
My lungs are dying, turned to black from inhaling all this smoke
This is a local product, nobody touches it, there are no bags in the store
I’m kinda worried from all the thoughts in my head, it’s getting darker
The last few songs I dropped stupidly, I dissed myself
You know when you’re feeling musical and you feel like composing?
You need to be in the same state of mind and understanding in order to
know:
Refrain:
Who’s the loser? Look in the mirror
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone
behind me
As far as I go, I say and respond to myself, I’m coming
(repeat)
They attacked with open mouths, my eyes opened and turned red from
anger
I organized my thoughts but it feels like they are sheep, they wander off to
graze elsewhere
I walked barefoot, knowing there were embers and broken glass
It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed
I don’t know if you’re worth anything if you’ve got no audience
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I don’t know what bitterness is because I’m always forced to foolishness
Your brother’s no hero, I got used to the idea of submission
I’ve got to go, I want to piss on the subject, but I can’t the gallstones are
bad
Shooting everywhere, up and down, I feel my life turned into an art lecture
For three years I’ve been sleeping on the sofa, I’ve forgotten the bed
Once I got fed up and told myself let me know my destiny
I tried to read my fortune from a coffee cup and cards; its hipsterism that
caught me!
I felt numb because in my head I was lost, I couldn’t write, so I left a
fingerprint
I asked the prof; he told me look towards the Vatican, he is wise
I can’t breathe without spitting rhymes, it’s like I’m a fish with gills
I’m so high up in the clouds, I lost gravity. I’m on the top of the pyramids
just like the dots in the letter sheen.
Who’s the loser? Look in the mirror
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone
behind me
As far as I go, I say and respond to myself, I’m coming.
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APPENDIX D

”=ﺎ ﺑﺤﺮ ﺧﺪﻧﻲ ﻣﻌﻚ“
جعفر الطفار و عبد الرحمن جاسم بالشتراك مع خضر سالمه
باص:زياد صادر

.ﻟﺒﺮﺳﺘ#ﺞ .ﻟﻜﻠ#ﺸ. 5 y#ﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ .ﻟﻜﻼs
.ﻟﺪﻋﺎ@ /ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻦ .ﻟﺮ.ﻗﻲ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺘﻌﺒﻲ .ﻟﺮs.
ﻓﻨﺎ. fﻟﻠﺤﻈﺔ .ﻟﺴﻌ#ﺪ;
ﻗNﻮ /ﺳ#ﺠﺎ@ /ﺟﺮ=ﺪ;  5ﻗﻌﺪ /ﻋﺎﻟﺘﺮs.
ﻣﺶ ﻛﻮﻓ#ﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﻟﻮ f.ﺷﺮﺷﻒ oﺎ5ﻟﺔ
ﺷﻠﻜﺔ ﺣﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﻤﻨﺎﺧ#ﺮ=. 5 .ﺪo .ﺎ=ﻠﻲ
ّ
ﻟﺒﻨﺎ. fﻟﻮ. ;P.ﻻﺧﻀﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﺐ .ﻟﻤﻌﻔﻨﺔ
}ﻗﺘﺼﺎ 5Pﻣﻦ .ﻟﺴ#ﺎﺣﺔ . 5ﻟﻨﺴﺎ .ﻟﻤﺰ=ﻨﺔ
ﺗ#ﺒﺲ . ~@ÅﻟﺴNﻞ
ﻧﺮﺑﻰ ﻧﺤﻦ ﺑﻌﻞ
ﺗﻘﺘﻠﻨﻲ  5ﺑﺪ bﺗﻘﻨﻌﻨﻲ .ﻧﻮ ﻧﺤﻦ nÅﻞ؟
.ﻟﺤﻜﻲ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻨﺠﻌﻲ ﺳNﻞ . 5ﻟﻔﻼ Fﺑﺄ@~ .ﻟﺴNﻞ ﻋﺎ=ﺶ ﺑﺄ@ﺿﻮ ﻏﺮ=ﺐ .ﺑﻨﻮ ﺑﺰ=@.5ﺐ
ﻣﺘﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺘﻄﻞ .ﻟﺸﻤﺲ ﻣﺘﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺘﻐ#ﺐ
ﻋﻨﺪÅ 5ﺿﻌﻒ .ﻻ=ﻤﺎ= fﻜﺮ Üﺷﻲ .ﺳﻤﻮ ﻟﺒﻨﺎf
ﻋﻨﺪ; .ﺿﻌﻒ .ﻻ=ﻤﺎ. fﻛﺮ Üﺷﻲ .ﺳﻤﻮ ﻟﺒﻨﺎf
=ﺎ ﺑﺤﺮ ﺧﺪﻧﻲ ﻣﻌﻚ
=ﺎ ﻣﻮ áﺑ#ﻌﺪﻧﻲ
ﻣﻘﻄﻮn qﻮ. fﻻﻣﻞ
ﻋ#ﺸﺔ ﺟNﻨﻤ#ﺔ
 .ﻗﺎﻟﻮ .ﻟﻲ  fÅﺣﺴّﺎnc fﺐ }ﻟﻰ .ﻟﺴﻮ=ﺪ؛ nﻨﺎ= bﻠﺘﻘﻲ .ﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄ#ﻨ##ﻮ fﺑﺒﻌﻀNﻢ
ﺿ#ﻘﺔٌ nﻲ ﺑﻼPﻧﺎ؛
.5Rﺳﻌﺔٌ ﻷ5@5ﺑﻲ =ﺘﺤﺪ. îﻟﻌﺒﺮ=ﺔ
ً
5ﻣﻮ[ﻒ ﺟﻤﻌ#ﺔ =ﺼﺮÅ dﻣﻮ.ﻟ= yﺴﺎ@ .ﻓﻲ .ﻟﺤﻤﺮ.
Rﻓﻲ .ﻟﻤﺨ#ﻢ. Rﻟﻮﻗﺖ Åﻗﻞ ﺿ#ﻘﺎ ً
.Rﻟﻨﺎ5Å sﺳﻊ ﺻﺪ@Å ً.ﻣﺮ ﺑ#ﻦ .ﻷﺳﻼb
P5Rﻋﻨﺎ .ﺑﻦ ﺧﺎﻟ ٍﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ Åﺳﺒﻮ Rqﻟﻤﺴﺘ. yﻟﻜNﺮﺑﺎء
ﻓﻤﺎ oÅﺎ. 4ﻟﺒﻘﺎء؛
ﻣﺠﺮ @5ﻣ#ﺎ Üﻻ ﺣﻞ ﻟ= Ryﺤﺪﺛﻚ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ .ﻗﺘﺮﺑﺖ
Rﺣﺴّﺎnc fﺐ }ﻟﻰ .ﻟﺴﻮ=ﺪ ﻻ =ﺄﺧﺬ bﻣﻌy
Rﻷﻧﻚ ﻟﺴﺖ ﺑ#Nﺎ ً 5ﻻ 5@5Åﺑﻲ! ﺣﺴّﺎ fﺗﻌﺮّ dﺑﺪ=ﻔ#ﺪ
=P5ﻔ#ﺪ ﺟﻤٌ #ﻞ ﺑNﻲ .ﻟﻄﻠﻌﺔ Åﺷﻘﺮ
=PRﻔ#ﺪ @ åÅﺣﺴﺎ fﻣﺨﺒﺮ.
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5ﺣﺴﺎ@ fﺳﻤ yﺟﺴﺮ .ﺑﺴﻢ =Pﻔ#ﺪ Rﻓﺮ Fﺣﺴّﺎf
Rﺣﺴّﺎ@ fﻛﺐ .ﻟﻄﺎﺋﺮP f5P /ﻣﻮq
Rﻓﻠ#ﺲ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻨﺎ fﻣﺎ =ﻮPﻋ yﻏ#ﺮ .ﻷﻟﻢ
n:ﻮ ﺗﺮ@ bﺳﺎﻟﺔً .5ﺣﺪ ً/ﻋﻠﻰ nﻮ.ﺗﻒ Åﺻﺪﻗﺎﺋy
.ﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄ#ﻨﻲ ﻻ =ﺤﺐ ﻟﺒﻨﺎ= Rfﻜﺮ Üﻟﺒﻨﺎ=5 fﻜﺮnÅ Üﻠy
=Rﺮ=ﺪ5ﻧﻨﺎ }ﻣﺎ ﺑﺒﻨﺪﻗٍ #ﺔ ﻧﺨﻀﺐ ﻛﻼﻣﻨﺎ ﺑﻔﻠﺴﻄ#ﻦ  f5Pﻋﻤﻞ
n f5PRﻮ=ﺔ
5ﺑﺎnﺎﻧﺔ ﻻﺟﺌ#ﻦ
Rﻧﺸﺤﺬ ﻣﻨNﻢ ﺳﻘﻒ =ﻮﻣﻨﺎ
!=ﺎ ÅﺧﻮﺗﻲÅ :ﻧﺘﻢ ﺑﻼ ﻏ ٍﺪ nﻨﺎ
.Rﻟﺤﻘﻮﻧﻲ }ﻟﻰ .ﻟﺴﻮ=ﺪ! .ﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄ#ﻨﻲ ﻻ =ﺤﺐ ﻟﺒﻨﺎf
=ﻜﺮ Üﻟﺒﻨﺎ=5 fﻜﺮnÅ Üﻠy
.Rﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄ#ﻨﻲ ﻻ =ﺤﺐ ﻟﺒﻨﺎf
=ﻜﺮ Üﻟﺒﻨﺎ=5 fﻜﺮnÅ Üﻠy
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺎ] .ﻟﻤﺨ#ﻢ =ﻮﻗﻔﻨﻲ ﻛﻠﺐ .ﻟﺤﺮ.ﺳﺔ
=ﺸﺘNﻲ ﻟﺤﻤﻲ 5ﺣﻠﻤﻲ 5ﻋﻠﻤﻲ
.ﻷ@` 5ﻗﻮ PﺟNﻨﻢ Åﻗﻮ4
n5ﺬ. Üﻟﺒﻼ PﺑﻄﻮﻟNﺎ 5ﻋﺮﺿNﺎ RﺑﺸﻌﺒNﺎ @Å5ﺿNﺎ ﻟﻸﻓﻮ4
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺎ] .ﻟﻤﺨ#ﻢ ﻛﻠﺐ .ﻟﺤﺮ.ﺳﺔ
@5ﺟﺎ. 4ﻟﺴ#ﺎﺳﺔ
5ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺎ. jﻟﻨﺨﺎﺳﺔ
=ﻤﻨﻌﻮ fﻓﻠﺴﻄ#ﻦ ﻣﻦ .ﻟﺪﺧﻮ4
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